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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE GENESIS OF THE REPORT
During two past two years, a group of researchers at the MIT Center
for Energy Policy Research has been conducting a study of the medium
term prospects for international trade in natural gas in various regions
of the world. This report, focussing on Western Europe, is the third
and final region study for this research project, the first two having
covered trade between the U.S. and Canada and LNG trade in the Eastern
Pacific. All three studies have shared a common focus and utilized a
similar methodology.
Specifically, each study has explored the cost side of natural gas
production and exporting, separating "real" or economic costs from
taxation which is treated as a transfer payment, and differentiating
between different cost reserves in various regions and countries. The
common question which was asked was how rapidly would costs rise at
different levels of demand growth over a 20-30 year period. On the
demand side, a range of plausible future levels was derived by looking
at prospects for gas capturing a greater share within specific using
sectors of the different countries, considering whether or not new gas
utilization technologies would play an important role in expanding gas
demand, and integrating the effects of high or low oil price scenarios
on total energy demand and natural gas's competitiveness. Long term
contracts for the advance purchase of natural gas and LNG are an
important component of producer-consumer relations and play a
significant role in determining the pattern of international trade in
gas. For this reason, each study has included research on contracting
issues, including some modelling of how contracts might be improved to
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bring about greater efficiency. Finally, dynamic trade models were
developed in each regional study to integrate the separate components
dealing with supply costs and demand levels. The models were used to
test for data consistency, to help calculate long run marginal costs, to
determine the relative costs of alternative trading patterns, and to
measure the economic costs of different policy distortions. At all
stages, careful attention was paid to the role government polices--
pricing, quantitative restrictions, bargaining--have played and what
effects these have had on efficiency.
This study of the prospects for natural gas trade in Western Europe
has followed this pattern, and this report has chapters dealing with
each of the above elements. The purpose of this introductory chapter is
to provide a brief summary and explanations of the main conclusions. In
addition, short summaries are included of the separate chapters of the
report.
BACKGROUND
Five years ago, the Western European energy market appeared on the
verge of a second natural gas revolution. The second oil price shock,
coupled with concern about security of energy supplies, appeared to
provide new opportunities for market penetration by gas, while at the
same time new supplies were becoming available, especially from Algeria,
Norway, and the Soviet Union. All indications were that natural gas
consumption would grow rapidly, mainly at the expense of oil's market
share. Because of optimistic expectations about future demand and
pessimistic expectations about future domestic supply and world oil
prices, consumers signed import contracts for large quantities of
additional natural gas, agreed to contracts with rigid take-or-pay
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clauses and rather high built-in prices. Producers, extrapolating long-
term market trends from short-term market conditions, insisted on such
contracts as a means for insuring maximization of their rents.
Instead, as world oil prices began to fall and the Western European
economies continued to show weak growth, events unfolded very
differently to what had been expected. The apparent cost advantages of
natural gas largely evaporated. Natural gas demand stagnated, resulting
in excess supply in the short run. The importers found themselves
burdened with supplies that were clearly overpriced and saddled with
inflexible contracts that did not allow for any adjustments to reflect
the new environment. Slowly, and painfully, exporters have had to
recognize that natural gas was neither as scarce nor as valuable as they
had believed. The result has been that many contracts had to be
adjusted or rewritten. Relations between consumers and producers became
increasingly antagonistic, and until the signing of the Troll contract
this spring, it appeared that no major new natural gas supplies would be
developed, at least during the remainder of the 1980s.
Certainly, externalities have played a major role in the failure of
the gas market to perform as expected, including the drop in oil prices
(and their failure to continue rising) as well as the sluggishness of
Western European economic growth. However, it has been a contention of
this study that past analyses of natural gas markets relied excessively
on assumptions and paid too little attention to the attendant
consequences should those assumptions not prove out.
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PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
The main findings of this study can be briefly summarized in the
following propositions:
-- Natural gas is likely to remain an under-exploited fuel
from the strict perspective of economic efficiency
-- Natural gas consumption is likely to grow rather slowly, in
the range of 1.5% to 2.5% annually, through the year 2010.
-- Low oil prices would reduce the potential for market share
gains by natural gas, while high oil prices would hinder
economic activity and demand for energy in general even if
gas became more competitive with oil.
-- New utilization technologies will not have a major impact
on demand without significant changes in prices and
policies.
-- At these projected consumption levels, the long run
marginal costs of producing and exporting natural gas to
Western Europe will rise very little, and be in the range
of $1.00 to $1.50 per thousand cubic foot.
Existing capacity can be operated economically even at
extremely low oil prices (e.g. $7-$10 per barrel) and gas
supplies can still be expanded at low oil prices (e.g.,
$10-$15 per barrel).
-- Little, if any, new large-diameter pipeline capacity will
be required through 2000, beyond the Troll project.
Lower oil prices and slow energy demand growth will
contribute to some reduction in government interference and
policy obstacles to gas use, but not to a degree necessary
to create fully competitive markets.
-- The relative importance of spot sales is likely to increase
due to the current surplus and the ability of some
producers to add small increments to supply without
undertaking major investments.
-- Any large new natural gas export projects will require
long-term contracts, although these (like Troll) are likely
have greater flexibility than those signed in the early
1980s.
Of course these rather pessimistic conclusions would be altered
either by greater movement by consuming or importing countries to
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encourage more competitive natural gas pricing more in line with long
run marginal costs, increased emphasis on pollution control which would
see a move to increase gas use in boilers, especially at the expense of
coal, or a stronger desire on the part of consumers to increase the use
of natural gas for security reasons.
The analytical underpinning of some of these conclusions can be
easily explained using Figure 1 as simple illustration. The estimated
long run marginal cost curve of supplies to Western Europe (aggregated
over all suppliers) is shown as a continuous line beginning at a very
low level, rising slowly and then reaching a level of $3.50 per thousand
cubic feet when supply reaches about 19 TCF per year. The "flatness" of
the curve at intermediate demand levels comes in part from plentiful low
cost reserves and in part from excess capacity in the present (and
committed) pipeline network. The sharp rise in the right-hand portion
reflect both new pipeline costs and more costly reserves.
The horizontal symbols are meant to bracket the estimated range of
future gas prices. The floor of $2.00 per thousand cubic feet
corresponds to oil prices at $11.60 per barrel if gas and oil were
priced equally in terms of heat content and a oil price of $17.40 per
barrel if the gas-to-oil price ratio were at the historical average of
about two-thirds. The corresponding oil prices for the ceiling of $3.00
per thousand cubic feet are $17.40 and $26.10 per barrel.
The vertical lines represent consumption levels. The left-most
level corresponds to current natural gas use in Western Europe, while
the two vertical lines on the right bracket the range of demand which
the study concluded is likely by about 2010. These illustrate the two
major conclusions regarding demand projections: (1) that the growth rate
1-6
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of consumption will be low, and (2) that the range between faster and
slower gas consumption growth likely will be narrow. The upper bound on
gas consumption is meant to correspond with the lower price for gas and
the lower level of consumption with the higher price level for gas.
Putting these pieces together, Figure 1 implies that at likely
demand levels in the future, gas prices will remain significantly above
long run marginal costs. This is what is meant by the conclusion that
the market will remain inefficient and natural gas under-exploited in
Western Europe. Another way of saying this is that there are likely to
be further opportunities for some combination of higher demand and lower
prices.
Figure 1 is, of course, an oversimplification in the sense that
dynamic factors such as reserve depletion effects and the importance of
existing contracts are neglected in the long run marginal cost curve.
These and other complications which cannot be included readily in a two-
dimensional graph are accounted for in the dynamic model of Western
European gas trade.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF GAS CONTRACTING
The project analyzed contracting practices with special emphasis
upon the changing pressures and motivations for traditional and new
forms of gas contracting. Results on the two key aspects of contracting
practices, price and quantity provisions, are summarized here.
Table 1 presents a concise summary of key changes in the Western
European natural gas market and the associated changes in contracting
practices that have occurred over the past 15-20 years.
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As displayed column 4 of Table 1, pricing practices have undergone
rather dramatic changes over the past history. Pricing practices in
long term contracts had been quite rigid prior to the 1970's and the
initial oil price increase. During the 1970's new contracts and some
renegotiation of old contracts established the practice of indexing the
price for contracted gas deliveries to the price of oil. This practice
continued and spread. In recent years the development has been in the
direction of more sophisticated formulas, but with the impact being a
greater degree of flexibility in the price and continued attempts to
write contract price clauses which make the price terms of the agreed
upon sale more responsive to market conditions for gas and competitive
fuels.
As described more fully in the chapter covering the analysis of
contracts, there is an inherent contradiction between the use of long-
term contracts and the need for price terms which reflect the current
market alternatives. The objective of a contract is to establish
clearly ahead of time the intention to purchase gas and some certainty
as to the profitability of the sale to the producer. This inevitably
requires establishing some set of price terms and it is impossible to
foresee all of the future developments which might arise and to write a
set of price provisions which will correspond to the anticipated future
market conditions. In the past, when oil prices were relatively stable,
the cost of rigidity in the price formula was relatively low. The price
of oil was unlikely to deviate far enough and fast enough to make the
unilateral cancellation of a contract by one party a viable alternative
to fulfillment of the agreed upon obligation.
1-9
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Subsequently, however, a long-term fixed price came to be viewed as
too rigid. Parties to a long-term agreement with a fixed or very
inflexible set of price terms would very likely discover in some period
of time that one party or the other had an incentive to demand a
renegotiation under threat of unilateral abrogation. Extreme
variability in the markets and price terms for competing fuels forced
flexibility upon the price terms for the long-term contracted gas
market. This flexibility is noted in the table as the key
characteristic of pricing terms in the 1980's.
The increased sophistication of price indexes in gas contracts is
an extension of this process.
This trend to increased flexibility in price indexes in long-term
contracts will undoubtedly continue. It is a response to the increased
flexibility of the markets on which gas competes, and the increased
flexibility in these markets is likely to persist for the foreseeable
future. While, the particular form of widely used indexes will perhaps
be developed further, the basic principle of a relationship between gas
and oil and of increased flexibility in the contracted gas price will
remain.
Historical developments in the quantity provisions of long-term
contracts do not lead us to similar conclusions regarding future
developments. These developments are summarized in column 5 of Table 1.
While early gas contracts in western Europe were not characterized by
high take provisions, this was largely due to the fact that the
inexpensive Netherlands supply dominated the market. As capital
intensive fields with large liquifaction or pipeline expenses became a
large factor in the supply during the 1970's, high takes also came to
1-11
characterize the market as we note in the table. Recent years, however,
have seen a large amount of renegotiation and therefore de facto
flexibility in quantity provision as well as reports of new contracts
with a larger degree of flexibility in the takes--Troll for example.
There is a widespread belief that the current time is characterized by
greater flexibility in quantity terms. We note in the table, however,
that this increased flexibility is not a general feature, but associated
with particular fields or with marginal quantities from developed
fields.
It is tempting to conclude from the trend towards greater
flexibility in the take provisions of gas contracts that the old-style,
high take, low flexibility contracts are a creature of the past, and
that a producer seeking to sell their gas in today's or tomorrow's
market must forgo the security of rigid long-term contracts. The
analysis of contracts presented in the accompanying study provides one
with an understanding of why such a prognosis would be unfounded. A
prediction of unending flexibility in gas contract quantity provisions
would be a blind extrapolation of history, baseless in its understanding
for the past historical developments, and confused regarding the
underlying purpose which rigid quantity provisions serve.
Long-term contracts in gas are designed to provide the producer
with sufficient certainty of the intentions of the buyer to warrant the
large dedicated capital expenditures necessary to deliver the quantities
of gas needed by the buyer. The importance of this depends critically
upon the nature of the field being developed and the structure market to
which the gas is to be delivered. If the capital expenditures necessary
for developing the field and the associated delivery system are
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relatively small, then the long-term contract is not as critical as when
the capital expenditures are large. In terms of the European market
this is the obvious reason why the Dutch Groningen fields are sold on a
flexible basis while Soviet gas has typically been sold under relatively
stiff quantity terms. When the delivery system is already extensive and
there exist a large number of buyers, then the long-term contract is not
as critical as when the delivery system is dedicated to a single market.
In terms of the North American market this is a principle variable
affecting the degree of flexibility which is possible in the contracting
of Albertan gas to the Midwest and Western US markets in contrast with
the relatively inflexible terms that must be negotiated to bring on line
the production from the Venture field to the East Coast market.
Unlike the historical developments in price indexes, the increased
flexibility in the quantity terms of gas contracts have not been a
response to a permanent change in the gas or competing fuels markets.
The increased flexibility in observed quantity provisions for gas in the
European market have been driven primarily by a change in the
composition of those fields supplying gas to the market and the
associated change in the optimal contract structure. What is important
to keep in mind is that the flexibility that any given producer should
find acceptable depends not upon the general trend of the market, but
rather the nature of the field which that producer is developing and the
range of alternative buyers to which the gas can be sold once the
capacity is installed. A producer like the Soviet Union can accept
flexible quantity provisions only under penalty of accepting the
significant risk of being subject to opportunistic bargaining in the
future in which the actual price of gas delivered above and beyond the
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bare minimum take occurs at extremely unfavorable prices. The mere fact
that there exist competing producers willing to offer flexible quantity
terms does not eliminate this risk nor change the calculated advantages
of long-term contracts. Of course, it may imply that the Soviet Union
will face difficulty finding a buyer willing to accept the inflexible
provisions, but this would then be a signal that Soviet gas is
"expensive."
Our prognosis therefore for future developments in quantity
provisions of contracts is flexibility for particular fields, but
continued reliance upon high take requirements for other fields. The
material in the contracts section of the report makes clear how this
differentiation will develop across the potential suppliers.
ANALYSIS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN GAS TRADE
A dynamic linear programming model was constructed in order to
integrate the supply and demand components of this study. The model was
used to check the feasibility and consistency over time of the various
demand forecasts and supply constraints developed elsewhere in this
study, and where necessary revise any inconsistencies or identify
potential bottlenecks. The supply constraints include reserve levels,
installed pipeline capacities linking various countries, and minimum or
maximum export/import flows associated with either contracts or
exogenous policies.
Given these inputs, the model calculates least-cost production and
trade patterns to meet alternative projected gas demand levels in the
different countries of Western Europe. This provides a method for
estimating the opportunity cost of following a trade pattern which might
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be sub-optimal from the point of view of real costs of production and
transportation. By varying the demand growth rates, the model can
calculate the opportunity cost associated with increasing deliveries to
particular countries.
Numerous model runs were conducted to perform a variety of
sensitivity tests of specific scenarios. Among the variables used in
developing a specific scenario are: the time pattern of gas demand
growth by individual countries; country-specific gas reserve levels and
production costs; different pipeline capacity availabilities and
additions; minimum delivery requirements under existing and foreseen
contracts, and various policy constraints that can be imposed by
specific importing or exporting countries. By having the model
calculate the least-cost solution for each scenario, it is possible to
estimate optimal build-up and depletion profiles, export patterns, and
the real costs (in terms of production and transportation costs) of
policies such as supply diversification strategies.
In Tables 2 to 4, some results of the model runs are presented.
Perhaps most striking are the calculations of the opportunity cost of
producing and delivering additional quantities of gas to the consuming
countries. Although there are minor differences between the importing
countries, related mainly to transportation cost differentials, the
model estimates that the marginal costs remain below $1 per Mcf for the
next twenty years (1986-2000). This holds for all demand levels that
were considered to be even remotely likely and whether minimum contract
takes are imposed or not and reflects the availability of large amounts
of low-cost supplies.
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Table 2
Summary Results: Case 1
Demand Scenario --medium
Export Constraints--none
New Pipelines --none
Discounted Cost ($ bils.) = 13.88
1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014
Imports (Bcm/year)
Austria from USSR 2.8 3.6 4.2 5.1 6.1 7.3
Belgium from Algeria 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Belgium from Netherlands 5.8 12.1 14.5 17.0 11.3 6.7
Belgium from Norway 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.6 16.6
France from Algeria 9.0 0.0 15.0 22.4 31.0 31.0
France from Netherlands 7.3 33.6 26.5 27.3 0.0 0.0
France from Norway 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
France from USSR 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.4 39.6
Netherlands from Norway 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Italy from Algeria 6.7 0.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0
Italy from Netherlands 5.2 27.4 14.4 19.7 17.8 27.7
Italy from USSR 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 7.7
United Kingdom from Norway 12.1 0.0 11.9 20.0 0.0 16.7
W. Germany from Netherlands 15.0 45.1 51.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
W. Germany from Norway 7.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 22.9 49.3
W. Germany from USSR 13.5 0.0 1.9 60.1 52.6 41.4
Total Gas Trade Flow 105.8 121.7 157.6 192.4 205.6 262.0
Marginal Import Cost ($/Mcf)
Austria from USSR 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.76 1.11
Belgium from Algeria NA NA NA NA NA
Belgium from Netherlands 0.15 0.42 0.46 0.75 1.10
Belgium from Norway NA NA NA 0.75 1.10
France from Algeria NA 0.44 0.48 0.76 1.12
France from Netherlands 0.17 0.44 0.48 NA NA
France from Norway NA NA NA NA NA
France from USSR NA NA NA 0.76 1.12
Netherlands from Norway NA NA NA NA NA
Italy from Algeria NA 0.48 0.52 0.81 1.16
Italy from Netherlands 0.21 0.48 0.52 0.81 1.16
Italy from USSR NA NA NA 0.81 1.16
United Kingdom from Norway NA 0.33 0.36 NA 0.71
W. Germany from Netherlands 0.14 0.40 NA NA NA
W. Germany from Norway NA NA 0.44 0.71 1.07
W. Germany from USSR NA 0.40 0.44 0.71 1.07
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Table 3
Summary Results: Case 2
Demand Scenario --medium
Export Constraints--minimum contracts imposed
New Pipelines --none
Discounted Cost ($ bils.) = 17.71
1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014
Imports (Bcm/year)
Austria from USSR 2.8 3.6 4.2 5.1 6.1 7.3
Belgium from Algeria 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0
Belgium from Netherlands 5.8 7.6 8.9 12.9 18.3 8.3
Belgium from Norway 1.7 3.0 4.1 2.6 1.6 15.1
France from Algeria 9.0 6.7 5.8 4.0 24.5 31.0
France from Netherlands 7.3 13.9 20.8 29.9 13.5 0.0
France from Norway 2.3 3.4 6.7 7.8 6.4 6.4
France from USSR 4.9 9.6 8.3 8.0 15.0 33.2
Netherlands from Norway 2.8 3.0 4.1 2.6 1.6 1.6
Italy from Algeria 6.7 7.8 9.6 18.0 18.0 18.0
Italy from Netherlands 5.2 9.7 16.4 13.3 20.3 27.7
Italy from USSR 8.2 9.8 6.4 6.4 6.4 7.7
United Kingdom from Norway 12.1 7.6 7.6 0.0 0.0 20.0
W. Germany from Netherlands 15.0 21.6 31.1 45.6 12.9 0.0
W. Germany from Norway 7.0 8.5 13.5 9.0 10.8 42.9
W. Germany from USSR 13.5 14.9 8.4 8.4 51.9 47.8
Total Gas Trade Flow 105.8 132.3 157.3 175.0 207.2 267.0
Marginal Import Cost ($/Mcf)
Austria from USSR 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.64 1.11
Belgium from Algeria 0.32 0.32 0.32 NA NA
Belgium from Netherlands 0.10 0.15 0.27 0.62 1.10
Belgium from Norway 0.46 1.10 0.52 0.62 1.10
France from Algeria 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.64 1.12
France from Netherlands 0.12 0.17 0.29 0.64 NA
France from Norway 0.48 1.12 0.54 0.64 1.12
France from USSR 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.64 1.12
Netherlands from Norway 0.43 1.08 0.49 0.60 1.08
Italy from Algeria 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.68 1.16
Italy from Netherlands 0.16 0.21 0.33 0.68 1.16
Italy from USSR 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.69 1.16
United Kingdom from Norway 0.33 0.98 NA NA 0.74
W. Germany from Netherlands 0.08 0.13 0.26 0.60 NA
W. Germany from Norway 0.42 1.07 0.48 0.59 1.07
W. Germany from USSR 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.59 1.07
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Table 4
Summary Results: Case 3
Demand Scenario --"super"
Export Constraints--none
New Pipelines --1996: Algeria-Italy +12 Bcm
2002: Norway-UK +20 Bcm, USSR-W. Germany +40 Bcm
2005: Algeria-Italy +18 Bcm, USSR-Austria +20 Bcm
2008: Norway-UK +20 Bcm
2011: USSR-Austria +30 Bcm, USSR-W. Germany +40 Bcm
2014: Norway-W. Germany +30 Bcm, Algeria-Italy +18 Bcm
2017: USSR-W. Germany +40 Bcm
Discounted Cost ($ bils.) = 26.39
1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014
Imports (Bcm/year)
Austria from USSR 2.8 4.8 6.3 8.2 10.7 13.8
Belgium from Algeria 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Belgium from Netherlands 5.8 15.0 19.7 24.8 31.6 40.0
Belgium from Norway 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
France from Algeria 9.0 12.0 15.0 31.0 31.0 31.0
France from Netherlands 7.3 31.3 43.5 8.8 11.4 17.7
France from Norway 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
France from USSR 4.9 0.0 0.0 35.5 55.3 76.5
Netherlands from Norway 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Italy from Algeria 6.7 18.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 66.0
Italy from Netherlands 5.2 18.3 18.7 25.5 26.4 0.0
Italy from USSR 8.2 0.0 0.0 6.9 24.3 38.2
United Kingdom from Norway 12.1 0.8 20.0 22.6 58.1 35.1
W. Germany from Netherlands 15.0 59.4 18.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
W. Germany from Norway 7.0 0.0 1.0 15.5 66.0 86.0
W. Germany from USSR 13.5 0.0 58.8 85.5 65.7 84.5
Total Gas Trade Flow 105.8 159.6 231.6 294.3 410.6 488.9
Marginal Import Cost ($/Mcf)
Austria from USSR 0.45 0.55 0.95 2.18 0.45
Belgium from Algeria NA NA NA NA NA
Belgium from Netherlands 0.28 0.51 0.94 2.17 3.24
Belgium from Norway NA NA NA NA NA
France from Algeria 0.30 0.53 0.96 2.19 3.26
France from Netherlands 0.30 0.53 0.96 2.19 3.26
France from Norway NA NA NA NA NA
France from USSR NA NA 0.96 2.19 3.26
Netherlands from Norway NA NA NA NA NA
Italy from Algeria 0.34 0.57 1.00 2.23 0.50
Italy from Netherlands 0.34 0.57 1.00 2.23 NA
Italy from USSR NA NA 1.00 2.23 0.50
United Kingdom from Norway 0.36 0.41 0.82 1.03 1.14
W. Germany from Netherlands 0.27 0.50 NA NA NA
W. Germany from Norway NA 0.50 0.91 2.14 3.21
W. Germany from USSR NA 0.50 0.91 2.14 3.21
*************************************************************
1-18
The more crucial factor in calculating marginal costs are pipeline
constraints. So long as import demand levels fall within the capacity
of the existing network, the marginal costs of expanding deliveries are
low. Because the demand scenarios imply that, at best, demand will grow
only modestly, the model is able to operate in most scenarios within
present capacity and in future capacity expansions for which commitments
have already been made. Again, note that the marginal costs calculated
by the model ignore all taxes, royalties, rents, and other transfer
payments. By inference, however, we conclude that the bulk of the
present prices importers are paying for gas are for rents and taxes
rather than merely to cover opportunity costs.
Another interesting result is that, unless demand growth
accelerates substantially, there are significant additional costs
incurred by adhering to the minimum takes in existing contracts.
(Compare Tables 2 and 3.) For the medium-demand scenario, the present
value of the additional opportunity costs are estimated to be $3.8
billion, a 28 percent increase over the least-cost production and trade
scenario. Of course, compared to the unit prices importers are paying
at present, the increase may not seem substantial, and could be
considered the cost of diversification. However, it does indicate that
significant bargaining room exists both among exporters and between
exporters and importers. Indeed, the change in the total discounted
cost of moving from the contract-constrained to the unconstrained cases
is greater than the additional cost of moving from the low demand to the
high demand scenarios.
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SUPPLY AND PRODUCTION COSTS
The past decade has seen most market actors confuse high-priced gas
with high-cost gas, with producers taking advantage of the sellers'
market to maximize markup rather than market share. However, this
should not be allowed to obscure the fact that most natural gas supplies
now available cost very little to produce and transport. The result has
been a surplus of supplies and competition between sources, which drove
gas prices down even before the recent drop in oil prices.
In the Supply Chapter, we employ publicly available information to
analyze natural gas development and production costs for major fields in
Algeria, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the USSR.
Figure 1 includes the aggregate marginal cost curve derived from our
analysis. This curve should be considered conservative, inasmuch as it
concentrates on the larger increments to supply, e.g., Groningen, Troll,
Algeria, and the Soviet Union, with supply from small domestic fields
limited to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Inclusion of
domestic natural gas in France, West Germany, and Italy would extend the
curve further. Even allowing for this conservative interpretation, it
is clear that potential supply of natural gas to Western Europe is far
in excess of current demand at current, or likely, prices.
In North America, lower prices should result in an end to the gas
surplus, but in Western Europe, the situation is not so clear-cut. In
the first place, taxes and royalties, as well as other forms of rent,
have been much higher in Western Europe, and can be reduced to allow
sales to continue. In fact, the need for revenue should encourage some
producers to seek higher sales volumes to offset lower prices. The
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price break has certainly undermined the belief future prices can only
increase such that withholding supplies will inevitably be profitable.
While low oil prices will reduce drilling to some degree, and
therefore discoveries of natural gas, the reduction in demand for
drilling, offshore construction, and similar investments should act to
create short-term surpluses in the oil service, drilling and
construction industries, keeping costs down and improving the economics
of many projects. However, lower prices should not curtail natural gas
availability in Western Europe because current supplies are so abundant
that new discoveries are unneeded until well into the next century.
Costs are low enough, in fact, that producers have the capability
to expand their sales in the low-margin markets, including spot sales
and the smaller, immature markets, such as Spain. This is seen
especially in the Norwegians' attempt to market Troll gas in the smaller
markets.
DEMAND PROSPECTS
In the Demand Chapter, we first analyze the historical development
of natural gas markets, especially in France, Italy, the United Kingdom,
and West Germany. This analysis is then combined with a review of
recent Western European economic growth forecasts to specify three
possible scenarios of Western European natural gas demand. A simple
economic model of the relation between fuel use, and relative oil and
natural gas prices and economic growth is used to generate these natural
gas demand scenarios which are used as input to the Western European
natural gas trade analysis discussed above.
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Natural gas demand is influenced by several factors, most
importantly:
-- Its price relative to those of close substitutes,
especially oil products but also coal and electricity;
-- The level of economic growth, and its composition (e.g.,
growth in heavy industry relative to services and light
industry);
-- Expectations about both future prices and reliability of
supplies;
-- Technology developments affecting the delivered service
cost of natural gas and closely competing fuels;
-- Government policies, especially fuel choice and
environmental policies.
The most important differences in assumptions underlying the three
Western European natural gas demand scenarios relate to (i) natural gas
prices relative to prices of closely competing oil products, and (ii)
the effect of overall energy prices -- in particular, oil prices -- on
economic growth. Regarding oil price expectations, we postulate three
possibilities for future oil prices (constant 1986 Dollars) including,
-- Re-emergence of a strong oil producer's cartel, resulting
in oil prices returning to the $26-30 range in the near
future, and continuing into the next century;
-- Emergence of a competitive world oil market, resulting in
oil prices in the $7-9 range; and,
-- A relatively weak oil producer cartel, resulting in
considerable volatility in oil prices in the $10-20 range.
Economic growth rates and future natural gas demand depend upon
these oil prices scenarios in the following way. High oil prices permit
increased scope for natural gas to increase market share. However,
higher overall energy prices will retard economic growth, and especially
growth of energy intensive industries and activities. The effects of
slower growth on natural gas demand will depend importantly on gas
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pricing policy relative to oil. Low oil prices would have the opposite
effect in that economic growth rates are stimulated; but now natural gas
must compete against cheap oil. Finally, volatile oil prices will
likely have a neutral effect upon economic growth, but will increase the
premium for investing in flexible, fuel-switching capability --
especially for industries where energy accounts for a significant share
of total costs. Investments in such flexible fuel systems will depend
importantly on natural gas pricing policy; for example, natural gas
prices that are rigidly locked to oil prices will reduce the flexibility
premium, and limit the possibility for natural gas demand to benefit
from volatile oil prices.
We employ a simple economic model to analyze the combined effects
of alternative oil prices, economic growth, and efficiency of natural
gas technologies, on future Western European natural gas demand. The
results are presented in Table 5. Most importantly, the analysis
indicates that future Western European natural gas demand to fall within
a fairly narrow range. Overall for the three oil price scenarios
outlined above, the average growth rate for gas demand in the period
through 2010 ranges from 1.88% to 2.05% per year; adjusting further for
various contingencies suggests the plausible range is perhaps 1.5X to
2.5% per year, still a very narrow range.
These small difference are due primarily to the off-setting effects
between oil prices, economic growth, and interfuel substitution
possibilities for natural gas. While high oil prices provide
opportunity for natural gas substitution, they reduce overall economic
growth, especially in the energy-intensive industries, thereby reducing
overall growth in energy demand. Conversely, low oil prices have a
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Table 5
Natural Gas Consumption and Average Annual Growth Rates
1984 Demand Scenarios
consumption
Countries (Bcm) low medium high "super"
France 29.50 2.94% 3.19% 3.43% 5.00%
West Germany 50.20 2.33% 2.52% 2.70% 4.41%
Italy 33.20 2.21% 2.35% 2.49% 4.25%
United Kingdom 47.50 0.87% 0.53% 0.18% 3.28%
Netherlands 38.60 0.50% 0.45% 0.40% 1.00%
Belgium 9.00 2.94% 3.19% 3.43% 5.00%
Austria 4.10 2.33% 2.52% 2.70% 4.41%
Norway 3.70 1.20% 1.00% 0.80% 3.00%
Total/Average 215.80 1.88% 1.96% 2.05% 3.85%
positive impact on economic growth, but reduce opportunities for natural
gas substitution for oil.
Table 5 also includes a much higher set of exogenously specified
growth estimates ("super"); these estimates are not related to any
particular oil price or economic growth scenario, but, as discussed
above, are used only to explore possible Western European natural gas
trade patterns under very extreme demand growth conditions.
Our analysis of the three oil price scenarios reflects the
assumption that government policy changes will have a small overall
positive impact on natural gas demand. We expect only slow, and small,
changes in the protection of market share for coal and nuclear in the
generation of electricity; however, the abundance of natural gas
supplies, and the likely aggressive pricing policies of natural gas
producers, should encourage penetration in, for example, boiler fuel
markets.
A_
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Government environmental policies might have some effect on future
natural gas demand since low pollutant characteristics are an important
attribute of natural gas. Although the value of this quality is
impossible to quantify, the growing concern worldwide with
environmental, health, and safety (specifically acid rain, chemically-
induced mutagenity, radiation, and C02 and S02 emissions) could
conceivably stimulate demand for natural gas well beyond present levels.
This socially-driven, potential impact on demand is noted, but it is
very difficult to project any significant effect with current
information.
NEW TECHNOLOGIES
As noted above, technology developments are potentially important
in analyzing future natural gas demands. We have continued the analysis
of natural gas related technologies begun in our previous two studies
and found that there are still economic possibilities of increasing
efficiency of natural gas use for all three of the oil price scenarios
considered in this study. These gains have not yet reached their upper
limit, and should continue, in combination with the lower gas prices
that have accompanied the fall in oil prices, to augment natural gas's
competitive position against other energy sources.
Specific technology developments in the major consuming sectors--
industry, residential and commercial, electric power generation, and
transportation--are also examined with an eye to determining the
potential scope of their commercial application in the future. The
major technologies assessed are: industrial cogeneration; heat pump and
air conditioning systems in residential and commercial applications; gas
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turbine and steam turbine cycles and methane gas via fuel cells in
electric generation; and, in the transportation sector, compressed
natural gas- and liquid methanol-fueled vehicles, methanol-derived
gasoline, and methane derived middle distillate fuel.
Of these technologies, only methane-gas turbine, combined-cycle
systems provide a potentially excellent opportunity for increased
natural gas demand in electric power applications. In the residential
and commercial sectors, no outstanding technology development is evident
on the horizon that would affect demand, although cogeneration systems
in commercial applications may present opportunities in the future.
There is some evidence that utilities will help stimulate this potential
market. In the transportation sector, potential demand gains are
hampered by the vast alterations in vehicle engines and the development
of a dedicated delivery system needed before liquified petroleum gas,
compressed methane, or methanol could make any inroads into gasoline and
diesel markets.
A FINAL FOOTNOTE: THE TROLL PROJECT
The development of a set of contracts that will apparently allow
the Troll project to move forward was quite fortuitous for this project,
inasmuch as it validates many of the conclusions reached in the
analysis. On the supply side, the Troll project, often described as
"ultra-high cost", is able to proceed even at oil prices in the $15 per
barrel range, once the tax regime was altered. Our analysis of the
physical economics suggest that, exclusive of government rent, gas can
be landed in Western Europe for $1.50 per Mcf with the project as now
constituted. The willingness of the government to reduce its take in
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order to bolster the project shows the attitudinal change wherein lower
prices have encouraged supply increases
On the demand side, the difficulty
finding buyers for first Sleipner, ther
weak nature of the market. The success
prices relative to oil prices shows the
strategies in increasing sales, and the
point to the Western European market ir
competitive markets.
The Troll contracts, which are so
described as the equivalent of letters
of the contract section that the lower
/ that the Norwegians have had in
Troll, illustrates the basic
achieved by discounting gas
importance of relative pricing
e decision to add a new entry
Belgium is a move towards more
flexible that they have been
of intent, confirm the findings
the cost of gas, the less
guarantees the producer requires against risk. Certainly, the size of
the Troll project makes it stand out from other gas deals, but at the
same time, we feel that the manner of its marketing and the price and
policy trends inherent in the deal, are indicative of the changes
occurring in the Western European gas market rather than an aberration.
WESTERN EUROPEAN NATURAL GAS POLICY: MANAGEMENT OR MARKETS?
by
Loren C. Cox1
INTRODUCTION
The Western European natural gas market currently occupies an uneasy
middle position between a true economic market and one constrained by the
policies of many different governments. Its interconnected pipeline system,
relatively short distances for transportation, diversity of supply sources,
and environmental concerns all suggest that an economic market would be easy
to implement. However, the inescapable fact remains that national boundaries
and national policies have had and continue to have enormous impact on the
Western European natural gas market.
Thus, any analysis of this market must deal with the reality of policy
interventions by both consuming and producing countries. Indeed, there is
considerable risk of becoming so transfixed by the enormously complex set of
policies that analysis yields only a reiteration of the reasons why such
complexity evolved. To do so makes little contribution, since participants
know the situation well. At the other extreme, only extolling a true economic
market is overly simplistic, and thus irrelevant.
The aim of this chapter therefore will be to identify those policies that
are the most constraining on an expanded Western European natural gas market,
and to reflect on what gains might be found to mutual advantage by
implementing changed policies.
1 The author owes a special debt of gratidude for the considerable efforts of
the project's Technical Editor, Mr. Peter Heron.
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To put the discussion into context, it is first necessary to review
briefly the history of gas use in Western Europe. However, rather than touch
on each country, this chapter will concentrate on four specific consuming
countries: West Germany, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. This list
may be somewhat surprising both for what it includes and what it omits. The
United Kingdom is included because it is a potential importer, thus competing
with continental importers; it also is a potential exporter of gas to the
continental market, either of its own production or of resold Norwegian gas
that might pass through its pipeline system. Because the United Kingdom's
future as either importer or exporter is uncertain, it is worth examining with
some care.
The omission of the Netherlands also may seem curious, since in this
country gas occupies the highest percentage of total primary use of any
Western European country. It is that fact that drops it from the list, for
there are almost no imaginable circumstances whereby the Dutch would expand
gas use domestically. Instead this chapter will examine the role that the
Netherlands historically played in Western European gas market development and
speculate on its future role as a natural gas broker.
The chapters elsewhere in this study provide considerable detail on
supply cost questions and on the competitive forces shaping demand for natural
gas in the four countries noted above. However, producing countries' policies
also have influenced the development of the current market in Western Europe.
Supplier strategies both have encouraged the gas market to grow, then have put
limits on its growth. The timing of policy shifts has had a profound impact,
and this chapter will pay considerable attention to those actions, and
reactions to them by consuming countries.
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: PRE-1973
As noted in our previous studies of North American and East Asian natural
gas trade,2 the first extensive use of gas in Western Europe also was in the
form of manufactured gas. Town gas companies were established in most
countries in the early 19th century, with manufactured gas used primarily for
lighting. Later, town gas expanded to home heating markets and to industrial
use, and continued in all countries at least into the 1950s. By this time,
oil was becoming a significant competitor for direct use under boilers and in
space heating, and town gas companies switched to oil as a feedstock for
manufacturing gas.
Natural gas transmission and use was well established in North America by
the late 1950s, but Western Europe had no apparent access to substantial
supply sources until the 1960s and beyond. Discovery and appraisal of the
Netherland's Groningen field between 1959 and 19623 resulted in the first
significant prospect for transborder trade of natural gas in continental
Western Europe. With successive upward revisions of Groningen reserves in the
1960s, it became clear that Dutch gas would become a significant export
product. Because of the length of time the Netherlands needed to switch its
domestic distribution from manufactured to natural gas, the majority of early
production from this new, large field was available for export. The central
2 International Natural Gas Trade Study Group, Final Report: Canadian-U.S.
Natural Gas Trade, MIT Energy Laboratory Report No. MIT-EL 85-013, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, October, 1985; and Final Report: East Asia/Pacific Natural Gas
Trade, MIT Energy Laboratory Report No. MIT-EL 86-005, March, 1986.
Malcolm W.H. Peebles, Evolution of the Gas Industry, New York University
Press, New York, New York, 1962.
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location of the Netherlands made its gas easily available to West Germany,
France and Italy. Despite its relatively lower calorific value, the Groningen
gas was easily sold, especially when priced to compete with oil products.
Thus, by the late 1960s, Dutch gas was flowing to West Germany, Italy, France,
and Belgium.
At about the same time that the Groningen field was discovered, LNG
imports by the United Kingdom began in 1959 on an experimental basis
(ironically, from Lake Charles, Louisiana). With this supplemental supply
proving a technological success, the United Kingdom contracted with Algeria
for LNG deliveries to begin in 1964. 4 Introduction of this gas required
construction of high-pressure trunk lines, and thus put into place a large
piece of the basic infrastructure that later would be used to transport North
Sea natural gas. With the discovery of North Sea gas in 1965, the U.K. system
was positioned to distribute this high-caloric gas to a large portion of the
country.
Thus, by the late 1960s, natural gas use by a combination of domestic
production and imports was well established in all four countries. This use
was impelled by differing motivations in each country; in all cases natural
gas initially was seen as a very limited option in the fuel mix. For the
United Kingdom, LNG was an alternative to increasingly high-cost manufactured
gas, and a welcome relief to serious air pollution problems.
For France in the 1950s, natural gas was produced principally from the
large southwestern Lacq fields (discovered in 1951),5 but these were located
ibid., p. 28.
J.D. Davis, Blue Gold: The Political Economy of Natural Gas, George Allen &
Unwin, London, England, 1984, p. 173.
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at a considerable distance from major industrial centers. Thus, manufactured
gas retained a significant role in French gas use until the 1960s. By 1966,
Dutch gas was available for French industrial use, first in the north and soon
after in Paris and its environs. Thus, Dutch imports allowed France to solve
an internal distribution problem at an attractive price.
Italy demonstrates similar early experience. Discoveries of significant
deposits in the Po Valley in 19496 were reasonably close to industrial
centers. A problem arose fairly quickly as demand claimed amounts in excess
of domestic production. Although basic market economics would suggest that
increased prices would have affected that demand, price controls on natural
gas foreclosed such a prospect. Thus, Dutch imports became an attractive
supplement.
West Germany also had early experience with natural gas available only in
limited quantities. The Ruhr coal and steel industries were prodigious
producers of manufactured gas, and coal itself was a major fuel. Also, coal
interests have exerted major influence on West German federal policy,
including a policy that the electric utility industry use domestically
produced coal in specified amounts. In 1935, the Reichstag enacted a law that
gave the Laender (states) broad authority over natural gas pricing, and broad
discretionary powers to plan for its transmission and distribution.' The
result was to segment the gas industry, concentrating use in Laender close to
or involved with production. Introduction of Dutch gas thus first occurred in
areas adjacent to the Dutch border, and tended to be used for electricity
6 ibid., p. 167.
7 ibid.
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generation--which did not compete with manufactured gas sales. In this sense,
the Dutch supply was incremental, and closely tied to the electricity sector.
In summary, the use of natural gas in Western Europe throughout the 1960s
was as a specialty fuel, primarily of interest to areas close to domestic
production or to import points. The introduction of natural gas through trade
was incremental both to manufactured gas and to constrained domestic natural
gas supplies. Interfuel competition was not a significant issue, as natural
gas occupied only a minority position in total fuel use. Crude oil and its
products were plentiful and their prices stable, and coal use was still well
established.
In this review of the introduction of natural gas into major Western
European markets, little specific reference has been made to price. One
reason for this omission was that manufactured gas was quite expensive, so
natural gas could be priced at market-penetrating levels, pay for new, high-
pressure transport and distribution systems, and still provide an attractive
rate of return to producers (whether private or public). The other reason is
that producing, contracting, and transmission costs and prices are considered
to be private information. Thus, the only price fairly readily observed is
the price of final sale to end users; that price includes taxes plus all other
costs and margins along the production/transmission/distribution chain.
As a result of this price non-transparency convention, analysis of the
sort undertaken here suffers from a handicap. The author's general
perspective is that price has a significant impact on interfuel competition,
and thus on policy alternatives considered by both producing and consuming
countries. Because price data have not been published in a consistent series
over time and across consumption sectors, we have had to rely on episodic and
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anecdotal evidence. Also, because such information often has been reported in
English language publications, and because most natural gas trade contracts
have been denominated in U.S. $, our references in turn are in U.S. $.
Exchange rates have fluctuated considerably over the period covered in our
analysis, so most mention of price in this chapter are to the then current
U.S. $ equivalent.
The reason for this short digression on price data limitations is that
the next stage of European natural gas trade is the 1970s: the decade of the
first OPEC oil price shock (see Table 2-1). When oil prices rose as a result
of crude oil price increases, the role of natural gas changed dramatically.
Not only did the interfuel competitive environment change, but policy actions
in both consuming and producing countries also sharply shifted. As shall be
seen, the fundamental changes were in the perception of oil price trajectories
and of the availability of oil (whether affected by global depletion--a
popular notion then--or by boycott). In these contexts, policies about
natural gas were based on securing access to supplies, and price was
considered a secondary concern.
As indicated below, this view turned out to be not only inaccurate but
even pernicious. Policies to encourage natural gas use in large consuming
countries led producing countries to institute fiscal regimes, development
policies, and contract terms that led to serious rigidities when later
responding to competition both from falling oil prices and from new gas
exporters.
We now turn to the evolution of natural gas markets in the 1970s.
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Table 2-1
Nominal Crude Oil Prices
(Persian Gulf/Saudi Light)
1.17
1.27
2.54
1.83
1.27
2.01
2.27
2.53
2.80
10.84
11.51
12.85**
13.90**
14.00**
23.20**
36.25**
35.00**
33.50**
29.90**
29.90**
* Calculated on a thermal equivalent basis.
** BP/BNOC prices.
SOURCES:
MMBtu*
21
23
47
34
23
37
42
46
51
199
211
235
255
257
425
664
641
614
548
548
1960-70: M.A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market,
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1972. (Derived Persian Gulf prices)
1973-83: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London,
August, 1985. (Official Saudi Light Prices
and U.K. Forties/BNOC Prices)
Year
1965
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
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THE OPEC OIL PRICE SHOCKS OF 1973-1974: A NEW ERA FOR GAS
The 1973-74 agreement by OPEC to limit production of crude oil and to
a. capture price increases created a very new environment for natural gas. As
noted in our previous studies, these oil price increases were seen as
heralding an end to available liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons. Oil use had
been increasing since the mid-1960s, and both industrial and electric
utilities had built substantial fractions of boiler capacity to use fuel oil.
Until 1973-74, oil prices had been remarkably stable, so such investment
decisions made good sense. However, with the OPEC shock, coupled with threats
of boycott or similar barriers to access, the notion of oil scarcity gained
credibility with remarkable speed.
With a producer's cartel operating with apparent effectiveness, consuming
countries formed the International Energy Agency (IEA), on the presumption
that international cooperation by consuming countries would be more effective
in coping with shortages in oil markets than would individualized actions.
Despite the IEA's apparent helplessness in the face of the second oil price
jump in 1979-80, it continued to seek common, effective counters to cartel
actions.
Based on ministerial agreements made during the 1970s, the IEA evolved
,. the view that reducing oil use would be the most effective action against OPEC
threats. Thus, IEA member countries pledged targets for reducing oil use in
individual countries, with methods for such reductions left to individual
country policies. The use of market forces generally was politically
unpopular--and potentially damaging to local economies. Indeed, some
countries having substantial domestic oil production (notably the United
States and Canada) retained or implemented price controls on crude oil and oil
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products. These price controls on domestic oil production had the effects of
subsidizing oil imports and lowering the total cost of oil use inside that
country, an outcome that was seen by countries without significant domestic
production as unfairly uncompetitive. Whatever the competitive effects, it is
now nearly universally acknowledged that, by any rational measure, these were
misguided policies. However meritorious or wrong-headed various policies may
have been, they all were directed away from oil consumption. A principal
beneficiary of this set of actions was natural gas. Oil was strongly
identified with Middle Eastern production and governments. Energy sources
from any other location were seen as vastly preferable, perhaps because it was
felt cooperation with non-Arab Gulf countries was much easier. However
erroneous this perspective turned out to be, at the time it provided major
impetus to the import and use of both coal and natural gas from anywhere other
than an OPEC country, insofar as that was practically feasible.
In the earlier description of the historic development of the Western
European natural gas market, it was seen that Groningen exports in the 1960s
fit well into certain market niches in West Germany, France, and Italy. These
exports also allowed the Netherlands time to build a domestic distribution
system for its own major utilization of that resource, while simultaneously
generating significant revenues for the Dutch economy. Because the
Netherlands could not use its own gas quickly, they priced their gas exports
in such a way as to develop markets in the countries described above. With
the first oil price shock, the world changed very dramatically.
As Table 2-2 indicates, the price of gas (which had been set to win
markets) no longer needed to stay low to ensure Groningen a place in export
markets.
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Table 2-2
Groningen Export Prices
(US$/MMBtu)
Contract Date Country Initial Price 1976 1981
1966 West Germany N.A. 1.1 4.1
1966 Belgium 0.33 1.1 4.1
1967 France 0.36 1.1 4.1
1970 West Germany 0.38 1.1 4.1
1969 - 70 Italy 0.44 1.1 4.1
SOURCE: Davis, ibid., p. 161.
This Table is not designed to show any particular characteristic of Dutch
export behavior, but rather to illustrate the movement over time of natural
gas prices in relation to oil price increases. As shall be seen, it is only
an example of a general rule about gas pricing in the 1970s.
Before turning to gas prices in consuming countries, it first would be
helpful to look at the exporter situation entering the 1970s. The Netherlands
dominated circumstances at this point, with their contracts backed by the
massive Groningen reserves. As of 1970, Dutch gas exports accounted for
essentially 100 percent of all natural gas trade in Western Europe, and by
1974 they still represented nearly 75 percent.
In the United Kingdom, the 1960 non-associated gas discoveries in the
southern North Sea had reduced reliance on Algerian LNG imports. Although the
contract remained in effect, Algerian LNG increasingly was used in the United
Kingdom for peak-shaving purposes until the contract term expired in 1979.
Because U.K. producers were required to sell their gas production to the
British Gas Corporation (BGC), prices were at low levels (see Table 2-3).
These low prices allowed Algerian LNG to be rolled-in to U.K. supply, so
the price to consumers remained at levels that continued to penetrate the
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Table 2-3
Initial Prices for North Sea Gas
SOUTHERN FIELDS
West Sole
1967-70
1971-
Hewett
Base Price
Valley Gas
Leman
First 600 million ft3/day
Second 600 million ft3/day
Remainder
Indefatigable
All gas to be 1983
Viking (1972)
PRICE/THERM (105 Btu)
UK pence US cents
2.08
1.12
1.195
0.844
1.196
1.1875
1.792
1.208
1.5
3.4Rough (1974)
NORTHERN FIELDS
Frigg (Norwegian) 1974
Brent
Beryl
5.01
2.39
2.83
1.997
2.83
2.81
2.79
2.89
3.5
7.87
(PRICE IN UK PENCE/THERM)
Initial 1982 (est)
8.8
6.5
11.5
12.5
16.0
North Alwyn
Asking for New Fields
22.0 - 23.0
20.0
SOURCE: Derived from Davis, pp. 106, 114.
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market (especially for residential use). With the 1973-74 oil price hikes,
gas contracts from North Sea production also increased in price, though less
than at the rate of oil prices.
The 1972 discovery of the Frigg field introduced Norwegian gas into the
U.K. system. This field was bisected by the U.K./Norwegian boundary, and U.K.
intentions to build its own gas line to the shore made purchase of Norwegian
zone gas an obvious solution. However, Western European buyers also competed
for these supplies, so for the first time the price paid by the BGC was bid
up.8 As noted in Table 2-3, the price for Frigg gas in 1974 was the only sale
made at a price higher than that paid for the initial West Sole purchase in
1967 (which subsequently decreased after the three-year initial contract
period). The competitive force of Western European buyers is a useful way to
take a brief look at Norway.
Norway might be considered a lucky country: it was in the right place at
the right time. Exploration in its North Sea sector began in the late 1960s,
and it began to log discoveries of oil and gas soon afterward. Frigg,
Ekofisk, Albuskiell, Tor, and the giant Statfjord fields were all identified,'
defined, and made available for buyer bidding in the 1970s. Although Norway
long has had a reputation for engineering prowess, it also has a relatively
small population, which is widely scattered across a rugged and vast
landscape. These conditions made domestic use of natural an expensive
proposition, and its small population gave rise to concern about the economy's
ability to absorb a too-rapid development of oil and gas resources. The
Norwegians thus adopted a carefully phased development strategy, designed to
8 Peebles, op. cit., pp. 31, 44.
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dampen inflationary impacts, provide full and geographically distributed
employment (without labor imports), and secure long-term export income to the
Norwegian economy. Concerns also were expressed about internalizing future
expected income into current national budgets.
These very sensible steps all were laudable. Of course, the oil price
shocks were pleasant surprises for Norway, at least at first. Most of its
discoveries in the 1970s were predominantly of oil, and gas development was
oriented toward capturing associated streams and pulling in non-associated
smaller gas fields (Frigg was the early exception). In this early strategy,
the task was to dispose of gas safely, at a profit, and to ensure that oil
development was not impeded. Norwegian supplies from Frigg had been
negotiated before the first oil price hike, and from Ekofisk not long
afterward. The prices in these contracts were relatively modest, with
purchasers apparently willing to pay somewhat more for Norwegian gas than for
alternative supplies, to encourage further development of gas in Norway.
Norway in the 1970s may be viewed as having gained valuable experience in
exploiting its oil/gas reserves, and in establishing itself in Western
European markets as a reliable supplier. The carefully designed phasing of
developments likely was considered as a strength, which also fostered
intermittent auctions of the (expected-to-be modest) gas resources. Potential
buyers would bid for the expected output of the field, and the resulting
contracts provided the financial means to proceed with actual development of
the field. Later the unforeseen risks embedded in the Norwegian strategy will
be examined.
Algeria h been a player in the Western European natural gas market
since 1964, when it first made an LNG delivery to the United Kingdom (although
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the contract was signed in 1961).9 Exports of Algerian LNG to France
commenced in the mid-1960s and to Belgium, Spain, and Italy in later years.
However, it might be argued that at the time, Algerian/U.S. LNG negotiations
had more impact on Algerian exports than did any other factor.
In the 1970s, the U.S. gas market was subject to price controls. This
induced a shortage of U.S.-produced gas and caused pipelines to turn to
imported supplies of gas to satisfy the need for incremental supplies. These
supplies (from Canada, Mexico, and Algeria) were priced higher than U.S.-
controlled prices, but those higher prices could be "rolled in" to the lower-
cost U.S. production. Because Algeria had developed substantial liquefaction
capacity (both to capture flared gas and to utilize non-associated fields), by
the early 1970s it had greater productive capacity than sales contracted for
in the late 1960s. In 1971, a U.S. consortium led by El Paso concluded a
contract with Algeria for 10 Bcm of annual LNG deliveries to several U.S.
terminals. The initial price was negotiated at about $S0.40/MMBtu f.o.b. (As
can be seen from Table 2-1, this was approximately f.o.b. oil price parity.)
U.S. regulatory and Algerian construction delays prevented timely
delivery, and as a result of the oil price increases of 1973-74 and 1979-80,
Algeria argued for an increase in the delivered price of its LNG. Because
U.S. gas markets still were subject to price controls, El Paso agreed to a
second contract as a mechanism to increase the price. This second contract
apparently included an index linking the price of Algerian LNG to oil prices,
a condition that caused the Federal Power Commission to balk--fearing this
would encourage Canada and Mexico to do the same. Deliveries on the first
9 ibid., pp. 28-9.
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contract began in 1978, but due to continuing disputes over the price,
shipments were suspended the following year. The later Trunkline project also
agreed to increases between the pre-1973 negotiation and the late 1970s'
planned delivery. Partial Algerian successes with U.S. contract price
revisions in the mid-1970s undoubtedly encouraged its view that gas should be
linked to f.o.b. oil prices.
However, Algerian attempts to escalate prices to Western European
customers have had mixed success. The 1971-72 project to France at Fos-sur-
Mer fit well into existing distribution from the Lacq fields, and the mid-
1970s' price escalation was absorbable for peak-shaving purposes--and to off-
set decline in Lacq production. Another outcome resulted in negotiations with
the SAGAPE consortium of five Western European nations (Austria, Belgium,
France, Switzerland, and West Germany). SAGAPE signed letters of intent to
buy 15.5 billion Bcm annually for 20 years from Algeria beginning in the mid-
1970s.10 The Algerian demand in the mid-1970s for a tripling of the
previously negotiated price likely was encouraged by the apparent success of
similar moves in the United States, but here the outcome was different. The
Austrian and West German participants dropped out of the consortium, which
then collapsed. As will be noted later, the French and Belgian groups later
accepted higher (and f.o.b. oil-indexed) prices.
An interesting hypothesis can be constructed from this discussion.
Because Algeria was so hawkish about f.o.b. oil price equivalents--and was
encouraged in that strategy by peculiarities in U.S. price-controlled
environment--conditions were created in Western Europe that made Soviet
10 Oil and Gas Journal, November 8, 1976, p. 145.
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supplies enormously attractive. Indeed, had Algeria taken the Dutch strategy
of setting prices with an eye to achieving market penetration, there well may
have been little interest in or actual need for Soviet supplies. Current
Algeria LNG capacity stands at approximately 31.3 Bcm, for which 20.4 Bcm is
either currently contracted or under negotiation. This leaves 10.9 Bcm, or
1.05 Mcf/day, that could have been supplied to Western Europe.
By comparison, since 1975 the Soviet Union has developed capacity to
export 30 Bcm to Western Europe. While it is only speculation that Soviet gas
exports would not have expanded had the Algerians been more aggressive in
marketing, it is an intriguing question, to which we shall return momentarily.
The Soviet Union has exported oil and natural gas for decades. Recent
western (especially U.S.) interest in these exports has tended to focus on the
geopolitical consequences of planning decisions about exports versus domestic
use. There also has been an inclination to view these decisions as being
based on non-economic criteria, most usually attributing anti-western motives
to decisions. This in part is due to cold war suspicions, but also in part to
uncertainty about the capacity of Soviet planners to understand the
consequences of their actions on market economies. Of course, both views
cannot be simultaneously correct. Western European perspectives seem to be
more benign (although occasionally bemused). In general, this view holds that
the Soviet Union knows how to participate in markets (both import and export),
though bureaucratic inefficiency may result in delays on schedules, poor
quality, and so forth. Fluctuating oil exports in recent years were seen by
the U.S. government as deliberately destabilizing; Western Europeans appeared
to attribute the variance to technical field problems, poor equipment,
excessive production, and so forth. This difference in perspectives and
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experience also was at the heart of the dispute over the Urengoi gas export
project in the early 1980s. The U.S. government's view was portrayed as
concerned with technology transfer, easy credit when tightening financial
flows would have hurt military expansion, and especially with creating
resource dependency that could be used as leverage to divide Allied interests
on controversial matters. This chapter will speculate below on this conundrum
and examine alternatives for mitigating the controversy.
Soviet gas supply prospects are examined.in detail in the supply chapter
(see Chapter 3), but the basic facts are straightforward. The Soviet reserve
base is huge, and exploration/delineation still is underway. Domestic use has
first priority, especially to meet the fuel requirements of industrialization.
The second stage of development was export to Eastern European countries,
which expanded rapidly (see Table 2-4). With major transmission lines in
place to this region, further expansion to Western Europe was only a modest
incremental step (though in this case, building new lines to reserves were
necessary). However, deliveries to Western European countries are not a
recent event, as sales to Austria began in 1968 (and expanded in 1974), to
West Germany in 1973, to Italy in 1974, and to France in 1976. Because
transportation costs to Western European delivery points were only
incremental, the prices offered at that time were quite attractive (see Table
2-5). Also recall that by the mid-1970s the SAGAPE consortium was faced with
Algerian demands for a tripling of price. In such circumstances, it is not
surprising that Western Europeans were interested in purchasing natural gas
from the Soviet Union.
As this review indicates, the 1970s largely saw a continuation of
producing/exporting country actions initiated in the 1960s. The Netherlands
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Table 2-4
Exports of Soviet Natural Gas to Eastern Europe: 1967-77
ear Poland Czechoslovakia
967 1.12
'68 1.00
169 0.99
'70 0.76
171 1.13
972 1.14
'73 1.30
974 1.61
'75 1.91
976 1.93
177 2.09
TOTAL 14.98
0.17
0.59
0.89
1.08
1.25
1.47
1.80
2.53
2.81
3.50
3.86
19.95
E. Germany
0.60
2.20
2.51
2.56
2.74
10.61
Bulgaria Hungary Total
0.23
0.90
1.69
2.19
5.01
__m
5.01
,
0.46
0.76
0.76
1.29
1.59
1.88
1.84
2.38
2.61
3.70
6.57
8.59
10.44
11.64
1.98 52.53
Exports of Soviet Natural Gas to Western Europe:
Year Austria
1968 0.14
1969 0.78
1970 0.73
1971 1.08
1972 1.24
1973 1.23
1974 1.60
1975 1.43
1976 2.11
1977 1.89
TOTAL 12.23
W. Germany
0.27
1.62
2.43
3.01
3.84
11.17
Finland
0.34
0.55
0.66
0.68
2.23
Italy
0.60
1.78
2.83
3.82
9.03
France Total
-- 0.14
0.78
-- 0.73
-- 1.0,8
-- 1.24
-- 1.50
-- 4.16
-- 6.19
0.75 9.36
1.46 11.69
2.21 36.87
SOURCE: Peebles, op.cit., pp. 31, 44.
Ye
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
1968-77
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Table 2-5
Average Apparent Soviet Export Border Pr
(U.S.$ per 1000 cubic fe
COUNTRY 1970
-ices of Natural Gas
.e t)
1974 1975 1976
Exports to:
40Austria
Finland
France
Italy
West Germany
Bulgaria
51 119 125
179 184 177
.. -- 96
29 64 62
53 70 85
57 115 125
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
46
Hungary
Poland
AVERAGE FOR ALL EXPORTS
43
44
57 100 133
56 59 104
117 127
52 110 120
57 91 106
SOURCE: Peebles, op.cit., p. 181.
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already was exporting its North Sea gas, Algerian LNG projects were underway
or under negotiation/dispute, Norwegian North Sea oil development was
proceeding, and the Soviets already were transporting gas to Eastern Europe
and beyond. There appears to be no indication that natural gas trade was
initiated because of market opportunities created by the 1973-74 oil price
increase, or even that there was a significant expansion of existing trade to
capture opportunities presented by that price increase.
What did appear to happen was: (1) producing/exporting countries did
increase the price of natural gas (although not at the same magnitude of oil
price changes); and (2) consuming/importing countries did make policies to
shift fuel use away from oil and toward other fuels, including natural gas.
It was this second factor that had the greatest impact on Western European
natural gas markets in the mid- to late-1970s. The IEA and the European
Economic Community (EEC) both were strongly exhortatory in their attempts to
move member nations away from oil use. This period was characterized by
annual reckonings on barrels of oil saved over previous years (usually using
1973 consumption as the base of comparison). These savings were the result of
a number of factors, including: taxes levied on oil products; the
installation of new, energy-efficient equipment; the impacts of a recession
(which reduced demand for all primary energy forms); requirements and/or
subsidies for insulation; and use of alternative fuels.
It is not possible to affix accurate shares to each of the above actions,
but the generally favorable environment for expansion of natural gas use is
obvious. From 1970 to 1979 natural gas use in the EEC grew from 56 to nearly
200 Bcm.1 As will be recalled from Table 2-1, the price of gas was very
European Economic Community, "Communication from the Commission to the
Council Concerning Natural Gas," Brussels, Belgium, April 9, 1984, pp. 2, 18.
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competitive, and the policy climate for its use was most favorable.
During the 1970s, the countries most closely studied here were leaders in
Western European natural gas use. From 1970 to 1979, West German consumption
grew from about 15 to over 50 Bcm.1 2 During this period, residential and
commercial use steadily increased (from 2.25 to 17 Bcm) and that trend likely
will continue. Industrial use also increased from nearly 7 to over 15 Bcm;
this sector appears to have plateaued. Electric utility use expanded from
about 3.5 to nearly 16 Bcm, but has shown sharp and continued declines since
1979.
In the United Kingdom, natural gas use always has been heavily oriented
toward the residential/commercial sector and toward the feedstock and
specialty industrial markets. By the time of the introduction of Algerian LNG
and later North Sea gas, the distribution system already was well established.
With capital costs already sunk, the infrastructure in place, and an
integrated monopoly (BGC) transporting and distributing the gas, it is no
wonder that use grew--especially considering the prices that were offered. In
examining BGC pricing practices, the Price Commission in 1979 noted that gas
was priced far below alternative fuels in residential markets, as Table 2-6
indicates.
12 Burckhard Bergmann, "The European Market for Natural Gas," Ruhrgas Report
Presented to European Gas Conference 1985, Oslo, Norway, 1985.
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Table 2-6
Natural Gas Prices (=100) versus Alternative Fuels
Use Electricity Coal Oil
Central Heating 140-170 130-150 125-140
Cooking 160-200
Space Heating 170-200 125-140
SOURCE: The Price Commission, British Gas Corporation:
Gas Prices and AlliedChanges, HMSO, London,
England, 1979, p. 116.
Recalling the contract prices for North Sea gas, such prices were
possible, although how long BGC could hold customers if alternative fuel
prices continued to edge upward is a relevant question, addressed later.
In a response to the 1973-74 prices increase, French policy during the
1970s was strongly oriented toward promoting nuclear power. However, natural
gas also became increasingly important to France. By 1975 gross domestic
consumption of gas was 19.3 Bcm, and by 1980 it had grown to 26.4 Bcm.1 3 This
period saw deliveries from the Netherlands, Norway, Algeria, and the Soviet
Union (plus increases in their own domestic production). Because of the focus
on nuclear-generated electricity, French natural gas policy was somewhat
neglected, or at least unclear. During the 1970s, residential use of gas
expanded rapidly, and the industrial sector saw strong growth as well;
however, with the nuclear push, consumption in the electric utility sector
declined sharply.
During the 1970s, Italy had substantial domestic natural gas production,
and most use was concentrated in the industrial sector. Deliveries from the
CEDIGAZ, "Natural Gas in the World," Paris, France, 1985, p. 57.
2-24
Netherlands and the Soviet Union also began during this period, although both
contracts were negotiated in the late 1960s; this also was the start-up period
for LNG trade from Libya. These additional supplies allowed a significant
expansion of natural gas use in the Italian residential sector, which was able
to absorb these relatively higher-priced imports. Because domestic production
was not increasing, imported natural gas became increasingly important. Since
Italy imports nearly all its oil, substituting natural gas for oil must have
appeared to be a supply diversification strategy of sorts.
From this review it is clear that the 1973-74 oil price jump, to some
extent, did affect both natural gas consumers and exporters. However, because
increases in gas prices lagged behind increases in oil prices, expansion of
gas markets was substantial. Further, other national and international
policies were directed to attractive alternative fuels, which gave gas use
additional impetus.
Thus, it is reasonable to attribute the growth in natural gas use in
Western European in the 1970s to two factors. First, the increasing
availability of gas from domestic production and imports from reasonably
proximate sources (via both pipelines and LNG shipments) allowed distribution
grids to expand without serious manpower or material bottlenecks. Second, the
policy overlays from the mid-1970s onward gave considerable encouragement to
use natural gas as a replacement for current imports of oil--or at least to
reduce future oil import requirements.
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TIMES OF TURMOIL: THE 1980s
From the vantage point of 1986, the 1970s was a comparatively a quiet and
orderly period in Western European natural gas trade, a period during which
policy guided the evolution of natural gas use, and imports/exports were
viewed as serving common, if not mutual, interests. However, the second oil
price shock of 1979-80 brought that relatively placid period to an abrupt and
dramatic halt. This event heralded the end of natural gas market growth in
Western Europe, with the first three years of the decade witnessing falling
levels of demand. This occurred despite strong perceptions of the need to
move away from oil. Because, beginning in late 1979, oil prices rose for
three years running, it became an article of faith that they would continue to
increase well into the forseeable future. The push toward reducing dependency
on oil imports became even stronger, and the IEA and EEC became even more
prescriptive in their advice to member nations.
Gas supplier actions added to this atmosphere of confusion and
contention. Algeria suspended LNG exports to France when the French resisted
demands for a major price increase. Dutch demands for price increases had
been underway for some years, and in 1980 the Dutch reached quick agreement
with buyers. This latter action was especially noteworthy, because Groningen
still represented a substantial fraction of total Western European gas trade.
Because Dutch export prices were low, the volume was large, and contract terms
permitted relatively low offtakes, Western European buyers were able to pay
relatively high prices and accede to high take requirements from other
suppliers (especially from Algeria, Norway, and to some degree from the Soviet
Union). Dutch impatience was understandable, as was buyer resistance to the
Dutch price increase.
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In many ways, the Groningen renegotiation marks a watershed event in
Western European gas markets. Its large impact was not only due to the
factors just described, but also due to timing. In the 1979-80 period, Dutch
exports comprised a significant percentage of imports to Italy, France, and
Germany (see Table 2-7).
Table 2-7
Imports from the Netherlands as a Percentage of Total Natural Gas Imports
(average of 1979-80)
Importing Country Total Imports (Bcm) Imports from Netherlands Percent
Italy 14.6 5.5 37.7
France 19.8 11.4 57.6
W. Germany 45.4 24.9 54.9
SOURCE: OECD, Annual Oil and Gas Statistics, Paris, France, 1979/80.
The significance of these relatively high percentages is obvious in
light of the earlier discussion about new contracts, contracts that exploited
the relatively low-cost and very flexible take terms embodied in the Dutch
contracts. In effect, the price renegotiation sharply reduced or entirely
removed opportunities to "roll in" new, high-cost supplies.
Simultaneously, the jump in oil prices contributed to a serious slump in
the world economy, a slump that was especially severe in Western Europe. The
concommitant drop-off in economic activity reduced demand for all fuels, and
for the first time there was a notable drop in the demand for natural gas.
Gas markets were caught in a significant whipsaw effect. First, Western
European countries' base supply contract prices (with the Netherlands) rose
just as expensive new supplies from other sources were either under
negotiation or under development. Simultaneously, although not apparent at
the time, in 1979 gas demand peaked, then began a four-year decline. Finally,
the increase in Dutch prices, in addition to new and expensive supplies,
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raised prices to a level that forced the use of gas in the electric generation
sector to decrease, a fact that (together with the overall decline in
industrial activity) resulted in a shift in load factor toward a more
seasonally varied one. This in turn made high take requirements from new
suppliers such as Norway and the Soviet Union (plus Algerian LNG) especially
onerous.
For all these reasons, the Dutch price change appears to have had a
significant impact on Western European gas markets, although it is not clear
that this impact has been thoroughly appreciated. What is clear is that
existing contracts and domestic production can meet virtually all annual
demand for natural gas in Western Europe throughout the remainder of this
century. If the oil price collapse proves durable, gas contracts likely will
be renegotiated to stretch out deliveries beyond 2000, perhaps bringing
significant price reductions as well.
Contract terms increasingly have tied gas price indices to competing
fuels, especially low-sulfur fuel oil, gas oil, and distillate. Thus, the
price of gas is less likely to be significantly out of line over a long period
(although this in turn depends on the time frame for automatic adjustments,
which typically have been shortening). What have not changed greatly are take
requirements (although Dutch contracts still are the most flexible). With
load factors in Western European consuming countries trending strongly toward
seasonal residential patterns, load balancing considerations will become
increasingly important.
With residential/commercial markets being the only sectors experiencing
continued growth (or remaining stable), this move toward a seasonal heating
pattern is general to the Western European market. In West Germany, the shift
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of load toward the residential sector is especially striking; between 1980 and
1983, gas use in the electricity generation sector declined by 60 percent;
since then it has declined another 30 percent. Electricity generation still
represents nearly 20 percent of total West German consumption, so gas
continues to be subjected to very severe interfuel competition. During the
1980-83 period, the West German residential sector grew approximately by 10
percent, but that increase accounted for less than 3 percent of the total
volume of gas used in total energy consumption.1 4 Although more recent data
suggest that the industrial sector is recovering somewhat, the real growth
continues to be in the residential/commercial sector. The implications for
West Germany are obvious: there will be slow or no growth in the total volume
of gas used and increased seasonal variability of demand for it.
France, in part because of its relatively early, policy-driven commitment
to nuclear power, has chosen not to rely on the use of natural gas in electric
power generation. Its use of gas in the industrial sector was strong and
growing in the 1970s, but levelled off in the early 1980s. Because French
natural gas prices have been high and electricity prices low, expansion in the
residential sector has been less rapid than in, say, West Germany. It is
likely that the cost of electric appliances also will remain low, so longer-
term prospects for increases in residential sector demand for gas are not
likely to improve. France also has the problem of carrying contracts with
very high gas prices. Following the Algerian LNG supply interruption of 1980,
France agreed to a price increase that seemed to have a premium attached for
14 ibid., p. 57; also British Gas Corporation official's speech, 1985, not for
record.
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non-energy purposes. Although deliveries of LNG resumed, natural gas has
been--and still is--at a competitive disadvantage compared to other fuels in
France.
Italy entered the 1980s particularly dependent on imports of all fuels.
Natural gas has been and remains today the only fuel in substantial domestic
production. Therefore, it is not surprising that one of Italy's major
objectives is diversification of imports of all fuels, and especially of
natural gas. In 1981, Italy passed a national energy program designed to
decrease oil dependency. Although the plan was ambitious in scope, by most
accounts it has fallen short of its goals (as did most other national energy
programs of its kind). The following IEA review of Italy underscores those
difficulties.
While most of those policy developments [Italy's national energy program
and subsequent laws] have been positive, actual results of implementing
these policies has been mixed . . . There are also areas where the
government has failed to define policy measures . . . Clearly the effect
of not holding to the targets in the 1971 NEP is to shift the schedule of
implementation back, implying a contjiued high level of dependence on oil
imports for several years more . . .
Irrespective of its national energy program, Italy has been very active in
contracting for natural gas supplies from a very diverse set of exporters,
more so than any other European country. It received Groningen gas, Norwegian
gas, Soviet supplies, LNG from Libya, and pipeline supply from Algeria.
Despite this diversity of suppliers, Italy for a long time has been unable to
reduce supply prices through contract negotiation. While not so obvious as in
15 International Energy Agency, "Energy Policies and Programmes of IEA
Countries," 1984 Review OECD, Paris, France, 1984.
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the French experience, Italy has been inclined (or pushed by the government)
to accept an Algerian price settlement that must have non-price benefits
(which one commentator suggested was in construction benefits for Italy in
North Africa and other Arab countries).1 6 The value of such a trade-off is
open to question, but another policy decision gave natural gas imports a
strong push--the decision to expand gas transmission to the Mezzogiorno region
in the south of Italy.
The majority of Italian industry is located in the north of the country,
and the perceived imbalance of economic development between the north and
south has been a long-standing, contentious issue. The TransMed pipeline
landing point in the south gave further access to supply in that area, and
provided the basis to link north and south with a common pipeline system.
Hookups have increased dramatically, but the bulk of users in the south are in
the residential/commercial sectors. Since most industry is in the north and
already has access to gas, growth in the south is potentially large in terms
of the number of customers but relatively small in volume. In order to use
contracted supply volumes, there has been a temporary shift to gas use in
electric power generation. Between 1983 and 1984 the amount in this sector
rose from 3.14 to 5.73 Bcm,1 7 and recent reports suggest that the trend
continued into 1985 as well.
Because new coal and nuclear plants are scheduled to come on-line in the
1990s, Italy appears destined to follow other Western European countries
16 Jann Haaland Matlary, Political Factors in Western Europe Gas Trade, Oslo,
Norway, 1985, pp. 49-50.
17 Financial Times, "International Gas Report," London, England, January 17,
1986, p. 8.
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toward a gas market concentrated in the residential/commercial sector. Thus,
the load factor problem likely will become more troublesome here as well.
Indeed, if gas used in the electric generation sector declines in the 1990s,
Italy could well face difficulties in using supplies for which it already has
contracted.
Finally, as noted, natural gas in the United Kingdom long has been
focused on the residential/commercial and light industrial sectors, and that
condition has not changed in the 1980s. The most notable development in the
early 1980s was growing concern about future supplies. BGC lost out in
bidding on the very large Norwegian Statfjord and Ekofisk fields (although it
was successful on the Frigg field). The Sleipner field was its next target,
but although BGC was successful in concluding a contract, that contract did
not receive U.K. government approval. Western European interest in this field
appeared desultory but that may be open to question; certainly Western
European buyers did not step in after the U.K. government's failure to approve
the contract. The reasons for failure to approve the contract still are hotly
debated, but clearly it has partial origins in the U.K. price structure
controversy discussed earlier.
Prices to U.K. end users remain the lowest in all of Western Europe, and
the average price paid to producers also is very low.1 8 There is little
incentive to add to reserves, with no one permitted to bid against the BGC and
with gas exports forbidden by law. During and following the Sleipner events,
the prices that the BGC offered to U.K. producers began to move upward, but it
18 L. Cox and M. Lynch, "European Gas Prices: Limits to Growth," MIT Energy
Laboratory Working Paper No. MIT-EL 83-021WP, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1983.
.- A
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will take some time to determine if this incentive is sufficient to produce
U.K. reserves--and to see if the reserves indeed exist. In the meantime, it
is curious that U.K. consumer prices continue to lag so far behind those on
the Continent.
This brief review of Western European consuming country developments in
the early 1980s includes: continued "off-oil" strategies (except for the
United Kingdom, a major oil exporter); a sharp fall in gas demand, especially
in the electric utility and industrial sectors; and continued growth in the
residential and commercial sectors. All these factors have combined in the
mid-1980s to produce a glut of contracted gas and a load curve that is
becoming increasing seasonal.
Turning to exporter country actions following the 1979-80 oil price
shock, we find that a very mixed set of circumstances prevails. Algeria
consolidated its reputation as an unreliable supplier by suspending LNG
shipments to France, and by threatening similar actions to Belgium and Italy.
After these three countries all capitulated on price terms, deliveries
resumed, although the ill-will generated is likely to be long-lasting.
Certainly it is true that gas priced at levels of the renegotiated contracts
contributed to the fall in gas markets seen in the early 1980s. Clearly,
Algeria's behavior in the 1970s and early 1980s created an aversion by many
countries to relying on it, which in turn likely created a significant
opportunity for Soviet supplies to make in-roads into the effected markets.
The Soviet Union has not suffered from a similar poor reputation, but
nonetheless it was at the center of a major dispute about future reliability.
The controversy surrounding the Soviet Union's negotiations with Western
European buyers in 1981-82 has been chronicled and interpreted elsewhere.
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Stated at its simplest, Soviet gas was (as was true of Norway in the 1970s) in
the right place at the right time. During the protracted renegotiation of
Dutch contracts in the late 1970s, the Netherlands suggested that it might not
renew contracts when they expired in the 1990s. The collapse of the SAGAPE
consortium over Algerian demands for price increases, together with the Dutch
negotiating threat, left Western European purchasers facing an apparently
significant shortfall in future supply. All this occurred in the atmosphere
generated by the oil supply crisis, and there was great pressure to move away
from what were thought to be either politically inaccessible or physically
depleting global oil resources. In addition, there was a firm belief that oil
prices would rise rapidly and forever. Of course, oil prices in Western
Europe continued to rise into 1985 because of appreciation of the U.S. dollar,
thus prolonging this perception in Western Europe.
Under this set of circumstances, the Soviet offer to supply 40 Bcm of gas
at attractive prices and other favorable trade terms was of enormous
importance to Western European buyers. Their commercial experience with the
Soviet Union had been without serious problems, and there seemed little reason
to believe this would change.
In addition, the loss of 15.5 Bcm/year by SAGAPE made the Soviet offer of
20 Bcm/year almost irresistible. If the Algerian sale to SAGAPE had been
consummated, the interest in Soviet supplies may have been small, and likely
only for spot or peaking purposes. What was different in this instance was
U.S. objections to the Western European/Soviet transaction. Outraged over
Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Poland, U.S. foreign policy under President
Carter was focused on a search for effective sanctions to punish such
adventurism. Lacking any realistic military options, the United States
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instead sought Allied cooperation in leveling economic actions against the
Soviet Union. In light of this, the Soviet gas contract was seen as
manifesting Western European indifference to Soviet expansionism, and an
implicit repudiation of the best opportunity available to deny the Soviet
Union commercial benefits. Additionally, U.S. policymakers suspected that
reliance on Soviet gas would give the Soviets leverage over the Alliance in
the future.
After the conclusion of negotiations, the Soviet Union proceeded with a
major expansion in its exploitation of the Yamal/Urengoi reserves. As the new
deliveries fell due, technical problems arose, threatening their timely
execution. Nevertheless, the Soviets met all initial requirements, and thus
allayed Western European concerns about their commercial performance. Indeed,
in sifting through the role of exporters in the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviets'
conduct appears exemplary. In fact, it was one of the few exporters that did
not exploit external market opportunities by threatening to stop deliveries or
increase prices beyond the terms of its contracts. It has shown flexibility
equal to the Dutch (who have set the Western European standard) on both
matters.
In the mid-1980s, Norway's luck apparently ran out. After its successes
with Frigg, Ekofisk, and Statfjord, failure to secure the Sleipner sale could
not have come at a worse time. The Norwegian policy was one of phased
development (bringing oil and gas projects forward in a sequential way), and
As is not infrequent in such policy matters, the lack of available
alternatives was persuasive in favor of proceeding with the contracts. U.S.
policy toward the Soviets is not less belligerent now, but currently the
United States has no objection to Allied trade with the Soviets in other than
high-tech matters.
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during the time that oil and gas prices were increasing, the approach worked
wonderfully. Yet Statoil either seemed unaware or unwilling to admit that the
Western European gas market, by the early 1980s, was decreasing just as new
supplies (including its own) were coming on stream. Holding out for price and
development terms geared to a previous era helped doom the Sleipner
negotiation to failure. At the same time, it was becoming clear that
Norwegian hydrocarbon prospects increasingly favored gas, and its oil options
were increasingly limited. Discovery of the giant Troll gas field, with
Sleipner still in the inventory, presented Norway with a formidable challenge.
In negotiations with both U.K. and Western European buyers, Norway became
increasingly aggressive about price and volume terms. Perceiving what it
thought to be a seller's market, Norway sought to shift both price and reserve
risks downstream, arguing that it had assumed exploration risks. Norway did
not contract to sell a specified volume of gas, but instead sold production
from a specific field; buyers assumed the risk of what the field would
produce. Statoil negotiators also were very aggressive about prices, arguing
for a "security premium" based on their Western Europeanness.
Unfortunately, with Sleipner unsold, Ekofisk operating at reduced output
(because of platform subsidence), and the Troll field too large to sell as a
whole field, Norway entered the mid-1980s facing some serious problems.
Mention of the Netherlands has been interwoven throughout the discussions
of the 1970s and 1980s. The Dutch initiated natural gas trade in Western
Europe, remain prominent today, and will continue to be a major influence for
the foreseeable future. For 15 years it has been a load-balancer, both due to
the nature of the Groningen field and its willingness to contract to fulfill
such a role. Its export prices for four years (1976-80) provided the cheapest
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supply in Western Europe, even while delivery requirements were pushed into
future years (by France, for example, to accommodate expensive Algerian
supplies). With requests for renegotiation receiving no response, the Dutch
then suggested that if the contracts were not be renegotiated, they might not
be renewed upon expiration. Even then, at the height of Dutch irritation,
there was no verifiable suggestion that it would abrogate the contracts.
However, in the panicky policy atmosphere of the early 1980s, renegotiation of
Dutch export contracts did occur--presumably to ensure renewal (and supply)
prospects in the 1990s.
This renegotiation of Dutch contracts also saw indexation of natural gas
with oil products, satisfying the major concern of the Dutch. However, the
flexible take provisions remained, thus keeping the Netherland's exports
exposed to being backed out by other high take export requirements during
times of weak gas markets. This was viewed as a problem, but it may turn out
to be a significant strength in the future.
NEW PROBLEMS AND NEW PROSPECTS: THE FUTURE
This review of Western European natural gas markets has attempted to
identify the key factors in both importing and exporting countries that shaped
the evolution of those markets. The markets originally developed as economic
markets, in the sense that normal commercial transactions determined their
essential character. These markets were small and specialized, and received
little significant policy attention by consuming governments. This was true
despite the fact that most of the exporters and importers are government-
controlled or government-directed organizations.
By the 1970s, natural gas began to play a more prominent role in energy
markets, and this trend accelerated after the first oil price shock of 1973-
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74. It was at this juncture that policy assumed a more prominent role,
particularly in importing countries. The "off-oil" push had begun, and much
more active attention was given to expanding the role of natural gas.
Exporter behavior still remained largely commercially-oriented in nature, and
there appeared to be no gas brought to market that was not already in
prospect. While gas prices did increase, they lagged behind the startling
jump in oil prices.
The second oil price hike of 1979-80 had more dramatic consequences. The
Western European transportation infrastructure was well-developed, and most
major industrial countries enjoyed relatively easy access to gas supplies from
a variety of exporters. Importing countries became even more anxious to
secure alternative fuels to decrease oil imports, and policies by both
individual countries and international agencies were established to speed this
process. At this point, exporters' policies also became more aggressive,
usually reflected in their demands for higher prices. Contract abrogation was
not a factor; Algeria was the only supplier to suspend shipments and then
restart them (Libya's export shutdown appears permanent).
At present (early 1986), the major change that faces both importers and
exporters in the Western European market is the sharp drop in oil prices.
Although the policy frameworks to reduce oil imports still remain in place,
interfuel competition at the burner tip will be savage and the outcome is
uncertain. Gas prices will come under increasing pressure, especially as
contract indexing provisions fall due. Although the residential sectors of
Western European countries likely will not switch if gas prices are only
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somewhat higher than those of light oil products, new hookups certainly will
slow or even halt altogether. Electric generation from gas certainly will
decline if gas prices are not competitive with alternatives and if industrial
users have increasing access to fuel-switching capability.
The implications of this new end-use price competition are striking.
With the demand load curve becoming increasingly seasonal, pressure will
increase to stretch out contracted quantities over even longer periods of
time, with importers seeking greater flexibility in annual takes. With
consumption by base-load users declining, opportunities for large volume sales
are decreasing for all but the lowest cost exporters. Failure to respond to
these competitive circumstances has another possible consequence for
exporters. That problem is the evolution of the view that natural gas is an
expensive fuel that offers no real flexibility in price or delivery terms, and
therefore in the longer run it is fundamentally not reliable. If that
perception takes hold, then gas will carry a discount rather than a premium.
The Western European gas industry (both importers and exporters)
frequently views natural gas as being in a long-range market situation, and
responses to this cannot be distracted or panicked by short-run fluctuations.
While this is a true statement, it is not a complete statement--or necessarily
relevant. Underlying this view is a belief that contractual relationships
will be enduring. But this outlook is challenged by the fact that falling
prices are no more predictable than rising prices. Rising fuel prices bring
contracting parties together to sort out division of rents, a task that may
result in argument, but nonetheless this is a process in which both parties
gain. A falling market (both price and volume) requires allocation of risk,
and this always is a less pleasant task.
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The uncertainties that face future Western European gas markets suggest
that new importance should be placed on achieving greater flexibility. With
high volatility in fuel prices, end users have a strong incentive to invest in
fuel-switching capacity to ensure minimum disruption. End-use flexibility
carries with it opportunities for collecting substantial premia if expected
price variations are great. Installation of fuel-switching capacity will add
to demand uncertainties, increasing the potential for even greater price
volatility.
Natural gas markets have inherent rigidities for several reasons: Storage
of very large amounts is expensive or prohibitive; transportation systems may
stretch over long distances, and the longer the more expensive; distribution
systems (especially for new residential customers) often lie within urban
areas and thus are expensive to construct; new residential customers must buy
new appliances, adding to conversion costs; producers (especially of offshore
wells) need assurance of future sales to make investments to develop the
project--all this, and yet the price of natural gas to end users may vary with
changing relative fuel price competition. These are all difficult matters,
matters moreover that must be dealt with simultaneously.
In other fuel markets, temporary imbalances are moderated through spot
markets. During unexpected circumstances these spot markets act as clearing
agents, and their greatest impact is felt during shorter-term imbalances.
However, if spot markets are well established as a market clearing function,
they also may serve as a reference point that allows contracts to adjust quite
quickly. This helps stabilize markets by ensuring that the price of a fuel
adjusts rapidly to competitive price changes, whether up or down.
The United States has experienced some success with a gas spot market, at
least until new regulatory rules brought new difficulties. The Western
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European natural gas market appears capable of enjoying substantial benefits
from the institution of a spot market as well, and that potential is likely to
increase with time. The growing seasonality of load, sharp competition from
oil products, and the apparent over-contracting of imported gas supplies are
all disturbances with which spot markets can deal efficiently. Spot markets
could move gas at high prices during periods of unexpected peaks in demand,
and at low prices during all periods to large users, which would help clear
excess inventory.
Unfortunately, the prospects for a spot market emerging in Western Europe
are bleak. There are two major impediments: national policies favoring
supply security, and the absence of a common carriage pipeline system. A few
words on each are in order.
There is a strong tendency in Western Europe for purchases to be made on
a bilateral basis, despite the "continental consortium" buying group
negotiations. In effect, each importing country decides what volume of gas it
wants to take from an exporter's current offer. These individual importer
volumes are collected together, and a lead organization (Ruhrgas, for example)
then acts as initial negotiator. The negotiation from that point forward then
is concerned not with volumes, but with price and with minimum/maximum annual
takes.
In short, the volume for each country already has been determined,
implying that demand also has been determined--and therefore supply sufficient
to meet that demand has been secured. This perspective seems firmly
entrenched, and dates from the era of concern over supply shortages.
The second impediment to the development of a spot market in Western
Europe is the lack of common carriage transportation. The pipeline system in
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Western Europe has become highly interconnected. Thus, the physical
capability to move natural gas through the various countries of the region is
not a problem for spot markets. The constraint rather appears to be some
combination of unfamiliarity with such markets, and the unwillingness of
certain sectors of the pipeline system to permit such carriage arrangements.
Ruhrgas, for example, has been characterized as reluctant to engage in common
carriage/spot market transportation arrangements. Ruhrgas is especially
important for several reasons: Its system is the major access point for both
Norwegian and Soviet supplies; the West German market is relatively open and
regulatory interference is slight; and the large fraction of Dutch gas taken
by West Germany gives it considerable potential for flexibility. There are,
however, no indications of any change in Ruhrgas's reluctance to become a
major common carrier in Western Europe.
Absent the use of such mechanisms as spot markets, the Western European
gas market is likely to experience increasing volatility. This probability
arises from rigidities in policy and practice reviewed above, and from the
potential of increasingly unbalanced load factors in the future. The
alternatives for dealing with this volatility are limited, but increasing the
flexibility of the system certainly would help. Such actions as a pipeline
between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands would open the possibility for
two-way flows, including trans-shipment of Norwegian gas via the U.K. system,
and/or United Kingdom access to Soviet supplies. If the Norwegian underseas
pipeline now landing at Emden also had a spur landing in the Netherlands or
elsewhere outside Germany, flexibility would be increased without disturbing
Ruhrgas' capacity.
In certain ways, the Netherlands occupies a potentially pivotal position.
Just as its location was important earlier in establishing markets for
2-42
Groningen gas, its location now could be important for brokering supplies in
an oscillating market. The Groningen reserve/production characteristics have
unique qualities, and if linked with other supply sources could serve another
producing country (e.g., Norway) and several consuming countries' interests
very well.
The future for gas markets in Western Europe is highly uncertain. Policy
management will be less effective when competitive pressures are high, which
they are now and will become increasingly in the future. Although Western
European governments seem mistrustful of economic markets, their influence may
be unavoidable, and attempts to avoid them may carry a very high cost, which
someone will have to pay.
* * *
A TROLL POSTSCRIPT
A contract for the sale of Troll (and perhaps Sleipner) gas to
continental buyers was announced after this chapter was completed. As of mid-
June 1986, details about price and contract terms still remain unclear.
Rather than recasting the analysis of this chapter in light of the Troll sale,
we reflect upon the impact this sale might have on future gas use patterns in
Western Europe. Indeed, the Troll sale would not change the foregoing
analysis in any significant way--except to note that, once again, Norway has
become a "lucky country." The trenchant question is: To what use will the
reported buyers put Troll gas? Oversupply under existing contracts presently
appears substantial. The previously-suggested need for spot markets likely
will increase, as will the necessity to find some way to deal with seasonal
load factor growth.
2-43
Three other issues are intriguing. First, the United Kingdom is the only
country of the four studied that is not a party to this new Troll contract.
Second, the three major producers (other than Norway)--Algeria, Netherlands,
and the Soviet Union--are facing quite different competitive circumstances.
Finally, the new pipeline from the Norwegian North Sea has opened prospects
for additional pipeline interconnections, especially in view of the
substantial remaining Norwegian reserves.
These three issues are not unrelated, and the United Kingdom is the first
obvious point of intersection. Having previously failed to secure the
Sleipner sale, the United Kingdom now potentially faces a "sold out" sign in
Norway. It thus is faced with the prospect of relying upon domestic
production or some incremental import arrangement. This chapter earlier
speculated on a pipeline link from the Netherlands, and this remains a viable
prospect--but only if the Dutch are able and willing to act as a broker for
-- other imports from Norway, and/or the Soviet Union, "mixed" with its own
Groningen production. Additionally, Belgium--with the new Zeebrugge link from
Norway at the same point as its LNG terminal from Algeria--now also has the
opportunity to link up with the United Kingdom, even though it lacks a
Groningen-type supply base.
Further, the United Kingdom has had a stable contractual relationship
with Algeria. Having overpriced its gas for over a decade, Algeria finds
nearly half its liquefaction capacity lying idle, and is facing contract
renegotiations with France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium under very unfavorable
circumstances. The Troll contract leaves Algeria squeezed, and mutual
interests between it and the United Kingdom now may be very strong.
The new contract may make life the most difficult of all for the Soviet
Union. As noted earlier, the Soviet Union has its largest pipeline capacity
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directed into West Germany. Thus, it is heavily dependent upon the West
German pipeline system to deliver gas beyond West Germany itself--especially
to the United Kingdom (the one major market not connected to the continental
system). Of course, the southern route to/through Austria to Italy (and
potentially to France/Switzerland) offers some growth prospects--but not of
such large volumes, and with potentially stiff competition from Algeria via an
expanded TransMed Pipeline.
Soviet gas could move west as well as south, if Ruhrgas offers access
and reasonable tariffs. Under this prospect, through its excess pipeline
capacity, the Soviet Union might become a swing and/or spot supplier. Indeed,
it may have to function like the Dutch in balancing loads, including balancing
its own previously contracted volumes. This is not likely a preferred path
for Soviet gas sales, but it may be the only path open to it. Otherwise, the
Soviet Union will be competing head-on with Algeria for the smaller but
growing Southern European markets. In view of its need for hard currency
earnings, it is likely the Soviet Union will opt for the largest volume sales,
under whatever conditions it must operate.
The Troll arrangement appears to bring the Western European market to
greater "maturity" in terms of interconnection, and thus the market
increasingly will resemble the North American situation than it ever has
before. And this condition includes the prospect for a "gas bubble" of
sustained oversupply conditions, especially if oil prices remain soft through
the next several years. Thus, Western Europe has succeeded in securing gas as
an alternative to imported oil--just as oil is becoming a relative bargain.
It will be interesting to see if Western European countries' policies,
including those of the IEA and EEC, now relax pressures to reduce oil use. If
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so, there may be a real prospect that economic gas markets will begin to
emerge in Western Europe.
A*-
.,W-
11·
0--·
ABBREVIATIONS
UNITS
Mcf = thousand cubic feet
MMcf = million cubic feet
Bcf = billion (thousand million) cubic feet
Tcf = trillion (million million) cubic feet
Bcm = billion (thousand million) cubic meters
MMBtu = million British thermal units
bbl = barrel
1 cubic meter = 35.3 cubic feet
1 cubic foot = 1000 Btus
fob = freight on board (i.e., price of good loaded on ship at
point of export)
cif = cost-insurance-freight (i.e., fob price of good, plus
shipping and insurance costs, or cost at point of import)
SOURCES
FT = Financial Times, daily, London
FTEE = Financial Times Energy Economist, monthly, London
IGR = International Gas Report, bimonthly, London
IPE = International Petroleum Encyclopedia, annual, Tulsa
MEES = Middle East Economic Survey, weekly, Cyprus
NYT = New York Times, daily, New York
OGJ = Oil and Gas Journal, weekly, Tulsa, Oklahoma
PE = Petroleum Economist, monthly, London
PIW = Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, weekly, New York
PPS = Petroleum Press Service, monthly, ondon (succeeded by PE
in 1974)
WO = World Oil, monthly
WSJ = Wall Street Journal, daily, New York
i"-
IBY-·
*a;·-
ar·
B%
·
pa·-
dY·
A"-
I·
rPl
la)i-·
CY"
Qpl
Iss
Irs
NATURAL GAS SUPPLY IN WESTERN EUROPE
by
M.A. Adelman and Michael C. Lynch
assisted by Jeffrey A. Stewart
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
While natural gas is "surplus" in both North America and Western
Europe, supply prospects are very different for the two regions.
In North America, the capacity to produce and deliver natural gas at
prices prevailing in fall 1986, greatly exceeds what consumers are willing
to take. The new but broad-based spot market price for gas has been
falling for the past two years, well before the 1986 oil price drop. Spot
prices in producing regions are now in the neighborhood of $1.50/Mcf. But
this surplus is deceptive in two senses. First, consumer prices are only
moderately affected by wellhead prices; hence, the demand response is
slow. Second, from the supply perspective, few term contracts are being
signed at anything near the levels of spot prices. The consensus, with
which we concur, is that these prices will not support investment
sufficient to maintain the current level of producing capacity. And as
capacity shrinks, prices will rise.
On the other hand, in Western Europe, the price relevant to supply
is hard to discern, in part because natural gas is sold to distributors
and large end-users at prices that are considered proprietary, and in
part because there is no short-term market by which to gain reliable
information. And suppliers are willing to offer much more natural gas
for long-term sales than buyers are willing to take.
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Thus, the long-run disequilibrium in Western Europe appears to be
the opposite of the short-run imbalance in North America. To determine
whether this impression is correct requires a detailed examination of
cost and supply, which this chapter undertakes.
Our conclusion is that a landed or border Western European price
of even $2.50 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf)--compatible with an oil
price of $12 to $15 per barrel-- rules out West Africa, the Persian
Gulf, and the Pacific. But this price is enough to make profitable the
investment needed to supply 10 to 15 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) annually
from non-Soviet Western European sources alone, and perhaps much more
from the Soviet Union. This is several times the amount of gas being
sold today and more than anyone expects to be sold even in the next
century. Even some egregious errors in our calculations --which are
admittedly imprecise--would not affect these conclusions.
So what prevents these large volumes of gas from being developed,
when that would benefit both producers and consumers? The basic
explanation lies with the existence of many barriers to competition. A
competitive market is a method of spreading and using information; the
lack of competition has obscured basic facts on supply. The slow growth
of understanding explains why natural gas prices were under downward
pressure even before the oil price break.
Moreover, as will be shown, lower oil prices have drastically
increased gas supply, an impossible result under competitive market
conditions, but logical enough given current conditions in the Western
European natural gas market.
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The Supply Curve of Natural Gas in Western Europe
In the Western European market natural gas supply is currently
overabundant as a result of the oil crises of the 1970s and the price
increases that resulted. Increased drilling for oil created large
additions to gas reserves. Consumers' desire to reduce oil imports,
coupled with a willingness to sign natural gas contracts at high prices,
led producers to develop production capacity in excess of demand.
The oil price decline of early 1986 doubtlessly will have an impact
on supply. However, there will be no short-term reduction in capacity.
And most of the price paid for natural gas represents not cost but
economic rents, mostly to producing governments. Hence, there is room for
increased supplies over the longer term, even with low oil prices.
Current installed capacity is very inexpensive to operate, since
operating costs are far below current price levels. In the short term,
the surplus of capacity could mean an increase in supplies from countries
seeking to maintain their revenues.
As to new projects, the analysis of this chapter suggests that at
the equivalent of $10/bbl of oil landed or delivered to the point of
import, many gas projects become economically questionable, even excluding
rents. However, with prices slightly higher, and with favorable tax
regimes, substantial new supplies will be available.
Given the very large role transport costs play in producing and
delivering natural gas, long-run delivered cost trends should be
relatively flat. This is especially true in both Algeria, where the
vast bulk of costs are for pipelines, and/or liquefaction and shipping,
rather than for production, and in the Soviet Union, where pipeline
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costs constitute about 80 percent of total delivered costs. In the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands field development costs play a much
larger role.
Future supply trends are heavily dependent on government policies,
but the connection between the two is complex and many-sided. In the
United Kingdom, the British Gas Corporation agreed to pay higher prices
for gas from the southern North Sea and thus greatly increased drilling
and additions to reserves. In Algeria, the government has priced itself
out of most of the markets. The recent trend for producing governments to
reduce their rents has increased supply potential, and a move away from
crude oil price parity would do the same, at least in the short term.
Over the longer term, low oil prices would tend to increase supply from
Norway and the Soviet Union.
The simplest way to represent these results is to aggregate them
into a supply curve. First, the shape of the theoretical supply curve
of natural gas supplies is shown in Figure 1. It consists of three
levels:
(1) Current capacity to deliver gas, (shown by the lowest level),
will contine to operate even at extremely low prices, since variable
costs for both production and transportation are quite low. Oil cannot
recapture the market at any price. But much of this capacity is Algerian
and Soviet, however, and may be unavailable for policy reasons, either on
the producer or consumer side.
(2) The middle level shows where additional supplies can be obtained
cheaply, where fields are known and partly or fully developed but where
transportation constraints prevent their full exploitation. Supergiant
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fields like Groningen, Hassi R'Mel, and Urengoi (in ascending order of
costs) could increase production if pipeline or liquefaction capacity were
added. (Some additional field capacity might be necessary, but the costs
would be small relative to those of transportation.) This gas could be
delivered at prices competitive with very cheap oil, perhaps as low as
$10/bbl.
(3) Finally, large increments in supply could be obtained at
higher price levels, as shown by the top level of the supply curve.
This includes the costs for new fields and pipelines (or liquefaction
capacity) necessary to expand greatly the amount of gas supplied to
Western Europe. For a landed price ranging between $1.50 and $3.00/Mcf,
most of this supply is economic, with the Troll project being in the
middle and small offshore fields, which require (relatively) substantial
pipeline investment, being at the high end.
At the high end of this price range, gas deliveries from more distant
provinces--like Askeladden, Qatar, and possibly Nigeria--begins to become
economic. However, these supplies have been analyzed only cursorily due
to the fact that cheaper, closer supplies are so abundant.
It is, of course, not possible to create an exact, complete long-term
supply curve based on empirical results: Many fields have not been
discovered yet, and/or development costs have not been aggregated.
However, because so much of the gas that is available to Western Europe
over the long run comes from a relatively small number of large fields, it
is possible to develop an empirical supply curve that encompasses a large
portion of the supply that will be available. In addition, using the
obserations on smaller fields that are shown in the producing country
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sections below, costs from areas like offshore Netherlands and United
Kingdom can be estimated. Table 1 shows the numerical data used to create
the supply curve for Western Europe which is presented in Figure 2.
.Before analyzing the curve, some caveats are in order. While
costs for fields like Troll or supplies flowing over gas gathering
systems like Statpipe are reasonably well estimated, a fraction of the
curve represents costs aggregations or interpolations of data, often
subjectively interpretated. Further, some supplies are not included at
all due to a lack of data, such as domestic production in France, Italy,
and West Germany, which accounts for 20 percent of Western European
consumption. However, their inclusion would not notably change the
results of the curve.
The implications of the supply curve are clear: Natural gas supplies
can be abundant in Western Europe for many years to come, even with very
low prices, so long as policies do not inhibit them. Neither the
economics of production and delivery nor the size of the physical resource
will be a constraint.
Plan of the Report
This chapter is divided into three sections and two appendices.
The first section provides some historical background on the development
of the natural gas industry in Western Europe, then gives an overview on
natural gas economics, including a brief discussion of the methodology
used in this chapter. Appendix A includes a more thorough explanation of
the methods and rationales underlying the critical assumptions.
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TABLE 3-1
WESTERN EUROPE SUPPLY CURVE
A. EXISTING PRODUCTION AND TRANSPORT CAPACITY
Country
Netherlands
Groningen
Other
Norway
Statpi
Frigg
UK
Exi sti
FLAGS
Algeria
LNG
Transmed
USSR
pe/Norpipe
(incl. UK s
ng southern
CAPACITY
Production T
(Bcf/yr)
2500
950
hare)
field
ransport
2500
1000
700
700
850 850
360
1000
460Pipeline
882.5
1059Urengoi pipeline
MARGINAL COSTS
Variable Total
($/Mcf)
0.05 0.05
0.4 0.4
0.5
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.35
0.5
0.6
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.35
0.5
0.6
B. EXISTING FIELDS AND NEW TRANSPORT CAPACITY
Algeria
Hassi R'Mel
Rhourde Nousse
USSR
Additional compression on
Urengoi
C. NEW FIELD DEVELOPMENT AND
Norway
Troll
Sleipner
Askaladden
USSR
Yamburg
TRANSPORT
2500
500
400
1000 1000
4000
800
4000
800
350
1
1.4
0.75
2500
500
400
1.5
3.5
3
2.5
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The next section examines the main producing nations, to wit, the
Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, Algeria and the Soviet Union,
in some detail. A brief history and some discussion of producer policies
is provided for each country, but the main emphasis is on the cost
structure of their respective supplies. The section concludes by unifying
the analysis of the economics of the individual supplies to offer an
overview of the economics of natural gas supply for Western Europe.
The final section discusses future developments, beginning with an
overview of forecasts performed by other organizations. Our own
expectations are discussed, including observations on marginal cost
trends in both the short- and long-term, and on the impact of changed
perceptions toward energy resources on the development of future supply.
Appendix B presents data on existing Western European natural gas
contracts.
INTRODUCTION
The oil price spike of 1979-80 provided not only economic but
political impetus for Western European consumers to sign large, long-term
contracts to import natural gas. However, by agreeing to large price
increases for volumes covered in old contracts as well as for new volumes,
they not only rendered large amounts of gas economic to develop but also
set into motion events that would drastically reduce demand. The end
result has been a severe glut of supply for the past several years.
Although recent contract renegotiations have led to reductions in
deliveries, Western Europe still will have to cope with this glut for
years to come, including supplies still under contract, the surplus
3-11
production and delivery capacity that now exists, plus that from large,
undeveloped reserves. This should produce downward pressure on prices,
even if oil prices recover to previous levels.
The question then is: What will the impact of lower gas prices be
on supply? What resources still can be developed, and where will there
be an impetus to increase sales, to add capacity rather than just to
use existing capacity?
Historical Background of Natural Gas Supply in Western Europe
With its abundant coal reserves, Western Europe produced manufactured
town gas for many years. The natural gas discoveries that did occur
before the 1960s (mainly the Lacq field in France in 1951 and the Po
Valley fields in Italy in the 1950s), were uneconomic to transport long
distances and so were utilized locally. This reflected in part the low
price of oil, which was gas's major competitor, plus the lack of an
existing pipeline distribution system. Only the availability of
substantial volumes would provide the assurances necessary to encourage
the development of an infrastructure to transport gas any great distance,
and so development of national gas markets did not occur.
The 1959 discovery of the supergiant Groningen field in the
Netherlands changed the situation dramatically. Within five years, the
Dutch realized that their gas reserves were so huge that they dwarfed
potential domestic consumption. (Even now, after a quarter century of
exploitation, Groningen could satisfy domestic consumption for 40 years
into the future.) Because the field was so large and the costs of
production so low, it was profitable for the Dutch to price the gas low
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enough to ensure the development of a pipeline transmission system
throughout Western Europe to utilize it.1
The Groningen discovery also encouraged oil companies to begin
drilling in the British sector of the southern North Sea, an extension
of the same geological formation. There, in 1965, the first of many
natural gas discoveries was made, leading to the development of a
nationwide natural gas grid in the United Kingdom, which to this day is
independent of the continent.
At the same time, the commercialization of LNG technology led to
the signing of small-scale contracts between Algeria and the United
Kingdom and France. Although the early contracts were not particularly
profitable, they did prove the feasibility of the technology. By the
time of the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo, LNG trade had grown several-fold,
with several new contracts between the North African producers of Libya
and Algeria and southern Mediterranean consumers of Spain, Italy, and
France.
When the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo occurred, gas had reached only a 10
percent penetration into the continental market, and new supplies still
were being discovered. The oil price increases of that time provided a
spur to more extensive LNG projects in North Africa, Soviet pipeline
expansion, and increased drilling in the northern North Sea. Although
predominantly oil was discovered, large quantities of associated gas
1 This condition also was seen in the United States, where the wellhead
price of gas in Texas and Louisiana was far less than the wellhead
price of oil because the gas had to be shipped great distances. Algeria
was able to approach f.o.b. parity for gas as a result of the panic
generated by the oil crises in the 1970s, consumer government perceptions
of resource scarcity, and their zeal to obtain supply at any price.
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were found as well. In 1976, the British began planning the FLAGS
system to utilize their associated natural gas, while the Norwegians
built the 15 Bcm/yr (530 Bcf/yr) Norpipe system to tap the 170 Bcm (6
Tcf) of associated gas in the Ekofisk field and land it in continental
Europe, as well as the 20 Bcm/yr (730 Bcf/yr) Frigg pipelines to deliver
gas from the Frigg field to the United Kingdom.
As a result, Western European gas consumption grew from 10 percent
of the total fuels market in 1973 to 14 percent in 1978; and while
domestic production grew 19 percent, imports more than doubled, providing
60 percent of gas supplies.2 After the second oil price shock, consumers
frantically sought to contract for new gas supplies, while the Dutch
revised their export policy to take advantage of the new atmosphere of
perceived scarcity. In essence, they refused to extend their existing
contracts, allowing exports to decline as contracts expired, thus
"preserving" the remaining Groningen reserves for domestic consumption.
To make matters worse, the new Iranian government tightened the market by
cancelling the IGAT-2 project, which was to have transferred 10
Bcm/yr (350 Bcf/yr) to Western Europe over the Soviet pipeline network.
Thus, Western European demand for natural gas from Algeria, Norway,
and the Soviet Union increased substantially. In response, these
countries increased their price expectations. Algeria, in particular,
demanded parity with f.o.b. crude oil prices, which would have made
delivered LNG more expensive than equivalent delivered oil products.
While importers resisted that pricing concept, they did agree to pay much
OECD Energy Balances. In this instance, Norwegian gas is considered
an import.
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higher prices on both new and existing contracts. As a result large
amounts of production and transportation capacity were added.
However, the combination of recession and higher gas prices resulted
in much lower levels of demand. Initially, consumers responded by
underlifting on contracts that had either no or weak take-or-pay clauses,
mainly the Dutch contracts, then renegotiating lower and more flexible
take levels on other contracts. Only recently have customers demanded
price reductions, and they have received some.
Yet gas frequently is being delivered for more than the equivalent
crude oil price. Low oil prices can be expected to worsen further the
outlook for gas prices further, and the viability of some new gas supply
projects now may be in doubt. The recent signing of the Troll contract,
for example, envisaged a 1995 oil price of $28/bbl, and some participants
are concerned that the project will not be viable at lower levels.3 This
will be discussed in greater detail below.
Western European Natural Gas Resources
As mentioned in our previous studies of international natural gas
supply, neither reserves nor resources are a fixed stock. Both are
increased by investment in facilities and in knowledge. Thus, the fact
that Western European natural gas "proved reserves" are equal to 34
years of production or 27 years of consumption says little about future
gas availability. The rapid growth in reserves in the last two decades
(seen in Figure 3) is a much more important indicator of supply trends,
3 See WSJ, 8/12/86, p. 32.
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Figure 3-3
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as is the level of drilling (shown in Figure 4) and the market price
for natural gas (in Figure 5).
In assessing the natural gas resources available to Western Europe
in the long-term future, estimates of undiscovered gas are indicative
at best. (See Table 2 for estimates made by the U.S. Geological Survey.)
These estimates define undiscovered reserves as gas that would be economic
to produce given current prices, technology, and operating conditions,
including tax regime. Since these factors all change over time, the
amount of undiscovered producible gas will change as well.
The reserves north of 620 N off the Norwegian coast provide a
perfect example of how changing conditions impact the definition of
undiscovered reserves. At present, any but the largest undiscovered
gas field that might exist in the Askeladden area probably would be
considered uneconomic and thus not be included in the resource estimate
shown in Table 2. With the development of the Haltenbanken area further
south, and the construction of a pipeline from there to the Continent, the
incremental cost of hooking up the Askeladden field would fall, forcing a
reassessment of the viability of those resources, possibly allowing a
number of large potential deposits to be added to the "undiscovered
reserves" category.
Further, if the pipeline were extended northward to exploit the
large, existing gas fields at Askeladden, then smaller fields would
only have to bear the incremental cost of being attached to the
trunkline. This would allow much smaller gas fields to be defined as
economic, assuming a constant landed price for the gas, and the resource
base would be greatly increased.
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Table 3-2
Undiscovered Reserves - Northwest Europe
Undiscovered Reserves Assessment
(Tcf)
Low High Mean
Volume South of 62 N
(Areas I and II)
United Kingdom 7.6 27.8 16.4
Norway 32.2 118.3 69.6
Denmark 0.9 3.5 2.0
Germany 0.5 1.8 1.0
The Netherlands 5.2 19.1 11.4
Ireland 0.9 3.5 2.0
Total 47.3 174.0 102.4
Volume North of 62 N
Norway 17.9 127.6 65.0
Total 65.2 301.6 167.4
Volume in Total Northwest
Europe Assessment Area 92.0 258.0 167.0
Total Assessment Area:
Demonstrated Reserves: 222 Tcf
Inferred Reserves: n.a.
Cumulative Production
(1/1/82) 40 Tcf
Notes: Area I consists of Viking and Central Grabens,
Morray Firth basin, and partial Ireland area.
Area II consists of Southern North Seas basin
and partial Ireland area.
Total assessment area includes all of the North Sea,
as well as parts of onshore Netherlands, Belgium,
and France.
Source: H. D. Klemme and Charles Masters, "Assessment of
Undiscovered Conventionally Recoverable Petroleum
Resources of the Northwest European Assessment
Area," USGS Open File Report 84-094, USGS, Washington
D.C., 1984.
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FIGURE 3-5
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Given proved reserves of over 30 years of supply, plus undiscovered
reserves that would roughly double this, natural gas supplies in Western
Europe seem quite secure. Since the Soviet Union and Algeria have
reserve-to-production ratios of 70 and over 100, respectively, few
concerns about adequacy of supply are necessary.
Economics of North Sea Supply
In early 1986, the North Sea received considerable attention as
one of two "high-cost" areas most at risk from falling oil prices. In
fact, average development plus operating costs for oil in the British
North Sea in 1984 were on the order of $7/bbl, with operating costs
alone some $2/bbl.4 Variable costs are naturally higher than the average
for some fields, especially smaller ones, but large-scale forced shut-ins
are not foreseen.5 Even so, these costs are well below 1985 oil prices,
and obviously much oil field development, at least, is quite viable
economically if the tax regime allows it. Tax levels today are under
intensive scrutiny in both Norway and the United Kingdom for precisely
this reason.
However, the development of natural gas reserves is a different
matter. Even with prices for oil and gas equal at the point of
M.A. Adelman, "The Competitive Floor to World Oil Prices," MIT Energy
Laboratory Working Paper No. MIT-EL 86-011WP, Cambridge, Mass, 1986,
forthcoming in The Energy Journal.
5 Some analysts have suggested forced shut-ins will not occur in the
North Sea above $5/bbl. The U.K. Energy Department has calculated
production costs for older fields at $9/bbl, $15/bbl for more recent
fields, and $21/bbl for fields now under development, but this obviously
includes development as well as variable costs. See PIW, 5/5/86, p. 3.
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consumption, the wellhead value of gas per unit of heat content is
lower than oil because of its higher transportation and distribution
costs. Moreover, at the point of consumption, gas is restricted to
less valuable stationary uses, where it competes mainly with coal and
residual fuel oil.
Additionally, a number of policy decisions have altered the economic
environment in which gas field development takes place. The monopsony
powers of the British Gas Corporation (BGC) in the British North Sea
depressed wellhead prices for natural gas in the southern sector,
drastically reducing incentives for finding and development. Recent steps
to reverse this situation have resulted in increased drilling and
discoveries.6 Similarly, price controls in Italy have suppressed
production, while West Germany at one point shut-in domestic production in
favor of imports with high take-or-pay clauses.
For gas reserves associated with oil, development and operating
costs are limited to the costs of processing and transporting the gas.
However, as will be shown below, these are not negligible. On the
other hand, associated gas and gas condensate fields contain substantial
amounts of liquids, whose sales can yield substantial revenues. This can
greatly enhance a project's viability.
6 After BGC began paying higher prices for gas from the southern North
Sea, one industry journal said a "Second Boom Grips UK Gas Basin..."
IGR, 4/13/84, p. 4. More recently, spending is being reduced by a
number of major operators, such as BP and Britoil, and a recent report
indicated that rig requirements have been cut 14 percent in the last
three months. Still, a number of discoveries have been made in the
southern sector that promise substantial reserve additions.
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Unlike the United States, most North Sea production comes from a
handful of fields. Thus, analysis of the resource economics is largely
project analysis. Discerning marginal cost trends for the North Sea
basin is made more difficult by the small sample size. Transportation
costs cannot be generalized, given the differences in terrain which
pipelines must cross. Still, past and expected development costs can
be examined, as well as the role transporation costs play in delivering
natural gas. The section below describes the methods applied to
individual countries and projects.
Cost Assessment
There are a variety of methods by which to assess the costs of
delivered natural gas: project evaluation, rate-of-return assessment,
and so forth. The methods used in this chapter, which have been explained
in detail in previous reports,7 are determined by project types and the
available data. This section provides a brief review of the method of
calculation and assumptions used in analyzing costs; they are discussed in
more detail in Appendix A.
By "cost" we mean the price that would make it barely worthwhile
for a producing company to develop a given gas deposit, setting taxes
equal to zero. That is, the discounted value of future revenues must
exactly equal value of the capital expenditures. This yields the
annualized marginal cost per unit of a project with a given time profile.
See especially the North American report, pp. 22-25, and the East
Asia-Pacific report, Table 5.
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This cost is the baseline for the contracting parties, i.e., the
producing company and the government. They must measure this cost in
order to agree on taxes and other obligations incumbent upon the producing
company.
The great bulk of cost consists of the return on the necessary
investment. To calculate this, need the following is needed:
Capital expenditures for development, excluding those for
exploration and bonuses, rentals, royalties, acreage acquisition, and
other expenditures not needed for development. It covers field
development, which includes the costs of platforms, drilling, and
connecting wells and field pipelines.
Reserves, which are total cumulative output through the
facilities purchased by the capital expenditures.
Annual output, in the initial and in subsequent years, over
the lifetime of the project.
The cost of capital, or minimum acceptable rate of return.
Given these complete data, one can write the following equation:
P * -e- (a+i)T (K/R) * T
(a+i)
where P is the supply price, or cost, a is the depletion rate, i is the
rate of return, or discount rate, K is the total capital expenditure, R
is the amount of reserves, and T is the time of production.
The rationale underlying this equation is that a single unit produced
each year over the life of the project is worth its present value, stated
on the left-hand side of the equation. There will be T units delivered,
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each costing (K/R) up front. Given realistic values of i, a, and T, the
left-hand side is usually simply equal to P/(a+i).
The equation can be used in either of two ways. First, we can
take an appropriate rate of return i, and calculate a cost or supply
price per Mcf of gas. This yields the lowest price that would make the
investment barely worthwhile. Or, given a market price, the rate of
return which the investor would receive (if there were no taxes) can be
calculated. A government must begin with this rate, and attempt to
obtain the highest possible share of it, up to the point where the
company would abort the project, rather than accept anything less.
The chief problems are with obtaining the data and with using
approximations to cover gaps in the data. For Algeria and the Soviet
Union, there are few or no data on capital expenditures. These are
estimated by using U.S. drilling and non-drilling costs for similar
depth classes and geological environments. In the North Sea, expenditures
are generally available by project. We think they generally tend to
overstatement, perhaps for the sake of bargaining, or because of
gold-plating or featherbedding. We make no corrections on this account.
In some important cases, costs are so low that even an extravagant margin
for error would not matter.
Reserves developed are publicly known for nearly every project or
field, though the definitions used and the reliability of the data,
vary widely.
Expenditures divided by reserves yield "in-ground costs" per unit.
Other information is needed to derive "above-ground costs", or cost at the
wellhead. An Mcf of gas in the ground is an asset, which must be held a
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certain length of time before it can be sold off. If each Mcf could be
sold as soon as it was purchased, below-ground costs would equal wellhead
costs. If it could all be sold in the first year, i.e., a decline rate of
100 percent per year, in-ground costs plus the needed return for one year,
would equal the wellhead cost. In general, the higher the decline rate,
the quicker the return, and hence the lower the necessary rate of return
and the smaller the multiplier that transforms in-ground costs to wellhead
costs.
The pattern of production and its decline rate is often unstated
and we are compelled to approximate it in various ways detailed in
Appendix A.
The necessary equity rate of return for companies producing oil
and natural gas in the United States and Canada is about 10 percent,
real. For field development in the Western European area, howeve, we
use 12 percent, reflecting a somewhat higher degree of geological risk.
For pipelines, which can be used by any field in the operating area, a 10
percent rate is used. The reader can easily substitute other rates.
Operating costs are assumed to be 5 percent of capital expenditures,
(see Appendix A for a more detailed explanation). However, for LNG
plants, 3 percent of capital expenditures is used and fuel costs are added
in separately.
Pipeline capital expenditures have been reported for all major
Western European projects, so transportation costs can be calculated
from actual data, using the methods described in Appendix A. However,
geographical diversity makes a rule-of-thumb for transportation costs
impossible to develop.
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Given the wildly fluctuating exchange rates of the last decade, it
seems inappropriate to use actual exchange rates to convert costs from
foreign currencies into U.S. dollars. Thus, we have chosen to rely on
the purchasing power parity index developed by the OECD.8 Lacking any
accurate inflation index for drilling or pipeline construction costs
that would be applicable to the diverse areas covered in this chapter,
the implicit price deflator for the U.S. gross national product was
used to convert current-year dollars into 1985 dollars.
In many cases, natural gas is not an independent product. It is
frequently either associated with oil or contains liquids. In both
cases, the economics are different from those of a dry gas field. For
associated gas, since the costs of production must be borne by the oil
being produced regardless of whether the gas is flared or piped to
shore, the marginal cost of the gas is the cost of transportation. For
gas fields that contain liquids, the cost of processing the liquids
cannot be separated from the rest of the field development expenditures,
and so the value of the liquids is subtracted from the cost of producing ;
the gas. A $10/bbl value is assumed for the liquids, correlating to a low
price for crude oil. Appendix A discusses the rationale and methods
behind this in more detail.
8 See Michael Ward, Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures in
the OECD, Organization of Economic ooperation and Development, Paris,
France, 1985.
3-27
Rents to Government and Costs to Operators
In analyzing the economics of natural gas supply, taxes and other
sources of rent are omitted for several reasons. First, the sheer
complexity of the various systems, each bearing differently upon each
individual operator and even upon each project. But even if every
aspect of taxes could be accounted for, this approach would not be
wise. More salient is the amount of rent attainable on the production
of natural gas in any given country or region. The division of rents
is a condition that the parties to a contract must negotiate. Our
objective is to show both sides (and other parties) the approximate
value of a project--which may be zero.
This leads to the second reason for omitting taxes and rents. The
rent to the government usually acts as a cost to the operator. Therefore,
a project that yields a positive pre-tax rate of return is perhaps not
worth undertaking post-tax. Both parties thereby lose. The company is
not a free agent, of course, and the government may not be either,
depending on the circumstances. It may be constrained by public opinion
to believe that "there's gold in them thar wells", and that failure to
demand more rent reflects timidity or corruption by government personnel.
Conversely, the operator may miscalculate or misstate costs. Thus, in the
short run, rents to the government are a cost to the operator, and the
short run may extend forever if both sides dig in. In the long run, both
sides are better off if they negotiate on the basis of costs as they exist
in reality.
Third, rents do not necessarily take the form of taxes. They may
be obsolete cost factors (a particularly important factor in deep-water
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development, where platform costs have decreased dramatically in the
last ten years). Or they may be "gold-plating" of installations, or a
payoffs, or overpayment of personnel, or requirements for domestic
purchase of goods or services that are available more cheaply from
foreign sources. Or they may be requirements to produce uneconomic oil
or gas deposits, either to satisfy some local interest and produce
local jobs, or to placate the fetish to preserve "precious, non-renewable
resources". There are many such possibilities, and they could not
possibly be measured here.
When announced investment plans are considered, and unit costs
calculated from them, we do not subtract imbedded rents. Some of these
rents exist to comply with government requirements. Moreover,
corporations are rarely suspected of understating the costs that are
submitted to governments and to public scrutiny. Nevertheless, there
is usually no way of peering behind the announced numbers.
Project investments calculated by using factors drawn from the
United States are relatively rent-free as far as factor inflation is
concerned from 1984 onward. There were many private rents in previous
years, generated by rapid expansion and resultant inefficiencies, but
we consider them to be largely squeezed out now. Of course, since the
U.S. numbers are averages, there is considerably more margin for error
in either direction.
The next section describes the main producing countries in more
detail, followed by a short section describing the small producers and
potential suppliers to Western Europe, such as Qatar and Nigeria.
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NATURAL GAS PRODUCING COUNTRIES
Although a large fraction of the natural gas consumed in Western
Europe is produced domestically, the future of the market will depend
in large part on the behavior of a handful of countries that have large
gas reserves available for export. This section examines the Netherlands,
Norway, the Soviet Union, and Algeria, plus the United Kingdom, which has
the potential to be either an importer or exporter, depending on future
prices and policies.
The Netherlands
With the 1959 discovery of the supergiant Groningen field, the
Netherlands ushered in the age of natural gas into Western Europe.
Like other countries, small deposits and manufactured gas had provided
supplies prior to that time, covering 1 to 2 percent of Dutch energy
needs,9 with a growing natural gas industry due to a number of field
discoveries. However, the Groningen field proved to be so large that
it allowed a massive conversion of the Dutch economy to natural gas.
Originally estimated to contain 2 Tcf of reserves, Groningen was
repeatedly upgraded so by 1963 reserves were put at nearly 40 Tcf,
although today they are believed to be twice that large.1 0 Although
Dutch long-term planning entails a horizon distant enough to see depletion
affecting the reservoir, Groningen will be a major factor in Western
European gas trade for years to come.
In 1960, roughly 60 percent of gas consumed was manufactured gas.
OECD Energy Balances.
10 J. Davis, Blue Gold, p. 156.
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Although the economics of Dutch gas revolve around the Groningen
reserves, other, smaller fields, both onshore and offshore, have come
to play an increasing part in Dutch production (see Figure 6). What
stands out is the fact that Groningen is a huge reservoir, with high
productivity, at medium depths, in an area having superb infrastructure,
all suggesting that its gas is extremely cheap to produce. This is
confirmed by the fact that, although the border price in the mid-1960s was
as low as $0.33/Mcf, 11 72 percent of the revenues were reported to be
going to the government in the form of taxes, dividends, and royalties.12
The amount of revenue left to cover production costs and corporate return
on capital could not have been large.
Our analysis of costs, discussed below, confirms this, with
development and operating costs estimated to be below $0.10/Mcf. Even
assuming a large margin of error, there is little chance that the costs
in this field can be significant relative to the value of the gas in
the marketplace. (The costs of other Dutch fields, where known, are
discussed below.)
Having gas that was far too abundant to be consumed domestically
and able to compete with oil prices in the 1960s (even allowing for the
costs of constructing new transmission/distribution systems) opened the
door for Western Europe to enter the gas age. Contracts were signed,
first with small consumers on the borders, then with the West Germans,
Belgians, and French. Export prices were on the order of $0.40/Mcf,
11 Davis, op. cit., p. 161.
12 PPS, 4/65, p. 149.
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with links to low-sulfur fuel oil that would allow 70-75 percent of any
change in oil prices to be reflected in gas prices after some delay.
Dutch policy was to allow development of the Groningen field in a
measured way, so as to avoid disruption of energy markets. In other
words, prices should be similar to competing fuels, which had the benefit
of increasing rents to producers, and especially to the Dutch government.
The other Western European countries proved to be willing buyers, and the
establishment of a continental natural gas market was begun.
Within a few years, however, the spectre of competition appeared,
as Soviet natural gas exports were offered in quantity. (Contracts for
25 Bcm/yr (880 Bcf/yr) were signed in the early 1970s, although the
first Soviet export pipeline, to Eastern Europe, was finished in 1967.
Its current capacity is 28 Bcm/yr.1 3) Concern about this development
led to the first Dutch export contract signed at a fixed price, with
Italy, for 6 Bcm/yr (210 Bcf/yr), in 1970.14
Then the oil price hikes accompanying the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo
increased both the demand for and price of gas, and energy markets
underwent drastic change and the suppliers' fear of competition was
replaced by the consumers' fear of shortages. In addition, the added
premium for more secure energy supplies meant that natural gas' value
relative to oil was perceived to have increased, although perceptions
differed among producers, importing governments, and actual consumers.
This allowed the Dutch to ask for and receive much higher prices for
Davis, op. cit., p. 124.
14 PE, 6/74, p. 228.
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their exports, including renegotiation of the Italian contract that
raised the base price and included an ndexation to oil.
At the same time, the new atmosphere of perceived resource scarcity
led Dutch policymakers to become concerned about the future of domestic
energy resources. Gasunie felt that its gas reserves needed to be
"conserved" for more valuable uses, and not "wasted" where less noble
fuels would suffice. Thus, the Dutch gave priority to the distribution
companies serving residential and small commercial users; ultimately,
supplies for electricity generation were to be phased out. The plan was
to allow export contracts to expire without renewal or extension, leaving
enough reserves to supply domestic needs well into the next century.
After 1973, at which time 50 percent of the then-known reserves were
committed, no new contracts were signed.
This policy also was reflected in Dutch attempts to acquire gas
from other sources to prolong the availability of cheaper domestic
gas. Thus, The Dutch signed a contract with Norway for 1.7 Bcm/yr (60
Bcf/yr) from the Ekofisk field, and, in 1978, for 4 Bcm/yr (140 Bcf/yr)
of Algerian LNG to be delivered starting in 1984, though this was
subsequently cancelled.1 5 Negotiations to import gas from the Soviet
Union also were undertaken, but no contract was signed.
The increase in gas prices also meant a startling increase in
government revenues. By 1975, half of all corporate taxes came from
the gas industry, and royalties and the profits from the state's share
of Gasunie were even larger. Of government revenues in 1975, 8 percent
15 PE, 12/78 p. 533.
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came from the gas industry.1 6 This increased the value of Dutch currency
and made non-gas exports more difficult, leading to the coining of the
term "Dutch disease" to denote the damage to non-mineral sectors of the
economy that resulted from large-scale mineral exports.
With the second oil price shock in 1979, the Dutch demanded new
changes in their contracts. By spring 1980, higher oil prices and the
expressed willingness of consumers to pay higher prices to other
exporters, led the Dutch Economics Minister to threaten to halt exports
if gas price renegotiations were not satisfactory. The result was much
higher prices and a change to indexation with low-sulfur fuel oil prices,
readjusted monthly. At the same time, the Dutch refused Algerian demands
for higher, crude oil-related prices on their LNG contract, and as a
result it was cancelled.
However, the Dutch did not have the same take-or-pay protection as
their competitors. When the additional supplies and the higher prices
clashed with the weakening economy, commitments to take gas could not
be met and the Dutch bore the brunt of the loss. For example, France
cut back its cheaper Dutch supplies in 1982 by 39 percent while Algeria's
market share increased by one third, despite its higher price.17
Overall, Dutch exports fell drastically, by 30 percent in 1982,
with overall sales (i.e., including domestic) falling 12 percent. With
the increased prices, revenues were slower to fall, though they were
16 From International Financial Statistics, International Monetary
Fund, and PE, 8/75, p. 295.
17 PIW, 5/2/83, p. 11.
3-35
far below those anticipated, and this discrepancy caused some economic
problems.
In 1983, the reduction in sales and the addition of reserves from
new discoveries led to an official reassessment: Gas supplies were no
longer to be hoarded for future domestic use. The Dutch now sought new
contracts (especially with the United Kingdom) and ten-year extensions
of old contracts, at the same time reducing prices to defend existing
market share. Price indices were changed to include gasoil, rather
than just low-sulphur fuel oil, which had the effect of making them
more responsive to changes in the heating market and lowering them
slightly as of October 1, 1984.18 Appendix B shows the extensions that
have been signed to date.
The Dutch were, in fact, disappointed at BGC's reaction to their
offer of supply. The Minister for Economic Affairs indicated that
"...statements suggesting that such gas is over-priced astonish me."19
In fact, the Dutch said they had offered to be competitive on price,
flexible on supply, and to finance the pipeline. 2 0 Despite all this,
BGC apparently felt comfortable with the cushion of supply that would
be provided by the impending Sleipner deal and the existing domestic
supply, and turned the Dutch away.
Dutch policy now has come full circle. At present, the Dutch rely
on competitive prices to maintain export levels. Although they still
18 FT, 1/21/85, "Netherlands Survey," p. IV.
19 IGR, 4/13/84, p. 7. Dutch gas was argued to be 10 to 20 percent
more expensive than Sleipner gas. See PE, 5/84, pp. 188-189.
20 PE, 5/84, p. 189.
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have gas available for export, however, major increases in exports
probably will not be sought while oil prices are low.
The Resource Base
It is not possible to separate the role of Groningen gas in the
Dutch resource base from that of other, smaller fields. Increasingly
higher estimates of the reserves in Groningen have helped undo the
Dutch perception that it is a rapidly depleting resource.2 1 Beyond
that, the discovery of numerous fields in the Dutch North Sea has provided
a significant boost to reserves. Figure 7 shows the rate of growth in all
Dutch reserves over the last two decades.
The Economics of Dutch Supply
Table 3 indicates that, given what is known about well depth and
productivity, the cost of gas from Groningen appears to be lower than
one cent per Mcf.2 2 This would seem astonishing but for the nature of
the reservoir as described above, which suggests that Groningen gas is
among the world's cheapest. No field today has similar characteristics
and is also located in a major consuming area.
21 IPE, 1977 puts total reserves at 58 Tcf, while Peebles, 1980, (cited
in Davis, op. cit., p. 156) states that industry put them at 70 Tcf.
22 An early report suggested that well productivity for one of the
initial clusters would be 26 MMcf/d, substantially lower than that
reported in the 1977 IPE. Even so, this would increase costs only to
the vicinity of 140/2-T $0.006/Mcf, or $0.03/Mcf. See PPS September
1963, p. 346. In a later report, modifications in well -design were
said to have increased well productivity from approximately 50 MMcf/d
in the first 14 clusters of 8 to 11 wells, to as much as 110 MMcf/d in
subsequent clusters. See WO, 1/73, pp. 38-39.
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Figure 3-7
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Table 3-3
Dutch Gas Development-Operating Costs
Groningen
1 Drilling and equipping costs per well 640 ($ M)
2 Allowance for non-drilling costs per well 480 ($ M)
3 Allowance for gathering per well 340 ($ M)
4 Total development costs per well 1460 ($ M)
5 Depletion 0.04
6 Annual development-operating costs per well 307 ($ M)
7 Development-operating costs per day per well 840 ($)
8 Average production rate per well 140 (MMcfd)
9 Average development-operating costs as sold 140 (MMcfd)
10 Marginal development-operating costs as sold 0.006 ($/Mcf)
11 Development costs in ground 0.008 ($/Mcf)
0.001 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. Joint Association Survey, 1984, figure for 9,500',
Onshore Texas. 1984 development costs converted
to $ 1985 using implicit price deflator from
Economic Report a_ the President.
2. Assumed to be 75% of line 1.
3. Assumed to be 30% of line 1 + line 2.
5. 1984 Dutch production / Dutch reserves at year end,
from Qil and GS Journal, December 31, 1984, p. 74.
6. Line 4 * (0.12 + 0.04 +0.05), allowing 12% discount
rate, 4% depletion, 5% operating costs.
7. Line 6 / 365.
8. International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1977, p. 239.
9. Line 7 / ((line 8) * 1000).
10. (line 9) * ((line 5 + i) / i) i = 0.12.
11. Delevopment costs at wellhead = line 4 * 0.16 / 51,100
MMcf/year = $O0.005/Mcf (0.16 = depletion + discount rate,
51,000 MMcf = yearly production).
Development costs in ground = development costs at
wellhead divided by (1 + (i / a)) i = 0.12, a = 0.04.
IS
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In the Netherlands, the role of Groningen is dominant, although
the Dutch increasingly are turning to higher-cost supplies. The smaller
offshore fields naturally are more expensive.
At present, however, there is not enough information to estimate
the long-term marginal cost trend in the Netherlands. Several field
development reports, shown in Tables 4 through 6, show that the offshore
fields are much more expensive than Groningen. This suggests that
marginal costs for the Dutch can be expected to increase, but also
that future supplies will not provide rents for the government on the
scale that gas Groningen has.
Norway
After the presence of hydrocarbons was found in the southern North
Sea, albeit natural gas and not oil, drilling moved to the northern
areas, where water depths were likely deeper and the weather worse, but
where prospects for oil were thought to be good. The Ekofisk field,
located in 1968, was the first of the major oil discoveries. Its large
reserves of associated gas led to the development of the Norpipe pipeline
system for deliveries to Emden, West Germany. The first large gas field,
Frigg, with 10 Tcf of reserves, was discovered in 1972, and led to a
contract with the United Kingdom for delivery of up to 15 Bcm/yr (530
Bcf/yr). 23
23
Reserves, of which 40 percent are in the U.K. sector, from IPE,
1977, p. 239. Delivery volumes are geared to production, and td
Norwegian exports have been about 12 Bcm/yr (425 Bcf/yr). See BP Review
of World Gas.
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Table 3-4
Dutch Gas Development-Operating Costs
Ameland Field
1 Drilling and equipping costs per well 3.15 ($ MM)
2 Allowance for non-drilling costs per well 2.36 ($ MM)
3 Allowance for gathering per well 1.65 ($ MM)
4 Total development costs per well 7.16 ($ MM)
5 Depletion 0.05
6 Annual development-operating costs per well 1.58 ($ MM)
7 Development-operating costs per day per well 4.33 ($ M)
8 Average production rate per well 33.300 (MMcfd)
9 Average development-operating costs as sold 0.130 ($/Mcf)
10 Marginal development-operating costs as sold 0.184 ($/Mcf)
11 Development costs in ground 0.029 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. Joint Association Survey, 1984, figure for 10,000',
Offshore Louisiana. 1984 development costs converted
to $ 1985 using implicit price deflator from
Economic Report f tht President.
2. Assumed to be 75% of line 1.
3. Assumed to be 30% of line 1 + line 2.
5. Assumed, 1984 Dutch production / Dutch reserves
at year end = 0.04, from Oil and Gas Journal, December 31, 1984,
p. 74. 0.05 used due to low Groningen depletion.
6. Line 4 * (0.12 + 0.05 + 0.05), allowing 12% discount
rate 5% depletion, 5% operating costs.
7. Line 6 / 365.
8. Qil an Gas Journal, January 27, 1986, p.68.
9. Line 7 / line 8.
10. (line 9) * ((line 5 + i) / i) i = 0.12.
11. Development costs at wellhead = line 4 * 0.17 / 12.16 Bcf/
year = $0.100/Mcf (.17 = depletion + discount rate,
12.16 Bcf = yearly production).
Development costs in ground = development costs at wellhead
divided by (1 + (i / a)) i = 0.12, a = 0.05.
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Table 3-5
Dutch Gas Development-Operating Costs
F/3 Project (F/2, F/3,, F/6 Fields)
Oil & Gas Project
1. Development costs
2. Reserves
3. Average production rate
4. Depletion (Q/R)
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development-operating costs as sold
9. Development-operating costs as sold,
adjusted for condensate production
650 ($MM)
423 (Bcf)
66 (Bcf/year)
0.156
1.537
2.718
0.492
3.210
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
2.546 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1981, p. 204.
Development cost given in $ 1981, converted to $ 1985
using implicit price deflator from Economic Report
Qf the President.
2,3. World Oil, August 15, 1985, p. 78.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
7. Line 8 - (yearly revenue from oil sales / line 3)
- line 8 - ((4,380,000 bbl) * ($lO/bbl)) / (line 3 * 1000).
Oil production rate from World Oil. August 15, 1985,
p. 78. $10 oil price assumed.
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Table 3-6
Dutch Gas Development-Operating Costs
Zuidwal Field
1. Development costs 432 ($MM)
2. Reserves 883 (Bcf)
3. Peak output 53 (Bcf/year)
4. Field life 20 (years)
5. Depletion 0.019
6. Development costs in ground 0.489 ($/Mcf)
7. Development costs as sold 1.208 ($/Mcf)
8. Operating costs 0.408 ($/Mcf)
9. Development-operating costs as sold 1.616 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1,2,4. International Gas Report, September 28, 1984, p. 7.
Development costs given in Guilders 1984, converted to
$ 1985 by dividing by the 1984 Purchasing Power
Parity, from Purchasing Power Parity and Real Expenditures
in tbhe fl D, and multiplying by the ratio of 1984 / 1985
implicit price deflator from the Economic Report of
the President. (Note that the costs include a 15 kilometer
pipeline.)
3. Petroleum Economist, September 1983, p. 360.
5. a = 0.019 to satify the equation Q * (1 - exp (-at)) = aR
Q = 53, t = 20.
6. Line 1 / line 2.
7. c = (line 1 * (i + a)) / (line 3 * (1 - exp (-(i + a) * t)))
i = 0.12, a = 0.019, t = 20.
8. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
9. Line 7 + line 8.
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The Norwegian sector of the North Sea has not proven to be as gas
prone as the southern North Sea, although several smaller fields, like
Cod, have been connected to the Ekofisk pipeline and sold into continental
Europe. The third major gas development was the Statfjord sale, in 1981,
which involved associated gas located 150 miles north of Frigg, well to
the north of Ekofisk. It entailed laying the longest underwater pipeline
in the world, partly to allow the wet gas to be processed at Karsto, in
Norway, before transshipment to the continent.
Subsequently, however, the industry began discovering more gas
than oil--specifically the Sleipner and Troll fields-- while the area
north of 620 N, opened for drilling in 1979, yielded almost exclusively
gas. Given transportation costs, this northerly gas is much less likely
to be developed than similarly located oil fields would be. (The precise
economics, insofar as they have been estimated, are discussed below.)
After the sale of Statfjord gas to a consortium of buyers in
continental Europe, the Norwegians turned next to marketing the Sleipner
field, located 200 miles north of Ekofisk and containing about 7 Tcf of
reserves. Given the glut in natural gas supplies on the continent and the
optimistic price expectations of the Norwegians, only the United
Kingdom showed real interest. After protracted negotiations, an agreement
with the BGC was reached in late 1984. This included a base price of
$4.10/Mcf ($1.40/Mcf less than the Statfjord base price, partly reflecting
the drop in oil prices), lower volumes than the Norwegians had wanted to
sell, especially peak volumes, and a sharing of the tax revenues from the
gas liquids pipeline, which the British wanted landed in the United
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Kingdom with the gas, but which the Norwegians insisted on landing in
Norway.
However, in early 1985 the U.K. government intervened and cancelled
the deal for a variety of reasons (discussed below). This left the
Norwegians with a "small" gas field unsold at the same time they were
trying to market the much larger Troll field. This suggested to the
Norwegians that Troll gas would be much harder to sell than originally
thought.
The Norwegians floated several responses to the Sleipner
cancellation. First, they suggested that, given unwillingness to accept
the gas contracts being offered, oil field development would be
accelerated to maintain the domestic offshore service industry, and
further supplies of gas simply would not be forthcoming. A second
tactic was a change to offering quantities of gas rather than entire
fields, leaving the development decision and source of gas to by made
by the Norwegians. Of course, new contracts still would have to involve
large quantities if fields like Troll were to be developed, but smaller
fields could provide incremental volumes. (In fact, the Tommeliten field,
which contains only 750 Bcf, is slated for development to provide several
years of supplies to the Ekofisk field to help with its subsidence
problem.)
Thus, it came as quite a surprise to many observers in spring 1986
when not only was a contract concluded that would justify development
of Troll, but that would include the Sleipner field as well. By all
accounts, the buyers were seeking gas from Troll, and the Norwegian
government encouraged them to increase purchases to cover Sleipner
3-45
also. To date, many details of this deal are not clear, but an analysis
of the economics of the development is provided below, followed by a more
general analysis of Norwegian supply economics.
Troll
Except for the Soviet-Western European contract for Urengoi natural
gas, the Troll contract is the largest ever signed, covering 450 Bcm (1.6
Tcf) of gas to be delivered from 1993 to 2020. At present, reports of
24
project costs are not entirely clear, but some information is available.
Originally, the planned Troll field development called for a $6
billion investment, which would have produced 1.5 Bcf/d and 70 tb/d of
oil.2 5 Gas would be piped over either the Frigg field pipeline or
through the Statpipe system. The plan to include oil production reflected
the government's insistence that oil not be left in the ground.2 6 The
uneconomic oil has now been excluded, and the project was revised to
reduce costs and the length of time required to develop the field.
The volumes of gas to be delivered include 1.76 Tcf from Sleipner
and 14.12 Tcf from Troll. The delivery period is 1993 to 2020, with
gas being delivered first from Sleipner, then from Troll (which makes
24 The Troll development revision was announced only in April 1986, and
details have been forthcoming only in the last few months. Therefore,
much uncertainty lingers as we analyze the development.
25 OGJ, 11/28/83, p. 48.
26 The Norwegians were hardly alone in their belief that the oil must
not be left behind without regard for the economics of its development.
As the Nordic editor of the Financial Times put it, "...only an altruistic
[sic] political decision by the Storting to abandon the oil layer would
make [large-scale gas exports] possible before the next century." See FT,
9/24/82, p. 32.
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up the great bulk of the project). Expenditures fall into three
categories: $1.92 billion for Sleipner development, $3.2 billion for
Troll field development, and $2.56 billion for pipeline and the Zeebrugge
shore terminal construction.2 7
It is hard to say whether the pipeline expenditures are necessary.
Originally, it was expected that Troll gas would be piped the short
distance to the United Kingdom, and either be sold there or piped over
land a short distance, then under the Channel to the Continent. (The
decline of production from Frigg in the mid1990s will also allow
deliveries of increasing amounts of gas to the United Kingdom without new
pipeline construction.) The current project calls for an undersea
pipeline of nearly 700 miles to Belgium, although early volumes will be
sent through Statpipe.28
In any case, the current plan is designed to cover the cost of
laying a new pipeline, and it leaves three-fourths of Troll gas
undeveloped. It therefore is proper to look at the capital costs of
production for the Troll field. The operating conditions are extremely
difficult, since the field lies under 1100 feet of water, yet is so
close to the seabed that directional drilling cannot be used. Still,
very high production rates bring unit costs down to low levels.
Total Troll field capital expenditures are $3.2 billion, which
indicates an in-ground cost of $0.227 per Mcf. However, the formula
(1+(i/a)), developed earlier, cannot be used, since the duration of the
27 OGJ, 6/9/86, p. 19.
28 OGJ, 9/22/86, p. 26.
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flow is limited and there is no indication of any decline rate. Some
simplifying assumptions must therefore be made: that the delivery
period is 23 years, and that there is zero decline. (The lower the
decline rate for any given cumulative output, the higher the cost of
holding the asset in-ground.) The formula equation [7] from Appendix A
can then be used:
P * (1-e-2 3 i)/i = $.227 * 23
The rationale for the equation is that the right-hand side is the
up-front outlay for 23 Mcf, to be delivered at a rate of 1 Mcf per year
for 23 years; the left-hand side is their present value. If a value
for i, the necessary rate of return, is assumed, P can be computed as
the supply price, or cost. Conversely, if a value for the net price is
assumed, the rate of return, i, can be determined.
If the needed rate of return is 12 percent, then P = $0.669/Mcf. 2 9
Conversely, at a price of $3.50, as has been reported,3 0 the rate of
return, before taxes, is 67 percent.
This calculation relates only to field development. Pipelines are
necessary before the initial sale can be completed, and the price of
the gas must cover the full cost of developing the pipeline. Subsequent
sales will pay only pipeline operating and maintenance costs. Pipeline
(and shore facilities) are slated to cost $2.56 billion. While capacity
is said to be planned for as much as 40 Bcm/yr (1412 Bcf/yr), we shall
29 If a 10 percent internal rate of return were employed, as was done
recently by a Statoil official in calculating costs for Askaladden, a
supply price of $0.58/Mcf results, as shown in Table 7. See PE, 1/86,
pp. 8-10.
30 PIW, 6/9/86.
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assume that the full costs will be borne by the sales announced to date,
which total 20 Bcm/yr (706 Bcf/yr).
At that rate, transportation costs will total $0.62/Mcf, or 8.8
cents per Mcf per 100 miles. Additional volumes, such as the 4
Bcm/yr (140 Bcf/yr) of sales now being discussed for Austria, Spain,
and Italy, may cost less to transport, if only additional compression
is required. 3 1
Re-estimating the rate of return with these pipeline costs simply
involves subtracting the transportation costs from the landed price.
Thus, a $3.50/Mcf landed price becomes a $2.90/Mcf wellhead price.
(The precise price formula is unclear at this point, though the
widely-cited $3.50/Mcf price has been said to correspond to an oil
price of $28/bbl.3 2) Operating costs for the field will be $0.23/Mcf.
Subtracting that from a $2.90/Mcf wellhead price, yields $2.67/Mcf to
cover capital costs, which would give an internal rate of return of 51
percent. Table 7 shows sensitivity analysis for various assumed rates
of returns and wellhead prices.
Calculating the rate of return at a price of $3.50/Mcf may be
counting the chicks before they hatch. "The agreement gives all the
buyers the right to renegotiate prices, volumes, and length of the
contract."3 3 Unless the Western European gas market can be controlled
and prices fixed above the market-clearing level, or unless oil prices
PIW, 7/7/86, p. 10.
WSJ, 8/12/86, p. 32.
OGJ, 6/9/86, p. 20.
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TABLE 3-7
Troll Sensitivity Analysis
A. Initial volumes
Price of oil in $/bbl:
Equivalent landed price
of gas in $/Mcf
Pipeline costs
Operating costs
Wellhead netback
Rate of return
10
1.67
0.62
0.23
0.82
15.6%
B. Subsequent Volumes (no pipeline
Price of oil in $/bbl: 10
Equivalent landed price
of gas in $/Mcf 1.67
Pipeline variable costs 0.18
Operating costs 0.23
Wellhead netback 1.26
Rate of return 24.1%
C. Supply Price if IRR is
Assumed rate of return
Capital Costs
Operating costs
Pipeline costs
Equivalent landed price
of gas in $/Mcf
Equivalent price of oil in
$/bbl
assumed
8.0%
0.50
0.23
0.62
1.35
8.08
capital costs
15 20
2.50 3.33
0.18 0.18
0.23 0.23
2.09 2.92
40.0% 56.0%
10.0% 12.0%
0.58 0.67
0.23 0.23
0.62 0.62
1.43 1.52
8.58 9.11
15
2.50
0.62
0.23
1.65
31.6%
20
3.33
0.62
0.23
2.48
47.6%
25
4.17
0.62
0.23
3.32
63.5%
30
5.00
0.62
0.23
4.15
79.5%
)
25
4.17
0.18
0.23
3.76
72.0%
15.0%
0.81
0.23
0.62
1.66
9.95
30
5.00
0.18
0.23
4.59
87.9%
20.0%
1.05
0.23
0.62
1.90
11.43
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recover much more strongly than we expect, the chance of ever collecting
such a price seems unlikely. But the project appears to be viable even at
lower oil prices.
If we assume that the price of gas stays approximately equal in
thermal value to the price of oil at $10/bbl, i.e., about $1.67/Mcf,
then the Troll rate of return is about 24 percent (after allowing for
operating costs; see Table 7). In other words, if the initial contract
covers the pipeline costs, the rest of the Troll field is viable even
if oil prices are below $10 when production begins.
The chief obstacle to sales at such prices lies in the chagrin of
the Norwegian decision-makers. Only a few years ago, they could have
pre-sold the Troll field at $6 and, allowing a $1 return to the operating
company, for $5 to Norway. At present, they probably cannot obtain more
than half of that net, and if the price of oil stays at current levels
($15), and the gas price stays near the thermal parity ($2.50), they will
receive only about $1.50/Mcf. Moreover, pre-selling Troll would have
started development several years sooner. Thus the Norwegian policy of
holding out for a very high price for the so-called "ultra-expensive Troll
gas" turns out to have been a great mistake, resulting in the loss of well
over half the value of the asset.
This is, of course, complicated by the fact that no contract is
inviolable, and no price agreement is guaranteed fixed. Although
Statfjord gas was sold at a high price, changes in the market environment
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meant that the price was subsequently renegotiated downward.3 4 Still, the
overall Norwegian policy of "orderly development", to avoid the economic
difficulties faced by the Dutch, and to ensure the maximum amount of
Norwegian content in the offshore industry, has delayed development and
reduced the benefits to the country. Many observers in the private sector
have suggested that faster development with investment of the surplus
rents overseas would reduce the impact of the "Dutch disease," but this
policy has not been accepted by the government.3 5
The current state of the Troll field development has been
substantially clarified by the recent announcement that the project
partners had unanimously agreed to accept the government's tax concessions
and to submit development plans to the government.3 6 (The buyers must
still approve the purchase contracts by October 15 in order to meet the
project deadline.) According to this report, Shell estimated that, should
oil prices remain at $15/bbl, the rate of return for the project would be
8 to 10 percent. Referring to Table 7, we can see that, using our
calculations of the project economics, the cost of the landed gas would be
between $1.35 and $1.43/Mcf, if those rates of return hold. The
equivalent price of oil would be much less than $15/bbl, but this can be
explained by two factors.
The willingness of the Norwegians to respond to market conditions in
this manner probably helped persuade customers that they would not bear
all of the market risk for the Troll contract, which would have
contributed to their acceptance of the contract.
See PE, 11/75, p. 429, and NYT, 3/18/85, p. D9.
See PIW 9/22/86, p. 10.
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First, the contract apparently calls for the landed price of the
gas to be less than the equivalent crude oil price. As noted above, at
$28/bbl for oil, the gas price would be $3.50/Mcf, or 75 percent of the
Btu-equivalent price of oil. Assuming that this ratio is constant for
all oil prices, and we have no knowledge one way or another, then a
$15/bbl price for oil would mean a landed price for the gas of $1.875/Mcf,
somewhat higher than the cost cited above.
This discrepancy is not serious, however, since it is expected
that the government will receive some degree of rent. If all of the
above calculations are correct, then the rent would be equal to between
$0.445 and $0.525/Mcf. If, as reported, Shell expects to receive a 15
percent rate of return at an oil price of $20/bbl, then using the same
assumptions as above yields a landed cost of $1.66/Mcf, a landed price
of $2.50/Mcf, and a rent to the government of $0.84/Mcf.37
Given these estimates, it would appear that (a) the gas will be
priced at a competitive level, and (b) the government has made sufficient
concessions to allow the project to proceed even under a weak oil price
environment. Thus, our earlier pessimism over this project has changed
substantially.
Note that we are applying the rate of return that Shell is reported
to have calculated for the "project" to Troll development costs, not to
Sleipner or to the pipeline. This, and other factors concerning the
precise participation by the different partners, financing, etc., which
would affect the calculations, are not easily assessed given the
information available to us.
3-53
Sleipner
The economics of the Sleipner development are an interesting facet
of the Troll deal. Originally, the group of fields known collectively
as Sleipner was slated for development with sales planned for either
the continent or the United Kingdom. The high CO2 content of the gas
meant that development would be expensive. Since the original
negotiations followed shortly after Statfjord.was sold in July 1981 for
$5.50/Mcf landed at Emden, the Norwegians argued that the higher cost
associated with Sleipner meant that an even higher price was justified.
The original development plan called for expenditure of $3.5
billion3 8 for the full 7 Tcf of reserves.3 9 Given the planned delivery
profile, the above-ground cost would have ranged from $1.10 to $1.70/Mcf
(see Tables 8A and 8B), depending on the length of production. No
separate estimates of the pipeline construction costs were announced, but
given the distances involved, they probably would have been on the order
of $0.30/Mcf. (See the section on U.K. associated gas.)
Under the revised development plan, deliveries from Sleipner are
slated to be only some 27 percent of total reserves. Since Sleipner
38 See WSJ, 2/13/85, p. 35. For higher estimates, see PE, 12/84, p. 438,
which gave $5 billion, and WO, August 15, 1984, p. 82, wich put costs at
$6 billion. These apparent7 included pipeline costs as well as field
development costs.
PE, April 1984, p. 137.
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Table 3-8 A
Norwegian Gas Development-Operating Costs
Sleipner
Gas/Condensate Field
Case Al: Original development plan with 10-year field life
1. Development costs
2. Reserves
3. Average production rate
4. Depletion (Q/R)
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development-operating costs as sold
9. Development-operating costs as sold,
adjusted for condensate production
3.5 (Sbillion)
7.0 (Tcf)
700 (Bcf/year)
0.100
0.500 ($/Mcf)
1.100 ($/Mcf)
0.250 ($/Mcf)
1.350 ($/Mcf)
1.084 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. Wall Street Journal, February 13, 1985, p. 35.
2. New York Times, June 3, 1986, p. Al, and Petroleum
Economist, April 4, 1984, p. 137.
3. 7 Tcf / 10 years. 10-year project to supply 7 Tcf, from
Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1985, p. 35. Other
reports of project life: 15-20 years, from Financial
Times Energy Economist, February 1985, p. 1.; 25
years, from Financial Times International Gas Report,
February 15, 1985, p. 1. See Case A2 for costs using
20-year life.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = .12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
9. Line 8 - revenue from condensate sales.
= line 8 - ((condensate reserves bbl / gas reserves mcf)
* $7.50 / bbl). Condensate reserves = 250 MM bbl from
Petroleum Economist, April 1984, p. 84. $7.50 condensate
price assumed. Note that this calculation assumes that the
condensate/gas production ratio = the original condensate/gas
reserve ratio.
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Table 3-8 B
Norwegian Gas Development-Operating Costs
Sleipner
Gas/Condensate Field
Case A2: Original development plan with 20-year field life
1. Development costs 3.5 (Sbillion)
2. Reserves 7.0 (Tcf)
3. Average production rate 350 (Bcf/year)
4. Depletion (Q/R) 0.050
5. Development costs in ground 0.500 ($/Mcf)
6. Development costs as sold 1.700 ($/Mcf)
7. Operating costs 0.250 ($/Mcf)
8. Development-operating costs as sold 1.950 ($/Mcf)
9. Development-operating costs as sold,
adjusted for condensate production 1.684 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. Wall Street Journal, February 13, 1985, p. 35.
2. New York Times, June 3, 1986, p. Al, and Petroleum
Economist, April 4, 1984, p. 137.
3. 7 Tcf / 20 years. 15-20 year project life, from Financial
Times Energy Economist, February, 1985, p. 1. Per
Financial Times International Gas Report, February
15, 1985, p. 1, 7 Tcf to be supplied over 25 years.
Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1985, p. 35, reports
project life as 10 years. See case Al for costs
using 10-year life.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5 of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
9. Line 8 - revenue from condensate sales
= line 8 - ((condensate reserves bbl / gas reserves Mcf)
* $7.50 / bbl). Condensate reserves = 250 MM bbl, from
Petroleum Economist, April 1984, p. 84. $7.5 condensate
price assumed. Note that this calculation assumes that the
condensate/gas production ratio = the original condensate/gas
reserve ratio.
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development costs are $1.10/Mcf in-ground,4 0 five times those of the Troll
field, it is curious that Sleipner is being developed at all, especially
when Troll should easily be able to fulfill the existing contracts.41
These capital costs yield a development-operating cost of $3.40/Mcf,
but they are dependent on certain assumptions used where gaps in the data
exist. (See Table 9A.) For instance, the 1.76 Tcf reserve figure
represents contracted deliveries, not developed reserves, a figure not
provided in the original reports. If the ratio of production-to-reserves
that was observable in the original field development project holds true
for this plan (and it does not necessarily), then 2.33 Tcf are planned for
development, leaving additional supplies that can be sold. If that is the
case, then the development and operating costs will be less than $3/Mcf,
after adjusting for condensate production (see Table 9B.)
If pipeline construction costs are charged to Troll, then Sleipner
gas becomes more economical than if a new pipeline were necessary. Of
40 The analogy with oil from the Troll field is obvious. The original
project costs would equal somewhere between $0.71 and $0.86/Mcf in-ground,
notably lower. The difference might be explained by a loss of economies
of scale, but it also may be due to the need for processing to remove the
high levels of C02 found in Sleipner gas. Under the British contract, the
C02 was not to have been removed by the project operators, but would have
been blended in to the British system. Trade reports have suggested that
the portion of the field with the C02 will not be developed for the
current sale. See Offshore, 8/86, p. 54. The cost of processing the
condensate may have grown relative to total development costs, given that
liquids production has apparently grown as a part of the project. See
OGJ, 9/22/86, p. 26.
41 One almost gets the impression that the Norwegians believe the Sleipner
field should be developed because of its place in the discovery sequence,
or because it is on the route to Europe from Troll, rather than because of
any particular economic rationale. One industry observer has remarked in
private conversation that he believes selling Sleipner is a matter of
national pride for the Norwegians, especially after the British rejection
of the proposed sale.
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Table 3-9 A
Norwegian Gas Development-Operating Costs
Sleipner
Gas/Condensate Field
Case B: Troll/Sleipner ales contract development
Reserves = 1.76 Tcf
1. Development costs
2. Reserves
3. Average production rate
4. Depletion (Q/R)
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development-operating costs as sold
9. Development-operating costs as sold,
adjusted for condensate production
1.92 ($billion)
1.76 (Tcf)
141 (Bcf/year)
0.080
1.091
2.723
0.681
3.404
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
3.138 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1,2,3. Li and Gas. Journal June 9, 1986, p. 19. Reserves =
expected Sleipner production under the Troll/Sleipner
sales contract.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = .12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
9. Line 8 - revenue from condensate sales
: line 8 - ((condensate reserves bbl / gas reserves Mcf)
* $7.50 / bbl). Condensate reserves = 250 MM bbl from
Petroleum Economist, April 1984, p. 84. $7.5 condensate
price assumed. Note, this calculation assumes
that the condensate / gas production ratio = original
condensate / gas reserve ratio.
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Table 3-9 B
Norwegian Gas Development-Operating Costs
Sleipner
Gas/Condensate Field
Case B2: Troll/Sleipner sales contract development
Reserves = 2.33 tcf
1. Development costs 1.92 ($billion)
2. Reserves 2.33 (Tcf)
3. Average production rate 141 (Bcf/year)
4. Depletion (Q/R) 0.061
5. Development costs in ground 0.824 ($/Mcf)
6. Development costs as sold 2.465 ($/Mcf)
7. Operating costs 0.681 ($/Mcf)
8. Development-operating costs as sold 3.146 ($/Mcf)
9. Development-operating costs as sold,
adjusted for condensate production 2.880 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1,3. Oil and Gas Journal, June 9, 1986, p. 19.
2. 1 * (7/3) 1 = # platforms currently planned to develop
the field, from Oil and Gas Journal, June 9, 1986, p. 19.
7 = reserves to be developed and 3 = # of platforms
to be used in original Sleipner development plan
(see case A), from Petroleum Economist, April 1984,
p. 138.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line /line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = .12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5 of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
9. Line 8 - revenue from condensate sales
= line 8 - ((condensate reserves bbl / gas reserves Mcf)
* $7.50 / bbl). Condensate reserves = 250 MM bbl, from
Petroleum Economist, April 1984, p. 84. $7.5 condensate
price assumed. Note, this calculation assumes that the
condensate / gas production ratio = original condensate /
gas reserve ratio.
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course, a connection to the Frigg pipeline to replace falling levels of
Frigg production would mean much lower pipeline construction costs than
delivery to Belgium. Or, if Troll bears the pipeline costs, Sleipner
becomes more feasible.
A report recently received suggests that the development may be
more economic than originally appeared.42 First, the reserves to be
developed are given as 1.9 Tcf. However, two. new pieces of information
were added: (1) capacity is to be 8.8 Bcm/yr (310 Bcf/yr) of natural
gas and 100,000 b/d of condensate. In other words, the level of initial
production reported previously and used in Tables 9A and 9B is far less
than planned peak production.4 3
This information has a large impact on the cost of producing the
Sleipner gas. First, the in-ground development cost drops slightly
because of the higher reserve figure. Second, depletion is much higher,
which reduces the development costs, as shown in Table 9C. Third, the
higher production level reduces the operating costs, since we account for
them as a percentage of total capital expenditures which are not
increased. Finally, the level of condensate production is much higher
than estimated in the previous two tables; although less than one-third of
42 OGJ, 9/22/86, pp. 26-27. Although there is still uncertainty, we
willT-ssume that these data are correct, and that there are no
misinterpretations. For example, we assume that the report of 1.9 Tcf
reserves is accurate, not a listing of contract sales instead of
reserves.
It is possible that capacity is higher than the level of production
now planned, but full capacity utilization is appropriate for measuring
per-unit costs.
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Table 3-9 C
Norwegian Gas Development-Operating Costs
Sleipner
Gas/Condensate Field
Case C: Troll/Sleipner sales contract
Reserves = 1.9 tcf
i. Development cost
2. Reserves
3. Reported capacity
4. Depletion (Q/R)
5. Development cost in ground
6. Development cost as sold
7. Operating cost
8. Development-operating cost
as sold
9. Development-operating cost
as sold, adjusted for conden-
sate production
sources: 1,2,3. Oil and Gas Journal
5. linel/line2
6. (linel/line3)*(line4+i)
7. 0.05*linel/line3 (annu
production) annual oper
development cost
8. line6+line7
9. Line 8 minus value of
Mcf of gas produced. Cond
100,000 b/d, from Oil and
Value of condensate assume
development.
1.92
1.90
310
0.163
1.011
1.754
0.310
($bn)
(tcf)
(bcf/year)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
2.063 ($/Mcf)
1.179 ($/Mcf)
September 22, 1986
i
al
at
p. 26-27
=.12
operating expense/annual
ing expense assumed 5% of
condensate production per
ensate production is
Gas Journal 9/22/86, p. 26.
d at $7.5/bbl.
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the natural gas is being developed, more than two-thirds of the total
condensate reserves are included in the project as it now stands.4 4 The
result is that the above-ground cost of the natural gas is only $2.06/Mcf,
25 percent lower than the earlier estimate, and only $1.18/Mcf when the
condensate offset is taken into account. Thus, given conservative values
for the condensate and even assuming full pipeline costs of $O.60/Mcf,
this gas can be delivered to the continent for $1.80/Mcf, which is
equivalent to less than $12/bbl of oil. If much of the gas is delivered
via the Statpipe system, the delivered cost will drop substantially.
The project economics are obviously much improved, as is our
assessment of its viability. If oil is only $15/bbl when deliveries
begin, however, and if the price index in the contract brings the landed
natural gas price to $1.875/Mcf, as discussed above, then there is little
room for taxes and royalties. Certainly, the unitization of the field
with Troll should allow the much better Troll economics to carry this
marginal development.
Other Norwegian Gas Supplies
A number of unanswered questions about the Troll contract affects
other future Norwegian supplies. By all appearances, the Troll deal is
intended, in part, to provide the Norwegians with the capacity to reach
easily other continental customers. By landing one pipeline in Belgium,
Unfortunately, information on the individual fields that make up the
Sleipner cluster is not available to us, but it appears that the
development has been planned for the field that contains the bulk of
the condensate reserves and little of the C02. It may also be that
earlier reports understated the condensate reserves of the whole group.
3-62
the Norwegians will introduce real competition between transportation
systems, and Ruhrgas no longer will have monopsony powers. This is
apparently a major concern of the Norwegians.4 5 This should facilitate
small-scale deals and even spot sales to other customers, such as Spain,
Switzerland, and Italy.
Incremental pipeline costs should, if anything, be lower than they
were for the original deal. Some reports suggest that the planned
development includes looping of the Ekofisk-to-Emden pipeline to add 20
Bcm/yr (730 Bcf/yr) of capacity.46 Even if this is not the case, gas
could be delivered via the Frigg pipeline, or through the Statpipe
system at a small incremental cost as fields now producing for them
decline.
The Statfjord pipeline, built to transport associated gas from
northern North Sea fields to Ekofisk and then to Emden, will allow
Norway to deliver 20 Bcm/yr (706 Bcf/yr) at very low costs. The pipeline
cost $3.5 billion,47 which translates to a cost of about $0.84/Mcf. Since _
the gas now being used is associated gas, the incremental production costs
are very small. Because the pipeline crosses such a large area, new
fields can be hooked up to it relatively cheaply to replace declining
45
PIW, 6/9/86.
46 Private conversations with industry officials.
47 IEA, Natural Gas Prospects, 1986, p. 78. According to The NYT,
10/16/85, p. D5, the Statfjord pipeline cost only $2.34 billion and had
a capacity of only 280 Bcf/yr. This figure probably does not include g
connections to the Heimdal and Gullfaks fields and similar expenses.
If correct, then costs for the trunk pipeline are about $0.55/Mcf.
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production in the current fields. (See Table 28 below for examples of the
costs of hooking up fields to trunklines.)
New Fields South of 620 N
Development costs for a number of fields, including Odin and
Northeast Frigg, which were hooked up to the Frigg pipeline to the United
Kingdom, are shown in Tables 10 through 13. The costs are fairly low,
even though the fields are much smaller than, for example, Sleipner and
Troll. For the Tommeliten field, which is planned to produce gas
initially for injection into Ekofisk, costs are over $2/Mcf, but the
production of associated liquids will offset nearly half those costs, even
if the liquids are worth only $10/bbl. (See Table 14.)
The development of Troll capacity for injection into the Oseberg
field could be considered as a new field development, although the
small size and the use of a five-well, subsea unit makes the resulting
costs less typical of the Norwegian North Sea. Tax breaks given to the
project and savings from the changed drive mechanism in the Oseberg
field (which will reduce the number of wells necessary at Oseberg by
20) create this viability. Tables 15A and 15B show the economics of the
project, with case A presenting the total development costs charged to the
gas project, and case B subtracting the savings in the development of the
Oseberg field from using the gas, but including the cost of injection
facilities.4 8
48 See OGJ, 6/23/86, p. 24.
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Table 3-10
Norwegian Gas Development-Operating Costs
Odin Field
1. Development costs
2. Reserves
3. Peak output
4. Field life
5. Depletion
6. Development costs in ground
7. Development costs as sold
8. Operating costs
9. Development-operating costs as sold
594
777
135
9
0.108
0.764
1.151
0.220
1.371
($MM)
(Bcf)
(Bcf/year)
(years)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
Sources:
1,4. International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1981, p. 196.
Development costs given in $ 1981, converted to
$ 1985 using implicit price deflator from Economic
Report of the President.
2,3. International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1985, p. 212.
5. a = 0.108 to satify the equation Q * (1 - exp (-at)) = aR
Q = 135, t = 9, R = 777,000.
6. Line 1 / line 2.
7. c = (line 1 * (i + a)) / (line 3 * (1 - exp (-( i + a) * t)))
i =0.12, a = 0.108, t = 9.
8. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
9. Line 7 + line 8.
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Table 3-11
Norwegian Gas Development-Operating Costs
North East Frigg Field
1. Development costs
2. Reserves
3. Production rate
4. Depletion (Q/R)
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development-operating costs as sold
0o
275 ($MM)
141 (Bcf)
77 (Bcf/year
0.546
1.950
2.379
0.179
2.558
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. International Petroleum ncvcloedia, 1984, p. 212.
Development costs given in $ 1983, converted to $ 1985
using implicit price deflator from Economic Report
of the President.
2. Petroleum Economist, April 1983, p. 127.
3. World Oil, August 15, 1984, p. 80.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5 of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
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Table 3-12
Norwegian Gas Development-Operating Costs
Heimdal
Gas/Condensate Field
1. Development costs
2. Reserves
3. Production rate
4. Depletion (Q/R)
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development-operating costs as sold
9. Development-operating costs as sold,
adjusted for condensate production
1.4
1.2
110
0.092
1.167
2.698
0.636
3.334
($billion)
(Tcf)
(Bcf/year)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf) .
($/Mcf)
3.136 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1981, p. 186.
Development costs given in $ 1981, converted to $ 1985
using implicit price deflator from Economic Report
of the President.
2. World gil, August 1985, p.76.
3. International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1984, p. 212.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5 of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
9. Line 8 - (yearly revenue from condensate sales / line 3)
= line 8 - ((2,920,000 bbl) * ($7.5/bbl)) / (line 3 * 1000).
Condensate production rate from International
Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1984, p. 76. $7.50 condensate
price assumed.
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Table 3-13
Norwegian Gas Development-Operating Costs
Frigg Field
1. Development costs 1.947 ($billion)
2. Reserves 10.981 (Tcf)
3. Average production rate 0.250 (Tcf/year)
4. Depletion (Q/R) 0.023
5. Development costs in ground 0.177 ($/Mcf)
6. Development costs as sold 1.111 ($/Mcf)
7. Operating costs 0.389 ($/Mcf)
8. Development-operating costs as sold 1.500 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. Offshore, June 5, 1976, p. 42. Note: Total cost given
as 2.2 billion $ 1976 with one-half attributed to
the pipelines to shore. 1.1 billion $ 1976 converted to
$ 1985 using the implicit price deflator from the
Economic Report of the President.
2. Reserves as of June 1985, from International Gas
-Report, July 5, 1985, p. 16, plus cumulative production
to June 1985, from Development of the Oil and Gas Resources
of the United Kinqdom. 1985, p. 69. Production for the
first half 1985 at average rate 1981-1984.
3. Ibid., p. 69. Average rate 1981-1984.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
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Table 3-14
Norwegian Gas Development-Operating Costs
Tommeliten
Oil & Gas Project
1. Development costs
2. Reserves
3. Depletion (assumed)
4. Average production rate (aR)
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development-operating costs as sold
9. Development-operating costs as sold,
adjusted for condensate production
626
650
0.10
65
0.963
2.119
0.482
2.601
($MM)
(Bcf)
(Bcf/year)
(Bcf/year)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
1.678 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1,2. Offshore, May 1986, p. 148.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 4) * (line 3 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 4 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
9. Line 8 - (yearly revenue from oil sales / (line 4 * 1000))
= line 8 - ((600,000 bbl) * ($10/bbl)) / (line 4 * 1000).
Oil production rate = aR. Oil reserves of 60 MM bbl
from Offshore, May 1986, p. 148. $10 oil price
assumed.
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Table 3-15 A
Norwegian Gas Development-Operating Costs
Troll Field
Development for Oseberg injection
Case A: Costs of development
1. Development costs
2. Reserves
3. Production rate
4. Depletion
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development operating costs as sold
394
255.5
25.55
0.100
1.542
3.393
0.771
4.164
($ MM)
(Bcf)
(Bcf/year)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
Sources:
1,2,3. Oil and Gs Journal, June 23, 1986, p. 24. Costs
given in $ 1986. Reserves = planned production of
70 MMcfd over 10 years.
4. Line 3 / line 2.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
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Table 3-15 B
Norwegian Gas Development-Operating Costs
Troll Field
Development for Oseberg injection
Case B: Costs of development subtracting Oseberg savings
1. Development costs 249 ($ MM)
2. Reserves 255.5 (Bcf)
3. Production rate
4. Depletion
25.55 (Bcf/year)
0.100
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development operating costs as sold
0.975 ($/Mcf)
2.144 ($/Mcf)
0.487 ($/Mcf)
2.631 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1,2,3. Oil and Gas Journal, June 23, 1986 p. 24. Cost
reduction from case A due to $263 MM savings at
Oseberg as 20 less wells are needed, less $118 MM
for conversions for gas injection. Costs given in
$ 1986. Reserves = planned production of 70 MMcfd
over 10 years.
4. Line 3 / line 2.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
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These examples demonstrate that Norwegian natural gas still can be
developed at current low oil prices, with rents available for both the
government and companies. If the tax regime is too strict, however,
many new developments will not go forward. The presence of nearby
pipelines with spare capacity also will be a major, if not the major,
factor in influencing their development. New fields as costly as
Northeast Frigg will be at risk, however, should the price of oil remain
at $15/bbl or lower.
New Fields North of 620 N
"'Roll up the map of the 62nd parallel. W 9will not need that for
15 years."' U.K. Department of Energy official
At present, it is hard to conceive of new supplies being developed
beyond Troll and Sleipner and the replacement of declining Ekofisk and
Statfjord production. Large reservoirs have been discovered off Norway
north of 620 N. However, the transportation distances involved ensure
that the costs will be much higher, and these supplies are not under
consideration for export in the near future.
To date, two areas of interest north of 620 N have been drilled:
Askeladden and Tromsoeflaket, above 710 N, and the Haltenbanken area,
at 650 N. The former thus far has 6 Tcf of recoverable gas and the
latter about 12 Tcf,50 although U.S. Geological Survey estimates show
that total resources for both could be much higher (see Table 2). The
Cited in Offshore, 8/86, p. 71.
See PE, 1/86, p. 8. PIW 9/29/86, p. 10, puts Haltenbanken reserves
at 11 T7.
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Askeladden area has been assessed thoroughly and is now under
consideration for development.
However, the extreme distance of the Askeladden fields from markets,
combined with the lack of infrastructure, apparently has made their
development uneconomic. Development costs have been put at $3.2 billion,
plus either $2.4 billion to build both a pipeline to shore and an LNG
plant or $13 billion to build a pipeline south.5 1 Table 16 indicates that
the wellhead cost of the gas will be $1.50/Mcf, (slightly higher than the
cost of landed Troll gas for example). However, the costs of LNG or
pipeline transportation would add to this considerably, raising the landed
cost of the gas on the continent to $3.00/Mcf. 5 2 (This is on the low side
of an estimate by Ager-Hanssen, the senior executive vice-president at
Statoil, of $1.73 to $2.43/Mcf landed in northern Norway and $3.21 to
$4.85/Mcf landed in Western Europe.53 He may very well have included
royalties and/or taxes.)
51 The pipeline cost estimate might include field development costs.
Since the amount of gas reserves required for such a pipeline were put
at 30 Tcf, this suggests that the pipeline would be larger than the 870
mcf/d to 1.2 Bcf/d (320-440 Bcf/yr) capacity of the LNG plant under
consideration. The largest pipelines now in use can carry 1412 Bcf/yr,
which would provide a depletion rate of 5 percent for 30 Tcf of reserves.
See OGJ, 2/27/84, pp. 68-69.
52 Assuming that the annual development-operating charge for both the
pipeline and the LNG plant is 20 percent of the total capital cost to
allow for the higher risk, and that the LNG plant capacity is 870 mcf/d
(320 Bcf/yr). At 1.2 Bcf/d (440 Bcf/yr) capacity (and the same capital
cost), the per-unit cost would drop by $0.40/Mcf. The pipeline capital
cost is assumed to be $10 billion, and the capacity assumed to be 1400
Bcf/yr.
Cited in PE, 1/86, p. 9. This assumes a 10 percent internal rate of
return. He iTso estimated that the delivered cost to the United States
would be from $3.47 to $5.02/Mcf.
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Table 3-16
Norwegian Gas Development-Operating Costs
Askelladen Field
1. Development costs
2. Reserves
3. Depletion (assumed)
4. Production rate (aR)
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development-operating costs as sold
3.31
6.0
0.10
600
0.552
1.214
0.276
1.490
($billion)
(Tcf)
(Bcf/year)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. 0il and Gas Journal, February 27, 1984, p. 68.
Development costs given in $ 1984, converted to $ 1985
using implicit price deflator from Economic Report
of thel President.
2. Petroleum Intelliaence Weekly, September 10, 1984, p. 8.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 4) * (line 3 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 4 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
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There are desirable aspects to both transportation options. With
the LNG option, the gas could be sent either to Western European or
U.S. markets, and development could occur in small increments, on the
order of 300 Bcf/yr. While the pipeline would require large sales volumes
and would be constrained to the Western European market, the development
of other, smaller offshore fields would be facilitated, especially as
Askeladden declined and pipeline capacity became available.
The reality, of course, is that between the glutted Western European
(and U.S.) markets and the availability of cheaper, undeveloped gas
resevoirs south of 620 N, these fields are unlikely to be developed for
export before the turn of the century. Developing the gas for domestic
use is under consideration, especially by conversion to electricity
(possibly on offshore platforms to save the cost of constructing an
undersea pipeline) and transporting the electricity south. To date, none
of the options has appeared sufficiently attractive to reach fruition.
The problem is that building a large-scale transportation system
would necessitate large contracts, meaning either rapid growth in Western
European gas demand or expiration of existing contracts. However, Troll
and Sleipner, as well as the many smaller southern fields, should satisfy
Western European demand for many years to come, and demand growth on a
large scale seems unlikely. Thus, any large-scale development lies
decades in the future. Statoil has noted that it believes there will be
no buyers for this gas until after 2000, and that methanol or fertilizer
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plants might be appealing, but the quantities of gas that would be used
are small and at present those markets are weak.54
Small-scale development might be more appealing, because it would
allow the government to spread some of the revenues from the offshore
service industry northward,5 5 as well as to justify the drilling effort
in those waters. Some of the natural gas from the project could be
diverted for domestic use as well, providing further justification.
However, any export of gas from this region would mean bypassing cheaper
gas in the south.
Norwegian Policy
The petroleum finds in the North Sea mean that as a nation we
shall become richer. The Government is of the opinion that these
new possibilities should be used to develop a qualitatitvely better
society. A rapid and uncontrolled growth in the use of material
resources should be avoided, unless the social structure is otherwise
substantially changed.--Royal Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 1974
Norway was very quick to recognize that the bonanza of oil and gas
forthcoming from the North Sea would have potentially profound impacts
on the country's economy. The 1969 discovery of Ekofisk was followed
by a number of other finds, that, by the end of 1973, had boosted proved
reserves to 4 billion bbl of oil and 23 Tcf of gas.57 Concern about the
54 PE, 1/86, pp. 8-10, and OGJ, 4/28/86, p. 40.
55 In Norwegian Long-Term Programme: 1986-1989, Report No. 83 to the
Storting (1984-85), p. 26, the Royal Ministry of Finance stated: "A
development of petroleum fields may help to give Central and North
Norway a broader industrial and commercial base."
56 Petroleum Industry in Norwegian Society, Parliamentary Report No. 25
(1973-74), Oslo, Norway, p. 6.
OGJ, 12/31/73, p. 309.
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possible impact of large-scale development led the government to analyze
its options, resulting in a number of policy recommendations affecting the
oil and gas industry. 5 8
The recommendations resembled more those of an OPEC country than
of an OECD member (in fact, cooperation with OPEC was one of the steps
recommended).5 9 Conservation of finite hydrocarbon resources for their
very valuable uses as raw materials and even food was felt to be
necessary,6 0 and the potential disruption to the economy of a booming
offshore drilling and service industry, and of large revenues from oil
and gas exports was recognized. The policies that were recommended,
and pursued, included: (a) a moderate development of oil and gas
resources; (b) a gradual introduction of oil and gas revenues into the
domestic economy; and (c) government majority control of as much of the
industry as possible (upstream, downstream, service, and petrochemical).
By releasing tracts for exploration at a slow rate, maintaining a
high tax rate, and requiring participation by Norwegian state-owned
companies, Norway has met these objectives. The production ceiling of
90 million tonnes of oil equivalent (1.8 million bbl/d of oil equivalent)
set in 1974 is still well above current production levels, although
ongoing field development, and especially the beginning of Troll
production in the late 1990s, could see this level reached.
Petroleum Industry in Norwegian Society, Parliamentary Report No. 25
(1973-74), Royal Norwegian Ministry of Finance, Oslo, Norway.
59 ibid., p. 14.
60 ibid., p. 16.
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At the same time, however, the non-petroleum sectors of the economy
have suffered, in part because oil prices were so much higher than
anticipated when the moderate pace of oil development was defined. The
manufacturing share of GDP has shrunk from 18.2 percent in 1979 to 13.6
percent in 1984, while the mining and quarrying sector (dominated by oil
and gas) has doubled to 18.6 percent over the same period. This occurred
despite the benefits to the manufacturing sector of having captive demand
for equipment from the offshore oil and gas industry. In fact, high
inflation and low productivity growth have hurt the international
competitiveness of the Norwegian economy, leading to moves to devalue the
kroner.
The weakness in international energy markets has caused some reversal
of Norwegian policy. The cancellation of the Sleipner deal by the
U.K. government provided the first impetus, and the plunge in oil and gas
prices a hearty shove. Whereas in the 1970s the government's concern
focused on excessive growth of employment in the oil and gas sector to the
detriment of the rest of the economy, now the primary concern is the
possibility that reduced exploration and development would create
unemployment in that sector. As the 1984-1985 report to the Storting from
the Royal Ministry of Finance put it, "The main task in the programme
period in Norway will be to ensure employment for everyone and safeguard
and develop further the welfare society. 6 1
Retaining and creating jobs in the non-hydrocarbon sector still is
a main concern of the Norwegian government, but one focus of the Troll
op. cit., p. 20. Emphasis added.
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contract was to provide work for the offshore industry during a period
of weak oil markets. Taxes also have been cut to a major extent to
encourage continued investment by foreign oil companies.6 2 However,
taxes are still the highest in the North Sea, even after the latest
revisions, such that the minimum economic field size in the Norwegian
sector is 500 million barrels (versus only 100 million barrels in the
U.K. sector), although other factors play a role.6 3
Norwegian tax rates have been criticized by the oil industry for
years, but revisions to them have been slow. Private companies have
continued to seek concessions despite complaints that the fiscal regime
yields poor returns, partly because of the size of finds still being
made in Norwegian waters.6 4 Only recent reluctance on the part of
foreign oil companies to bid for exploration licenses, combined with
the drastic fall in oil prices, have forced a reconsideration by the
Norwegian government. As one Norwegian official said, "...there isn't
any support for adjusting the total tax level, as long as it is possible
for us to get exploration and production licenses out without trouble."65
62 OGJ, 7/21/86, p. 35. The industry's "special tax rate" is to be cut
from-'5 to 30 percent, and the 10 to 15 percent royalty on new field
developments will be foregone.
The estimate of viability assumes an oil price of $15/bbl, and is
made by Wood, Mackenzie, cited in PIW, 8/18, 1986, pp. 2-3.
64 As the WSJ, 8/29/84, p. 29, pointed out, Chevron refused a 1972
offer to operate Statfjord, which turned out to be the largest oil
field discovered to date in the North Sea, and companies are afraid to
repeat that mistake.
65 Hans Henrik Ramm, Petroleum Adviser to Norway's Finance Minister,
cited in ibid.
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With oil and gas revenues falling and with the possibility of
increased personal income taxes, further concessions for the petroleum
industry become increasingly difficult. Projects that are marginal and
that would require deep cuts in the government's take may not receive
the necessary help. Yet the alternative may look even worse: a shrinkage
of oil and gas revenues and of employment. The recent concessions on the
Troll/Sleipner development demonstrate that the government is still
willing to be flexible.
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom not only had the first but also the most highly
developed manufactured gas industry in Western Europe. By 1961, the
United Kingdom accounted for nearly two-thirds of total Western European
manufactured gas consumption and, relative to total energy requirements,
U.K. gas consumption was five times that of the rest of Western Europe.6 6
However, as coal prices increased during the 1950s, the industry's
competitive position faltered. By 1956, the price per therm for coal gas
used in heating was only slightly cheaper than electricity, and when
adjusted for efficiency, it was more expensive than any fuel but butane
(see Table 17).
The British Gas Council, which oversaw the 12 Area Boards governing
gas distribution, realized it was at a strategic crossroads. To reduce
costs, it began centralizing its gas production, at the same time seeking
alternatives to coal gas. To that end, investment was made in oil-based
66 OECD Energy Balances: 1960/74, Paris, France, 1975.
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TABLE 3-17
RELATIVE COSTS OF HEATING FUELS
IN THE UK IN 1956
(COAL GAS = 100)
Price per therm
Coal Gas 100
62.5Kerosine
Wood 29.2
29.2Coal or Coke
Butane
Electricity
Price per therm adjusted
for apparatus efficiency
100
62.5
91.7
54-92
187.5 187.5
120.8120.8
Note: For coal gas and butane, a small,
assumed. Otherwise, efficiency drops by
high efficiency stove is
about 50 percent.
Source: Petroleum Press Service, May 1956, p. 178.
Fuel
_ _ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
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gas manufacturing systems, while at the same time the Gas Council signed
the first long-term contract with Algeria for LNG supplies.
The 1959 discovery of the Groningen field in the Netherlands aroused
interest in the North Sea basin, particularly the shallow areas off the
southern United Kingdom. (Previously, only two small onshore gas fields
had been found, both by the Gas Council.) The first discoveries were made
in 1965, and within three years, the United Kingdom was enjoying an
abundance of natural gas from a number of large fields. As Figure 8
shows, growth of reserves was dramatic during the late 1960s, as these
discoveries were assessed and booked.
Not surprisingly, this gas obviated the need for either more LNG
imports or manufactured gas, and within a few years many of the coal-gas
plants were shut down. In fact, the quantities of gas discovered were so
large that it was difficult to absorb them all. The Continental Shelf Act
of 1964 shaped the development of these resources by (a) preventing their
export and (b) granting monopsony power to the British Gas Council, except
in certain cases of direct industrial use, such as in petrochemical
plants.6 7
The British Gas Council (which became the British Gas Corporation
(BGC) in 1972) looked upon the southern North Sea supplies as a reservoir
of cheap natural gas which it could use both to cover costs of expansion
of its system and to penetrate new markets. Most gas was sold to
industrial and residential/commercial customers, rather than to the
electric generation sector, and prices offered to producers were roughly
67 See Davis, op. cit., p. 103.
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Figure 3-8
BRITISH NATURAL GAS RESERVES
(January 1)
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one-quarter the price of manufactured gas.6 8 Having no other markets open
to them, producers had little choice but to accept these prices, although
exploration suffered as a result. Not until many years later were higher
prices paid for supplies from the southern sector of the North Sea. (See
Table 18.)
However, the BGC continued to seek new supplies, including imports
from Norway. Although having lost out on the Ekofisk and Statfjord
sales, the BGC managed to contract for gas from Frigg (which straddled
the U.K. and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea) and Sleipner (although
the government later cancelled the contract). Prices offered for these
supplies were higher than those for U.K. fields, and while the BGC did
pay a higher price for the more costly northern U.K. gas, a lower price
was paid for the U.K. share of Frigg than the Norwegian share,
demonstrating BGC's monopsony power. In addition, the cheap gas from
the south was "rolled-in" with the higher cost Norwegian and northern
sector U.K. gas, keeping average prices low.
BGC has consistently expressed concern about its future supplies,
particularly as Frigg volumes decline in the next decade, and is unsure
of potential future domestic additions-to-reserves. The Sleipner contract
was signed for this reason, but the U.K. government, more confident than
the BGC that higher prices for domestic gas would bring on higher
supplies, would not approve the contract.
68 ibid., p. 98, shows manufactured gas costs as being 4 to 5 pence per
therm and the prices to the first fields developed were on the order of
1 to 1.2 pence per therm (p. 106). The BGC was in the unique position
of being not only a monopsony purchaser but a partner in the fields.
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TABLE 3-18
PRICES FOR UK NORTH SEA AS
Location
Nest Sole Southern
Hewett:
Base price
Valley gas
Date Price
[Pence/There]
Notes
1967-70 2.08
1971- 1.12
Southern
Leean: Southern
First 600 NNcf/d
Second 600 NMcf/d
Retainder
1.195
0.944
1.196
1. 1875
1.792
Indefatigable Southern
All gas to 1983
Southern
Southern
1.208
These prices are for the first 15 years of production.
After that, prices will be 1.196p, 1.167p, and 1. 14 6p per
there respectively for the specified aeounts produced per
day for the Leean field; and
1.208p for first 600 Ncfd, 1.792p for next
600 nNcf/d, and 1.158p per there for the balance for the
Indefatigable field. (converted at 2.4 d per pence)
1972 1.5
1974 3.4
Frigg Northern
(Norwegian sector)
Brent Northern
1974 B.8
1982 11.5 (est)
1975 6.5
1982 12.5 est)
Terns of delivery of
British gas probably
considerably different,
with price closer to that
of Brent field.
Production start-up 1976.
1982 16.0 est) Price on shore after delivery
via Frigg line. Production start-up 1976.
North Alwyn Northern 1982 22-23 est) Price for North Alwyn associated
gas. Production tart-up 19B7.
Cleeton, Hoton,Southern
Hyde, Ravenspurn
28-30 p/therm
(est)
Production due
in 1988.
Southern 23-24 p/there est)
Sources: Davis, 1984, pp. 106 and 144, and trade press.
Field
Viking
Rough
Beryl Northern
Sean South
& Sean North
--- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
--- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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In fact, the prolonged Sleipner negotiations saw the British extract
a series of concessions from the Norwegians. In part, this reflected the
short-term glut of natural gas on the continent and the lack of buyers
there, and in part the changing expectations for future oil prices as
energy markets generally proved weaker than had been expected just a short
time before, when the Statfjord contracts were signed. The concessions
included the construction of a 40-inch pipeline with capacity far in
excess of what the Sleipner contract required; an agreement to share the
tax proceeds from the liquids pipeline to Norway (which the British had
wanted landed in the United Kingdom), and a reduction of the level of peak
supplies, presumably raising the development costs slightly, although
exact figures are not available.
After an agreement embodying all these concession was signed, the
conflict between the BGC and the oil companies with gas reserves in the
southern North Sea intensified. Many of the companies produced
projections showing that domestic natural gas supplies would be adequate
for the foreseeable future, and that large-scale imports were
unnecessary. One company even offered a large gas supply contract
without specifying the source of the gas, a move some believed was an
attempt to make the Sleipner deal appear unnecessary.69
Two other factors affected the government's decisions on this
deal. First, given the high unemployment rate in the United Kingdom, the
69 One good example would be BP's analysis which suggested that despite
declining contracted gas, gas about to be contracted and gas already
discovered would cover British needs until about 1995. Only a small
amount of newly discovered gas would need to be discovered and developed
before the turn of the century. See FT, 5/6/83, p. 8. See also FT,
12/18/84, p. 1, and FTEE, 2/85, p. 1.
3-86
government was reluctant to import something that could arguably be
produced domestically.7 0 Secondly, since the contract price was
denominated in U.S. dollars, the depreciation of the pound meant that
the price had grown 40 percent, up to 35 p/therm, versus an average
purchase price of 15 p/therm at the time.71
Since the cancellation of the Sleipner contract, the future
purchasing plans of the BGC have been uncertain. Initially, an oversupply
situation had developed, and some observers said that the BGC was sitting
on domestic reserves.7 2 However, contracts have been moving forward
gradually and a number of new field developments are to be undertaken.
(See below.) Still, certain exogenous policy developments will affect the
amount and manner of natural gas contracts that the BGC agrees to in
coming years.
For one thing, the privatisation of the BGC will give it the power
to pursue its own strategies, and these could include signing new
contracts with Norway.7 3 Second, a possible cross-channel pipeline
70 FT, 1/24/85, p. 2.
71 See FTEE, 2/85, pp. 1-2, and FT, 1/28/85, p. 16, which put BGC's
average purchase price in 1984 a13.3 p/therm.
72 See, for example, Offshore, 10/85, p. 21.
We do not take seriously reports that the BGC is considering building
20 coal gasification plants at a cost of 1 billion apiece to replace
dwindling North Sea reserves, as reported by The Economist, 4/16/83,
p. 61.
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link that would allow both exports to and imports from the continent
would break the BGC's monopsony power.7 4
The BGC's main response to these threats has been to offer prices
that approach world levels for new natural gas supplies, especially
from the southern sector. (See Table 18.) And in fact, higher prices
have spurred more drilling and discoveries in the southern sector. In
1985, numerous gas discoveries were made in the southern North Sea,7 5
and the listing in Table 19 shows that many of these have economic
potential. (Although flow rates do not correlate directly with reserves,
they are a factor in determining the economics of field development, as is
shown below.)
Having raised its buying price for southern North Sea gas, the BGC
was overtaken by events in world oil markets. The data presented below
suggest that there still is gas available that less than $2.00/Mcf, but
marginal costs appear to be increasing and rapid expansion of supply
may not be possible. However, maintaining current levels of domestic
production should pose no problem. As fields discovered in the last
two years are assessed, a clearer picture of the future of natural gas
supply from the southern sector will emerge.
74
Companies were recently given the power to make direct sales to
industrial customers, but with one small exception, BGC has used its
old, low-priced purchase contracts to undersell all such efforts. See
OGJ, 12/30/85, pp. 48-49.
75
See Offshore, May 1986.
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GAS WELL DI
Operator
TABLE 3-19
SCOVERIES IN
Block-well
SOUTHERN NORTH SEA
Flow Rate
48/11a-7 34 MMcfd
+ 230 b/d conden.
Ardmore
Petroleum
Amoco
BP
BP
BP
BP
BP
49/13-one well 1
47/9a-7
48/18-1
42/30-4
47/5a-4
48/7b-5
49/4-1
n.a.
n.a.
13.7 MMcfd
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
8.5 MMcfd
Britoil
Britoil
Britoil
47/14a-6
47/14a-7
47/14a-8
Charterho
Petroleum
use 44/29-one well
48/11b-6
48/11b-4
44/22-3
44/22-one
44.2 MMcfd
48.8 MMcfd
+ 300 b/d conden.
35 MMcfd
well 3 MMcfd
+ 33 b/d conden.
Gulf
Hamilton
Hamilton
Hamilton
Hamilton
Hamilton
50/6-1
43/26-1
43/26-3
43/26-5
43/8a-3
43/15a-2
1.3 MMcfd
+ 2,074 b/d oil
3.2-14.2 MMcfd
49.5 MMcfd
40.2 MMcfd
15-33 MMcfd
27 MMcfd
London &
Scottish
43/12-one
48/18a-one well
+
48/17a-2
49/29-B4
19-34 MMcfd
652 b/d conden.
34 MMcfd
31 MMcfd
Arco
40
31
n.a.
MMcfd
MMcfd
n.a.
Conoco
Conoco
Conoco
Conoco
well
Mobil
Mobil
Mobil
n.a.
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TABLE 19
(cont.)
Operator Block-well Flow Rate
Phillips
Phillips
49/11a-2
49/11a-3
34.6 MMcfd
+ 70 b/d conden.
31.5 MMcfd
+ 97 b/d conden.
Ranger
Ranger
Shell
Shell
Shell
Shell
Shell
Texas Gas
48/18b-3
48/19b-7
48/14-2
48/20a-3
48/19a-6
44/28-2
48/13a-two
12 MMcfd
29 MMcfd
wells
44/23-4
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
27 MMcfd
Ultramar
Zapata
49/5-3
42/15b-one well
39 MMcfd
n.a.
Trade press.Sources:
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Economics of Gas Supply in the United Kingdom
Excluding imports (i.e., gas from Frigg), U.K. gas supply consists
of the southern North Sea and the FLAGS associated gas collection system.
Recent developments suggest that while there will be additions to peaking
capacity--such as the Rough and Morecambe fields, the latter in the Irish
Sea--and continued hookups of small gas and gas/condensate fields as well
as associated gas flows from northern and central sector fields, most
future U.K. gas production will be from fields in the southern sector of
the North Sea.
Unfortunately, new field development in the southern sector has
not been sufficient in recent years to allow the kind of analysis of
development costs that is possible for oil.7 6 When development
expenditures are examined relative to capacity and reserve additions,
the results fluctuate so wildly as to render them unreliable. This
undoubtedly reflects the low level of field development and expenditures
for associated gas pipelines (specifically FLAGS) that were made for some
years before deliveries actually started, which makes costs difficult to
average out.
It is possible to provide some estimate of operating costs, using
production rates and aggregate operating expenditures (see Table 20).
As can be seen, these inflate at roughly 5.5 percent annually in real
terms, although the data are slightly contaminated by the growing impact
of associated gas, for which only pipeline expenditures are available.
76 See Adelman, "The Competitive Floor Price for World Oil," Energy
Journal, October 1986, for an analysis of U.K. oil costs.
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Table 3-20
United Kingdom Gas Field Operating Costs
($ 1985)
Total Gas field
Operating
Expenditures
(million $)
295.38
287.71
294.70
363.47
374.82
394.52
Total Gas
Production
(Bcf)
1387
1317
1321
1352
1396
1418
Development f the Oil and Gas Resources of the United
Kingdom, 1985. Production from p. 69, (includes associated gas).
Expenditures from p. 78, (includes expenditures on FLAGS
and the other associated gas gathering pipelines). Expenditures
given in sterling of the year in question.
Converted to $ 1985 by dividing by the purchasing power
parity, from Purchasina Power Parity aLd Real Expenditures fghe
-OECD, for the year in question and multiplying by the ratio of
1980 / (year in question) implicit price deflator from the
Economic Report f the President.
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Unit
Operating
Costs
($/Mcf)
0.213
0.218
0.223
0.269
0.269
0.278
Source:
m
aom
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Table 3-21
British Gas Development-Operating Costs
Esmond Complex (Esmond, Forbes, Gordon Fields)
1. Development costs
2. Reserves
3. Average production rate
4. Depletion (Q/R)
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development-operating costs as sold
688
600
73
0.122
1.147
2.281
0.471
2.752
($MM)
(Bcf)
(Bcf/year)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
Sources:
1,2,3. Petroleum Economist July 1985, p. 260.
Development costs given in sterling 1985, converted
to $ 1985 by dividing by the 1984 Purchasing Power
Parity, from Purchasing Power Parity and Real ExDenditures
in the OECD, and multiplying by the ratio of the 1985/1984
implicit price deflator from the Economic Report
of the President.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
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Table 3-22
British Gas Development-Operating Costs
Hewett Field
(Expansion of an existing field)
1. Additional development costs
2. Reserves added
3. Peak output
4. Depletion (Q/R)
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development-operating costs as sold
49
120
36.5
0.304
0.408
0.569
0.067
0.636
($MM)
(Bcf)
(Bcf/year)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
Sources:
1,2,3. il and Gas Journal, April 28, 1986, p. 34.
Development costs given in $ 1986.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5 of
development costs.
8. line 6 + line 7.
lol
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Table 3-23
British Gas Development-Operating Costs
Morecambe Field
1. Development costs
2. Reserves
3. Peak output
4. Depletion (Q/R)
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development-operating costs as sold
2.85
5
438
0.088
0.570
1.353
0.325
1.678
($Billion)
(Tcf)
(Bcf/year)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. World Oil, August 15, 1981, p. 174 (includes costs of pipeline
to shore). Development costs given in $ 1981, converted
to $ 1985 using implicit price deflator from
Economic Report f the President.
2,3. Petroleum Economist, Febuary 1985, p. 67.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
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Table 3-24
British Gas Development-Operating Costs
Thames Complex (Thames, Yare, Bure)
1. Development costs 230
2. Reserves 460
3. Peak output 43.8
4. Depletion (Q/R) 0.095
5. Development costs in ground 0.500
6. Development costs as sold 1.129
7. Operating costs 0.263
8. Development-operating costs as sold 1.392
($MM)
(Bcf)
(Bcf/year)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
Sources:
1,2. Petroleum Intelliqence Weekly, Feburary 2, 1985,
p. 12. Development costs given in $ 1985.
3. International Ga Report, Febuary 1, 1985, p. 2.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses/annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
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Table 3-25
British Gas Development-Operating Costs
Victor Field
Gas/Condensate Field
1. Development costs 139 ($MM)
2. Reserves 706 (Bcf)
3. Production rate 91 (Bcf/year)
4. Depletion (Q/R)
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development-operating costs as sold
9. Development-operating costs as sold,
adjusted for condensate production
0.197 ($/Mcf)
0.380 ($/Mcf)
0.076 ($/Mcf)
0.456 ($/Mcf)
0.444 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1984, p. 202.
Development costs given in $ 1984, converted to $ 1985
using implicit price deflator from Economic Report
of the President.
2. Development of the Oil & Gas Resources of the
United Kingdom, 1985, p. 64.
3. Petroleum Economist, October 1984, p. 391.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 3) * (line 4 + i) i = .12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 3 (annual operating expenses / annual
production) annual operating expenses assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
9. Line 8 - (yearly revenue from condensate sales / line 3)
= line 8 - ((146,000 bbl) * ($7.50/bbl)) / (line 3 * 1000).
Condensate production rate from Petroleum Economist,
October 1984, p. 391. $7.50 condensate price assumed.
0.129
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Table 3-26
British Gas Development-Operating Costs
Vulcan, Vanguard, South Valiant Fields
1. Development costs
2. Reserves
3. Depletion (assumed)
4. Production rate (aR)
5. Development costs in ground
6. Development costs as sold
7. Operating costs
8. Development-operating costs as sold
960
1.4
0.10
140
0.686
1.509
0.343
1.852
($MM)
(Tcf)
(Bcf/year)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, March 3, 1986,-p. 12.
Development costs given in $ 1986.
2. New York Times, Febuary 26, 1986, p. 5.
5. Line 1 / line 2.
6. (line 1 / line 4) * (line 3 + i) i = 0.12.
7. 0.05 * line 1 / line 4 (annual operating expenses/annual
production) annual operating expense assumed to be 5% of
development costs.
8. Line 6 + line 7.
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However, a number of developments, mostly in the southern sector,
have been recently announced in sufficient detail to calculate their
costs (see Tables 21 through 26). (Note that Morecambe will be used
for peaking purposes and that the Hewett development is an expansion of
an existing field.) The variance is high, but all the fields would be
viable at oil prices around $15/bbl, assuming that pipeline costs are
small. Using reserves as to weight the costs yields a weighted average,
for these developments, of $1.65/Mcf.
Associated Gas
The United Kingdom has substantial reserves of associated gas in
oil fields in both the central and northern sectors of the North Sea.
Approximately 13% of domestic production in 1984 consisted of associated
gas.7 7 Future levels of supplies depend on the development of a pipeline
system to gather the gas now being flared or reinjected into a variety of
fields and on the economics of such a system.
For associated gas, most costs will be for gathering and pipelining,
since exploration and field development costs are borne by the oil.
(Processing costs need not be considered, since recovery of the liquids
before flaring is almost always economic.) Thus, the true marginal cost
of associated gas consists of costs of the pipeline and associated onshore
facilities.
Table 27 summarizes an analysis performed in the late 1970s of the
economics of several suggested gas gathering systems. (These include
Development of the Oil and Gas Resources of the United Kingdom 1984,
U.K. Department of Energy, p. 69. Gas used on oil production platforms
is excluded.
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TABLE 3-27
ASSOCIATED GAS
(1985
TRANSPORTATION
US$)
Proposed
System
Central System
All U.K. Fields
All U.K. Fields
plus Statfjord
Existing Pipelines
Recommended
Total
Capital
Costs
1460
2650
3024
2606
2993
Annual
Capital
Costs
175
318
363
313
359
Annual
OperatingDesign
Costs Capacity
59 297
100 533
114 677
100
114
373
657
Costs per
Mcf
0.787
0.785
0.705
1.108
0.721
Source: A North Sea gas gathering system,
U.K. Department of Energy, May 1978.
COSTS
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some gas/condensate fields, as well as oil/gas fields.) In most cases,
the range of estimated costs for delivering gas with these systems
(excluding the Statfjord/Heimdall legs) was substantially below $1/Mcf.
The system that was developed, the Far North Liquid and Associated Gas
System, is reported to have cost $1.6 billion.78 Using the previously
described method, this translates into a delivery cost of roughly
$0.75/Mcf.
However, the incremental cost of hooking up new fields should be
lower, since the trunk pipeline reflects sunk costs. Turning to estimates
made during the original gas gathering pipeline study, Table 28 provides
some examples of these incremental costs, which range from $0.40 to
$1.25/Mcf.
Algeria
With its supergiant Hassi R'Mel field and its close proximity to
Western Europe, Algeria is in a uniquely favorable position as a gas
producer. It can achieve very high rents by exporting natural gas,
partly by pipeline, to the second largest market in the world. However,
by demanding too high a price, the Algerians have lost many of their
customers and may lose more. At present, they not only have huge surplus
export capacity, but there is little prospect in the foreseeable future of
significant increases in sales.
Although Algerian natural gas resources include more than just the
Hassi R'Mel field, this field dominates the Algerian supply picture.
78 Natural Gas Prospects, International Energy Agency, 1986, p. 78.
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TABLE 3-28
COST OF HOOKING UP GAS FIELDS, UK NORTH SEA
Distance Peak
System Capacity
(miles) (Bcf/year)
(million
1985$)
COSTS
($/Mcf
($/Mcf) per 100 mis.)
Field
Fulmar
Magnus
9/18
Hookup Pipeline
147.5
Lomond
Magnus2
Statfjord
Beryl
33.1
48
154.1
49.3
207.7
83.2
Proposed
Thelma
Thelma2
Thelma3
Thelma4
Trunkline
136
136
136
136
Options:
300
530
675
830
Onshore Facilities:
System A
System B
System C
System D
297.11
532.9
677.075
827.455
555
794
973
1062
0.317
0.253
0.244
0.218
Note: Currency converted at .4665 pounds per dollar,
which is average of 1979 and 1980 purchasing power parity
exchange rates, from OECD, Purchasing Power Parities
and Real Expenditures in the OECD
Pipeline capacity from OGJ 8/12/85; (estimated for
Fulmar and Beryl).
Capital costs in January 1980 pounds from A North
Sea gas gathering system, Energy Paper Number 44
UK Department of Energy, May 1978, pp. 27-31.
Field
85
73
36.5
75
73
365
100
471
203
223
557
251
805
340
0.942
0.474
1.038
1.263
0.584
0.375
0.578
0.64
1.43
2.16
0.82
1.18
0.18
0.69
438
538
571
596
0.248
0.173
0.144
0.122
0.18
0.13
0.11
0.09
A*
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Discovered in 1956, by 1966, its reserves were estimated at 39 Tcf.7 9
By 1977 they had grown to 54 Tcf, not including approximately 1.5 Tcf
that already had been produced.80 Other fields, shown in Table 29,
contain a reported 129.3 Tcf proved reserves, led by the Rhourde Nousse
field with 13.1 Tcf. (The Oil & Gas Journal listed proved reserves of
107 Tcf on January 1, 1986.) At 1985 production rates, the existing
reserves have an expected life of well over 100 years.
On the other hand, undiscovered resources are believed to be fairly
small. Algeria officially maintains that its possible and probable
hydrocarbon reserves constitute one-third of its proved reserves. The
U.S. Geological Survey puts the mean expectation for undiscovered gas at
only 26 Tcf, less than one-quarter of the amount discovered to date.8 1
Partly due to its small oil reserves and partly due to these low
expectations for undiscovered resources, Algeria considers itself to be
resource poor. However, for the purposes of natural gas trade, Algeria
is a major supplier. Even if the above assessments are correct, resources
will not be a constraint on Algeria's natural gas trade position for
decades. In reality, these assessments probably reflect an assumption
that the minimum economic field size is very large, reflecting the high
79 PPS, February 1966, p. 44.
80 IPE, 1977, p. 239.
81 January 1, 1986 reserves were 107 Tcf, and gas produced to that date
amounted to 12 Tcf. Reserves from OGJ, op. cit. and cumulative production
from Energy Information Administration, lEpartment of Energy, The
Petroleum Resources of Libya, Algeria, and Egypt, March 1984, p 77.
Undiscovered resources from U.S.G.S. 82-1056, cited in DOE, ibid. The
estimated range of undiscovered natural gas is 19 to 35 Tcf, at the 5 and
95 percent probability levels.
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TABLE 3-29
ALGERIAN NATURAL GAS RESERVES
(Tcf)
Field Proven Probable Possible
Hassi R'Mel 85.3 -- --
In Salah 5.2 15.2 15.7
Rhourde Nousse 13.1 2.2 2.0
Tin Fouye Tabankort 5.4 5.0 --
Gassi Touil 6.9 1.6 1.0
In Amenas 5.5 1.1 2.0
Stah 7.7 0.6 0.2
Haoud Berkaoui 0.2 -- --
TOTAL 129.3 25.7 21.0
Totals may not add due to rounding.
Source: Sonatrach, cited in Mossavar-Rahmani, op. cit. p. 120.
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transporation costs of the gas and perhaps also the Algerian policy
environment. In the future, if the minimum economic field size drops,
resources should grow substantially.
Algeria initiated the first long-term LNG contract, beginning
deliveries to the United Kingdom in 1964. Small contracts with France
and Spain followed, usually delivered for under $1/Mcf (in current
dollars). These prices were essentially competitive with then-current
oil prices, a necessity in marketing the gas. At least one study
suggested that these exports were not really economical, but Algeria
has argued they were undertaken to develop the technology.8 2
Algeria was well positioned to take advantage of the first oil
shock. The first large-scale (135 Bcf/yr) contract for LNG exports had
been signed only in 1972, with France, but a number of others were
under consideration, including several with U.S. companies. (Spot
sales were made to the United States in the winter of 1970, at prices
on the order of $1.50/Mcf. 8 3 )
Given both the regulation-induced tightness in the U.S. natural
gas market, and competitive prices for LNG, it was natural at the time
that U.S. pipeline companies turn to Algeria for supplies. Contract
82 Clinton Mouer, "The Economics of Liquefied Natural Gas," MIT Sloan
School of Management, Masters Thesis, Cambridge, Mass., June 1973,
p. 80. When the net present value was set to zero, the internal rate
of return was 7 percent, less than the opportunity cost of capital at
that time of 8 percent.
83 PPS, 7/70, p. 269. Although the price equates to approximately
$9/FT7 of oil, far above market prices at the time, transportation
costs for natural gas were high enough that the price was probably
competitive when delivered along the East Coast, to Boston in particular.
Other reports put the price at as little as half those prices. See, e.g.,
PPS, 4/70, p. 144, which put proposed c.i.f. prices at $0.68 to 0.85/Mcf.
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negotiations took place from the early 1970s on, and a number were
signed, although some were never initiated. In all, contracts for 16
Bcm/yr (564 Bcf/yr) were signed at one time or another, and an additional
20 Bcm/yr (730 Bcf/yr) was negotiated, although the peak flow to the
United States was only 7.2 Bcm (253 Bcf). No deliveries are being made at
present.8 4
A number of problems have prevented exports of Algerian LNG to the
United States. In one instance, at the end of 1973, the Algerians
cancelled a contract when the required approval from the U.S. government,
specifically the Federal Power Commission, was not granted within the time
they required. The Algerians seemed to be responding to rising world oil
prices, which had rendered the original contract price of $0.42/Mcf
unappealing,85 and the contract was renegotiated at higher prices.
Subsequent price increases were accepted by El Paso, and approved by
U.S. regulatory agencies, in 1979, but Sonatrach abrogated the contract
only months later since oil prices were still rising. When U.S. natural
gas prices weakened, the importers chose to abrogate the contracts, as
their sales prices became increasingly uncompetitive. Trunkline, for
example, was able to replace its LNG imports at half the Algerian price.86
84 In settling claims with Sonatrach, Panhandle Eastern promised to
begin good-faith negotiations for marketing LNG in the United States.
See IGT Highlights, 7/28/86, p. 1.
85 PE, February 1974, p. 67.
86 Platt's Oilgram News, 12/15/83, p. 3. Falling U.S. gas consumption
and inflexible take-or-pay clauses in the Algerian contracts also were
contributing factors.
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Abrogation of the contracts allowed importers to reduce the price of
natural gas to their customers.8 7
After the 1973 oil crisis, a number of other LNG contracts were
under consideration by customers as diverse as Germany and
Czechoslovakia. The contracts actually concluded, mostly after the
second oil crisis, were with Spain (for 4.5 Bcm/yr; 160 Bcf/yr), France
(for a total of 9.1 Bcm/yr; 320 Bcf/yr) and Belgium (for 5 Bcm/yr; 175
Bcf/yr). In 1984, however, only 19.1 Bcm (675 Bcf) actually was exported;
none of the countries had been able to accommodate the full contract
quantities, both due to the weakness in energy demand in Western Europe
and due to their overestimation of natural gas demand potential. As the
highest-priced exporter, the Algerians have suffered proportionally more
than most other suppliers.
More recently, Algeria commenced deliveries to Italy via a pipeline
beneath the Mediterranean Sea. The Algerians initially delayed
deliveries, demanding a higher price. As a result, the start-up of
deliveries was delayed by almost two years, increasing interest costs by
nearly $250 million.
The result is that Algeria now finds itself with 1550 Bcf/yr of
export capacity (1100 Bcf/yr of LNG capacity, and 450 Bcf/yr of pipeline
capacity), of which about 60 percent will be utilized in 1986.89 The
87 Trunkline cut its prices by 19 percent. See OGJ, 12/19/83, p. 52.
88 PIW, 5/30/83, p. 5.
89 Assuming the Belgians and Spanish are able to take 2.5 Bcm each, the
French 8 Bcm, and the Italians 12 Bcm. Yugoslavia is slated to take
1.5 Bcm when the pipeline from Italy has been expanded, but the date
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recent Troll contract with Norway should make it difficult for Algeria to
increase its sales. Indeed, it may be that the Belgians will abrogate
their contract with Algeria altogether. The French and Spanish
governments have proven susceptible to political pressure, as well as
Algerian threats to respond by limiting imports from them, and so they are
less likely to cancel their contracts, although adjustments are being
sought.
Algerian Policy
"If LNG were to be sold on terms comparable to the cost of
its real global economic alternative--that is, syngas from
coal--Gulf producers would be offered a real incentive to
move ahead with their investments. Modest though such a
return would be--a little over $1.00/MMBtu, or perhaps
one-third of the return on oil--it would at least put a
positive value on the gas itself. The days when producer
governments would put gas into an LNG plant at zero wellhead
value, and content themselves megaly with a financial return
on their investment, are over."
As mentioned above, Algeria consistently has sought higher than
prevailing prices for its gas exports, using a variety of arguments.
While its demands for f.o.b. parity with crude oil prices have received
the most attention, that is only one approach. The crude oil parity
argument was strongly made because it seemed the most simple: To them,
deliveries would commence has not been announced. The surplus LNG
capacity reflects nameplate capacity; actual capacity may be less due
to engineering problems and neglect of unutilized machinery.
90 Nordine Ait-Laoussine, Executive Vice President, Sonatrach May 1979, in
"Developments in the Natural Gas Industry of Algeria, OPEC Review,
Vol. III, No. 2, Summer 1979, p. 7.
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the value of gas exports should be the same as the value of crude oil
exports.91
Other arguments included the notion, not held uniquely by Algerians,
that natural gas should be "reserved" for use in "premium" markets, and
priced to reflect that premium value, while less "noble" hydrocarbons,
presumably coal, satisfied demand for boiler fuels.92 When oil was priced
at still $14/barrel, they argued that the price should be equated or
linked to the cost of synthetic gas, which was well above crude oil
equivalency prices.93 When oil prices rose, Algeria suggested using
equivalency with middle distillate.94 Finally, lacking all else, they
suggested that, as pioneers of the technology, they deserved greater
rewards for having accepted the risks.9 5
In fact, Algeria has not limited its goal to achieving a crude
oil-equivalent price. In 1974, they demanded a ten-fold increase in
prices by 1979, well over equivalent oil prices. 9 6 Later, in 1977,
Mossavar-Rahmani, op. cit., p. 92.
92 Nordine Ait-Laoussine, "Towards a New Order in Gas Pricing," OPEC
Review, Vol. IV, no. 2, Summer 1980, pp. 50-72. Ait-Laoussine was
speaking as a private consultant at this point.
93 Nordine Ait-Laoussine, "Developments in the Natural Gas Industry of
Algeria," OPEC Review, Vol. III, no. 2, Summer 1979, p. 7.
94 Ait-Laoussine, 1980, . cit., p. 67. This would have increased
prices 10 percent above t ose of crude oil equivalency.
95 Algerian Minister of Energy and Petrochemicals Belkacem Nabi, quoted
in MEES, 4/21/80, p. 5.
96 Certainly, the Algerians' expectations of oil prices may have included
such an increase, but that is not clear from the information available.
Their prices at that time were equivalent to $1.80 to $2.40/bbl of oil,
and they asked for an immediate increase to approximately the equivalent
of $12/bbl, roughly the prevailing price. See PE, May 1974, p. 177.
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they argued that the appropriate price would be $6.50/MMBtu in 1985, or
about three times the then-prevailing price!9 7
Algeria has never attained its pricing goals. It was, however,
highly successful in repeatedly convincing customers to accept higher
prices, and has (like others) introduced oil price-indexation into its
contracts. It also managed to convert a number of contracts from c.i.f.
pricing (i.e., pricing related to end-use markets) to f.o.b. pricing
(i.e., "value" pricing).9 8
Their success occurred due to the fears of customers during the
past oil crises that their energy supplies would be inadequate, reflecting
their belief that prices were not as important as locating supplies.
Actual users had little influence (either politically or through the
marketplace) until the gas was delivered. Both the French and Italian gas
utilities resisted Algerian price increases, but their respective
governments overrode them, and provided subsidies to offset the
higher-than-market prices. The Italian government agreed to pay about
$0.50/Mcf of the price (depending on exchange rates), or more than 10
percent. The French government similarly agreed to a 13.5 percent subsidy
Ait-Laoussine, 1979, p. 9, quoting himself. The same caveat applies
as in the previous footnote.
98 Ait-Laoussine, 1980, p. 65, criticized this practice, both because
of problems with keeping the gas competitive, but also because "...energy
prices are expected to increase faster than the transportation
charges...," meaning that buyers would receive the rents from the
resulting disparity in c.i.f. prices for gas and oil.
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to Gaz de France (GdF), which was subsequently rescinded due to budgetary
constraints.
When the gas did arrive, customers refused to buy it in the
quantities expected. The demand for energy in general had been
overestimated, and in addition natural gas prices were losing their
competitive advantage. Although government planners felt that gas
imports were much preferable to oil imports, consumers held a different
view of the differential value of the two. As the price of gas rose in
response to renegotiated gas contracts, consumers were less likely to
switch to gas.
The recent fall in oil prices has led to strong demands for a
reduction in LNG prices. Algeria, maintaining the fiction that its
crude oil still is selling at official pre-crash prices, has refused.
As a result, the Belgians and Italians unilaterally lowered the price
they were paying. Instead of $3.81/Mcf for LNG f.o.b. Algeria and
$3.45/Mcf for pipeline gas at the Tunisian border, for Belgium and
Italy respectively, they are now paying $2.30/Mcf and $2.00/Mcf (f.o.b.)
while awaiting conclusion of the renegotiation process.100
At the same time, the French and Spanish have agreed to an interim
price on the order of $3.18/Mcf f.o.b. (about $3.60 c.i.f.), indexed to
The French government did agree to allow GdF to increase prices to
offset the loss of the subsidy. See PIW, 3/12/84, p. 4. Even with the
subsidy, GdF claimed that half its 1982deficit was due to the excessive
price for Algerian LNG. See PIW, 5/2/83, p. 3.
100 ibid. They have stated that any difference in the price that is
finalTynegotiated will be paid (or demanded) retroactively.
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Dutch and Soviet gas export prices rather than to crude oil prices.1 01
Reports suggest that this is an interim price and that negotiations
for a new, long-term pricing formula are still underway.10 2
The future direction of Algerian policy is not clear. Although a
recent statement by the Energy Minister admitted that it is not possible
to market a fuel that is not priced competitively, 10 3 the Director General
of Sonatrach expressed optimism over regaining sales to the U.S. market,
based on his assessment of the lack of available gas in Canada and
Mexico.10 4 Considering the glut in the U.S. natural gas market, and with
current spot prices at $1.50/Mcf, LNG imports appear extremely unlikely,
at least at prices comparable to those paid in Western Europe.
This optimism no doubt is based on Algeria's past successes in
obtaining sales at prices above those prevailing in the market. Algeria
has denied that its prices were political in nature,10 5 but at the same
time it has sought to reinitiate the defunct contracts both through its
political contacts10 6 and by putting pressure on those U.S. banks through
which it has loans to use their influence with the importing pipelines.10 7
101 See IGR, 4/11/86, pp. 1-3.
102 ibid.
103
Summer of 1985, cited in PIW, 9/16/85, p. 5.
104 OPEC Bulletin, July/August 1985, p. 57.
105 IGR, 10/26/84, p. 11.
106 Such was referred to during a March 1985 visit to the United States
by Algerian President Benjedid. See PIW, 3/25/85, p. 6.
107 WSJ, 3/28/84, p. 36.
3-112 .
At the same time, Algeria is seeking new contracts outside its
traditional markets. A small (1 Bcm/yr, or 35 Bcf/yr) barter contract
was signed with Brazil last year, which would have used Algerian LNG
tankers to deliver and regasify the natural gas at a reported price of
$4.00 to $4.5/Mcf, c.i.f.1 0 8 However, the contract failed to achieve
approval due to internal disputes in Brazil. 10 9 The Algerians also
have sought customers in the Pacific basin, but at crude oil-equivalency
prices and given the LNG glut in that market, customers have no incentive
to buy additional supplies from a new source.1l0
The Economics of Algerian Natural Gas Supply
In arguing for higher LNG prices, Algeria repeatedly has suggested
that the complexity and expense of the liquefaction process requires
prices higher than those being paid by customers. Whatever the merit
of this argument, cost is an important criteria in investment decisions.
Specifically, we need to know the returns that Algeria requires to provide
natural gas to the Western European market. To that end, the costs of gas
production, liquefaction, and transportation are examined.
At present, the Hassi R'Mel field provides most of Algeria's natural
gas production, and an approximate cost can be estimated from available
data. Table 30 shows that the development/operating cost of Hassi R'Mel
is approximately $0.05/Mcf, due to its shallow depth and prolific
108 MEES, 3/25/85, p. A7.
109 IGR, 7/19/85, p. 1.
110
IGR, 11/22/85, p. 1.
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Table 3-30
Algerian Gas Development-Operating Costs
Hassi R'Mel
1 Drilling and equipping costs per well 530 ($ M)
2 Allowance for non-drilling costs per well 400 ($ M)
3 Allowance for gathering per well 280 ($ M)
4 Total development costs per well 1210 ($ M)
5 Depletion 0.01
6 Annual development-operating costs per well 218 ($ M)
7 Development-operating costs per day per well 600 ($)
8 Average production rate per well 120 (MMcfd)
9 Average development-operating costs as sold 0.050 ($/Mcf)
10 Marginal development-operating costs as sold 0.054 ($/Mcf)
11 Development costs in ground 0.0003 ($/Mcf)
Sources:
1. Joint Association Survey, 1984, figure for 7,500', Onshore Texas.
1984 development costs converted to $ 1985 using
the implicit price deflator from Economic Report of
_the President.
2. Assumed to be 75Z of line 1.
3. Assumed to be 30% of line 1 + line 2.
5. 1984 Algerian production / Algerian reserves at year
end from Oil and Gas Journal, December 31, 1984, p. 74.
6. Line 4 * (0.12 + 0.01 + 0.05), allowing 12X discount
rate, 1 depletion, and 5 operating costs.
7. Line 6 / 365.
8. International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1977, p. 239.
9. Line 7 / ((line 8) * 1000).
10. (line 9) * ((line 5 + i) / i).
11. development costs at wellhead = line 4 * 0.13 / 43,800 MMcf/
year = $0.004/Mcf (0.13 = depletion + discount rate,
43,800 = yearly production).
Development costs in ground = development costs at wellhead
divided by (1 + (i / a)) i = 0.12, a = 0 .01.
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production per well. (Any error will be insignificant on an absolute
scale.)
Once produced, the gas must be transported. To transport gas from
Hassi R'Mel to Arzew requires a 510 kilometer pipeline. In 1984, a
contract for $200-$300 million was let to expand capacity by 5 Bcm/yr
(175 Bcf/yr) by looping the existing line.ll Using the methodology
described previously, yields a transportation cost of $0.29/Mcf, which
is in close agreement with the estimate of $0.25/Mcf made in the 1982
IEA report.1 1 2 The distance to Skikda, where 8.5 Bcm/yr (300 Bcf/yr, or
27 percent) of the liquefaction capacity is located, is about one-quarter
longer, and the distance to Cape Bon in Tunisia, where the TransMed
pipeline begins, is about twice that. From the Rhourde Nouss field to
Hassi R'Mel is about the same distance as from Hassi R'Mel to Arzew. The
resulting transportation costs to the various exit points are shown in
Table 31.
The major transportation costs are incurred after the gas has
reached the sea. According to the 1986 IEA report, the Transmed pipeline,
at 12 Bcm/yr (425 Bcf/yr) capacity, cost $1.6 billion, although this
includes the Algerian section.1 13 Subtracting the onshore section, brings
PIW, 8/20/84, p. 6, put the cost at $300 million, while WSJ, 8/15/84,
p. 3ut it at $196 million. The latter report conceivably could exclude
subcontracts, some materials, etc., so we have used the higher number.
112 op. cit., p. 127. The IEA estimate is from Hassi R'Mel to the
Tunislanborder, which is slightly further than to Arzew. This cost
estimate is approximately one-third higher than U.S. marginal pipeline
costs.
113
p.2 cit., p. 78. PE, July 1983, p. 257 put the cost at $3 billion.
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TABLE 3-31
ALGERIAN NATURAL GAS COSTS
($/Mcf)
COSTS Hassi R'Mel Rhourde Nousse
Production 0.050 0.100
Transportation
to Arzew 0.300 0.600
to Skikda 0.375 0.675
to Transmed 0.600 0.900
LNG costs
Capital costs 0.600 0.600
Operating (3%) 0.140 0.140
Fuel (10% input)
Arzew 0.035 0.070
Skikda 0.043 0.078
Total liquefaction costs
Arzew 0.775 0.810
Skikda 0.850 0.885
"fob" cost
Arzew 1.125 1.510
Skikda 1.275 1.660
Transmed 0.650 1.000
Transport costs (exAlgeria)
to S. France 0.110
to Zeebrugge 0.440
to Italy 0.400
Total costs, cif
to S. France
Arzew 1.235 1.620
Skikda 1.715 2.100
to Zeebrugge 1.715 2.100
to Italy 1.050 1.400
Source: See text.
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the capital cost down to about $1 billion. (This is probably too
high.)11 4 Applying the previously described method to this capital cost
yields a transportation cost of $0.40/Mcf.1 15
There is a possibility that capacity will be boosted to 18 Bcm/yr
(635 Bcf/yr), but since looping will be necessary to accomplish this,
rather than just additional compression, costs for incremental volumes
will not fall significantly.
The LNG plants at Arzew apparently cost on the order of $2.6
billion for 15.5 Bcm/yr (550 Bcf/yr) of capacity.1 16 Using this as a
base cost1 17 yields liquefaction costs of $0.775 to $0.885/Mcf, as
shown in Table 31. The table also compares this cost with costs to the
point of import for the pipeline. Most other estimates of liquefaction
costs are around $1.00/Mcf.1 1 8 Using our estimates, the total costs to
114 A recent report estimated the cost of the undersea segment between
Tunisia and Sicily at $520 million, or half this amount. The length
from Sicily to the Italian coast is noticably longer, but mostly onshore,
and should be less than half the cost from the Tunisian coast, so the $1
billion estimate seems to be on the high side. See M.T. Bensalem,
"Inspection and Maintenance Techniques for the Algeria-Italy
trans-Mediterranean Pipeline," OGJ, 7/7/86, p. 54.
115 The 1982 IEA report estimated the cost at $1.53/Mcf, which this
included transportation to Northern Europe, but the precise distance is
not stated.
116 $1.7 billion in 1978 dollars, according to PE, August 1978, p. 348.
The cost was estimated at the beginning of the Foject at exactly half
that (PE, October 1974, p. 378), but such escalation was common for this
type oproject during the mid-1970s. See the Asia-Pacific report for a
more detailed discussion of cost escalation, pp. 48-68.
117 Industry sources have informed us that the Arzew plant was
"gold-plated," reflecting the expectations for very high future LNG
prices and little cost control, so we assume that other plants will be
no more expensive.
118 See pp. 26-27 of the Asia-Pacific report.
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the point of delivery vary from $1.05 to $2.10/Mcf. Insofar as most
production comes from Arzew, the true range is much more narrow.
Since Hassi R'Mel has the capability to produce at current levels
for as long as a half-century, suggesting that Rhourde Nousse represents
long-term marginal costs overstates the point. Certainly, an additional
$0.30/Mcf does not represent a severe escalation over such a long time
horizon. Any future increments to transportation capacity appear likely
to be via undersea pipelines, suggesting a further moderation of costs.
On the other hand, any new liquefaction capacity probably would be
much more expensive than that built in the late 1970s, given cost
escalation. (This is one reason why Algeria has concentrated on pipeline
deliveries for future incremental volumes.) Also, to the degree to which
the Algerian plants have not been able to reach full capacity for
technical reasons, our costs would be understated. If the low capacity
utilization is the result of price disputes, then that hardly can be
counted as a physical cost.
The Algerians are considered to be unreliable suppliers because
they have often threatened to stop deliveries if their demands for
contract revisions were not met, and have sometimes carried out those
threats. Their gas should therefore sell at a discount, although their
customers may forego that.
The Soviet Union
The Soviet Union has by far the largest reserves of natural gas in
the world. It also has an urgent need for the hard currency that gas
exports offer, as well as a willingness to price its resources
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competitively in order to penetrate markets. Thus, the Soviet Union
has the potential to become the dominant natural gas supplier to Western
Europe.
However, the location of these resources in a forbidding environment
and the vast distances the gas must be transported both suggest that there
are economic constraints on delivery of Soviet gas, especially at a time
of weak oil prices and saturated gas markets. This section attempts to
assess whether continued expansion of gas exports would be profitable to
the Soviet economy.
Perhaps comparing expected natural gas prices with long-run marginal
costs was superfluous when gas sold at $5.50/Mcf, and when Western
European consuming governments were panicked about supply. But the most
recent large-scale contract in Western Europe, for the sale of Norwegian
offshore gas, is nominally at $3.50/Mcf (with renegotiation available at
any time) if oil prices are $28/bbl. So our reference prices will be from
$1.75 to $3.50/Mcf.
Is it profitable to develop Soviet gas at prices clearly much
below this range?
The closed Soviet economy and the difficulty of translating Soviet
costs into Western equivalents make analysis of Soviet gas supplies
difficult, but certain limited inferences can be drawn. Based on what
information is available, it appears that gas can be produced and
delivered from Western Siberia to the West German border for about
$2.00/Mcf. Since most of the costs are in rubles, the Soviets should
be willing to expand their capacity to sell gas to Western Europe, to
say nothing of continuing deliveries, even if Western European natural
3-119
gas prices are around $2.50/Mcf. Until the pipeline from Urengoi reaches
full capacity, the economic incentives to increase sales will be much
higher.
Historical Background
The Soviet natural gas industry developed in a manner similar to
that of the United States. Before World War II, most gas consumed was
manufactured or associated gas. However, during the search for oil to
replace reserves in regions occupied or threatened by the Germans prior
to and during the war, a number of large natural gas deposits were
found in the Northern Caucasus and Volga-Ural areas. At that time,
little effort was made to develop or exploit these resources; indeed,
investment allocated to gas of all types comprised only 3 percent of
all investment in the oil and gas industries in the Fourth Five Year
Plan (1946-50), and only 8 percent in the Fifth (1951-55). Even then, a
large fraction of the allocated investment was devoted to manufactured
119
gas.
The post-WWII search for oil continued to find natural gas at a
far greater rate than the country was exploiting it. From 1946 to
1955, reserves grew twice as fast as production, despite the fact that
only 10 percent of exploratory drilling was devoted specifically to
gas.120 By 1956, the Soviets officially recognized the abundance of
natural gas resources, which led to formulation of an official goal to
119 Robert W. Campbell, The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas, Resources
for the Future, 1968, pp. 197-8. Hereafter ESOG.
120 ESOG, p. 198.
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increase its share in consumption from 6 percent in 1958 to 21 percent
in 1965.121 Until the mid-1960s, though, the gas industry generally
did not meet its goals, unlike the oil industry. This resulted mainly
from bottlenecks due to shortcomings in completing pipelines, as well
as slowness in developing gas-using equipment.1 2 2
As Soviet reserves became increasingly concentrated in Siberia and
other areas distant from domestic consuming centers, rapid expansion of
the pipeline system became necessary. As a result of this effort,
approximately 74 percent of the country's population is now connected
to natural gas, and only the most remote areas are not part of the
system.123
At the same time, however, gas supplies became so abundant that
the Soviets sought exports to Western Europe, first in the late 1960s,
and then again in the late 1970s, totalling 25 Bcm/yr (880 Bcf/yr) and
24 to 32 Bcm/yr (850 to 1130 Bcf/yr), respectively. 1 2 4 Currently, the
Soviets still have about 15 Bcm/yr (530 Bcf/yr) of excess pipeline
capacity from Urengoi, and are drilling in the Yamburg field with the
intent of adding 200 Bcm/yr (7 Tcf/yr) of production capacity. Some of
this will be devoted to exports to Eastern Europe and some to domestic
consumption; additional exports to Western Europe may be sought in the
future.
121 ibid.
122 ibid.
123 OGJ, 2/10/86, p. 35.
124 A number of the contracts grow slowly. The higher number assumes
all gas, including optional amounts, is sold.
3-121
Resources
"Explored" reserves of natural gas in the Soviet Union total 1,500
Tcf. While proved reserves are not reported separately, they are probably
about half to two-thirds of explored reserves. Hence, Soviet reserves
constitute from 38 to 52 percent of the non-communist world's proved
reserves.12 5 (The quantities are so enormous that the precise amount is
not important.)
Most of these reserves were discovered in the last decade and most
(6 out of the 8 supergiants) are located in Siberia. This largely
reflects discoveries in the Yamal peninsula, where fields like Urengoi
and Yamburg are currently estimated to contain 284 and 168 Tcf,
respectively.1 2 6 The fact that Urengoi alone contains more natural gas
than current U.S. proved reserves underscores the enormity of the resource
base in that area.
Since the first major natural gas discovery in Siberia was only
two decades ago, and the Urengoi field, discovered at that time, is
only now being exploited, the province can hardly be described as mature.
The U.S. Geological Survey estimated West Siberian undiscovered gas at
between 235 and 1519 Tcf (see Table 32), with a mean of 702. For the
total country, they estimate undiscovered natural gas could be 2000 Tcf,
OGJ, 12/31/85. The Soviet Union reports "explored" reserves, which
inclhes proved and some probable, according to the U.S. definition.
See ESOG, p. 60, or USSR Energy Atlas, CIA (1985), p. 13, for an
explanation.
126 OGJ, 12/12/83, p. 57.
3-122
Table 3- 32
Undiscovered Reserves - U.S.S.R.
Undiscovered Reserves
(Tcf)
Low High
Assessment
Mean
Middle Caspian Basin
East Siberian Basin
Volga-Urals Basin
West Siberian and
Kara Sea Basins
Timan-Pechora Basin and
Barents-Northern Kara Shelf
Total of Areas Given
25.5
44.8
19.0
123.0
330.5
142.0
62.8
158.2
63.0
235.0 1519.0 702.0
179.1 498.1 325.2
503.4 2612.6 1311.2
--- Reserves -----
Demon-
strated Inferred
(Tcf) (Tcf)
Cumulative
Production
as of 1/1/81
(Tcf)
Middle Caspian Basin
East Siberian Basin
Volga-Urals Basin
West Siberian and
Kara Sea Basins
Barents-Northern Kara
Total of Areas Given
6.0
32.0
75.0
Shelf
400.0
11.3
524.3
n.a.
25.0
25.0
260.0
n.a.
n.a.
0.8
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
7.3
n.a.
Notes:
Middle Caspian Basin: Most giant discoveries should be
offshore, the area is oil prone, but gas is more probable
at deeper depths.
East Siberian Basin: At the time of assessment, the area was
in the early stages of exploration with one well per 3200
square kilometers. Most of the wells have been drilled in
previously drilled areas. These wells have found mainly gas.
Volga-Urals Basin: The Orenburg field was discovered in 1975
with 70 Tcf. No major new discoveries are likely.
Timan-Pechora Basin, Barents-Northern Kara Shelf: Only the
Southwest portion of the Timan-Pechora basin is highly
explored. The Barents-Northern Kara Shelf is mostly unex-
plored. Significant possiblilities for finding gas giants
in structural traps ot the Timan-Pechora basin exist. The
eastern and central regions of the Barents-Northern and Kara
Shelf are mainly gas prone.
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Table 3- 32 (continued)
Sources:
James W. Clarke, "Assessment of Undiscovered and Convention-
ally Recoverable Petroleum Resources of the East Siberian
Basin, U.S.S.R.," USGS Open File Report 84-1027, USGS,
Washington, D.C., 1984.
Charles R. Masters, "Assessment of Undiscovered and Convention-
ally Recoverable Petroleum Resources of the Volga-Urals
Basin, U.S.S.R.," USGS Open File Report 81-1027, USGS,
Washington, D.C., 1981.
Charles R. Masters, "Assessment of Undiscovered and Convention-
ally Recoverable Petroleum Resources of the West Siberian and
Kara Sea Basins, U.S.S.R.," USGS Open File Report 81-1147,
USGS, Washington, D.C., 1981.
Gregory F. Ulmishek, "Assessment of Undiscovered and Convention-
ally Recoverable Petroleum Resources of the Timan-Pechora
Basin, and Barents-Northern Kara Shelf, U.S.S.R.," USGS Open File
Report 82-1057, USGS, Washington, D.C., 1982.
Gregory F. Ulmishek and Wyman Harrison, "Assessment of Undiscovered
and Conventionally Recoverable Petroleum Resources of the Middle
Caspian Basin, and Barents-Northern Kara Shelf, U.S.S.R.," USGS
Open File Report 82-296, USGS, Washington, D.C., 1982.
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far greater than in any other region.127 Obviously, the resource base is
not a constraint in terms of future gas supply from the Soviet Union.
Cost escalation, pipeline capacity, and investment policy will be the
determining factors.
The Economics of Soviet Natural Gas Supply
Unfortunately, it is not appropriate to apply the same cost
methodology to Soviet resource development as is used for other countries,
because much of the Soviet expenditures are in rubles, and the income from
export sales is in dollars or other hard currencies. The appropriate
exchange rate between rubles and dollars is a matter of debate among
economists, with the official rate set at 1.3 dollars per ruble. Since
hard currency can be used to obtain goods that are not otherwise available
in the Soviet Union, its ruble value is difficult to measure. In theory,
the Soviets should be willing to spend more money (in rubles) to develop a
natural gas export project than the price (in dollars) they would receive
from it. How much more is not clear, but it is very important in
determining future export policy, especially in an environment of weak
prices.
Of what value are estimates of Soviet natural gas production and
transportation costs? Certainly the Soviets are not indifferent to the
costs, especially where some are in hard currency. Also, if the costs
are known, then indications about opportunity costs can be provided,
127 See, for example, Charles D. Masters, "World Petroleum Resources--a
Perspective," U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 85-248, 1985,
p. 20. The IEA (1982), p. 362, shows total CPE remaining gas resources
as exceeding 3000 Tcf.
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given what is known about the costs of substitution, etc. Then, too,
the extent to which costs appear to be increasing is a vital indicator
of changing investment patterns, and of Soviet willingness to continue
exploiting their natural gas reserves.
The estimation of costs will be approached in several ways. First,
an evaluation of what the Urengoi field development would cost in the
United States will be made for purposes of comparison. Second, the costs
of transporting the gas to the West German border will be provided,
including the hard currency costs for the Yamal pipeline now coming into
operation. Then development costs for the Yamburg field will be
presented, to provide some idea of what trends the Soviets face as they
exploit their resources in less tractable areas. Finally, there will be
some discussion of the trends in long-run marginal costs as demonstrated
by both field development described above and other available indicators.
Urengoi as the North Slope
In previous studies, the U.S. Gulf Coast was used as a surrogate
to estimate supply costs in Southeast Asia, given the similarities in
operating conditions in the two regions.128 However, the only places
outside the Soviet Union that resemble Siberia are the North Slope of
Alaska and the Canadian Arctic. While gas fields in northern Alaska
are 200 miles and more above the Arctic circle, the weather there is
milder than in the Urengoi field, which straddles the Arctic Circle.
In fact, no natural gas is being produced in the North American Arctic,
128 See East Asia/Pacific report, supply chapter, p. 17.
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beyond the associated gas at Prudhoe Bay (which is mostly reinjected),
so actual development costs are not available.
However, in the past few years many wells have been drilled in
these areas, allowing some indication of well costs. In Alaska, the
average cost for onshore gas wells between 5000 and 10,000 feet deep
was $3.5 million from 1979 to 1984, which would consist mainly of gas
wells on the Kenai Peninsula in the south.1 2 9 Total Alaskan onshore
well costs, including oil wells and dry holes, dropped from $3.4 million
per well in 1981 to $1.8 million in 1984.130 In the Canadian Arctic,
onshore wells in the Mackenzie Delta were estimated at $1.5 to 2.25
million.1 31
Assuming the operating environment at Urengoi to be harsher than
in the North American Arctic and the infrastructure less developed, we
use $5 million as a per-well cost in the Urengoi field. Making a similar
allowance for non-drilling costs and dry holes,1 3 2 we derive total
129 Joint Association Survey of Drilling Costs, American Petroleum
Institute et. al., various years. Hereafter JAS. The depth at Urengoi
is put at 3400 to 10,400 feet according to IPE, 1977, p. 242, but
Gustafson (1983), p. 79, indicates that the average well depth drilled
at Urengoi in 1979 was 5350 feet.
130 JAS. For wells between 7,500 and 9,999 feet deep, in current
dollars.
131 Geological Survey of Canada, Oil and Natural Gas Resources of Canada
1983, Energy Mines and Resources, Canada, 1984, p. 24. The figure given
is $2 to 3 million in 1983 Canadian dollars, converted at .75 C$/US$.
Costs probably have decreased since then. While the figure is for all
wells, shallow oil and gas wells in the United States show similar costs.
See JAS.
132 Adelman and Ward, Annual Review of Energy, 1979. Also see the
discussion in Table 5 of the East Asia/Pacific report, Supply Chapter,
p. 18.
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per-well costs of $10 million for the Urengoi field.1 3 3 Gathering costs
are assumed to be 10 percent of per-well costs, or $1 million per well.
Thus, total development costs per well are $11 million. Applyling a
discount rate of 12 percent and a depletion rate of 3.1 percent,1 3 4
the annual development-operating costs per well are $2.2 million. 135
Since well productivity appears to be 15 to 20 MMcf/d, 13 6 and well
cost is $6300/d, above-ground costs would be $0.42 to $0.56/Mcf, if
this field were being developed in North America.
133 In ibid., an allowance was made for (a) a pipeline to shore and (b)
the hig-ercosts of overseas operations. Together they were assumed to
increase per-well costs by 50 percent. At Urengoi, we assume that
Soviet costs are lower than U.S. costs due to lower labor costs, for
example, but that this is offset by lower efficiency in the Soviet
industry. Therefore, no adjustment is made. The effect of spending
rubles is discussed elsewhere. As shown below, this is roughly the
same as the estimated costs per well in the Yamburg field, which is
located further north and has a less developed infrastructure, suggesting
the Urengoi well costs should be lower. However, the Yamburg field is
much shallower, which would offset the harsher conditions.
134 Peak production is planned for 250 Bcm/yr (8.8 Tcf/yr), according
to Gustafson (1983), p. 78, and initial reserves were 285.6 Tcf, according
to OGJ, 9/22/86, p. 57.
135 Operating costs usually range from 3 to 5 percent of total capital
costs. Total development costs can be converted to annual
development-operating costs by multiplying them by the discount rate
plus the depletion rate plus operating costs, i.e., $11 million * (.12
+ .031 + .05). See Appendix A.
136 According to Gustafson, (1983) p. 80, 1000 new production wells
were planned between 1981 and 1985, intended to increase production by
200 Bcm/yr (19.3 MMcf/well/d). In fact, it appears that production
increased by 150 Bcm/yr, but the number of wells drilled to produce
that result is not known. If 1000 wells were drilled, then well
productivity would be 15 MMcf/d. This is an underestimate, since some
wells are offsetting depletion, but the depletion rate was not large in
this period, so we have chosen to ignore it.
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Transportation of Natural Gas from the Yamal Peninsula
In size and scope, the Urengoi Pipeline resembles nothing so much
as the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System (ANGTS). Planned to
transport 3.9 Bcf/d (1.4 cf/yr), versus 3.2 Bcf/d or 1.2 Tcf/yr for
the ANGTS system, the pipeline covers 2740 miles to the Czechoslovakian
border1 37 (compared to 4800 miles for the ANGTS system), although the
Urengoi passes through only 200 miles of continuous and discontinuous
permafrost (plus 200 miles of sporadic permafrost) versus 770 miles for
ANGTS.1 38 Unlike the Alaskan line, the Soviets use larger pipe (56
inch) with lower compression (1100 psi being the norm, with plans to
raise that to 1469).139 Still, given cost estimates as high as $50
billion for the ANGTS project, the capital costs for the Yamal pipeline
are obviously large.
As discussed in a previous study,14 0 pipeline costs in Arctic
regions are subject to debate. However, for the non-Arctic region, a
transportation cost between $1.50 and $2.00/Mcf would be expected,
137 Plus roughly 600 kilometers to the West German border.
138 See Executive Office of the President, Energy Policy and Planning,
Decision and Report to Congress on the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation
System, September 1977 for information on the ANGTS system, and Central
Intelligence Agency, USSR Energy Atlas January 1985, for the Urengoi
Pipeline. The CIA lists the pipeline capacity at 32 Bcm/yr or 3.1 Bcf/d,
but most other sources put it at 40 Bcm/yr, or 3.9 Bcf/day, reflecting the
capacity for a 56 inch pipe with high compression.
139 The Soviets are apparently having difficulties overcoming the
technical problems inherent in the higher pressures, although they
claim to be capable of producing pipe that can operate at those
pressures. See OGJ, 7/4/83, p. 49. The Alaskan line was planned with
48-inch pipe, with -Fpressures as high as 1680 psi under consideration
for some parts of the line. See ANGTS report, p. 75.
140 North American report, Appendix B.
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using U.S. cost factors.14 1 The capital costs would run on the order
of $12 to $20 billion for that segment.
For the Arctic segment, the best comparison available is the planned
Polar Gas pipeline from the Beaufort Sea, which would deliver an annual
average of 9.8 Bcm/yr (345 Bcf/yr) for a capital cost of $3.3 billion.14 2
Using the methods described above, the cost for new Arctic pipelines
appears to be 12.5 cents per Mcf per 100 miles. Thus, the Arctic segment
of the Urengoi pipeline appears to cost about $0.50/Mcf.
In fact, total costs for the Urengoi pipeline have been variously
reported as ranging from $15 to $22 billion.14 3 This suggests that
pipeline costs will be from $1.30 to $3.30/Mcf, depending on assumptions
about throughput and rate of return. Table 33 shows the sensitivity of
per-unit costs to the different assumptions.
Another approach is to use the Soviet rule of thumb of 1 billion
rubles per 1000 kilometers of 56-inch pipeline.14 4 This yields a cost
of $6.5 billion to the West German border, or less than $1/Mcf, well
141
In the early 1980s, 7.5 cents/Mcf/100 miles seemed to be the cost
for new large-diameter pipelines, yielding the $2/Mcf estimated. More
recently, construction costs have dropped by perhaps 25 percent, bringing
the transportation costs down to $1.5/Mcf. See the East Asia/Pacific
report, p. 66. For the spur to Turkey, costs will be under 5
cents/Mcf/100 miles, suggesting the lower number is more appropriate. See
OGJ, 7/14/86, p. 44.
142 OGJ, 1/6/86, pp. 76-80.
143 Oil & Gas Pocket Reference 1984, Armco National Supply Co., p. 37,
and CIA, USSR Energy Atlas, p. 11, respectively.
Gustafson, (1983) p. 39.
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TABLE 3-33
SOVIET PIPELINE
URENGOI TO
($/Mcf)
REAL RATE OF
THROUGHPUT 5%
(A. Capital Cost is $6.5 bil
30 Bcm/yr (1060 Bcf/yr) 0
35 Bcm/yr (1236 Bcf/yr) 0
40 Bcm/yr (1412 Bcf/yr) 0
10%
lion)
.74
.64
.56
COSTS
BORDER
RETURN
0.98
0.84
0.74
(B. Capital
30 Bcm/yr (1
35 Bcm/yr (1
40 Bcm/yr (1
(C. Capital
30 Bcm/yr (1
35 Bcm/yr (1
40 Bcm/yr (1
Cost is $15
060 Bcf/yr)
236 Bcf/yr)
412 Bcf/yr)
Cost is $22
060 Bcf/yr)
236 Bcf/yr)
412 Bcf/yr)
Project life assumed at 25
See text for sources.
billion)
1.71
1.47
1.29
billion)
2.51
2.15
1.89
years.
2.27
1.94
1.70
3.32
2.85
2.50
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below the other estimates.1 4 5 However, adding in the Arctic segment
separately, and using the cost factors given above, brings the estimate to
between $1.25 and $1.50/Mcf, which is at the low end of the range from the
other estimates.
Why this large discrepancy in pipeline costs? In the first place,
while they do not discuss their methodology, the CIA frequently has
estimated Soviet expenditures by measuring the equivalent costs in the
United States, i.e., using U.S. labor rates, raw materials costs, etc. 46
While this is a useful approach, it overstates the costs as the Soviets
perceive them.
On the other hand, one would expect the CIA to be well-informed
about the hard currency costs of the pipeline (which it put at $7
billion), since that involves correlating information about sales from
Western European companies. Still, where those goods were bartered for
natural gas, and where pricing assumptions for the natural gas were
probably optimistic, the $7 billion may thus be overstated.
14 5 .The only precise Soviet report of pipeline costs is A. I. Shirkovsky,
who in 1965 stated that the 40-inch, 4460 kilometer Gasli-Ural line cost
504 million rubles. Assuming an annual throughput of 350 Bcf, and using
the then-official exchange rate of 0.90 U.S. dollars to the ruble,
inflated to 1985 U.S. dollars, yields a cost of 2.8 cents per Mcf per 100
miles, about half the current U.S. marginal pipeline costs. For the
Urengoi field (non-Arctic segment), this would be the equivalent of
$0.66/Mcf. The age of the source reduces the reliability of this
estimate. See A. I. Shirkovsky, "Problems of the Development of
Gas-Condensate Fields and Modern Ideas for Their Solution," in Proceedings
of the Seminar on the Development and Utilization of Natural Gas
Resources, Mineral Resources Development Series, No. 25, United Nations,
New York, 1965, pp. 158-167.
146 This method is used in estimating the Soviet defense budget.
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Certainly the $6.5 billion estimate seems low, allowing little
margin for any ruble expenditures even if the CIA's estimate of hard
currency was too high by a factor of 2. Thus, we believe the appropriate
figure is somewhere between the two lower ones, which, depending on
throughput and rate-of-return assumptions, yields a cost of $1 to $2/Mcf.
Delivered costs of Soviet natural gas from Urengoi to the West
German border then appears to be approximately $2/Mcf, plus or minus
about $0.50/Mcf. Since much of these costs are borne in rubles, it
would seem that the Soviets will be willing to sell natural gas at very
competitive prices.
Yamburg Field Economics
Unlike the Urengoi field, we have some direct data about the costs
of developing the Yamburg field, which, while slightly smaller than
Urengoi, is still the second largest in the world, with reserves of 168
Tcf.1 4 7 Using a cost figure of $5.2 billion for development of 195
Bcm/yr (6.88 Tcf/yr) of production yields a development/operating cost
of $0.16/Mcf.1 4 8
The astute reader will note that this is much cheaper than for the
Urengoi field. Two factors are at work that make such an estimate
147 OGJ, 9/22/86, p. 57.
148 Field capital expenditures are listed as 4 billion rubles in WO,
2/1/85, p. 9, and converted at the official exchange rate of 1.3 Zillars
per ruble, yielding an in-ground development cost of $O.031/Mcf. The
depletion rate is 4.1 percent, according to the reserve figure given above
and the production figure of 195 Bcm/yr given in PE, 12/85, p. 454. Using
a 12 percent discount rate gives us an above-ground development cost of
$0.122/Mcf. (See footnote 135.) Operating costs, at 5 percent of total
capital expenditures divided by annual production, come to $O.038/Mcf.
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plausible. First, the Yamburg field is shallower, about 3500 feet deep
versus over 5000 feet for Urengoi.1 4 9 This lowers drilling costs
substantially, so that the per-well costs in Yamburg, about $10.4 million,
are roughly the same as those estimated for Urengoi.150 Second, well
productivity at Yamburg appears to be about twice as high as at Urengoi,
again acting to depress relative costs.151
To render this estimate comparable to that for Urengoi requires
adding the pipeline cost to the Urengoi field, at the start of the
trunkline to the west. Using our estimate of 12.2 cents per Mcf per
100 miles for Arctic conditions adds $0.146/Mcf to Yamburg costs, making
the total cost at the trunkline entrance $0.306/Mcf. Thus, Yamburg gas
can apparently be delivered to the West German border for approximately
the same amount as Urengoi gas.
As confirmation, E. G. Altunin, the Tyumen bkom Secretary for
industry, estimated that each increment of 35 Bcm (1235 Bcf) from north
Yamal would cost an additional 1.5 billion rubles.1 5 2 This is roughly
double the previous figure, but probably includes pipeline costs.
Using this as the field development cost and applying the method given
149 IPE, 1977, p. 242, and see above for Urengoi.
150 The Urengoi estimate is obviously much less certain. See WO, 2/1/85,
p. 9, for field capital expenditures and number of wells.
151
With 6.88 Tcf/yr planned peak output and 500 wells being drilled,
per-well production would be 38 MMcf/d. WO, 8/86, p. 72, puts per-well
yield in West Siberia at as high as 35 to 45 MMcf/d.
152
Gustafson, (1983) p. 49. This presumably means that the capital
costs for 35 Bcm/yr (1.2 Tcf/yr) of capacity are an incremental 1.5
billion rubles, not 1.5 billion rubles for each 35 Bcm of gas produced,
which would equate to an additional $1.60/Mcf, which seems to be an
excessive amount.
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in the paragraph above would suggest an additional $0.33/Mcf in
development-operating costs, which is very similar to the estimate
above of development/operating and transportation costs to the Urengoi
field.1 53
Marginal Cost Trends
Estimating the costs of any given new Soviet field development
does not conclusively demonstrate marginal costs for the country as a
whole. This reflects the fact that Soviet gas resources are still in
the early stages of development, and the country is not a competitive
environment.
Recent reports suggest that the marginal costs of Soviet oil
production are rising rapidly. Thane Gustafson estimated that investment
in oil more than doubled from 1976 to 1984, while production barely
increased.1 5 4 For natural gas, investment tripled from 1971 to 1979,
while production doubled, but the rapid expansion which occurred would
tend to inflate the increase in marginal costs.1 5 5
On the other hand, the largest resources are, as mentioned, in
Siberia, and the large discoveries available in the Yamal area now are
planned for exploitation. Specifically, the Yamburg field is being
developed as a follow-up to the Urengoi field and, if demand exists,
153 An annual capital charge is derived by multiplying the total capital
expenditure times the discount rate (12 percent) plus the depletion rate
(4.1 percent). Annual operating costs are assumed equal to 5 percent of
total capital expenditures.
154 NYT, 10/31/85, p. D17.
155 Gustafson, (1983) p. 7.
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its gas will be marketed to Western Europe in the same way as the Urengoi
field was, i.e., a large-diameter pipeline transporting large incremental
volumes. At present, it is likely to be used to meet increases in
domestic consumption and deliveries to Eastern Europe, which has already
agreed to take 20 to 22 Bcm/yr (710 to 780 Bcf/yr), and to replace and
supplement older, declining fields.
Thus, the incremental cost of developing the Yamburg field can be
used as an indicator of marginal costs in the Soviet Union for some
time to come. Since Yamburg costs are very close to Urengoi costs,
relatively flat marginal costs are implied.
Ed Hewett used reported Soviet investment figures to calculate the
marginal costs for oil and gas over the last 15 years, shown in Table
34. As can be seen, oil costs indeed have risen rapidly, while gas
costs have been relatively stable.1 56 This can be explained in several
ways. Oil to date has been more intensively exploited in the Soviet
Union than gas. The Soviets still are developing their supergiant gas
fields. They also have benefitted from the increasing infrastructure
in Siberia, as well as from their own advances in pipeline technology,
which, as Gustafson points out, have made the northern gas fields economic
today, whereas ten years ago their development was postponed. 57
156
Transportation costs have risen, reflecting the greater distance of
the new Siberian supplies, but these should remain stable for some
time, as most incremental supplies come from the Yamal peninsula.
157 Hewitt, op. cit., p. 36. The pipeline technology existed ten years
ago, but the"~bi1ity to produce it was much more limited and much higher
imports from the West would have been required.
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TABLE 3-34
MARGINAL COST TRENDS IN SOVIET GAS SUPPLY
(Investment per net increment to energy output)
1969 rubles/bdoe
Extraction Extraction Plus
Period Costs Transportation Costs
1966-70 3812 n.a.
1971-75 4765 9013
1976-80 4279 11904
1980 4717 n.a.
Source: Hewett (1984), p. 41.
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Thus, the expansion of pipelines, gathering systems, roads, and
other infrastructure in Siberia should act to depress growth in long-term
marginal costs. The presence of extremely large reserves in one area
should have a definite dampening effect on incremental costs, although the
more rapidly development is pushed, the higher the costs will rise.
Still, since most costs are pipeline costs (see Figure 9) and pipelines
are not subject to increasing costs, marginal costs should not increase
dramatically in Soviet gas production.
Soviet Gas and the Soviet Economy
An examination of the Soviet economy is beyond the scope of this
chapter, but the effects of recent developments can be analyzed, if
only qualitatively. These include the drop in oil prices on the Soviet
economy, the need for hard currency, and the losses from lower oil
prices, as well as the impact of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
and his new economic policies.
Because of the insulation of the Soviet monetary system from the
West, and the inability of the domestic manufacturing sector to deliver
goods of quality and capability similar to Western goods (in most
instances), the Soviet Union has a particular need for "hard" currency,
that is, money that can be used to purchase goods in Western countries.
Since the Soviet ruble is valued by the government at artificially high
prices, and due to the low demand for finished products from the Eastern
Bloc, most purchases in the West require that the Soviets pay with money
earned from exports to the West, i.e., "hard" currency.
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Figure 3-9
SOVIET CAPITAL INVESTMENT
IN THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
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As Figure 10 shows, these exports have grown substantially, even
in the last decade.1 5 8 In part, this is due to much higher oil revenues,
resulting from the explosion in oil prices, as well as from a growth in
oil exports to the West. (See Figure 11.) All this has helped the
Soviets keep their foreign debt low and stable, much more so than in most
of their allies. In the early 1980s, gross hard currency debt to the West
remained at approximately $20 billion, while net debt remained at about
half that.15 9
Falling oil prices and the weaker dollar could alter that trend.
Indications are that falling oil prices are beginning to result in an
increase in that debt.1 6 0 Even the contracted-for increase in natural
gas deliveries and a reversal of the decline in oil production will
leave the country with a drastic decline in hard currency earnings.1 6 1
Short-term effects, such as this year's harvest and the Chernobyl nuclear
accident, are difficult to assess; the weather is unpredictable and there
is still little data on the economic impact of the Chernobyl disaster.
158 Note that the figures are in nominal dollars.
159 CIA, op. cit., 1985, p. 73, puts the 1984 gross debt at $20.2 billion,
and the net dTTE at $10.4 billion, a decline from $12.5 billion in 1981.
160 Syndicated Western bank loans to the Soviet Union grew from $100
million in 1983 to $900 million in 1984 and $1.5 billion in 1985. So
far this year, two syndicated loans have been announced, totalling $675
million. See WSJ, 4/11/86, p. 31.
161 Oil production was reportedly up 1.4 percent in the first quarter,
according to OGJ, 6/9/86, p. 30. The intensive efforts to bring shut-in
wells on-line and debottleneck the industry should see a short-term spurt
in production, though it may not last long. Some observers have estimated
the decline in hard currency earnings at $4 to $5 billion, (WSJ, 4/11/86,
p. 31) while the IMF has estimated a increase in the deficit7T $5 to $6
billion. (NYT, 5/5/86, p. A8)
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Figure 3-10
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Figure 3-11
SOVIET OIL EXPORTS
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If, as predicted by Soviet experts, the harvest is good, $3 to $4 billion
in grain imports can be avoided. 1 6 2 (Grain is unlikely to be affected by
fallout.) On the other hand, meat and dairy product imports may have to
be increased, as well as fruit and vegetable imports, due to the impact of
fallout. Still, these items can be reduced in the Soviet diet much more
easily (with less political turmoil) than grain, which is a staple.
The impact of Gorbachev's new economic policy on hard currency
needs is not clear. The new five-year economic plan calls for greater
worker discipline and better use of existing technology and resources,
but not for any major structural changes in the economy. 163 As one
official put it, "The changes must be profound . . . but they must also
be gradual."1 64
It seems as if the intention is to focus on: (1) more decentralized
decision-making, (2) increased efforts on debottlenecking in order to
reduce waste and inefficiency, and (3) more automation and increased use
of computers.
What does this mean for hard currency exports? Successful
debottlenecking, particularly of agriculture, could reduce the need for
hard currency by reducing the amount of food lost due to poor planning,
inadequate transportation facilities, etc. On the other hand,
decentralized authority resulted in a spurt of imports in China, and the
162 See Marshall Goldman, "Chernobyl's Economic Fallout," Boston Globe,
5/11/86, p. A21.
163
NYT, 10/14/85, p. D8.
16 Abel Aganbegyan, director of the Institute on Production Forces and
National Resources, quoted in ibid.
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same may happen in the Soviet Union. Certainly, more imports will
be necessary in order to increase the use of computers and automated
machinery.
The role of natural gas is fairly clear: The Soviet Union has the
capacity to deliver to Western Europe approximately 65 Bcm/yr, (2.3
Tcf/yr) 15 Bcm/yr (530 Bcf/yr) more than it has contracted to deliver
in the short term. By signing several small contracts with Mediterranean
countries,165 it has managed to reduce this surplus, but it can still move
gas to Western Europe without significant further investment. The amount
of hard currency provided by these exports would depend on (a) the price
of oil at the time, and (b) the relative price of delivered natural gas
needed to make the sales. At $3/Mcf, the hard currency revenues from 15
Bcm (530 Bcf) would total $1.6 billion, and at $5/Mcf, $2.6 billion. This
would only partly offset the expected loss in oil revenues in 1986. The
planned Progress pipeline from Yamburg to Eastern Europe is scheduled to
be completed in 1989, with 30 Bcm/yr (1060 Bcf/yr) of capacity, 20 to 22
Bcm/yr (710 to 780 Bcf/yr) of which will be delivered to Comecon
countries. 1 6 6 If the additional 8 to 10 Bcm/yr (280 to 350 Bcf/yr)
capacity is used for hard currency sales, it would result in $1 to 2
billion/yr, although the price on these additional supplies is likely to
165 Greece has a contract for 1.5 Bcm/yr (53 Bcf/yr) with options on
another 3 Bcm/yr (105 Bcf/yr), and Turkey has agreed to take an initial
1.5 Bcm/yr, with options on an additional 6 Bcm/yr (210 Bcf/yr).
166 See OGJ Newlsetter, 4/21/86, PIW, 8/12/85, p. 8, and IGR, 3/30/84,
p. 5. Since the line is composed-c6 56 inch pipe, it seems reasonable
to assume that capacity could be expanded to 40 Bcm/yr (1.4 Tcf/yr)
with the addition of appropriate compressors. PE, 5/84, p. 188, put
planned capacity at over 40 Bcm/yr.
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be lower than Urengoi gas, especially in light of the recently-signed
Troll contracts.
Investment Policy in the Energy Industries
The new economic plan contains a message for the oil and gas
producing industries as well. The Soviet version of the old American
axiom, is, "If it ain't broke, don't spend money on it." Investment
in the Soviet Union frequently emphasizes the troubled sectors of the
economy, often at the expense of sectors that are performing well.
Thus, when the oil sector was surpassing its quotas in the early 1960s,
the government shifted its emphasis to gas. Now that gas is outperforming
oil, relative to their respective quotas, the focus of investment is
shifting back toward oil. However, officials have insisted that
investment levels in gas will be maintained, and Gorbachev himself has
noted the incipient problems in the Yamal producing area.16 7
The Security Question
Much analysis of Western Europe natural gas markets has as its
origin the fears of excessive dependence on the Soviet Union for natural
gas supplies, although to a large degree those fears are higher outside
Western Europe than within it. This is not the first time a Soviet
pipeline has raised security concerns: In 1962-63, the Kennedy
administration pressured Western Europeans to deny export of wide-diameter
pipe and other equipment needed by the Soviets for to complete their
167 See OGJ, 10/7/85, p. 66.
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"Pipeline of Friendship". The arguments then were very similar to those
made by the Reagan administration: The infrastructure would benefit the
Soviet military, dependence on the Soviet Union for oil supplies would
increase Western European vulnerability to Soviet pressure, and the
improvement Soviet economic conditions would ease pressure on the Soviet
military budget.1 6 8 The outcome then was different, as a combination of
political pressure and offers of cheap oil supplies from multinationals
convinced the Western Europeans to cooperate. Considering that oil is a
much more easily traded and replaced commodity during a disruption than is
gas, it is interesting that the oil deal was cancelled while the gas
pipeline went forward.
The question of political, economic, and/or military vulnerability
resulting from dependence on a particular supply source is beyond the
scope of this chapter. 1 6 9 However, the question of security of supply
and policy issues arising from dependence on a supply source that is
perceived to be unstable or insecure do need to be addressed.
The first point is that the United States should not throw stones
on the issue of supply security. Aside from embargoes on items such as
grain, the United States frequently has resorted to political intervention
in the oil industry. In recent years, this has included boycotts of oil
from Libya and Iran, as well as of oil field equipment for Vietnam and the
168 See Bruce W. Jentleson, "East-West Energy Trade and Domestic
Politics," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 4, Autumn 1984, for
an excellent summary and a review of the vehemence with which many
American politicians opposed the pipeline.
169 Some discussions of the topic include Adamson (1985), Hewett (1984),
Niebling, Russell and Shubik (1984), and Stern (1980).
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Soviet Union. The Reagan administration even has attempted to interfere
in the activities of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies that attempted
to deliver equipment to the Soviet Union.
Of course, other gas suppliers have not always proven entirely
reliable, as discussed below. On the other hand, where importers of
Soviet gas have argued that the Soviet Union is particularly reliable,
some observations must be made.
The Soviet Union, on rare occasions, has resorted to boycotts of
fuels for political reasons. During the 1956 Suez Crisis, it announced
an oil boycott of Israel, a notable action at a time when the oil industry
was less politicized.1 7 0 More recently, the chief of the Soviet coal
union announced that no Soviet fuel would be delivered to the United
Kingdom until the coal miners' strike ended, although the practical impact
was minor.171 Other instances include actions against Albania, Australia,
China, France, Rumania, the United Kingdom, the United States and
Yugoslavia, but for the most part the Soviets have appeared to be more
concerned with maintaining their exports to hard currency countries.172
170 In 1955, the Soviet Union provided one quarter of Israel's oil
supplies, but ceased deliveries following the Israel's military moves
in the Sinai. Although oil and politics always have been closely tied,
an embargo at that time was unusual enough to stand out, and was cited
as a reason for the wariness of oil importers in considering purchases
of Soviet oil in PPS, January 1957, p. 7.
171 See WSJ, 10/30/84, p. 30, and PIW, 2/4/85, p. 11. Freight costs
rose, thougih, since Soviet ships hadbackhauled fuel oil from the
Mediterranean to the United Kingdom.
172
172 A good source on economic sanctions is Gary Clyde Hufbauer and
Jeffrey J. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current
Policy, Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 1985.
Table 1.1, pages 13-20, lists the cases studied. It is worthy of note
that since 1945, the Soviet Union appears on the table 6 times, while the
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One mistake made by many observers is to overemphasize the danger of
embargoes and the intentional withholding of supplies for political
reasons. Security of supply is broader. Intentional disruptions are
the most dangerous, because the causality implies both an attack on a
specific target and an uncertainty about the duration. Further, although
Soviet use of natural gas supplies to gain political leverage seems
unlikely, there remains the possibility of an intentional disruption from
other sources. The Shah of Iran was perceived as a reliable supplier
because he did not participate in the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, but his
domestic enemies disrupted production and deliveries in order to damage
him.17 3
Soviet natural gas supplies have, in fact, been "disrupted" several
times for seasonal reasons. Since Soviet gas exports are a residual of
production and consumption, with the domestic grid capable of drawing
supplies from the export pipeline as needed, the result has been a
reduction in exports during periods of severe winter weather in the
western Soviet Union. Since this often coincides with cold weather
in Western Europe, some inconvenience has occurred, although the presence
United States is listed 62 times. Sampling bias probably is responsible
for part of the difference between them. Another source which is more
specific to the Soviet Union is John Van Oudenaren, "The Urengoi
Pipeline: Prospects for Soviet Leverage," The Rand Corporation, Santa
Monica, California, December 1984, especially pp. 6-9.
173 There is no suggestion here that a revolution is likely in the
Soviet Union, but it has been known to happen before. Labor actions,
though rare and harshly suppressed, are not unknown, and the war in
Afghanistan has created a large body of people who are dissatified with
the Soviets, although they lack the capacity to affect natural gas
shipments seriously. Afghanistan provides 2.4 Bcm/yr (85 Bcf/yr) to
the Soviet Union, hardly enough to make a significant difference if it
were lost. See BP Review of World Gas.
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of the large Groningen field as a "swing producer" has alleviated the
problem substantially. (Unfortunately, obtaining data on monthly gas
exports and separating the effect of demand changes has proven impossible
to date.)
The aspect of this is the impact on supply in Siberia during
extremely cold winters. Equipment is more prone to failure and workers
less effective when temperatures drop to 65 degrees below zero, as they
sometimes do.1 7 4
There also are reasons to believe that the Soviet export pipeline
may be vulnerable to technical difficulties. For example, the pipelines
from Siberia are laid side by side, only 100 to 150 feet apart, thus
increasing the chances that a leak and explosion in one will affect the
others.1 7 5 Some pipelines apparently have "floated" out of the
permafrost, as the inadequately cooled gas caused the surrounding
permafrost to melt and the pipeline to partially surface. This increases
the likelihood of a rupture.1 7 6 This sort of problem is not unknown in
the Soviet Union; the pipes in the Samotlor oil gathering system are
beginning to experience breaks and explosions, and three or four ruptures
frequently occur simultaneously.17 7
174 Minus 54 degrees Celsius.
175 According to John Kean, President of Nuri Corp., cited in Platts
Oilgram News, 10/28/83, p. 2. A 1985 gas pipeline explosion in Kentucky
left a crater 30 by 100 feet wide, and up to 20 feet deep. See NYT,
4/29/85.
176 ibid.
177 OGJ, 8/12/85, p. 67.
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In addition, there are indications that the Soviets are not
processing all of the liquids from the gas they produce, which places a
greater strain on the compressors.1 7 8 Since the American embargo on
pipeline equipment resulted in greater reliance on domestically-produced
compressors, which presumably are of lower quality, the possibility of
reduced gas flows due to compressor problems cannot be ignored. Loss of
one compressor should not have a major impact on the system, but it will
increase the strain on the other compressors, and thus the likelihood of
further failures.
These problems fall under the jurisdiction of commercial prudence,
and point to reasons a customer should not be overly reliant on any one
given producer, including the Soviets. Still, natural gas supplies
from other sources have been threatened or disrupted for both political
and commercial reasons.
The most well-known interference with supplies is the "technical
problems" that Algeria suffers with its LNG plant whenever it is
dissatisified with contract terms, usually prices. In early 1974, gas
consumption in France had to be reduced by 25 percent in many areas to
offset the failure of the Skikda liquefaction plant to produce LNG,
which the French suggested may have reflected a desire for contract
renegotiation rather than actual technical troubles.1 7 9 Similarly, in
1980, El Paso's deliveries were deliberately stopped over its refusal
178 Gustafson, (1983) p. 81.
179 PE, 4/74, pp. 149-150.
3-150
to agree to higher prices.1 8 0 Algeria's customers have shown willingness
to respond in kind when the market turned around, both by refusing to take
deliveries of gas that they could not consume, and by unilaterally setting
the price while negotiations were still underway.18 1
Both the Netherlands and the Soviet Union have threatened to
interrupt supplies if more favorable pricing terms were not accepted by
their customers, although. in neither case were the threats carried
out.18 2 Politically motivated embargoes of LNG also have occurred, as
when Libya and Algeria imposed an embargo of LNG shipments during the
1973 Arab Oil Embargo. More recently, the caterers strike in the
Norwegian North Sea resulated in a two week reduction of production by
2 Bcf/d from Frigg, Statfjord, and Ekofisk (although had the situation
been regarded as serious the Norwegian government had the authority to
step in and end it).183 As it was, the BGC was forced to invoke cutoffs
of gas to industrial users with interruptible contracts.
For the customer, the most important question is whether the hazards
of interruption or decreased deliveries from the Soviet Union, Norway, and
Algeria, are independent or correlated. If they are independent, and if
supply is drawn in roughly equal proportions from all three, then supply
is not insecure. For example, if in any given month there is one chance
180 WSJ, 7/2/80, p. 19.
181
See IGR, 10/26/84, p. 11, for reduced French takes.
182 PE, April 1980, p. 176.
18 See OGJ, 4/14/86, p. 58-59. Some analysts suggested that the
government did not intervene, and indeed may have encouraged the strike,
because it wanted to reduce oil production and strengthen the market. See
NYT, 4/7/86, p. D12.
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in ten of an interruption in each of the three sources, there is only one
chance in a thousand of all going down together.
Seasonal interruptions may be correlated between Norway and the
Soviet Union, but not Algeria. Political interruptions might be
correlated between the Soviet Union and Algeria, but this is unlikely.
When the OPEC nations were cutting back oil production, the Soviet
Union gladly took advantage of the resulting high prices. Certainly,
buyers must be prepared to deal with an interruption of supplies from
any given producer, but the simultaneous cessation of supplies seems to
be a low-probability event.
Other Potential Suppliers
In the mid- and late-1970s, many other natural gas trade projects
to Western Europe were considered, including sales LNG or pipeline gas
from Nigeria and Iran. The announcement that Iran would resume gas
trade with the Soviet Union, the development of the supergiant North
field in Qatar, and the restructured Bonny LNG project in Nigeria all
suggest that ideas for such trade have not been completely abandoned,
although the distances involved suggest that the economics will be less
than favorable.
The driving force behind all these projects is the location of
enormous gas reserves in areas that have no ability to use significant
amounts of the resource. Iran has 470 Tcf of proved reserves, much of
it associated with oil, Nigeria has 47 Tcf, also largely associated,
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and Qatar has 148 Tcf in the North field.184 Together their reserves
are nearly three times greater than those of Western Europe, including
Norway.
But the prospects for these projects achieving economic delivery
to Western Europe are not bright. A brief overview of cost estimates
for each of the proposed projects is provided below. Although these
costs are not always higher than those of alternative supplies, such as
Askaladden, they all lie at the high end of the spectrum. For this
reason, they have not received as detailed attention as the projects
discussed above.
Pipeline Gas from the Persian Gulf
The most attractive of all alternative projects would be some
version of pipeline delivery from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe,
specifically the IGAT-2 project (or an updated variant).1 8 5 This called
for Iranian deliveries of gas to the southern Soviet Union, allowing for
diversion of Soviet supplies to Western Europe. Unfortunately, a precise
estimate of the economic savings involved and of the resulting delivery
costs to Western Europe from this project would require a regional
analysis of Soviet gas production and consumption, an endeavor beyond the
scope of this study. Suffice it to say that this type of swapping
184 OGJ, 12/30/85.
185 Iran is currently holding discussions with the Soviet Union over
resumption of deliveries of natural gas, but observers have suggested
the talks are more of diplomatic interest than of relevance to possible
energy trade. See WSJ, 8/26/86, p. 29.
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probably would result in delivery cheaper than new gas production from
West Siberia, i.e., less than $2/Mcf.
A new gas pipeline originating in the Persian Gulf and bypassing
the Soviet Union by going through, for example, Turkey, has been
considered, both by countries far south of the Soviet Union, and also
by Iran, presumably for political reasons. Depending on the producer
involved, such a pipeline would be between 3000 and 4000 miles long,
before reaching Southern Europe. Mossavar-Rahmani estimates the cost
of such a pipeline project at $3.70 to $4.70/Mcf, which would be at
least twice as expensive as U.S. transportation costs over equal distance,
but is not unreasonable, given the terrain and lack of infrastructure in
many places.
LNG from the Persian Gulf
Even though LNG exports were under consideration from the Persian
Gulf to as far away as the United States before the second oil price
shock, it is difficult to see how they would be economic now, even
given a recovery in oil prices. Using factors developed in the East
Asia/Pacific report, liquefaction would cost $1.00/Mcf, regasification
$0.35/Mcf, and transportation about $2.25/Mcf.1 86 Thus, without including
production costs, which should, admittedly, be low, a base delivered cost
186 The transportation cost estimate reflects an assumption of a route
around the Cape of Good Hope of 11,300 miles, and a shipping cost of
$0.20/Mcf/1000 miles.
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of $3.60/Mcf is reached.18 7 This suggests LNG exports will remain
uncompetitive for the foreseeable future.
Natural Gas from Nigeria
The large quantity of associated natural gas in Nigeria (442 Bcf
was flared in 1983188) and the reluctance of its various governments
over the years to see that gas "wasted" has encouraged a number of
proposals for delivering the gas to market, including the construction
of a pipeline to North Africa and Western Europe (either to Italy or
Spain), or an LNG export project. However, the prohibitive costs of
both projects have prevented them from progressing beyond the planning
stage.
For example, the current, reconfigured plan for LNG exports would
require $5 billion in capital expenditures to deliver 4.25 Bcm/yr (150
Bcf/yr). 18 9 Compared to $8 billion to deliver 20 Bcm/yr (706 Bcf/yr)
from Troll, this project hardly appears competitive. In fact, the
capital expenditures appear to be out of proportion with other LNG
export projects, especially considering the low production costs due to
the gas being associated. Economies of scale and the high cost of
187 The IEA (1982), p. 151, estimates costs for such a project at
$2.95/Mcf, plus $0.25/Mcf for gas gathering. Mossavar- Rahmani, op. cit.,
p. 98, provides a cost estimate of $4.65/Mcf, plus $0.60 for production,
gathering, and delivery to the liquefaction plant.
188 International Energy Annual 1984, Energy Information Administration,
Dept. of Energy, Washington, D.C., 1985, p. 64.
189 See WO, 8/15/85, p. 107, and PIW, 11/11/85, p. 12. No breakdown of
the costsThas been given.
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capital construction in West Africa are usually cited as the reasons
for the higher relative costs.
A TransSaharan pipeline has also been intermittently considered as
a means of gathering gas from various deposits in West Africa and moving
it to the Western European market, perhaps through Algeria or the Straits
of Gibraltar. Aside from the fact that such a pipeline would be
vulnerable to the many political conflicts in the region, and that Algeria
would be unlikely to look favorably on such a project, because it would
further reduce what little market power it now has, the costs would be
extremely high. While the estimate of $4.71/Mcf provided by
Mossavar-Rahmani191 seems high, being roughly equal to pipeline costs in
Arctic conditions, even using U.S. cost factors the delivery cost would
probably surpass $2.00/Mcf. The true figure would probably be much
higher, given the isolation of much of the terrain which the pipeline
would traverse and the high costs of transporting materials there.
While there are obvious benefits to be gained from diversification
of supply, it appears that, economics aside, the political obstacles to
transporting Nigerian gas into Western Europe are formidable, although
too complex to examine here. Still, there are large amounts of gas
available to Western Europe from these areas, some of it at medium
level costs (i.e., Iranian gas swapped for Soviet gas), but most of it
available only at prices in the $3 to $5/Mcf range, depending on the
190 Mossavar-Rahmani, op. cit., p. 98, puts the cost of an LNG project
from West Africa to Northwest Europe at $3.81/Mcf plus $0.60/Mcf for
production and gathering. Applying factors from the East Asia/Pacific
study yields a cost of roughly $3.00/Mcf plus production and gathering.
191 op. cit., p. 97. Excludes $0.30/Mcf for production and gathering.
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rents required by producers and on other factors such as the amount of
liquids that would be produced or the amount of flaring that is
occurring. Small quantities may become available over the next decade,
but they will not be of major importance relative to the other producers.
CONCLUSION: THE ECONOMICS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN GAS SUPPLY
This section draws together all the threads strung through the
individual country discussions to provide a picture of the economics
governing future natural gas supply in Western Europe. The impact of
policy variables and changing views toward mineral resources are discussed
below.
This section also provides an overview of various available supplies
of natural gas, as well as their costs and quantities. It does not
provide a specific estimate of the costs of future, undiscovered supplies,
but short- and long-term cost trends in the different supplier regions are
addressed below.
The first question is: How much gas can be delivered if oil prices
keep falling, and at what point do supplies dry up for economic reasons?
In essence, What are the variable costs of existing capacity? We have
seen that the variable costs of producing and transporting most of the
natural gas now available are quite low. Low oil prices should not affect
existing gas supplies.
However, this does not take into consideration some of the non-cost
expenses that private companies incur in producing natural gas, most
notably royalties and taxes related to production levels (as opposed to
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income).1 9 2 In addition, the costs of ceasing deliveries (whether
incurred by plugging a well, yielding a lease, or litigation for
non-performance), are not considered. The former would promote shut-ins
at prices higher and the latter at prices lower than simple economic
rationality would dictate.
Therefore most existing capacity will continue to be produced at
extremely low price levels, even lower than seems likely to occur.
Hence, buyers could safely increase takes from the current levels.
However, the development of new capacity, either to increase sales or
to replace declining capacity, would require higher prices than those
that would equate to $10/bbl oil, for example.
New capacity falls into two categories: replacement and
incremental. Replacement capacity is cheaper because it can use existing
transportation facilities, whereas incremental capacity may (depending on
location and timing) involve the construction of new transport
facilities: pipelines or LNG plants.
Geographical diversity makes it impossible to provide any rule of
thumb for incremental transportation capacity, but pipeline costs in
the North Sea usually have been under $1.00/Mcf, and often half that.
For small fields close to existing pipelines, including associated gas
supplies, costs can be less, although small volumes may not justify
construction of even short pipelines. To develop new liquefaction
192 For national oil companies, e.g., Sonatrach, taxes and royalties
usually are not an issue. But they sometimes are subjected to rules
that make no sense for a state-owned concern.
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capacity the costs are higher, on the order of $1.00/Mcf or more,1 93
with an additional $0.10 to $0.45/Mcf for shipping.
Costs of new production capacity vary, being extremely low in the
Groningen and Hassi R'Mel fields but much more expensive for the smaller
North Sea fields. New supplies are available for $1.00 to $2.00/Mcf, with
some exceptions (additional Troll supplies being less and Sleipner more,
for example).
Thus, replacing declining production with new fields through existing
transportation capacity will allow gas to continue to be delivered to
Western Europe for as little as $1.00/Mcf.1 94 This suggests that, under
unrestrained competition, oil will not capture any market share from
natural gas in Western Europe except through growth in overall energy
demand, even at extremely low prices.
On the other hand, adding capacity would be notably more expensive.
Transportation costs will, for any sizeable increments, involve costs
approaching $0.50 to $1.00/Mcf. Combined with production costs,
incremental supplies will cost as little as $1.50/Mcf for cheaper fields
or as much as $2.50/Mcf for smaller, offshore fields not close to shore.
For the onshore supergiant Groningen, incremental supplies are available
at very low costs, while the supergiant Hassi R'Mel can deliver gas for a
193 This was the cost level that appeared to be most common in Asia;
the paucity of construction efforts in North Africa makes it difficult
to generalize about current costs.
194 The extent to which some countries are willing to sell gas at these
low prices, even if rents are still forthcoming, is discussed below.
At certain times in the past, some, like Algeria, have been reluctant
to sell even at relatively high profits.
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little more than $1.00/Mcf via an undersea pipeline, and the supergiant
Troll for perhaps $1.40/Mcf.
Thus, if oil prices remain in the $12 to $15/bbl range, many of
the smaller fields will not be viable and the larger fields will increase
their market share, although concessions on taxes and royalties probably
will be necessary.
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EXPECTATIONS FOR THE WESTERN EUROPEAN GAS MARKET
Given the above analysis of the economics of natural gas supply in
Western Europe, some conclusions about future market behavior can be
drawn. This section first reviews forecasts for Western European gas
supply, concentrating particularly on those of the International Energy
Agency (IEA); then discusses trends in natural gas supply, both short-
and long-term; and concludes by describing the current market situation
in Western Europe and its evolution.
Supply Forecasting for Western Europe
Now that the gas market in Western Europe has begun to weaken, it
is superfluous to point out that the numerous forecasts of gas production
have been very wide of the mark. Nor is it important that the current
market weakness was foreseen several years ago by several of the
researchers on this project.1 9 5 The history of mistaken forecasts has a
different import.
This chapter attempts not to predict what decision makers in natural
gas will do, but rather to explain what they can do--to lay out the
boundaries that constrain their actions. Thus, the Demand Chapter
aims to discover how much gas consumers will take at various prices and
at what terms of sale. The Supply Chapter aims to show how much gas it
would be profitable to produce, at various prices, and how soon. If
195 M. A. Adelman, "The Changing Structure of the Oil and Gas Market,"
delivered to the IAEE/BIEE International Energy Conference, Cambridge,
U.K, 1982, published in Paul Tempest (ed.), International Energy Markets,
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983, pp. 15-25; and Loren Cox and Michael
C. Lynch, "European Gas Prices: The Limits to Growth," Energy Laboratory
Working Paper, MITEL 83-021WP, August 1983.
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the market were competitive and uncontrolled, both these independent
inquiries could be brought together to generate a price and volume
trajectory over time. (Policy constraints alter the actual results.)
'The difficulty with the various forecasts is that they have put
largely unelucidated data through unexplained black boxes. There is no
way to tell precisely what the forecasters assumed about supply, demand,
and policy controls. Since production and sales are determined by all
three factors, it usually is unclear what precisely the constraining
factors might be.
To correct that deficiency, this section examines a number of
forecasts of natural gas supply in Western Europe, focusing particularly
on those of the OECD, but including some made by other governments as well
as an important private forecasts.
Forecasting Difficulties
The most important difficulty in forecasting future natural gas
supply trends is that, until recently, most forecasters focused primarily
on oil. Equally important has been the mixed nature of supply and the
large role policy interventions play therein. Supply from the Netherlands
through the end of this century, for example, is largely determined by
government willingness to export. Lower oil prices and decreased demand
since 1982 have had the paradoxical result of increasing the desired level
of exports.
Moreover, where much of North American natural gas supply depends
on the drilling investments of literally thousands of producers, whose
actions can be forecast with help from the law of large numbers, in
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Western Europe much potential supply still consists of large fields and
single-project developments, especially in the Norwegian North Sea and
in the Soviet Union. These discrete decisions have proven difficult to
predict, especially where cost data are scarce and where governments
play a major role.
The Soviet Union is a large supplier of natural gas, with potential
for much larger production. While some information is available, on both
physical and decision-making aspects, it is generally inferior in both
quantity and quality to information about Western supplies. Since
economic planning in the Soviet Union is more rigidly controlled by the
government than in Western countries, Soviet policy and political changes,
which are difficult for outsiders to foresee, play an even larger and more
obscure role than in the Western natural gas industry.
In the West, the emergence of a new and bountiful natural gas
province has further complicated forecasting. Drilling in the northern
North Sea began only recently, with Ekofisk (containing over 3 Tcf of
associated gas) being the first major natural gas deposit discovered in
1969 outside of the southern U.K. basin. Frigg, the first dry natural
gas field discovered in northern waters (at 600 N), was found in 1972.
Thus, the first OECD forecast was reduced to speculating about the
potential for natural gas supply from these regions.196 At that time,
although proved and probable reserves in the North Sea were estimated to
196 As the authors put it, "Any present assessment of potential natural
gas resources in Western Europe must be regarded as provisional,
particularly in view of the preliminary knowledge of the geological
conditions in the North Sea." See OECD, op. cit., 1974, Volume II,
p. 137.
v.
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be between 80 and 110 Tcf, additional possible reserves were estimated to
range only from 7 to 21 Tcf. 97 Compared with current proved reserves of
104 Tcf for Norway alone, this is obviously a major source of error.1 9 8
Even the 1982 OECD report was too early to incorporate recent
geological developments. The Troll field was not discovered until
1979, and given the deep water technology of the time, it seemed
impossibly expensive to develop. Drilling north of 620 began only in
1980. While the Askaladden and Haltenbanken discoveries of 1981 are
not currently planned for export to Western Europe, Troll is slated to
commence production in the 1990s. The 1982 OECD report certainly
recognized the potential of the far northern waters, which were estimated
to contain 35 to 71 Tcf of additional reserves.1 99 The most recent OECD
forecast for Western European gas supply, which was recent enough to
incorporate some of the drilling results north of 620 N, was at the high
end of the 1982 OECD supply range (see Table 35).
The first major OECD energy study was commissioned prior to the
1973 Arab Oil Embargo, and it was intended to ascertain the degree of
future energy dependence on volatile areas and the potential for avoiding
it. Of course, the 1973 oil price increases rendered the forecasts
inoperative, but the results are still informative. Most of the error of
this OECD forecast is due to overestimating offshore production, as Table
35 shows. Forecasters could not allow for the low monopsony prices paid
197 ibid., p. 138.
198 OGJ, 12/31/85.
199 OECD, op. cit., p. 91.
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TABLE 3-35 A
OECD Europe Production Forecasts 1980 & 1985
(Tcf)
Year of forecast
1974
1977
Predicted Production
…-------…--Years----------
1980 1985
5.1-5.7
4.4
9.5-10.1
onshore
offshore
TOTAL
United Kingdom and Norway
The Netherlands
Other
TOTAL
2.6
3.6
1.7
7.9
1982
United Kingdom and Norway
The Netherlands
Other
TOTAL
ACTUAL PRODUCTION
United Kingdom and Norway
The Netherlands
Other
TOTAL
2.3
3.2
1,5
7.0
2.7
2.6
1.3-1.5
6.6-6.8
2.4
2.7
1.5
6.6
Sources: 1974 forecast: Enerqy Prospects to t9_5, OECD, 1974.
1977 forecast: World Enerqv Outlook, OECD, 1977.
1982 forecast: Natural Gas Prospects .tD200 D, OECD, 1982.
Actual production:
1980: British Petroleum, "Statistical Review," 1980.
1985: Cedigaz, "Natural Gas in the World 1985," Centre
International d'Information sur le Gaz Natural et tous
Hydrocarbures Gaseux, Paris, France, 1985.
5.3-5.9
7.2
12.5-13.1
2.8-3.2
3.2-3.9
2.0
8.0-9.1
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TABLE 3- 35 B
OECD Europe Production Forecasts 1990 & 2000
(Tcf)
Year of forecast
1982
1986
Predicted Production
------------ Year----------
1990 2000
United Kingdom and Norway
The Netherlands
Other
TOTAL
United Kingdom and Norway
The Netherlands
Other
TOTAL
2.7-3.0
2.1
1.3-1.6
6.1-6.7
2.1-2.4
2.0-2.3
1.2-1.4
5.3-6.1
2.5-3.9
0.9
1.0-1.6
4.4-6.4
2.0-2.9
1.8-2.1
1.0-1.2
4.8-6.2
Sources:
1982 forecast: Natural .Gas rospects ,g 2000, OECD, 1982.
1986 forecast: Natural Gas rospects, OECD, 1986
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by the BGC, the Netherlands' reluctance to lease offshore areas for
drilling, and the belief that oil and gas were appreciating assets whose
exploitation could be profitably delayed. Where the analysts not
unreasonably assumed that high oil prices and short-term energy scarcity
would accelerate development of domestic resources, the price increases
actually delayed it.
The follow-up report issued in 1977 reflected some of the lessons
learned in the years following the first oil crisis. Production
projections were revised downward rather drastically, although they
still proved to be one-fourth too high. However, in this instance, the
difference was mainly the OECD's overestimation of Dutch production, an
error that reflected both Dutch policy and the unexpected lack of demand
at prevailing prices, rather than a misestimate of supply.
The 1982 OECD report, partly due to its short prediction horizon,
came fairly close accurately forecasting to actual levels of 1985
production. The estimates for both onshore and offshore production
were scaled back from those of the previous report, although they still
were slightly too high. The authors particularly acknowledged remaining
uncertainty about future Groningen production levels, as the Dutch
government tried to reformulate policy to cope with a surplus due both to
lower-than-anticipated demand and to new discoveries.
The methods used in the 1982 report were stated as follows:
"The first two scenarios are representative of
econometrically based methodologies for projecting energy supply
and demand using a combination of econometric techniques and
judgement with an underlying assumption of an unchanged energy
policy environment. Specific assumptions are made about
economic growth, oil prices, and the prices of competing fuels
and these are used in conjunction with estimated historical
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price and income elasticities to derive energy demands by
end-use sector. Supplies are matched to demands, taking into
account judgemental assessments of likely availability, and in
this process the 'desired' fuel mix may be altered to reflect
constraints on the availability of non-oil fuels. The demand
for oil is then determine 0 at the end of this iterative
process, as a residual."
This methodology was applied to both a low- and a high-growth
scenario, with oil prices inversely related to growth. A third scenario
was used, in which national projections for energy use were taken and
altered to reflect continuing reductions in oil use, both for economic and
policy-related reasons. The relative price structure of 1980 was used,
and policies were assumed to be "strengthened" where necessary to achieve
the desired results. The assumption that the mere statement of goals and
targets directly reduced consumption is questionable at best.
In essence, these projections are policy driven:- Prices do not
adjust to reflect the relative supply/demand balance.
In contrast to the OECD, one consulting group took the approach of
determining potential supplies, assuming a relaxation of political and
policy constraints.2 0 1 Their forecast relied on "...the essential
parameters of reserves' availabilty and national economic and political
interests of the producing countries."2 0 2 Even so, allowance was made
for constraints on production, as well as the constraints on short- and
medium-term demand. Still, the group managed to "forecast" much higher
200 op. cit., p. 33.
201 Energy Advice, Energy Supplies and Prices in Western Europe to the
Year 2000, Geneva, Switzerland, March 1985.
202 ibid., p. 86.
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natural gas production and sales than did the 1982 IEA report, as shown
in Table 36.
In summary, most forecasts produced to date have operated under
severe handicaps. Aside from incomplete knowledge, two major defects
may be noted.
First, most forecasts assumed that the existing policy environment
would remain unchanged. In 1974, this would lead one to overestimate
future Dutch supplies and in 1980, to underestimate them. Any policy
that can be made, can be reversed.
The other major shortcoming was an underestimation of supply.2 03
In part, the tendency for policy decisions to restrict production (often
by restricting demand) is misinterpreted as a sign that resources are
scarce.2 0 4 Additionally, by considering proved reserves of a fluid under
pressure to constitute the total resources available, it follows
rigorously that production will begin to decline, usually immediately.
Although reserves are occasionally revised downward, especially if prices
fall, in any large petroleum province such as the North Sea, only gradual
changes in additions to reserves per unit of drilling can be expected.
These underestimations of supply have repeatedly led to errors.
The Dutch decision to extend export contracts was a recognition in part
of new discoveries, as well as lower than projected sales. Similarly,
203
This has been discussed extensively in the previous two studies.
204 This dynamic was also at work in the United States, particularly
during the Carter Administration.
3-169
Table 3-36
European Natural Gas Supply
(Bcf/yr)
1984
Production
Potential Peak Annual
Production in 1990's
Forecasts
1990 2000
Netherlands
Norway
United Kingdom
Other Producers
2,439
1,045
1,250
1,373
3,601
more than 5,295
1,588
N.A.
Source: Energy Supplies and Prices in Western Europe to the Year 2000,
[Energy Advice, 1985], p.85.
2,548
1,176
1,764
1,960
2,744
2,156
2,274
2,234
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the U.K.'s decision not to approve the Sleipner deal reflected new
confidence that gas discoveries would continue, as they have.20 5
Predicting future policy directions for producer countries (or
consumers) is foolhardy at best. But the economic pressures to adopt
particular policies can be measured by analyzing the costs of supply,
as we have done in this chapter. However, costs are not the only factor
affecting long-term supply or policy changes: The trends of supply costs
affects decision making, both public and private. The next section
examines these trends.
Future Cost Trends for Western European Gas Supply
In assessing the future of Western European gas supply, two trends
are important: (1) the short-term cost effects of both the oil price
crash and the natural gas supply glut, and (2) the long-term marginal
supply cost trend. The latter will prove to be especially important if
oil prices remain low over a long period of time, which ultimately
would suggest that rising costs of natural gas production will result
in a loss of market share to oil, all else being equal.
Short-term Cost Trends
Previous studies by this group noted that the costs of gas production
and delivery were driven higher by demand-side inflation. Large-scale
rent-capturing occurred as tight labor markets led to rapid growth in wage
205 See Offshore, May 1986, p. 89, for a list of discoveries made in
1985, including 11 natural gas strikes in the southern sector of the
U.K. North Sea. Table 19 lists discoveries we have found in the trade
journals.
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levels, as land bonuses and other rents to governments soared, and as
inefficiency increased dramatically due to the increased demand for
drilling, plant and pipeline construction, and so forth. The post-1982
weakness in oil prices marked the beginning of a reversal of this trend,
with drilling, labor, and capital costs all declining.
To some extent, this phenomenon can be seen in Western Europe,
particularly in the declining rental costs for offshore drilling rigs.
The contract price, which at its peak in the early 1980s was $90,000/d,
by late 1983 had fallen to $20,000 to $25,000/d.20 6 However, with
direct operating costs of $25,000/day, it has been suggested that this
price represents the floor price,20 7 despite the surplus of rigs that
has occurred due to the fall in oil prices. 2 0 8 It is possible that the
writing-off of rigs and/or bankruptcies among small oil or drilling
companies will lead to further declines in rig rates over the next year
or two, and that labor efficiencies will lower the operating cost.20 9
It is important to note that drilling costs are unlikely to behave
in the North Sea as they have in the United States, because North Sea
drilling should not be as adversely affected by the oil price collapse.
In part, the impact will be delayed, and in part, it should be less
severe. This delay will come from a combination of company and government
206 OGJ, 11/14/83, p. 90.
207 OGJ, 11/11/85, p. 28. Wood-Mackenzie provided the rig rate data.
208 OGJ, 5/19/86, p. 22, showed 31 rigs idle in the North Sea in April,
versus 9 at the beginning of the year before the oil price collapse.
209 ibid. In the United States, rigs are reportedly selling for 4.5 to
15 cents on the dollar. See OGJ "Newsletter," 7/21/86.
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behavior. Producing governments, anxious to prevent an increase in
unemployment, may encourage continued field development where private
companies might prefer to delay it.2 1 0 Reductions in taxes, or tax
write-offs that act as subsidies, may be used to improve the desirability
of either exploration or development. Other policy changes, more
difficult to quantify, may keep drilling from declining by reducing
development or exploration costs. Certainly, a relaxation in
local-content demands for equipment and services is unlikely when
employment in the industry is weak, but other constraints can be loosened
without serious political or economic side-effects. For example, the
Norwegian decision to allow Troll's oil to remain in the ground rather to
than require its production greatly improved the economics of the project.
Given the long time span involved in North Sea operations, most
private operators will not react immediately to the oil price collapse.
The lengthy time necessary to develop some projects (such as Troll), could
encourage field operators and purchasers to treat the recent fall in oil
prices as a short-term aberration that will be partly or totally reversed
by the time deliveries are scheduled to begin. If and when prices remain
depressed, the effects on the drilling industry will become more severe,
and costs should drop further.
The impact of the oil price collapse on drilling outside North
America also will be mitigated by the fact that oil and gas production
is much cheaper overseas.2 1 1 In fact, although expenditures by major
210 This may be the case with Troll, where much of the financing will
come from government sources.
211 See Adelman, 1986, op. cit., Table III.
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oil companies for exploration in the United States has fallen by 40
percent this year, the same companies have cut spending outside of
North America by only 18 percent.2 12 How rapidly and how far drilling
will fall depends in part on the willingness of governments to reduce
taxes and royalties.
The very large surplus of capacity to produce and deliver natural
gas to Western Europe means that marginal costs will be very low for
some time, but only as that capacity becomes utilized. The marginal
cost of increasing throughput in the Urengoi pipeline is very small,
but Western European countries may prefer to develop and produce the
Troll field at a higher cost.2 1 3 Still, the existence of this capacity
which can be delivered for a marginal (i.e., variable) cost of less
than $1.00/Mcf should act in most instances to keep prices low and
markets competitive. The fact that the lion's share of this capacity
is found in countries that rely heavily on hydrocarbon exports for
revenues will enhance that tendency.
Long-term Cost Trends
Over the long-term, the declining size and increasing depth of oil
and gas deposits should increase the marginal costs of the resource.
Given that the high costs of transporting natural gas result in a floor
212 PIW, 7/7/86, p. 6.
213 The price probably would be the same for the two, however.
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price that is much higher than that for oil,2 1 4 the rate at which natural
gas costs will increase over the next decade or two is very important.
The more rapid the increase, the more quickly gas will lose market share
to oil, all else being equal.
To reiterate, the predominance of transportation costs in natural
gas production and delivery costs will sharply mitigate any decline in
the resource base. Construction costs may increase at times, but there
is no unavoidable upward cost pressure on them analogous to those
experienced in resource development. Indeed, manufacturing processes
typically become more productive over the long-term, reducing costs.
Of course, in the North Sea transportation costs are usually lower.
Pipeline costs tend to be less than $1.00/Mcf, frequently half that, and
field development costs comprise a much higher share of total delivered
costs, particularly in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Those two
countries should experience the most severe cost escalation of the major
producers, although as the infrastructure in their producing regions
improves, some cost savings will occur.
The tendency for increases in long-term resource costs to be
mitigated by improving knowledge and technology has been discussed
elsewhere,2 1 5 but the North Sea provides a textbook example. The last
214 In "The Competitive Floor to World Oil Prices," Adelman demonstrates
that enormous quantities of oil could be produced for less than
$1.00/bbl. Although there are significant quantities of natural gas that
can be produced for approximately $1/bbl of oil equivalent (in the Soviet
Union and the Middle East for example), oil costs only $1.00/bbl to
transport, while natural gas transportation from e.g., the Middle East or
the Soviet Union, typically costs $10-$15/bbl of oil equivalent.
215 M.A. Adelman, "Scarcity and World Oil Prices," Review of Economics
and Statistics, August 1986.
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decade has seen rapid improvement in technology, which has had the
effect not so much of providing cheaper gas but of allowing previously
uneconomic gas fields to become viable. This is especially true in the
U.K. sector (since the Norwegians have deliberately delayed exploitation
of their resources).
The best example of this is the use of new production systems,
including subsea completions, semisubmersible floating production
facilities, tanker-based floating production facilities, and tension-leg
platforms. These technologies can permit production of fields that are
too small and/or too deep to warrant a full production platform and they
will, in effect, add to the resources available at current prices.
The dominant factor remains the very large resources that are
available now: discovered fields, many undeveloped, and pipelines or
liquefaction plants already in place. It will be many years before
there is a need for more intensive development in most of the Western
European supply regions, and advances in infrastructure and technology
will go far to offset the decline in the resource base represented by
the next phase of discovery and development.
The Current Market
Although many natural gas supply contracts index the price of
natural gas to competing oil products, the market has not cleared. The
continued glut in natural gas markets may result in lower gas prices
relative to competing fuel prices, especially of oil, but there is no
"natural" relationship between the two prices. A previous study noted
that the ratio of oil to natural gas prices in the United States has
WV
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varied considerably over time, even before the market was regulated.2 16
In the U.S. market, gas prices declined sharply throughout 1985, before
oil prices began their plunge, and a similar situation may occur in
Western Europe.
There is no reason to expect that a thoroughly competitive natural
gas market will develop in Western Europe. But careful observation
suggests the direction in which the shadow equilibrium price is pressuring
the market. If demand outstrips supply, then the price will be below
competitive equilibrium, and a queue of disappointed would-be buyers would
form. If supply exceeds demand, then sellers could not sell as much as
they would wish.
There clearly is excess supply at present. The past several years
have seen the Norwegians, the Dutch, the Algerians, and the Soviets all
unable to sell supplies at current prices. The result has been downward
pressure on gas prices relative to oil prices. They have not just been
following oil prices down, although some buyers have sought to take lower
quantities and some sellers have preferred to shut-in production rather
than reduce prices.
The Illusion of Oil and Gas as Appreciating Assets
It is widely believed that oil and gas are fixed stocks that can
only grow more valuable over time. The net value of the deposit (i.e.,
price less extraction cost) must rise at the rate of interest in order
to induce the holder to keep it in the ground rather than sell it.
216 North American report, Supply Chapter, op. cit., p. 10.
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This belief has exerted a powerful influence over public and
government opinion, and has generated a strong bias against producing
hydrocarbons, particularly against producing them to sell to foreigners
who thus obtain the "irreplaceable resource" at prices less than it is
really worth, or will in time be worth.
We cannot review here the whole theory of depletable resources, 217
but we must point out that the evidence is clear that over time the real
price of practically every mineral has declined rather than risen.
Clearly something is wrong with the argument that mineral resources are an
appreciating asset.
We suggest that the limitation on resources is not relevant, because
no resource will ever be exhausted. What matters is diminishing returns:
the tendency for discoveries to become constantly smaller and less
accessible. This tendency has been opposed by increasing knowledge, which
has (thus far) more than overborne it. The minimal conclusion is that
mineral prices are the uncertain, fluctuating residual of two opposing
forces. Hence they are risky assets, and in evaluating them, holders
should use high discount rates or any other appropriate means of allowing
for risk.
Any actor who preferred to hold rather than sell oil reserves
(e.g., in the Persian Gulf) would have (a) gained in 1945-1950; (b)
lost heavily during 1950-70, as real prices declined; (c) profitted
hugely during 1970-74; (d) not gained during 1974-1978; (e) profitted
217 M. A. Adelman is now preparing a paper on the subject, to be issued
in the first instance as a Working Paper of the Center for Energy Policy
Research at M.I.T. See also Adelman, et. al., Energy Resources in an
Uncertain Future, 1983.
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in 1978-80 even more than in 1970-74; (f) lost disastrously in 1980-86.
Taken as a whole, the gain during the 1945-86 period would have been near
zero. For the 1970-86 period, the increase would have been from $3.00 to
$8.00 (in 1982 prices), or 6.32 percent (real) annually. This is not an
impressive rate of return, especially since it was improved by a one-time
change, specifically the imposition of the monopoly after 1970.
With the decline in resource value of the last few years and the
increasing realization that the finite nature of oil and gas has been,
to put it mildly, overstated, the market has entered a new era. In the
past, producer nations often withheld supplies expecting their assets
to appreciate, thereby tightening the market and fulfilling their
expectations. They now have recognized that the value of their asset
has declined in the last few years, and instead are seeking to increase
sales, and thereby maintain revenues. As a result, the market has
weakened considerably and may very well weaken further, given the number
of producers who need to maintain revenues in the face of declining
prices, and given the available surplus capacity that is economic to
utilize at almost any price.
Higher volumes of gas sales will exert downward pressures on oil
prices, while lower oil prices will exert increased pressures on producers
to sell more gas. The vicious spiral of increasing competition may be
broken by transitory events, such as an oil crisis, but a long-term
reversal will come about only when producers feel they have more to gain
by withholding their assets than by producing them. Our analysis of the
economics of supply suggests that this is most likely to occur at very low
prices.
APPENDIX 3A
METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING THE COSTS OF NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
There are a wide variety of methods by which to assess the costs of
delivered natural gas, including project evaluation, rate-of-return
assessment, etc. Our methods, which have been explained in detail in
previous reports,1 are determined by the type of project and the amount of
data available. This section provides a brief review of the manner in
which natural gas costs have been determined in this report.
Rationale of Method
The net present value of any given development can be shown by:
T
V = £ (Rt - Ct) (l/(l+i))t
t=O
V E (PtQt Ct) (1/(l+i))t
Where:
V = net present value
R = revenues = PQ
P = price
Q = annual production
i = discount rate or cost of capital, percent/year
C = operating cost
Setting V equal to zero, we are to solve for P. Simplifying
assumptions made include:
(1) Production starts at the maximum rate, and declines at a
constant exponential rate from the original level QO.
1 See especially the North American report, pp. 22-25, and the East
Asia/Pacific report, Table 5.
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(2) Capital expenditures are made at one instant, just before
production starts.
(3) Operating cost is a constant fraction of capital cost, i.e., Ct
= cK, where K is total capital expenditures.
(4) All production and receipts are in continuous time.
Some other important relations that will be needed below:
Qt QO et
'T Qt dt R Q 1-e-at Qo/a, as t--> 00
a
C t = cK
K f e-it [ (Ra/(l-e-at) eat) -cK dt
We will ignore operating costs, cK, and treat them separately
below.
Field Development Capital Costs
The objective of calculating field development capital costs is to
find the marginal or incremental cost per Mcf of gas obtained by investing
in a new project. We first show how to do this when the minimum amount of
information is available, then how to incorporate additional data.
In all cases, we end with an equation of the following type:
P = f(i, K, R, Q, a, T) [1]
where P = market price or supply price (see below);
i = market interest rate or project rate of return (see
below);
K = capital expenditures;
R = reserves to be developed;
Q = initial or peak output;
a = exponential decline rate;
T = life of project.
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Equation [1] can be used in two alternative ways. First, by taking
i, the discount rate, as exogenous, P can be calculated as the supply
price or cost, the price that would make the investment just profitable.
Or, alternatively, by taking P as a market price, we calculate i as the
rate of return on the investment, disregarding taxes. A number of
examples demonstrate how equation [1] can be employed.
Case 1: K, R are known
Assume a = 1/15 = .067, which is a well-known rule of thumb. In
both the United States and the North Sea, a runs almost twice as high,
and it is best to use 0.1 as a first approximation.
Reserves = cumulative output, declining exponentially, as shown by
the equation:
R = Q e -at dt = (Q(1-e aT)/a [2
Assuming T is indefinitely long, then R = Q/a [3]
The revenue stream declines at a rate a, and its value declines at
the compound rate (a+i). Thus,
PQ $ e -(a+i) dt = [ PQ (l-e-(a+i)T) ] / (a+i)
= PQ/(a+i) [4]
when T is infinite. The present value of revenues must be just equal to
the capital expenditures:
PQ/(a+i) = K
Since Q = Ra,
P = (K/R) * (a+i)/a [5]
In other words, the supply price is equal to the cost per Mcf in
the ground (K/R) multiplied by the adjustment for holding the stock
until produced, (a+i)/a = (1 + (i/a)).
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Alternatively, if the price is known, the rate of return can be
solved for, as indicated by:
i = a((PR/K)-1) [6]
Case 2: K, R, and Q are known
Again, assume T is infinite, take Q/R = a, and use equations [5]
or [6].
Case 3: K, R, Q, and T are known
By solving equation [2], a can be found, but by using the actual T
rather than infinity. Then insert a and the known T into the following
equation, and solve for either P or i:
P * 1-e - (a+i)T = (K/R) * T [7]
a+i
With realistic values of i, a, and T, the left-hand side is equal
simply to P/(a+i).
In the special case of a zero decline rate over the known time period
T, R=QT, and Q=R/T. Then:
V = (PR/T) * (1-e-iT)/i K = [8]
A single unit produced each year over the life of the project is
worth its present value, stated at the left hand side of the equation.
There will be T units delivered, each one costing (K/R) up-front.
Note: In the foregoing example, we assume that all capital
expenditures are made at one time, in year zero. We assume peak output
occurs initially, followed by an exponential decline. In fact, capital
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expenditures stretch over several years, usually peaking just before year
zero, when production starts. Typically, production builds up over
several years, then holds approximately stable for a few more, then
declines steeply.
The errors are mutually offsetting. Adelman and Paddock showed
that for North Sea fields, the value of P calculated as above gave an
excellent prediction of the values as calculated form the actual
production plans, tabulated by Wood, Mackenzie & Co.2
The result of the Adelman-Paddock test is not surprising. McCray3
gives the following formula slightly adapted here for calculating the
expected decline period, which our short method equates to infinity:
T = R * n (Qo/Qf)
Qo-Qf
where T is the period in years, R=reserves=estimated cumulative output,
Qo=initial-year output, and Qf=final-year output. Obviously when the
final-year output is zero, the period is infinite.
Consider proved reserves of 100, initial-year output of 10. Not
nowing the final output, we set the depletion/decline rate equal to
10/100 = 0.1. Setting the price to unity, and the discount rate to 10
percent, the present value of the reserve is equal to 10/.20 = 50.
Suppose we know, however, that final-year output is 2. Then we
can calculate:
2 M.A. Adelman and James L. Paddock, "An Aggregate Model of Petroleum
Production Capacity and Supply Forecasting," M.I.T. Energy Laboratory
Working Paper MIT-EL 79-005WP, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980.
3 A. W. McCray, Petroleum Evaluations and Economic Decisions (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975, p. 323.
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T = 100 * In 5 = 12.5*1.6 = 20.1 years
Since the final-year output is 0.2 times the initial-year output,
the average decline must be the reciprocal of 0.2 to the power 1/20.1,
or 1/0.923 = 1.083. Then the present value of the deposit, again setting
the price to unity, is:
PV = 10 * [ 20.1 e_(.083+.10)20.1 dt] = 10*[(1-e-3h 6 8 )/.183] = 53.3
Thus our method, which assumes infinite time, understates present
value, and overstates cost, by a factor of 6.6 percent. If output
stays on an initial plateau before declining, cost is further overstated.
In the North Sea, where detailed data on reserves, production
levels, and field development investments are available, the in-ground
costs can be readily calculated and converted into above-ground costs
using equation [5]. In some instances, particularly the recent proposed
Troll field development, there is no meaningful decline rate. In such
cases, given the internal rate of return, life of production, and field
development costs, the supply price can be calculated using the formula
shown in equation [7].
In some areas, such as Algeria and the Soviet Union, few or no
reports of investment costs exist. In these cases, the method applied in
the East Asia/Pacific report is used: well costs are estimated using
reported U.S. drilling costs for the same depth class and adjusted for
non-drilling costs and overseas conditions, as shown.4 Multiplying by the
discount rate plus the decline/depletion rate yields the annual capital
4 See Table 5 in the supply paper, p. 18.
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charge, which can then be divided by the well productivity to yield a per
Mcf development cost.
Operating Costs
In most of our examples, an industry rule of thumb has been that
operating costs are 3 to 5 percent of capital expenditures. This can
be seen in Table A-1, where a detailed breakdown of capital and operating
costs was made for a number of types of projects: production, pipeline and
liquefaction.5 For this study, we take the high end of the range (i.e., 5
percent), although in the case of LNG plants, where operating costs are
skewed by fuel consumption, 3 percent is assumed as the operating cost and
fuel costs are added separately. Fuel costs are assumed to be the
delivered cost of the gas, since anything in excess of this will be rent
to the producer. 6
Pipeline Costs
For many producers, pipeline costs comprise a substantial fraction
of the delivered costs of their gas, either due to distance or environment
(e.g., offshore projects). Unfortunately, because of the substantial
differences in operating environments, no generalization is
possible in estimating the capital costs of pipelines. For example,
Soviet pipelines face many river crossings as well as mountains and
One private corporation provided detailed cost estimates for several
large LNG projects. In them, operating costs usually were 4 percent
for gas fields and 7 percent for liquefaction plants, the latter
presumably due to high fuel costs.
6 The role of inflated plant-gate fuel prices in raising LNG cost
estimates is discussed in the East Asia/Pacific report, on pages 38-42.
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TABLE A-1
OPERATING COSTS RELATIVE TO CAPITAL COSTS
Total
Capital
Source Costs
PIPELINES
Trans Alaska Gas S
Total System
Pipeline
TAGS Phase II
Total System
Pipeline
North Sea Gas Gath
System A
System B
System C
Existing Pipelines
Recommended System
Annual
Operating
Costs
ystem Phase I
7173
4548
7121 1
3635
ering Projects:
1460
2650 1
3024 1
2606 1
2993 1
78
20
28
35
59
00
14
00
14
Processing
System A
System B
System C
System D
facilities (North
199
285
349
381
Sea Gas
11
16
19
21
Gathering
5.5%
5.6%
5.4%
5.5%
Project):
Venture Gas Field
LNG PROJECTS
LNG Project
Liquefaction plant
Regasification plant
Nixon library
Sources: See next page.
Ratio
1.1%
0.4%
1.8%
1.0%
4.0%
3.8%
3.8%
3.8%
3.8%
2446
800
15
100
30
1
4.1%
3.8%
4.0%
3.5%
6.7%
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TABLE A-1
(cont.)
Sources:
TAGS is from "Trans Alaska Gas System:
Economics of an Alternative for North Slope Gas,"
January 1983, Exhibit A2, A3.
Fuel is excluded.
Venture is from "Venture Gas Project:
Application to the National Energy Board
for an Export Licence," vol. II, pp. 6-13, 6-16.
North Sea Gas Gathering Project estimates are
from "A North Sea gas gathering
system," UK Dept. of Energy, May 1978.
LNG Project is basic project costs estimated
in LNG Handbook, a Commemorative publication of LNG-6,
courtesy of JGC corporation. Fuel is excluded.
Liquefaction and regasification plants from
Robert DiNapoli, "Economics of LNG Projects,"
Oil and Gas Journal, 2/20/84, p. 50.
Nixon library from NYT 9/29/86, p. B8.
Operating costs based on assumed rate of
return on endowment of 10 percent.
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Arctic conditions for part of their routes. Algerian pipelines might
traverse relatively easy terrain for much of their routes, but more
equipment and personnel have to be imported than elsewhere. North Sea
pipelines may reflect typical cost profiles for undersea pipelines, but if
Norwegian pipelines cross the Norwegian trench, their costs will be
higher.
To compound the problem, there are so few examples of pipeline
construction in any given area that it is difficult to draw overall
conclusions about transportation costs: An initial pipeline may be
excessively expensive due to unexpected difficulties with the terrain,
lack of existing infrastructure, or the costs of developing and using
of new pipelaying technology. Also, the period when any given pipeline
is lain may be one of inflated or deflated capital construction costs,
depending on the state of the industry and its position on the business
cycle at the time of contracting and construction.
Thus, although we sometimes make comparisons between reported
construction costs and more general estimates of normal costs (for '
example for undersea pipelines), this paper relies on actual specific
project costs to the extent possible. When considering the cost of new
supplies, what has been observed about past pipeline costs will be
incorporated, with the caveats discussed above.
The method used for converting pipeline capital costs, which are
the most commonly reported costs, to per-unit natural gas costs will be
as follows: The annual capital charge is taken as 12 percent of total
capital costs, the same as that for a project with a real rate of return
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of 10 percent and a life of 20 years. 7 Operating costs are the same as
described above, and throughput is assumed to be 100 percent, except where
noted.
Discount Rates
For field development projects, a discount rate of 12 percent is
assumed, reflecting their inherent geological uncertainty inherent.
For pipelines, which can be utilized by any field in their locale, a 10
percent discount rate is assumed (see previous paragraph).
Accounting for Inflation and Currency Conversion
Inflating costs to current dollars is difficult for several reasons.
First, real exchange rates vary over time, but must be accounted for in
some manner. Second, there is not necessarily a direct correspondence
between any given price deflator and the various costs involved in
developing and transporting natural gas. In the United States, a price
deflator for field development exists--the IPAA drilling index--but it
cannot be freely translated to North Sea conditions. Nor can a general
price deflator reflect the boom and bust conditions extant in the oil
industry, and the accompanying boom and bust in costs.8
Our approach thus is as follows: When given field development or
pipeline costs from the past several years, no inflation is applied.
For older examples (pre-1983), the implicit price deflator for U.S. GNP
is used to inflate to 1985 U.S. dollars. When the report is not in
See IEA, Natural Gas: Prospects to 2000, 1982, p. 53.
8 Short- and long-term cost trends are discussed in the main body of the
paper.
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U.S. dollars, the currency exchange rate we use is the purchasing power
parity index, published by the OECD.9
Natural Gas Liquids
Field development costs for natural gas liquids include only those
processing costs that are specifically necessary for their production.
We need not bother with the meaningless argument that liquids should be
assigned their "fair share" of exploration and development costs.
Data on the costs of processing the gas in the North Sea for liquids
are not available. Presumably estimates of capital expenditures for gas
field development include the investment necessary for gas processing and
liquids recovery. Therefore, we estimate the revenue from the gas
liquids, and treat it as an offset to, or subtraction from, the
development-operating cost of the gas. Representative prices are used for
natural gas liquids that reflect an assumption of low oil prices,
i.e., $10/bbl.1 0
The same method could be applied to oil field developments where
associated gas is produced as a byproduct. However, since gas pipeline
costs make up the vast majority of the costs of producing associated gas,
9 See Michael Ward, Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures in the
OECD, OECD, Paris, France, 1985.
10 Condensate values have been described as 15 percent less than naphtha
prices, roughly the same as crude oil. See Gas Gathering Pipelines (North
Sea) Ltd., Gas Gathering Pipeline Systems in the North Sea, Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, London, England, 5/78, p. 53. There is not really a
spot market in condensate, but an examination of Algerian condensate
prices, which are roughly competitively priced, shows them to be close
to crude oil prices. LPG, because of its lower heat content, is much
lower in price.
XW:
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and pipeline costs are known, most of the incremental costs of producing
and delivering the gas can be shown.
There are three systems that deliver associated gas from the North
Sea: FLAGS (northern British sector), Norpipe (Ekofisk) and Statpipe
(Statfjord area). Although some non-associated gas is included, the
amounts are small, and the data are insufficient to allow production
cost estimation except in a few cases.
APPENDIX 3B
CONTRACT VOLUMES
Table 3B-1 shows the volumes exported/imported by country,
for 1987-2017, under the' existing contracts as used under the Blitzer
model's low demand scenario. Also shown are 1984 actual deliveries.
The volumes are actual contracted volumes adjusted to conform to the
low demand scenario.
Contract volumes and durations were ascertained from a variety of
sources. Contract volumes, durations, and sources are listed in Table
3B-2 which also details calculations and assumptions. The base
sources for this information were Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI),
Energy and Hydrocarbons, 1981 and 1983. The ENI data was adjusted for
contract revisions/adjustments as reported in trade periodicals,
journals, and newsletters. Among the sources reviewed for contract
revisions/adjustments were: International Gas Report, Petroleum
Economist, Oil and Gas Journal, International Petroleum Encylopedia,
and BP Review of World Gas.
In most cases, the volumes contracted greatly exceeded the
expected imports (expected imports = gross demand - nonexported
domestic production) under the low demand scenario. To conform
gas flows under existing contracts with import demand, all contracted
volumes were adjusted by decreasing the expected takes as a percentage
of contracted volumes. The expected take percentages were determined
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by considering both the actual contract take provisions and historic
performances under the given contracts. Reduced expected takes as a
percentage of full contract volumes are as follows:
Algerian contracts with France and Italy 80%
Algerian contract with Belgium 30%
Russian contracts 50%
Dutch contracts 50%
Norwegian contracts 80%
Norwegian Sleipner/Troll contract
During build-up 100%
Post build-up 80%
;e
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Table 3B-1
Contracted Volumes
Adjusted for Low Demand Scenario
(Bcf)
Exporter Importer
Algeria
Belgium
France
Italy
TOTAL
Austria
France
Germany
Italy
TOTAL
The Netherlands
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
TOTAL
Norway
United Kingdom
Belgium
France
Germany
The Netherlands
TOTAL
Net imports by country
United Kingdom
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
The Netherlands
Norway
1984
55
287
232
574
144
158
448
268
1018
204
276
644
14
1137
480
69
77
193
107
926
480
144
328
798
1286
513
-1031
-926
1987
53
251
339
643
71
274
565
424
1333
74
175
455
106
810
268
106
120
323
106
923
268
71
233
820
1344
868
-704
-923
1990
53
237
339
628
71
339
565
424
1398
74
125
455
106
761
268
106
120
323
106
923
268
71
233
821
1344
868
-655
-923
1993
53
237
339
628
71
339
565
424
1398
74
115
455
106
750
268
120
177
380
120
1065
268
71
247
867
1400
868
-630
-1065
1996
53
237
339
42
339
297
226
904
53
115
455
0
623
268
144
273
477
144
1306
268
42
250
963
1228
565
-479
-1306
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Table 3B-1 (continued)
Contracted Volumes
ted for Low Demand Scenario
(Bcf)
Exporter Importer
Algeria
Belgium
France
Italy
TOTAL
Austria
France
Germany
Italy
TOTAL
Netherlands
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
TOTAL
Norway
United Kingdom
Belgium
France
Germany
The Netherlands
TOTAL
Net imports by country
United Kingdom
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
The Netherlands
Norway
Adjusl
1999
53
141
339
533
42
339
297
226
904
53
0
455
0
508
0
97
299
342
97
836
2002
53
141
,339
533
42
282
297
226
847
53
0
455
0
508
0
92
275
318
92
777
2005
0
0
.339
339
0
226
0
226
452
53
0
455
0
508
0
92
275
318'
92
777
2008
0
0
339
339
0
226
0
226
452
0
0
455
0
455
0
56
226
226
56
565
2011
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
56
226
226
56
565O
_e
565
0
42
203
779
1094
565
-411
-836
0
42
198
699
1070
565
-417
-777
0
0
145
501
773
565
-417
-777
0
0
56
452
681
565
-399
-565
0
0
56
226
226
0
56
-565
---
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Table 3B-1 (continued)
Contracted Volumes
Adjusted for Low Demand Senerio
(Bcf)
Exporter Importer
2014 2017
Algeria
Belgium 0 0
France 0 0
Italy 0 0
TOTAL 0 --I
Austria O O
France 0 0
Germany O O
Italy O O
TOTAL O O
Netherlands
Belgium O O
France 0 0
Germany O O
Italy O 0
TOTAL O O
Norway
United Kingdom 0 0
Belgium 56 56
France 226 226
Germany 226 226
The Netherlands 56 56
TOTAL 565 565
Net imports by country
United Kingdom 0 0
Austria 0 0
Belgium 56 56
France 226 226
Germany 226 226
Italy 0 0
The Netherlands 56 56
Norway -565 -565
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Table 3B-2
Sources X...
1984 actual volumes: Cedigaz, "Natural Gas in the World 1984,"
Centre International d'Information sur le
Gaz Natural et tous Hydrocarbures Gaseux. Paris,
i 4." 1985.
Contracts listed by exporter by importer
Algeria:
Belgium: Contract 1982-2002 176.5 Bcf/year, BP Review of
World Gas, London, 1985, p. 14.
France: Contract
Contract
Contract
1964-1989 17.65 Bcf/year, BP, Q. cit.
1972-1997 119.14 Bcf/year, BP, 9o. d.
1982-2002 176.50 Bcf/year, BP, go. cj.
Italy: Contract 1983-2008 @ 423.60 Bcf/year. Contract initiation,
BP, . it. Contract duration, Ente Nazionale
Idrocarburi, Energy and Hydrocarbons, 1981, Italy,
1982, p. 76. Contract volume, Cedigaz, o_. cit.
USSR:
Austria: Contract 1975-1995 35.3 Bcf/year, Enerqy and Hydrocarbons,
1981, oo. cit.
Contract 1984-2004 52.95 Bcf/year, Ente Nazionale Idrocarbi,
Enerqv and Hydrocarbons, 1983, Italy, 1984, p. 98.
20 year duration assumed consistent with German/
French/Italian Trans-Siberian agreements.
France: Contract 1976-2001 141.2 Bcf/year. Volume, ibid. Duration,
Petroleum Economist, January 1975, p. 17.
Contract 1984-2009 282.4 Bcf/year, Petroleum Economist,
March 1982, p. 105. 1987 volume, International
Gas ReDorL, June 21, 1985, p. 2.
Germany: Contract 1973-1993 @ 335.35 Bcf/year, Energy and Hydrocarbons,
1981, Q. cj.
Contract 1984-2004 370.65 Bcf/year, ibid
Italy: Contract 1974-1994 247.1 Bcf/year, ibid.
Contract 1984-2009 282.4 Bcf/year, ibid.
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Table 3B-2 (continued)
Sources
The Netherlands:
Belgium: Contract 1966-95 147.91 Bcf/year + 1996-2005 contract
extension 105.9 Bcf/year, Petroleum Economist.
March 1985, p. 103.
France: Contract 1967-1987 0 328.29 Bcf/year, Enerav ntiLHydrocarbons,
1981. oD. cit. 1988-1998 extension 229.45 Bcf/year,
Petroleum Economist, March 1985, p. 11.
Contract 1970-1990 @ 21.18 Bcf/year, Enerqy and Hydrocarbons,
1981, Q 'il
Germany: Contracts, various, entered into 1966-1975: Per Petroleum
E.nnomist, February 1985, p. 66, contracts
extended 10 years, with total volume to be taken
over contract life plus extension = 17,297 Bcf.
Yearly volume = 910.74 Bcf = 17,297 / (remaining
remaining contract period + 10). Original contract
expirations estimated to be 1993. Estimated as the
volumetric (contract volumes) weighted average of
the Netherlands/German contracts. Expirations and
contract volumes, Energv an Hydrocarbons, 1981,
ap. ·Gt.
Italy: Contract 1974-1994 211.8 Bcf/year, iJig.
Assumed contract not extended.
Norway:
United Kingdom:
Contract 1977-1997 335.35 Bcf/year, ibid.
Germany: Contract 1977-1997 289.46 Bcf/year, ibid.
Volume, Enerav ad Hydrocarbons, 1983, QL, ci.
Contract 1986-2007 123.55 Bcf/year. Duration,
International Petroleum Encvlopedia, 1983 p. 186.
Volume, Energ and Hdrocarbons. 1983, 2, i.
Contract 1993-2020 (Troll/Sleipner). Duration and
volumes, Dil and Gas Journal, June 9, 1986, p. 19.
Initial production (1993) under the Norway/ European
utility group contracts given, peak production
and takes by each country (Germany, the Netherlands,
Belgium, and France) also given. Calculations
assume constant production increase from 1993 to 2000
with constant production thereafter. Also assumed
each country pruchases, over time, in proportion to
its expected takes in the year 2000.
A.
'.w'
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Table 3B-2 (continued)
Sources
The Netherlands:
Contract 1977-1997 @ 88.25 Acf/year, Enerqv and Hydrocarbons,
1981, Q ci.
Contract 1986-2007 42.36 Bcf/year. Duration,
Tntrnat ina l Ptroleum Encvlopedia, 1983,
p. 186. Volume, Enerqy and Hydrocarbons, 1981,
PL, t.
Contract 1993-2020 (Troll/Sleipner), see Norway/Germany.
Belgium: Contract 1977-1i997 88.25 Bcf/year, Enerqy and Hydrocarbons,
1981, op. cit.
Contract 1986-2007 r44.13 Bcf/year. Duration,
International Petroleum EncvloDdia, 1983, p. 186.
Volume, Enerav and Hydrocarbons, 1983, 2p c.,
Contract 1993-2020 (Troll/Sleipner), see Norway/Germany.
France: Contract 1977-1997 88.25 Bcf/year, Enerqy and Hydrocarbons,
1981, gp. cit.
Contract 1986-2007 61.78 Bcf/year. Duration,
Internatijona Petroleum EncyloJdia, 1983, p. 186.
Volume, nergy and Hydrocarbons, 1983, Q. cit.
Contract 1993-2020 (Troll/Sleipner), see Norway/Germany.
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PROSPECTS FOR NATURAL GAS DEMAND IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1986-2000
by
Arthur W. Wright
INTRODUCTION
Western Europe is easily the most complex and least tractable of the
world's major markets for natural gas. No fewer than five countries are key
suppliers, two of which lie outside the region (the Soviet Union and Algeria)
and three within it (Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), with
the latter two also being important consumers. On the demand side, some 14
different national energy policies are at work, and the Soviet Union's role as
a major supplier injects a controversial national security element into the
analysis. Furthermore, the Western European market trades two physically dis-
tinct types of natural gas: Dutch gas at some 0.8 million Btu (MMBtu) per
Mcf, and all other gas at about 1.0 MMBtu per Mcf.
Some of this variety shows up in the diversity of how gas is used in the
countries of Western Europe. In 1984, the share of natural gas in total pri-
mary energy use was about 14 percent. In France, however, it was only about
12 percent, while it was some 46 percent in the Netherlands. The shares of
natural gas consumption in primary energy use by major sectors for these two
countries show even greater disparities:
France The Netherlands
Residential/Commercial 23.3% 46.3%
Industrial 21.9% 71.4%
Electricity Generation 0.0% 57.5%
This broad variation in policies, influences, and consumption patterns is the
abiding characteristic of the Western European gas market. Differences in
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weather and in the structures of national output do not explain much of the
diversity. And different resource endowments account for some of it only be-
cause nationalist energy policies have prevented the development of natural
gas markets according to strictly economic criteria. Had it not been for
policy barriers based on political criteria, the gas resources of the Nether-
lands and the North Sea, for example, might have supported a rather
homogeneous development of demand in the core countries (the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands).
Yet, for all this policy-driven complexity, prospects for natural gas
demand in Western Europe over the next 15 years depend on the same economic
factors as in North America and Japan. The most important factor is the price
of oil (or, more accurately, expectations about the future levels and price
structures of refined oil products). The institutions for trading natural
gas, in particular how it is priced, also exert a strong influence, as do the
rates and composition of economic growth. Finally, long-run strategic (or
"disequilibrium") considerations also play a large role. This chapter ad-
dresses each of these factors.
The complexity of the Western European market for natural gas shapes the
analysis by forcing us to be selective. Economy dictates focusing on only
four countries in detail: France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and West
1 Indeed, if one accepts the general thrust of the results of Blitzer's
dynamic programming model (described in Chapter 5), the unconstrained devel-
opment of the Western European natural gas market would have greatly reduced
the roles of both Algerian and Soviet gas supplies--both of which are sources
of political controversy and instability in the market.
4-3
Germany.2 We consider only in broad terms the prospects for demand in the
Western European market as a whole, and in the other ten countries in the
region.
Before examining the Western European market, this chapter first sets
forth the concepts and principles that underlie the subsequent analyses. We
then present an overview of natural gas demand in the entire Western European
market, followed by detailed analyses of the four major countries. The chap-
ter concludes by synthesizing the general and the specific analyses, using as
a framework the three different scenarios that form the basis of the demand
side of Blitzer's modeling work (see Chapter 5).
THE NATURE OF DEMAND FOR NATURAL GAS
Natural gas demand is influenced by a host of factors. The most central
is its price relative to those of close substitutes, especially oil products
but also coal and electricity. Other factors include the level of energy
prices generally, economic growth (both rate and composition), expectations
about both future prices and reliability of supplies, demographics, new tech-
nologies, and environmental policies. This section provides a framework of
economic analysis to help sort out how these factors apply to the Western
European natural gas market.
2 These four countries, together with the Benelux countries, account for about
95 percent of current Western European gas use (OECD/IEA, Natural Gas Pros-
pects, Paris, France, 1986, p. 41). One could argue that the Netherlands, as
a major user of natural gas--currently consuming more than both France and
Italy combined--merits detailed treatment, too. However, owing to its now-
lengthy history of gas use (stretching back to the 1950s), the Dutch market
appears to be almost fully saturated; evidently, this applies even to family
automobile use. If so, future increases in gas demand turn mainly on economic
growth. In contrast, the four countries studied here all offer significant
possibilities for demand growth through substitution and economic growth.
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Economic Demand Functions for Natural Gas
Throughout this chapter, the term "demand" is used in its economic sense;
that is, demand is a function that relates different quantities demanded by
buyers to different prices charged by sellers. Typically, a change in one or
more shift parameters will increase or decrease the entire function; that is,
more or less gas will be demanded at higher or lower prices than before the
shift occurred. The most important shift parameter is the price of the compe-
ting oil product (e.g., residual fuel oil).3 Other shift parameters are
stocks and prices of user equipment, technologies, and people's tastes.
As holds true with most goods, demand curves for gas "slope downward."
Greater amounts will be demanded at low prices than at high prices, assuming
that shift parameters are held constant, and the quantity demanded will be
more responsive to a given price change in the long run than in the short run.
If prices change suddenly, purchasers' quantity responses will be restricted
by their existing capacities to use gas. With time, however, replacement of
capital stock and other adjustments will widen the scope of these responses.
The importance of user equipment as a shift-parameter introduces a
strategic or dynamic element into the analysis. Expectations about both fu-
ture prices and reliability of supplies help frame investors' decisions to in-
stall gas-using capacity. Thus, supply expectations may shape the course of
gas demand over time. This factor was clearly evident in the development of
the U.S. natural gas industry between the end of World War II and the late
We discuss the problem of incorporating oil prices into the analysis
of gas demand below.
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1960s (when regulation-induced shortages first appeared in the market for new
reserves). The discovery of a new field (Mid-Continent, Groningen, Western
Siberia), a cost-reducing technological development (high-pressure, "seamless"
steel pipe), a shift in government policy (binding price ceilings in the
United States in the late 1960s; Oslo's recent new approach to gas exports --
all these are capable of profoundly altering future demand for natural gas.
Categories of Gas Demand 4
The demand for natural gas is not homogeneous. Three consuming sectors
commonly are distinguished: residential/commercial, industrial, and electric
utility. In all three sectors, levels of demand depend on the price of gas.
But the price often varies by customer class, and other factors of the demand
functions also may differ.
In the residential sector, the prices of near substitutes--mainly middle
distillate fuel oil and, increasingly, electricity--are important shift para-
meters, as are household income and user equipment. However, the derived
demands of commercial, industrial, and electric utility customers do not
depend directly on income. Stocks of equipment and technology also are impor-
tant. The long-run decision to install "dual-fuel" (gas and oil) capability
makes fuel switching a short-run possibility. For most commercial sector
demands, as for most residential ones, relevant long-run substitutes include
distillate fuel oil and/or electricity. Industrial users can substitute dis-
tillate in both process-heat and feedstock applications, and residual fuel oil
under boilers; conversions in the latter case tend to be to dual-fuel capabil-
A useful supplement may be found in OECD/IEA, op. cit., pp. 33-41.
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ity, given the high proportion of fuel bills in total costs. In electric gen-
eration, residual fuel oil is the effective short-run substitute for natural
gas. Coal and nuclear (base load) and distillate fuel oil (peak load) are all
long-run substitutes, as of course are hydro and pumped storage.
Broadly speaking, residential (R) and commercial (C) gas demands are less
"price-elastic" than industrial (I) and electric utility (EU) demands. For
any given percentage change in price, the percentage change in quantities
demanded for R and C use is relatively smaller than for I and EU uses. R and
C demands sometimes are labelled "captive," suggesting that homeowners and
shopkeepers are prisoners of capital outlays, which represent a larger frac-
tion of their total costs of gas use, and this therefore retards their range
of possible adjustments to price changes.
Exceptions, of course, do exist. Some large commercial users (e.g.,
apartment houses) find it worthwhile to invest in fuel-switching capability.
And certain large industrial users--e.g., petrochemical producers and some
firms using process heat--employ techniques expressly designed to use natural
gas. Thus, they have less elastic demands than the "penny-switchers" who
swing from gas to residual fuel oil and back again in response to relative-
price movements of as little as one penny per MMBtu.
These arcana of natural gas economics are important to understand how gas
markets operate. Differences among market segments both in marginal use value
and in price elasticities imply the existence of distinct ranges in the total
demand curve in a given gas market. Figure 4-1 depicts a stylized market for
natural gas at end-use. The highest demand prices and steepest slopes occur
in the region labelled "R+C", followed by "I", and then by "EU". The range of
the R+C region of the demand curve below which the I region begins is not
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relevant: No seller will sell gas for R+C use if I use will fetch a better
price. And similarly for the range of the I region below which the EU region
begins.
Prospects for the growth of gas demand will vary considerably, depending
on whether gas prices are clearing (or are allowed to clear) below the R+C
range. All other factors being constant, if the market clears in the R+C
range, sellers will realize greater revenues than they would if it cleared in
the I or EU range. Among buyers, the range of market-clearing prices will
shape the rates of penetration by gas into the various market categories.
Not long ago, natural gas was viewed as a "premium" fuel in many parts of
the world--in North America (except on the Gulf Coast), Western Europe, and
Japan (but not in the Soviet Union)--because incremental units of gas
delivered to many markets fetched R+C prices. Today, many have begun to view
gas more as a "blue-collar" fuel that will clear in the I range (against
residual fuel oil) or even (in the long run) in the EU range (against coal)--
in the process opening up new markets to natural gas in other categories.
This view is now common in North America and to a lesser extent in Western
Europe.
The Critical Role of World Oil Prices
As noted above, when studying the demand function for natural gas, the
most important shift parameter is the price of the competing oil product. An
expected increase in oil prices will tend to reduce total energy demand--
quantities demanded at every price--and vice versa. Movements in the relative
prices of oil, gas, and other fuels will shift gas demand, in some cases
quickly and significantly. Thus, investors in fuel-using equipment are
forced, willy-nilly, to form expectations about future oil prices.
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The sharp drop in world crude oil prices since November 1985 has forced
us to think harder about how oil-price expectations are built into our
analyses. As of mid-1986, the range of possible and plausible oil-price ex-
pectations looks to be quite wide. We argue here that where expectations ac-
tually settle in the range will shape significantly both the level and the
forms of investment in energy-using equipment--and hence also the future
course of demands for natural gas.
Since 1973, there have been three major oil-price shocks. In the first
two (1973-74 and 1979-80), crude oil prices rose severalfold. In the third
(1985-86), prices thus far have fallen by 50 percent or more.
These three oil-price events have one thing in common: Few, if any,
analysts were able to provide a coherent account and forecast of these
precipitous price movements. Many thought the oil price increases of the
1970s were permanent--that "high" and ever-rising oil prices were here to
stay. On that basis, natural gas buyers were willing to sign gas contracts
with price and other terms set at "premium" levels and tied to oil at or near
thermal parity.
As it turned out, high oil prices were not here to stay. However, it
does not follow from this that oil prices, now fallen, will stay low. In
fact, we cannot be sure how actors in energy markets will form their expecta-
tions about future oil prices. Choosing one particular assumption about ex-
pectations would leave our analysis vulnerable to becoming irrelevant. It
therefore is best to resort to sensitivity analysis to cope with the wide
range of possible assumptions about oil price expectations.
To do this, we postulate a reference oil price that participants in gas
markets use when deciding whether to invest, how much, in what, where, and
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when.5 Any given reference oil price necessarily is associated with some set
of expectations about world oil prices. We may think of a reference price as
an expected value or mean, plus some measure of the probability that the ac-
tual price will diverge from the mean in any particular period. Reference oil
prices may well differ not only in their means but also in their divergences
from the means.
We further postulate that the key element in oil price expectations is the
market structure that decision makers believe will prevail in the world oil
market over the decision horizon: say, 10 to 20 years.
Three structural scenarios for the world oil market are postulated:
(1) A Strong Oil Cartel Re-forms: At one extreme is a re-formed world
oil cartel, with a coalition of larger exporting countries again led by Saudi
Arabia. The reference price in this extreme scenario would be around $28 per
barrel (bbl), + $2.6 Loosely speaking, this scenario resembles oil market
conditions in the mid- to late-1970s.
(2) Competition Prevails in the World Oil Market: At the other extreme,
competitive forces eventually may prevail in the world oil market, pushing
prices down to near long-run marginal cost. A plausible competitive reference
price might be $8/bbl, + $1. This scenario may be likened to conditions in
the world oil market over the 1950-70 period.7
M.A. Adelman is the source of this concept, but he is not to blame for any
misrepresentation or misuse in its application here.
All prices are quoted in 1986 dollars.
7 See M.A. Adelman, "The Competitive Floor to World Oil Prices," Energy Jour-
nal, forthcoming, for an analysis of long-run marginal costs for oil produc-
Toin in different producing regions of the world.
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(3) The Oil Cartel Waxes and Wanes: Intermediate between these two ex-
tremes is an oil market in which the cartel's grip is loosened but not com-
pletely broken. There is general uncertainty from one period to the next
about just how tight the cartel's grip is going to be. The reference price
under this "clumsy-cartel" scenario might be $15/bbl, + $5.8 Something resem-
bling this scenario has appeared in the world oil market since early 1982, and
some might argue that it also prevailed during 1975-77.9
These three oil-price scenarios have quite different implications for fu-
ture gas demand. Natural gas markets may clear in different price ranges of
8 The existence of price volatility suggests that organized futures trading in
natural gas could be economically viable under this scenario. The possibility
has been considered in the United States--indeed, one model contract has been
submitted to the U.S. Government for approval--and references are made to ap-
plying it to Western Europe (e.g., with respect to the "swing" role that
Groningen gas plays in that region). Regulatory impediments (especially
restrictions on gas deliveries and prices) appear to be the most serious bar-
rier to organized trading in natural gas.
The urge to speculate about which of the three variants is most probable
over the next 15 years or so is irresistible. Giving in to the urge, but
entirely as an aside, we opt for (3), for at least three reasons.
First, energy supplies in general are much more price-elastic now than
than they were in the early 1970s. Low or even "soft" energy prices will not
cause much of a permanent loss in existing capacity, plus acquired exploratory
knowledge, gained in response to the high oil prices of the 1970s. More
price-elastic energy supplies make variant (1) less likely to occur today than
(admittedly with hindsight) in the early 1970s.
Second, energy demands in general are more price-elastic than they were
in the early 1970s. The investments in energy-saving and fuel-switching ca-
pacity prompted by the oil prices and expectations of the 1970s will not go
away for many years. More price-elastic demands also reduce the probability
that a strong cartel will re-form.
Third, prospects for variant (2) are dimmed by the inability, or unwill-
ingness, of the major energy-consuming nations to learn from sad experience
and kick the cartel while it is down. A vigorous oil stockpiling program
would be much cheaper to implement now than it was five years ago; moreover,
the mere existence of a large stockpile would pose a credible threat to any
re-forming oil cartel and reduce its ability to disrupt the market. The ener-
gy users' failure to take measures like stockpiling, plus the financial stake
of the big oil exporters in gaining and exercising market power, make the com-
petitive variant unlikely.
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the demand curve, and investments relating to fuel use and interfuel choice
are likely to vary across the three oil-price scenarios. Moreover, the vari-
ous scenarios likely will have quite different effects on macroeconomic ac-
tivity and performance, and especially on economic growth.
Under scenario (1), a re-formed and cohesive oil cartel, gas markets
would be more apt to clear in the "premium" or R+C range.1 0 In contrast, at
the opposite extreme of scenario (2), gas markets could well clear in the
"blue-collar" or I and EU ranges, with their relatively price-elastic demands.
The mixed oil price scenario, (3), would see gas demand less stable than in
the two extreme cases. This instability would create substantial uncertainty
about where gas markets would clear, which in turn would affect investment de-
cisions, to which we now turn.
High oil prices (scenario 1), which pull up other energy prices, on the
one hand would encourage investment in more energy-efficient capacity, thus
tending to retard the growth of total energy use, and with it growth of gas
demand. On the other hand, provided gas prices were not closely linked to oil
prices, high oil prices also would tend to encourage investment in gas-only
capacity (e.g., in process-heat applications, petrochemicals, new residential
and commercial buildings, and conversions of existing heating plants), and in
add-on capacity to permit fuel-switching from oil to natural gas.1l The low
10 This is particularly true if governments respond (as did those of many
Western countries in 1974) by placing restrictions on gas use and taking other
measures that turn gas into a political good. In this case, both economic and
political criteria will make gas a "premium" fuel.
Following the first two sharp oil-price rises, in 1973-74 and 1979-80, gas
prices in many new contracts were linked tightly to oil prices, often at
premia in terms of cost per usable Btu. This can be traced, in our view, to
the unique supply conditions existing in gas markets at the time, and these
would be unlikely to occur again if our scenario (1)--a reprise of the mid- to
late-1970s--came to pass. Those unique gas supply conditions were the
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oil prices at the opposite extreme (scenario 2) would push these investment
choices in just the opposite directions. Under scenario 2, prospects for in-
creased natural gas demand would hinge to a large extent on expectations about
the volatility of gas prices relative to those of oil, and on macroeconomic
forces.
The large price variances associated with scenario (3) would provide the
greatest incentive to invest in fuel-switching capacity. This is because a
premium would be placed on the flexibility of fuel-switching capacity. In ad-
dition, the instability of oil prices under this scenario could enhance the
penetration of gas into previously single-fuel uses. This presumes, of
course, that gas prices are less tightly tied to oil prices than they were in
the past, as we expect them to be (see footnote 9).
Oil price expectations exercise their macroeconomic effects both through
"real" impacts on aggregate supply and through governments' responses in fis-
cal and monetary policies. Lower oil prices tend to increase aggregate supp-
ly, and thus to stimulate economic activity; the converse is true for higher
oil prices. If past policymakers' responses to oil price shocks are any
(continued)
regulation-induced shortages in North America and the infancy of the industry
in the Pacific basin region and in Western Europe (outside the Netherlands).
These conditions made for short- and intermediate-run supply price
elasticities of supply that were low enough to confer market power on sup-
pliers. With today's more "mature" gas industries all around the world, supp-
ly elasticities will be greater, even in the short run. This point is rein-
forced but does not depend on the current gas "gluts" found in various regions
of the world.
The investment behavior discussed here depends on governments not
responding high oil prices as discussed in footnote 7, so natural gFas becomes
a "premium" fuel by fiat. Government restrictions on gas trading and use, of
course, will have a chilling effect on all new investment in gas-using capac-
ity.
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guide, fears of the inflationary effects of higher oil prices would tend to
push macro policy toward restraint, aggravating the deflationary impact of the
higher prices. Conversely, policymakers may feel freer to pursue expansionary
macroeconomic policies under low oil prices, thus enhancing the stimulative
effect of the low oil prices.
In terms of natural gas demand, these macroeconomic "income" effects work
against the fuel-substitution effects of the associated scenarios. Any in-
creased demand for gas that higher oil prices would bring would be weakened to
the extent that those same oil prices would reduce economic growth. The off-
set would be even greater if restrictive macroeconomic policies reinforced the
aggregate supply effects of higher oil prices. The opposite holds true for
lower oil prices: The decline in demand for gas due to lower oil prices would
be mitigated by stepped-up economic activity, and the more so as macroeconomic
policies pushed economic expansion.
Whether the substitution or the income effects will win out is an empiri-
cal question. The experiments in North America during the first two oil-price
shocks (1973-74 and 1979-80) were spoiled by coterminous government-induced
shortages of natural gas and the related passage of the U.S. Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978. In Western Europe and Japan, one cannot reject the
hypothesis that the higher oil prices of the 1970s spurred gas demand, but
again the experiments are clouded: by policy favoring diversification in
Japan and by the relative infancy of the gas industries in both regions. In
the calculations used to generate demand scenarios for the modelling exercise
(see Appendix A and Chapter 5), macroeconomic effects outweigh substitution
effects in all four of the countries studied in detail.
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The relationships just discussed have some interesting applications in
several of these countries. In particular, an examination of how they inter-
act with national energy policies yields some interesting results.
OVERVIEW OF NATURAL GAS DEMAND IN WESTERN EUROPE
A Timely Case Study: "Norway's $64 Billion Gas Deal"
On June 3, 1986, Statoil of Norway and a consortium of six natural gas
companies in Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands announced a major
new contract that the New York Times labelled "Norway's $64 Billion Gas Deal."
The contract calls for deliveries of Norwegian gas to the consortium beginning
in 1993 and rising by 1998 to peak annual volumes of 20 Bcm. A new pipeline
said to cost nearly $3 billion (presumably at 1986 prices and exchange rates)
will transport part of the gas from the Sleipner and Troll fields in the Nor-
wegian North Sea to Zeebrugge, Belgium; this pipeline will pass by the Ekofisk
field, where it will hook up to an existing pipeline to permit the rest of the
gas to be transported to Emden, West Germany. According to various press
reports, the deal presumes that an onshore trunk pipeline will be built
through France to southern Europe, and Statoil officials also have mentioned
the possibility of building a spur pipeline to the United Kingdom. 1 2
This contract (which took a year and half to negotiate) highlights many
salient features of the Western European gas market in the mid-1980s:
(i) major potential suppliers;
(ii) the complex roles of large supplier-users;
12 See, for instance, Wall Street Journal, June 4, 1986, p. 35.
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(iii) the existing West German (Ruhrgas) monopsony of access to gas
supplies;
(iv) the diversity of national energy policies;
(v) the national security element; and
(vi) notions of what constitutes "stability" in this market.
All these features will affect the course of natural gas demand (as well as
supply, contracts, and policy) in Western Europe for the remainder of this
century.
The new contract13 is based on the ability of the Norwegians to supply
significant quantities of natural gas to the core industrial countries of
Western Europe. In 1985, Norway lost a sizable contract to supply Sleipner
gas to the United Kingdom just before it was to have been signed. Under the
newly signed contract, the Norwegian government will bear much of the front-
end risk of financing the development of gas reserves in the Troll field and
of building the new pipeline to Zeebrugge. This is a newly aggressive stance
compared with Oslo's previous reticence toward oil and gas development (see
Chapter 3).
The new contract also involves the Netherlands and potentially the United
Kingdom, both of whom are major gas producers and major consumers. The
Netherlands also exports sizable amounts of gas. The Dutch firm, Gasunie, is
a member of the buyers' consortium, and (as mentioned) Statoil already is con-
sidering extending a spur line from the new pipeline into the United Kingdom.
13 Our sources state privately that it is in fact a contract and not just a
"letter of agreement" committing both sides to negotiate further. A tentative
design and construction schedule already exists. However, the Wall Street
Journal recently wrote that ". . . the Norwegian government . . . wants the
consortium of buyers, oil companies and governments to approve the contract by
year's end . . ." (August 12, 1986; emphasis added).
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While much of the public discussion in the two countries has been couched in
terms of planning for future supplies when domestic resources "run out,"
moving Norwegian gas into both countries now in order to displace their own
gas south and east in fact could prove very economical. Displacements of this
kind have been common for years in the North American and Soviet/Eastern Euro-
pean markets.
The new Norwegian contract raises several interesting questions about the
energy policies of some major actors in the Western European gas market. Gaz
de France (GdF) was slated to take 8 Bcm annually--40 percent of the 20 Bcm
peak volume. Given existing contracts and nuclear power plans, could that
volume of gas be sold in French markets? Or, more to the point: Would the
gas be priced to fit into the French market, and how would its price affect
existing contracts and goals for nuclear power in electric generation? And
how much of its gas would GdF have to moved on into Spain, Switzerland, and
Italy? If France does boycott the deal, will German, Dutch and Belgium buyers
take over its share of the gas in the orgianl deal?
What does the new contract imply about Dutch policy regarding rates of
development and export of its gas reserves? Will the Dutch in fact use the
Norwegian gas to displace more of its own production into the export market,
or will they substitute the imported gas at home and cut back on production?
Will the United Kingdom, also a major producer of gas, permit construction of
the proposed spur pipeline to its shores and begin exporting its own gas to
the continent? Will the prices associated with the new contract force the
U.K. government to reconsider both its export and domestic policies toward
gas?
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Construction of the new trunk pipeline to Zeebrugge would break Ruhrgas's
monopsony as gas transshipper in the Western European market.1 4 Yet Ruhrgas
is a member of the consortium. From what we have been able to gather, the
Norwegians insisted on the construction of the trunk pipeline to Zeebrugge, in
addition to the connection into Emden. Ruhrgas resisted this until it learned
that Statotl also was negotiating separately with Elf Aquitaine to bring the
line only to Zeebrugge. The inference might be that Ruhrgas, seeing its
monopsony doomed in either event, preferred to be part of the new deal
(indeed, in a lead role, taking the same percentage of peak volumes as GdF)
rather than sitting on the sidelines.
The national security element in the Western European market was front
and center in press coverage of the contract. The New York Times' front-page
headline stressed ". . Cutting Reliance on Soviet Supply." In the Wall
Street Journal, a lead sentence stated that the contract ". . . reduces
Europe's potential long-term energy dependence on the Soviet Union." The
Journal went on to quote a "senior Reagan administration official" to the ef-
fect that the contract had calmed U.S. fears about Western European reliance
on Soviet gas. And Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, listing Austria as "among
prime candidates for future Troll contracts," noted that country's near 80-
percent dependence on Soviet gas.15
News accounts also suggested that the Norwegian gas delivered in the core
Western European market would carry a security premium compared with Soviet
14 One news report cited a Norwegian belief that it has ". . already lost
possible gas sales to Switzerland as a result of high Ruhrgas [pipeline]
rates . ." (emphasis added), Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (PIW), June 9,
1986, p. 2.
15 ibid.
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gas. Underlying this suggestion, however, is the notion that Norwegian North
Sea gas will be "expensive" to produce and transport. This raises the ques-
tion of what precisely makes Norwegian gas "expensive": resource costs, or
taxes and other components of government revenues? West German sources say
that price terms in the contract, translated at current values of the formula
referents, in fact do work out to be somewhat higher than Soviet gas. But,
this raises the further question of which Soviet gas: current "spot" gas?
long-term contracted minimum takes? at current formula values? The same
sources state that the price of the Norwegian gas also works out to be some-
what less expensive than Groningen gas, on a thermal-equivalent basis. How-
ever, volume terms for Groningen gas are the most flexible in the market, and
questions similar to those for Soviet gas also arise in this comparison.
In fact, while the idea that the new contract contains a security premium
cannot hurt Western European relations with Washington, we are skeptical that
any such premium in fact could survive competitive pressures down the road
when (and if) deliveries actually begin or, alternatively, that Washington
would come up with financial assistance to offset the penalty. Reliance on
buyers' willingness to absorb a premium penalty seems a slender reed on which
to support several billion dollars of up-front investment in pipeline and
other development.
More fundamentally, it is highly speculative to attach prices to the
Sleipner-Troll gas, and then to compare those prices with their Soviet or
Dutch counterparts. The supply prices of the Norwegian gas, and in turn the
economic viability of the entire project, turn on two interrelated variables:
the Norwegian government's take, and the disposition of the remainder of
Troll's potential supplies. The economics of both wellhead production and
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pipeline shipment of Troll gas would be much more favorable if all of it could
be sold, not just the 25 percent involved in the new contract. In fact,
without substantial further sales out of Troll, the project probably will not
go forward.16 Calculations by Adelman and Lynch (see Chapter 3) suggest that
Troll gas will offer a good rate of return at a wellhead price below
$2.00/Mcf--but this assumes development and transportation of the entire
reserves of the field, not just 25 percent of them.
A Wall Street Journal header on June 4, 1986 (p. 35) asserted that the
new contract "Will Stabilize Western European Market." By "stabilize" the
Journal meant the security blanket of the old, familiar long-term contract.
Given today's energy-market conditions, that time-honored institution is
obsolete; attempting to use it is likely to leave one or another party to the
contract unhappy.1 7 Moreover, appearances are deceiving: While the Norwegian
contract is multi-year and contains provisions that govern its entire term, it
almost certainly is not a long-term gas contract in the old sense. Evidently,
the price terms--the formula itself--may be reopened at the option of either
side every four years. In addition, the quantity terms appear to be renegoti-
able and to contain provisions for market-outs in case of "hardship." If this
is true, the locus of interest turns on how the project is financed, particu-
larly regarding the development of Troll reserves and the construction of the
new pipeline to Zeebrugge. Statoil, with help from the Norwegian Ministry of
Finance, will finance the pipeline. The private producer participants in
16 See Wall Street Journal, August 12, 1986, p. 32.
17 This theme was very much present in the two earlier reports of this pro-
ject.
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Troll, who will have to outlay substantial capital to develop the reserves,
have raised serious questions about the viability of the new contract.18 The
pricing package includes cuts in taxes, in royalty oil payments by producing
companies, and in the companies' obligations to pay the government's share of
exploration costs. Such provisions confirm the suspicion that earlier
estimates of the "high costs" of Norway's North Sea petroleum production con-
tained significant economic rents.
The announcement of the Norwegian contract was surprising to many because
of the widespread impression that the Western European gas market (like others
around the world) faces excess supplies, based on existing contractual commit-
ments, that should last well into the future. And yet here is a contract for
new supplies, with a peak contract volume equal to a third or more of current
gas imports (both pipeline and LNG) into Western Europe. These facts make the
new contract seem more destabilizing than otherwise. Where will all that gas
go in France and in the other three countries who are parties to the deal?
"Excess supplies" cannot be defined, of course, without reference to
prices. As in North America and the Pacific Basin, the realization slowly has
dawned in Western Europe that the prices embodied in gas contracts signed in
the mid- and late-1970s are not sustainable. That is to say, insistence on
adhering to the price terms of many of those contracts would precipitate
breachers of contract, defaults, and bankruptcies. Realism therefore dictates
that actual transaction prices for natural gas be lower than those thought
reasonable several years ago. These lower prices will help clear up "excess
supplies."
18 Wall Street Journal, op.cit., p. 32.
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But even with lower price terms, the Norwegian contract still looks
risky, particularly if real oil prices remain in their present range ($12-
15/bbl).1 9 A more dynamic interpretation is required to comprehend fully the
broader implications of the contract. The Norwegian deal must be seen as a
bold (if risky) attempt to change expectations about the future availability
of gas in Western Europe. As suggested earlier, a strategic shift of this
sort could increase the demand for gas over the long run through its effects
on investors' expectations about both the price and the supply security of
natural gas in Western European markets.
Media reports have made much of the "strategic" importance of the Nor-
wegian contract. It would establish Norway as a major gas supplier throughout
the core Western European market, as well as provide it with access to several
peripheral markets. As noted above, the new pipeline to Zeebrugge would break
Ruhrgas's monopsony on transshipment in the region and, through France, open
up a second major trunk pipeline system in the core market. In turn, this new
pipeline configuration would give Norway access to the Austrian, Spanish, and
Italian markets. Indeed, the capacity of the proposed pipeline to Zeebrugge
would be larger than that required to fulfill just the deliveries envisioned
in this contract.2 0
If this interpretation is correct, "Norway's $64 Billion Gas Deal" could
be just the sort of stroke that we found the Canadians contemplating in North
America and that we argued Japan should consider.
19 Recent reports suggest that the Norwegian calculations for the project re-
quire minimum oil prices of about $20 per barrel (ibid.)
20 One news report puts total annual capacity for the pipeline at 46 Bcm,
split 25-21 between Zeebrugge and Emden. See PIW, June 9, 1986, p. 2.
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The Current Western European Pattern of Gas Use
As noted, there really are no "typical" Western European patterns of gas
consumption. This holds true also for overall primary energy use and for the
structure of gas use itself. In 1984 the shares of the various sources of
primary energy in Western Europe as a whole, in the four countries examined in
detail, and in the Netherlands, are shown in Panel (a), and the pattern of gas
use by major sector in 1983 is presented in Panel (b). Again excluding the
Netherlands, the noteworthy features of these panels include:
(1) the relatively large share of gas devoted to residential/commercial
use in the United Kingdom;
(2) the relatively small share in the same sector in West Germany; and
(3) the relatively large shares of gas used to generate electricity
in Italy and West Germany.
Finally, Panel (c) shows the diversity across Western Europe in the per-
centage share of total energy consumption occupied by natural gas, in 1983, in
the following sectors: (a) industry; (b) residential/commercial; (c) total
fossil fuels used to generate electricity; (d) total electric power generated
in "conventional thermal" plants; and (c) total electric power generated.
Western Europe is sufficiently small and economically compact that the
major gas resources of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom21 alone could
support quite uniform development of the gas industry throughout the entire
region. However, as noted earlier, political barriers, reflecting nation-
alistic energy policies, prevented this development. The "haves" (in terms of
21 Norway is an exception to the analysis in this paragraph. The reasons in-
clude its much lower population density and its relatively low degree of in-
dustrialization, compared to the nations in the industrial heartland of West-
ern Europe.
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Panel (a)
(mi
Total
PRIMARY ENERGY USE, BY ENERGY SOURCE, 1984
llions of metric tons of oil equivalent Lmt,
Nat. Gas Oil Coal H'
oe])
ydro Nuclear
W. Europe: 1,249.4
(100%)
190.1 591.0 256.7 107.0 104.6
(15.2%) (47.3%) (20.5%) (8.6%) (8.4%)
France:
Italy:
U.K.:
W.Germany:
Neths.:
187.0
(100%)
140.2
(100%)
191.9
(100%)
260.9
(100%)
66.7
(100%)
23.5 86.2 25.2
(12.6%) (46.1%) (13.5%)
26.5 84.7 15.3
(18.9%) (60.4%) (10.9%)
45.2 88.7 45.3
(23.6%) (46.2%) (23.6%)
41.1 110.9 83.3
(15.8%) (42.5%) (31.9%)
31.2 28.9 5.7
(46.8%) (43.3%) (8.5%)
13.7 38.4
(7.3%) (20.5%)
11.3 2.4
(8.1%) (1.7%)
1.2 11.5
(0.5%) (6.0%)
4.7 20.9
(1.8%) (7.9%)
0.0 0.9
(0%) (1.3%)
Gas, London, England, August 1985, p. 2.
.
SOURCE: BP Review of World
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Panel (b)
GAS USE BY MAJOR SECTOR, 1983
(billion cubic meters [Bcm])a
W. Europe:
France:
Italy:
U.K.:
W.Germany:
Neths.:
Total b
197.6
(100%)
25.7
(100%)
25.6
(100%)
48.5
(100%)
44.0
(100%)
33.4
(100%)
Industry Res./Comml. et al.C
69.6
(35.2%)
11.3
(44.0%)
10.4
(40.6%)
14.8
(30.5%)
16.4
(37.3%)
9.11
(27.2%)
91.4
(46.3%)
12.5
(48.6%)
11.4
(44.5%)
28.9
(59.6%)
16.3
37.0%)
15.2
(45.6%)
Elec. Gen .
26.3
(13.3%)
1.0
(3.9%)
3.4
(13.3%)
0.4
(0.8%)
8.8
(20.0%)
8.3
(24.9%)
Notes: a. Totals may not equal sum of components due to slight errors i
converting from mtoe to Bcm.
b. = domestic production + net imports + net stock reductions.
c. Also includes agriculture, public-service, and "other (non-
specified)". Whenever the last category is of any magnitude,
it covers mainly residential or commercial uses.
d. = returns and transfers + statistical differences + manu-
factured gases + petroleum refineries + own use and losses
(all net).
n
SOURCE: OECD, Energy Balances of OECD Coluntries, 1982/83, Paris, France,
1985.
Misc.d
10.0
(5.0%)
1.8
(7.0%)
0.4
(1.6%)
4.4
(9.1%)
2.4
(5.5%)
0.7
(2.1%)
, A_.
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Industry
W. Europe: 24.6%
France: 21.9
Italy: 24.8
U.K.: 31.7
W. Germany: 21.7
Neths : 46.3
Panel (c)
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF NATURAL GAS IN TOTAL
SECTORAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION, 1983
Fossil Fuels "Conventional
Res./Comml. Used in Thermal" Elec. Total Elec.
et al.a Elec. Gen. Power Gen'd. Power Gen'd.
32.8% 14.4% 15.2% 9.5%
23.3 4.5 6.1 1.7
30.5 10.6 10.5 7.5
47.4 0.7 0.6 0.5
20.4 11.2 12.7 9.9
71.5 61.8 61.9 58.2
Notes: a. Also includes agriculture, public service, and "other (non-
specified)." Whenever the last category is of any magnitude,
it covers mainly residential or commercial uses.
SOURCE: OECD, Energy Balances of OECD Countries, 1982/83, Paris, France,
1985.
U:%·
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natural gas resources) elected to expand intensively their domestic consump-
tion of gas through subsidies, rather than to export their gas to the highest
bidders. Even the Dutch, who for year have exported natural gas as far as
Italy, have overdeveloped domestic consumption of gas relative to what they
would have done had their policy been to maximize the economic present value
of their gas resources.
The energy policies of the have-nots also help to explain the diversity
of natural gas use across Western Europe. For example, France has con-
centrated on developing nuclear power as the major basis for electricity pro-
duction. Belgium also has stressed nuclear power, as has West Germany, al-
though to a lesser degree.
For internal political reasons, West Germany and the United Kingdom long
have subsidized their domestic coal industries. The retarding effect of this
on the development of natural gas use has been greater in West Germany than in
the United Kingdom, partly because the latter also promoted the development of
domestic gas resources. In addition, though, the United Kingdom has had to
deal with air pollution problems related to the widespread use of coal in the
residential sector; in contrast, West Germany has pushed the use of its
domestic coal mainly in industry and electric generation. And in Italy, which
lacks major domestic resources of either fuel, the move to natural gas began
only after the oil-price shock of 1973-74. The noteworthy feature of Italian
energy policy is the practice of assigning dominant positions in energy
markets to huge, state-run enterprises: ENI in oil and SNAM in natural gas.
Finally, note the sizable variations in energy pricing policies among the
various countries. These variations derive from differences in taxation and
subsidy practices and in contract terms (e.g., the linkage of gas to oil pro-
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duct prices). The details of certain of these pricing policies are described
below.
Macroeconomic Policies and Economic Growth
As mentioned earlier, macroeconomic policies are important determinants
of natural gas demand, because of their impacts on economic growth. Since the
oil-price shock of 1973-74, economic growth in Western Europe has been pallid
compared with that of the 1950s and 1960s. For the 1973-83 period, the OECD
gives an average annual growth rate of real GNP of about 2.2 percent. Unem-
ployment rates persistently have run double what they were before the slow-
down.
The relevant question here is whether this pattern will change, and (if
so) when. A common view is that the confluence of higher oil prices and in-
creasing structural defects in Western European labor markets in the 1970s
raised fears of escalating inflation among Western European governments and
discouraged them from adopting expansionary macroeconomic policies. By this
same view, the declines in oil prices, in interest rates, and in the value of
the U.S. dollar since late 1985 should give these governments enough slack in
terms of aggregate supply that they can afford to pursue more expansionary
fiscal and monetary policies. This holds true even without structural reforms
in labor and goods markets (like those now mooted in France by Premier
Chirac).2 2 Oil prices (and expectations) at about $8/bbl, as in scenario (2)
above, would reinforce this point.
22 See ibid.
, ,
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We cannot predict what macroeconomic policies the various Western Euro-
pean governments will pursue. The important point is that, for two of the
oil-price scenarios discussed earlier--(2) low ("competitive oil market") and
(3) variable ("weak cartel")--Western European governments could pursue more
expansionary policies than they have recently with less fear of rekindling un-
acceptable rates of inflation.
Some Demand Forecasts
Table 4-1 summarizes three recent, independent forecasts of natural gas
demand in Western Europe. We present them to illustrate several points about
such forecasts, and because in part they form the basis for the demand
scenarios analyzed in Chapter 5. The first point is that forecasts have half-
lives approaching those of subatomic particles. Another point is that basic
underlying assumptions are the all-important ingredient in any forecast.2 3
Third, one forecast rarely agrees with another.
23
Accordingly, before commenting on the three forecasts in Table 1, we should
briefly list the assumptions that underlie them.
"Roland" refers to a forecast from a 1984 working paper by Kjell Roland,
"Natural Gas Supply and Demand in Western Europe, 1990 and 2000," manuscript,
Stanford Energy Modelling Forum, Stanford, California, February 1984, p. 5.
For economic growth rates, "Roland" assumes an average annual increase in GDP
of 2.5 percent from 1983 onward. The rates for France and West Germany aver-
age 3 percent a year in 1983-85 and then decline to the regional average; the
United Kingdom experiences growth rates of half a point less than the region
as a whole. Income elasticities of gas demand are assumed to range from 0.7
to 0.9 except for the Netherlands, which has a "significantly lower
elasticity" (ibid., p. 4). Relative fuel prices "are not drastically
changed," incTluding incentives in the United Kingdom for "continuing substitu-
tion of gas for crude oil and to some extent for coal." [This last assumption
is no longer valid.] Real crude oil prices fall during the late 1980s but
then increase at 1-1.5 percent per year through 2000.
"IGU" refers to projections of "potential economic demand" reported in
International Gas Union, Report of Task Force: World Gas Supply and Demand,
1983-2020, no date or place of publication available, 1985, p. 23. "The
potential gas demand figures are central estimates ... Actual gas demand . . .
is more likely to be below the . . . potential [figures] . . . than above
them" (ibid., p. 22).
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Table 4-1
FORECASTS OF WEST EUROPEAN GAS DEMAND
1990'Current' Use
(1982) 212 Bcm 236-252 Bcm
1.35-2.185
(1983) 203 Bcm
2.45
FORECAST
2000
iF
276-307 Bcm
2010
N.A.
1.6-2.0O
240 Bcm 261 Bcm 271 Bcm 
0.855 0.4%
I.E.A.
(1986)
AAPC:*
(1984) 212 Bcm
(a):0.9S
(a):224 Bcm
(b):244 Bcm
(b):2.4S
(a) - 'Low Growth/High Oil Price"
(b) a 'Hgh Growth/Low Oil price"
*Average Annual Percentage Change Between Years.
Roland
(1984)
AAPC:*
IGU
(1985)
AAPC:*
248 Bcm
280 Bcm
1.0S
258
305
0.4%
Bcm
Bcm 
1.4S 0.85%
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The "Roland" forecast dates from 1984 and therefore may be forgiven for
failing to predict such imponderables as the steep, post-1985 decline in oil
prices. Roland and his colleagues also did not foresee the change in U.K. gas
pricing policy that has accompanied the "privatization" of the British Gas
Corporation (BGC); thus, their figures for the United Kingdom may be too high.
The "Roland" projections also underestimated the growth of gas use in Italy,
which surpassed their 1990 figure in 1984.
The IEA's 1986 "illustrative projections" update its 1982 forecast, which
foresaw substantially greater future gas use than do these later figures. The
IEA's earlier forecasts came under fire because actual figures have lagged be-
hind those forecast.24 In fairness, it should be pointed out that, since the
early 1980s, the trimming of demand growth estimates for natural gas (and for
other forms of energy) has taken place worldwide. The 1986 IEA report is a
near-model of circumspection and balance.
(continued)
"IEA" refers to "illustrative projections" given in OECD/IEA, Natural Gas
Prospects, op.cit., pp. 57ff. and 123. According to Appendix I, pp. 1 1 9-21,
the two sets of estimates are both based on declining real oil prices until
1990, then a steady increase indefinitely thereafter; case (b) assumes a more
rapid rate of increase than does case (a)--e.g., $45/bbl versus $30/bbl in
2000 (1984$). Economic growth rates in cases (a) and (b) are assumed to be
3.5 percent and 2.5 percent annually, respectively, over the period 1983-2010.
U.S. dollar exchange rates are assumed to revert to 1983 levels from those of
1984-85. Perhaps most significant, the IEA forecasts assume that the ratio of
burner-tip gas prices to oil prices remains the same as in early 1985 through-
out the forecast period.
24 See, for example, Energy Advice, Energy Supplies and Prices in Western
Europe to the Year 2000, place of publication not available, 1985. This docu-
ment can serve as a caution to the arrogant among oil-price forecasters: "Once
the realization of oil as a 'permanent' high-cost commodity dawned, ... "
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The IGU's 1985 forecasts of "potential economic demand" for gas over the
next 35 years are based on much less explicit assumptions about growth and oil
prices than the other two studies. In fact, they derive from a survey of IGU
members who are gas users.
Appendix A describes the methodology used to derive the gas demand fig-
ures that were fed into the dynamic programming model (discussed in Chapter 5)
as part of this study. These figures are not "estimates" of Western European
gas demand, much less "forecasts." Rather, they are the product of postulated
macroeconomic growth rates that generate total energy demands, coupled with a
price-based rule for choosing the share of gas in total energy demand, for
each of the four countries discussed in detail below. Thus, they merely are
illustrative of how different macroeconomic and gas-choice assumptions may af-
fect future gas demand. The various demand trajectories actually used in the
model runs are not strikingly different from the forecasts just discussed.
Peripheral Areas Affecting the Western European Gas Market
Before turning to the four countries, a few words are in order about
other areas that affect the Western European gas market but to which this
chapter does not otherwise give detailed attention.
The first is the Benelux countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
burg. The dominant gas-using member of the group is the Netherlands, which
accounts for about 80 percent of total Benelux gas use and commonly is viewed
(with reason ... see earlier Tables) as having a "saturated" gas market that
leaves little room for future demand growth (except through economic growth.)
Belgium accounts for most of the remaining 20 percent and has some potential
to expand use in its residential/commercial and industrial sectors; further,
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it currently uses very little gas in the electric generation sector. However,
even with a significant rate of economic growth, total Belgian gas consumption
would not be large enough to affect the market significantly.
The second peripheral area is a polyglot of smaller countries: Switzer-
land, Austria, and Spain. Spain has considerable potential for future growth
in gas demand. Its total energy use is 20 to 25 percent greater than that of
the Netherlands, and its economy is still less industrialized than the coun-
tries to its north. At present, only LNG is available in Spain, but the
recent Norwegian contract may change that fact by the mid-1990s. Switzerland
can tap into gas flows in any direction between France, Italy, and Germany.
Swiss purchases improve the economics of pipeline capacity, but the relatively
small size of its demand levels limits its impact on the overall market. The
same holds true for Austria, which is able to tap into Soviet gas entering
Central Europe. Its total energy demand being of roughly the same magnitude
as Switzerland's, Austria's impact on the overall market also is limited.
The third peripheral area is Communist Eastern Europe. Although gas
demand in this region would make a fascinating story by itself, here it is of
interest primarily as a possible competitor for Soviet gas supplies to Western
Europe. As suggested in Chapter 3, competition is apt to be mainly short
term (e.g., due to periods of severely cold weather or during a breakdown in
the Soviet supply mechanism). The Soviet supply picture (discussed in detail
in Chapter 3) suggests that, in the long term, Eastern Europe will not be an
effective constraint on exports to Western Europe, especially considering
Soviet needs to obtain hard currency.
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DETAILED DEMAND ANALYSES OF FOUR COUNTRIES
This section discusses the prospects for natural gas demand in the four
countries--France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and West Germany--that seem most
likely to shape future demand in Western Europe. As argued earlier, world oil
prices, economic growth, and gas pricing will drive the demand for gas in
these countries. However, differences in national energy policies also are
important.
France
France consumed 31.0 Bcm of natural gas in 1985, or 11.7 percent of its
total energy consumption. In 1985, domestic production provided 5.4 Bcm and
imports 25.6 Bcm, up from 23.5 Bcm in 1984. Sources of imports in 1984 were
as follows:2 5 Algeria, 9.0 Bcm; the Netherlands, 7.3 Bcm; the Soviet Union,
4.9 Bcm; and Norway, 2.3 Bcm.
Natural gas currently meets just under one-quarter of total energy demand
in the residential and commercial sectors, and just under one-fifth of demand
in the industrial sector.26 In the electric generation sector, however, the
share of gas is a mere 1 percent. These shares are the lowest of the four
countries discussed.
It is the stated intention of the French government to phase out gas in
the generation of electricity by 1990 in favor of nuclear power. Nuclear
25CEDIGAZ, "Natural Gas in the World, 1985," Centre International
d'Information sur le Gaz Natural et tous Hydrocarbures Gaseux, Paris, France,
1986; and British Petroleum PLC, "Review of World Gas," London, England, Au-
gust 1985, Table 12.
26 DRI Europe, The Outlook for Natural Gas in Western Europe, 1985-2000,
London, England, November 1985.
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power now accounts for nearly one-half of French electricity production,2 7 and
by 1990 it is targeted to provide some three-quarters (see Table 4-2).
The French pro-nuclear program began in the 1970s with what were plausib-
ly economic-efficiency motives, given perceptions and expectations at the
time. The large state-run utility, Electricite de France (EdF), succeeded in
expanding nuclear generating capacity, backing out now-dearer oil, and con-
tributing to the modernization of French agriculture and industry.
However, lagging demand growth--not unique to France--has left EdF with
excess capacity. The responses to this have been bureaucratic, not economic.
Government-subsidized rates to spur electricity use effectively have given EdF
a fiscal role, not only in producing electricity but also in shaping the dis-
tribution of income. This has added bureaucratic to economic obstacles to
natural gas's penetration of the electric generation sector. Natural gas also
faces competition from subsidized electric power in the residential, commer-
cial, and industrial sectors.
Despite this, however, gas use has increased steadily in the residential
and commercial sectors, from 5.8 Mtoe in 1974 to 11.1 Mtoe in 1983. In the
industrial sector, it has increased some two-thirds over 1974 levels (see
Table 4-3). The combined share of gas from these three sectors is about the
same as that of the electric generation sector. However, the use of elec-
tricity is slated to expand (largely at the expense of oil; their shares of
total final energy consumption in 1983 were 44 and 39 percent, respectively)
far more rapidly than natural gas. The drop in oil prices since late 1985 may
27 Financial Times Energy Economist, "World Status: Electricity," Issue 45,
London, England, July 1965.
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Table 4-2
FRENCH ELECTRICITY CAPACITY & GENERATION
1983
Production
(TWh)
of
Production
Nuclear
Hydro
Coal, etc.
TOTAL
1990
Production
(TWh)
S of
Production
Nuclear
Hydro
Coal, etc.
TOTAL
Source: Edf.
Capacity
(GW)
25.5
19.9
30.7
125
66
76
76.1
47
25
28
267
Capacity
(GW)
56.0
26.1
27.8
273
69
31
110.9
74
18
8
373
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alter these plans but, given the excess capacity in electricity generation,
probably- by retarding the back-out of oil rather than by increasing gas use.
As shown in Table 4-4, GdF sets gas prices according to category of end
use: "domestic" or household (which includes so-called "collective heating"),
commercial, and industrial. In addition to prices set by GdF, the consumer
also pays a value-added tax (VAT), which is deductible against income tax (in
the case of commercial and industrial users, at a rate of 18.6 percent in
1983-84). Residential and commercial customers all pay essentially the same
price; there are few geographic differences. In contrast, prices to industri-
al customers reflect geographic location, a monthly demand charge, and a com-
modity charge that varies with the quantity taken. Table 4-5 provides exam-
ples of gas prices paid by residential/commercial and industrial consumers in
the Paris region from 1978 to 1984.
Given all this, the price of oil should have little effect on gas demand
in France--probably the least effect of the four countries examined here. If
oil prices are high, the nuclear commitment will look good, and if they are
low, the nuclear commitment will look bad. However, the use of nuclear power
is so central to French energy policy that additional penetration by gas may
be modest at best, regardless of oil-price expectations. Barring serious
problems with further development of the nuclear industry--worse, apparently,
than the political effects of the Chernobyl accident--the central question
about French gas demand is whether France's gas industry can maintain its
present shares in the non-electric markets. The recent 23 percent cut in in-
dustrial gas prices suggests that GdF is aware of this problem.2 8
28 International Gas Report, no. 53, April 11, 1986.
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Table 4-4
FRANCE: CONSUMER TARIFF GROUPS AND PERCENT OF GAS
1980
Domestic Users:
1. Heating Tariffs
2. Other Tariffs
3. Collective Heating
4. Commercial Users
5. Industrial Users
TOTAL
26.8
4.9
9.9
15.0
43.4
100.0
1981
26.6
4.5
10.0
14.4
44.6
100.0
1982
27.1
4.5
10.6
15.0
42.8
100.0
SALES TO GROUP
1983
27.3
4.8
11.0
15.3
41.6
100.0
Source: European Economic Community publication, Earostat, Gas Prices 1978-1984.
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Table 4-5
FRANCE: EXAMPLE DOMESTIC & INDUSTRIAL CONSUMER PRICE (PARIS AREA)
Domestic (Annual Consumption 8.4 GJ per customer)
Taxes Included
48.7
53.6
67.9
76.8
90.8
100.3
107.6
Excl. Taxes
41.4
45.6
57.7
65.3
77.2
84.6
90.7
Industrial (Annual Consumption 419 GJ per customer) FF/GJ
Taxes Included
19.8
21.6
30.2
35.7
46.6
51.9
56.5
Excl. Taxes
16.9
18.3
25.7
30.4
39.6
43.7
47.6
GJ = gigajoules.
Source: EEC, Eurostat, Gas Prices 1978-84.
January 1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
FF/GJ
January 1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
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Italy
In 1985, Italy consumed 33.4 Bcm of natural gas, or 17.4 percent of its
total energy consumption. In 1984, domestic production accounted for 13.7
Bcm, and imports for 19.7 Bcm. Sources of imports in 1984 were as follows:
the Soviet Union, 8.2 Bcm; Algeria, 6.3 Bcm; and the Netherlands, 5.2 Bcm.2 9
In the past decade, Italy has increased natural gas as a percentage of
its total energy consumption, reflecting the government's desire to reduce de-
pendence on imported oil. Gas use in the electric generation sector has more
than trebled (see Table 4-6), although the share of gas inn total electric
power generated is still below the Western European average. Nevertheless,
current policy envisions reducing the share of gas in electric generationt to
8.9 percent in 1990, and further to 6.1 percent in 1995.30
The most important aspect of Italian gas use is its regionality. In both
the residential/commercial and the industrial sectors, SNAM (the state-owned
gas production and import corporation) currently supplies over 80 percent of,
total delivered gas to the more economically developed northern and central
regions. However, SNAM recently has publicly expressed interest in connecting
new residential/commercial customers in the less-developed south, although
demand forecasts for this region suggest this still would constitute only 25
percent of total energy demand in this sector. 3 1 Although natural gas is ac-
cessible to nearly three-quarters of all residences in the northern region,
29 CEDIGAZ, op.cit.
30 Financial Times, "International Gas Report," No. 29, London, England, April
26, 1985, p. 3.
31 SNAM S.P.A. (ENI Group), "Natural Gas Development Program, 1984-87," Milan,
Italy, 1985.
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growth potential has not been exhausted. SNAM's gas development plan (see
Table 4-7) involves 580 communes, more than half of which are northern com-
munes planned to be connected to the existing grid. This of course conflicts
with SNAM's public statements, which emphasize the connection of new consumers
in the south.
SNAM's forecasts for 1990 put residential consumption in the north and
central regions at 12.4 Bcm, compared with 9 Bcm in 1982. SNAM expects that
by the end of 1986, 40 percent of southern households will have end-use capac-
ity.
By contrast, gas use in electric generation is greater in the south than
in the north (currently 1.7 and 1.1 Bcm, respectively). Demand in 1990 is
forecast to reach 2.4 and 2.6 Bcm, respectively. However, as stated above,
the government ultimately wishes to reduce the share of gas in electric gener-
ation.
The story is similar in the industrial sector. Despite massive state
aid, the southern region has a very thin industrial base. Given this fact,
there is considerable doubt associated with any demand forecast for this
region. However, SNAM's objective is to raise the number of large commercial
users in the south from 83 in 1982 to 522 in 1990.
Total natural gas consumption in Italy rose considerably more than SNAM
had forecast from 1983 to 1984, by 17.1 percent to 32 Bcm (residential & com-
mercial sector, 7.4 percent; electric generation sector, 82.8 percent). The
residential/commercial sector accounted for 40.7 of total gas use;32 elec-
32
Financial Times, "International Gas Report," no. 33, London, England, June
21, 1985, p. 16.
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Table 4-8
TOTAL POPULATION
SERVED BY GAS
REGION
IN MEZZOGIORNO
COMMUNES SERVED BY GAS
MARCH '81 MARCH '85
%POPULATION SERVED
MARCH '81 MARCH '85
MARCHES
MATIUM
ABRUZZO
MOLISE
CAMPANIA
APULIA
BASTILICATA
CALABRIA
SICILY
TOTAL
SOURCE SNAM
2
12
30
10
16
16
3
3
1
93
10
18
58
14
23
27
7
6
7
170
49.5
26.2
52
41.5
39
29.5
19.4
9
7.7
25.8
74. 5
38. 2
61.7
46.1
42. 4
34.7
25
15.1
16.1
32.3
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tricity generation 18 percent; and industry 30 percent. This unexpected in-
crease in demand appears to be due in part to pricing issues.
Prices in Italy are determined at two levels. First, SNAM determines
prices for primary distribution in conjunction with local utilities and
Cofindustria (the association representing large private users). Second, lo-
cal utilities impose a tariff, which is determined by negotiations between the
distributor and the Interministerial Price Committee. Table 4-9 shows 1982
gas sales patterns.
The number of consumers served by distributors is much greater than those
served directly by SNAM: in 1983, 8,600,000 and 4,851, respectively.33 To
understand Italian end-user prices, it is important to realize that VAT rates
vary with consumer type. VAT rates have varied over the last few years; more
recently, the fixed primary distribution tariff has been some 6 percent of the
total price. This is linked to inflation indices and is reviewed annually. A
variable component is tied to the end-user price of #2 heating gasoil. This
additional tariff is designed to give the local utilities a "fair rate of
return." These tariffs vary from city to city and depend on the different
costs each utility faces for gas purchases, investment, labor, maintenance,
and general expenses. Also, different residential consumers are subject to
different tariffs, depending on which of three use categories they fall into:
cooking and water heating, individual space heating, and grouped central heat-
ing. Table 4-10 shows sample prices for consumers in the
residential/commercial and industrial sectors.
Eurostat, EEC, Luxembourg, "Gas Prices, 1978-84," Italy, p. 47.
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Table 4-9
ITALY: PATTERN OF GAS SALES, 1982
(1) SNAM DIRECT SALES: 57%
Of which: Power Stations 38.5%
Chemicals 7.0%
Motor Fuel 1.0%
(2) SALES VIA DISTRIBUTORS: 43%
Of which: Small Domestic Consumers 10.0%
Individual Central Heating 17.0%
Collective Heating 8.0%
Non-Domestic Users 8.0%
SOURCE: EEC
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Table 4-10
ITALY: EXAMPLE DOMESTIC AND INDUSTRIAL CONSUMER PRICES (ROME AREA)
Domestic (Annual Consumption: 8.4 GJ) LIT/GJ
January 1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Taxes Included
5064
4504
6763
11759
12519
17754
*20026
Excl. Taxes
3989
3461
5421
10099
10804
15484
17754
Industrial (Annual Consumption: 419 GJ)
January 1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Taxes Included
3965
3125
6134
9034
9844
12780
14475
Excl. Taxes
3478
2741
5381
7856
8560
10830
12267
Source: EEC, Eurostat, Gas Prices, 1978-84.
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The point to be made from the foregoing discussion is that gas prices in
Italy vary considerably from customer to customer. For example, net of VAT,
the domestic user in Rome paid approximately $0.340/cubic meter in 1984 versus
$0.295 in Milan (or about 15 percent less).34 Gas price tariffs are currently
under review in an effort to reduce these discrepancies. In 1984, before
taxes, gas was highly competitive with other fuels on a heat-equivalent basis;
it was approximately 6 percent cheaper than heavy fuel oil, 20 percent cheaper
than light fuel oil, 30 percent cheaper than LPG, and 300 to 400 percent
cheaper than electricity.
Using the information developed above, we can apply the three oil price
scenarios developed earlier to illuminate future natural gas demand in Italy.
Overall, gas demand in Italy will be considerably more sensitive to oil prices
than in France, for example. Given the heavy fuel-switching from oil to gas
that took place in the early 1980s, any significant price differential in fa-
vor of gas also will increase gas demand. However, this fuel-switching mostly
takes place in the electric generation sector, and as Italian policy is to
phase out hydrocarbons in this sector over the next ten years, any switching
effect likely cannot hold over the long term. In conclusion, the prospects
for growth in natural gas demand in Italy appear to be the best of the four
countries examined, given the potential for demand growth in the
residential/commercial and industrial sectors as Italy's gas grid continues to
be expanded.
34
Financial Times, "International Gas Report," no. 46, London, England, De-
cember 20, 1985.
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The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom consumed 56.0 Bcm of natural gas in 1985, or 21.1 per-
cent of its total energy consumption. In 1984, domestic production provided
42.3 Bcm and imports from Norway the remaining 13.7 Bcm.
The United Kingdom is the second largest gas user of the four countries,
consuming only 4.0 Bcm less than West Germany in 1985. Gas has a very high
penetration in the residential/commercial sector (in 1983, 60 percent of total
energy consumption [see Table 4-11]). This can be explained by historical
patterns of gas use (see Chapters 2 and 3 for a fuller discussion) and by U.K.
gas pricing policies to domestic users. Through the control of gas supply and
participation in all early offshore developments, the British Gas Council
(today the British Gas Corporation [BGC]) developed an extensive distribution
system and, with it, established prices for gas that were highly competitive
with those of alternative fuels. For 1974 through 1983, residential/ commer-
cial gas use increased approximately 60 percent,-versus 40 percent for all
sectors. Therefore, short-term future gas use does not depend on increased
penetration through further development of the distribution system, as it does
in other Western European countries (and most importantly, in Italy); the dis-
tribution system already is largely in place in the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom uses very little gas in the electric generation sector
(a mere 1.0 percent of total energy consumption) in 1983. Electric genera-
tion historically has been based on coal, and this trend continues (80 percent
in 1983), although nuclear is accounting for an increasing amount. This is
due to the abundance of coal in the United Kingdom and the concommitant
reliance on coal-fired electric generation plants. In addition, the phasing-
out of oil-fired plants, which was accelerated by the 1979-80 hike in oil
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prices, helped to preserve coal's dominance. In sum, there appears little
likelihood that gas can achieve any significant penetration in this sector.
In contrast, gas accounts for a substantial percentage of total energy
demand in the industrial sector (approximately 30 percent in 1983, or 13.2
Mtoe). A substantial proportion of these sales was made on an interruptible
supply basis,3 5 suggesting the potential for some of these sales to be re-
placed by coal in the future. However, given current and past competitive gas
pricing policies, any significant change in demand likely would be driven by a
price hike. This likelihood is discussed below.
A potentially significantly impact on gas demand is the privatization of
the BGC. The government has announced that "free" imports and exports of gas
will follow the floatation of BGC stock, and competition in the industrial
sector will be encouraged legislatively (until recently it appeared that the
BGC would be able to continue to monopolize the gas distribution system
through price setting, denying competitors fair access.)3 6 The new regulatory
structure has yet to be disclosed; however, the purchasing and marketing of
post-deregulation gas clearly will have profound influence on demand levels.
The preference for gas in both residential/commercial and industrial sectors
is unlikely to continue after the privatization has been completed. Thus, al-
though there still is potential for increased gas demand in both these sec-
tors, it appears that deregulation-related price increases may restrain this
growth.
35 International Gas Union, World Gas Supply and Demand, "1983-2020 Demand--
West Europe: The Markets for Gas," Report Submitted to the Task Force, p. 63.
36 Financial Times, "International Gas Report," nos. 45 and 48, London, Eng-
land, December 6, 1985, p. 12, and January 31, 1986, p. 9.
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Gas prices in the United Kingdom are set according to tariffs established
by the BGC in conformity with government-determined financial goals. No
direct taxes are levied on gas sales. Table 4-12 shows BGC sales by number of
consumers and sales. In the residential/commercial sector, there essentially
are two types of tariffs: the credit and the domestic prepayment tariffs
(essentially a two-part tariff combining a standing [or fixed] and a quantity-
used charge). Since 1983, small consumers in all sectors have benefitted from
a rebate granted if the standing charge is higher than the quantity-used
charge.
In the industrial sector, there is a wide range of prices paid. Recent
policy has been aimed at reducing this range, which currently favors large
consumers who often have interruptible contracts.
Gas prices relative to those of competing fuels are relevant to future
gas demand (see Table 4-13). Historically gas has been highly competitive
with both heavy fuel and gasoil, but less so with coal. This largely cor-
responds with actual usage patterns in the industrial sector. Table 4-14 pro-
vides examples of gas prices paid by both domestic and industrial consumers in
London from 1978 to 1984.
West Germany
West Germany consumed 60.0 Bcm of gas in 1985, or 15 percent of its total
energy consumption. Domestic production provided 17.2 Bcm and imports 42.8
Bcm. In 1984, total imports were 35.5 Bcm: 15.0 Bcm from the Netherlands,
13.5 Bcm from the Soviet Union, and 7.0 Bcm from Norway.3 7
CEDIGAZ, op.cit.
4-54
Table 4-12
BRITISH GAS SALES 1982-83
Users
Domestic Sales:
1. Prepayment Tariff
2. Credit Tariff
3. Commerical Sales
4. Industrial Sales
5. National & Local
Government
Consumers
10.8
85.5
3.0
0.5
0.2
n 15929428 16463 M therms
Source: EEC, Eurostat, Gas Prices, 1978-84.
Sales
2.2
50.1
11.8
34.0
1.8
TOTAL
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Table 4-13
PRICES OF FUELS USED BY MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY PENCE/THERM (DELIVERED)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Coal 8.20 8.90 10.36 13.43 15.52 18.43 19.07 19.09
Heavy Fuel Oil 13.48 12.64 15.70 22.24 26.65 28.15 31.00 36.86
Gas Oil 18.23 18.30 23.83 34.93 40.68 44.27 45.82 47.07
Gas 9.26 11.71 13.67 17.57 21.59 23.24 24.06 26.34
Electricity 50.33 55.67 61.53 69.35 79.29 86.10 85.09 84.67
Source: Digest of UK Energy Statistics, 1985, Department of Energy, U.K.
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Table 4-14
UNITED KINGDOM: EXAMPLE DOMESTIC & INDUSTRIAL CONSUMER PRICES (London)
Domnestic (Annual Consumption: 8.4 GJ) UKL/GJ
January 1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Taxes Included
2.79
2.79
3.00
3.79
5.51
6.79
6.67
Excl. Taxes
2.79
2.79
3.00
3.79
5.51
6.79
6.67
Industrial (Annual Consumption: 419 GJ)
January 1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Taxes Included
1.76
1.76
2.32
2.55
2.65
3.27
3.43
Excl. Taxes
1.76
1.76
2.32
2.55
2.65
3.27
3.43
Source: EEC, Eurostat, Gas Prices, 1978-84.
UKL/GJ
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The central theme of West German gas policy is to allow competitive
forces to drive the market. This broad policy nothwithstanding, efforts to
protect the domestic gas industry from supply disruptions include diversifying
supply sources, improvements in storage capacity, and expansion of pipeline
networks.3 8 In 1983 total demand, excluding exports, grew 4.3 percent over
1982 levels; in the residential sector it grew by 5.2 percent, reflecting a
shift in consumption from the electric generation to the domestic sector and
to a lesser extent to the industrial sector (see Table 4-15).
Gas use in the electric generation sector is indirectly driven by govern-
ment policies toward coal. The West German government provides extensive sup-
port for coal production, largely in response to political pressures from
miners. Some substitution of oil and gas due to government subsidies of the
coal industry as taken place over the last five years; these include price
supports, production and exploration grants, and investment tax credits. Fu-
ture demand increases in the electric generation sector are planned to be met
both by hard coal-fired plants and by new nuclear generation capacity (which
accounted for 23.5 percent of electricity generation in 1984). Therefore,
there appears little opportunity that gas will increase its share of the
market in this sector; in fact, it is having difficulty in maintaining even
its current share, which fell in 1985 about 10 percent from 1983 levels.3 9
Any real growth in gas demand will come from the residential/commercial
and industrial sectors. Gas currently accounts for 23 percent of
38 International Energy Agency, "Energy Policies and Programs of IEA Coun-
tries, 1984 Review," Paris, France, 1985.
Ruhr Gas Aktiengesellschaft, "Ruhn Gas Statistics," Essen, Germany, 1985.
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residential/commercial use. Limited demand growth in these sectors has fol-
lowed the growth of the distribution system. According to Ruhrgas, the major
supplier of gas in West Germany, the number of households expected to use gas
for space heating will increase from 6 million in 1982 to some 8 million by
1990, as the distribution system is further developed. 4 0 This appears to be a
reasonable forecast, given increases in the numbers of households connected to
the gas grid in the last few years (approximately 250,000 to 300,000
annually).
Gas meets about 21 percent of energy demand in the industrial sector. In
a recent DRI forecast,41annual demand growth was forecast to be 3 percent in
2000, approximately half coming from increased market penetration in this sec-
tor and half from industrial growth itself. Increased penetration is forecast
to come from additional gas use in the process industries, although this will
be offset by declines in some traditional gas-using industries, such as steel-
making.
Figure 4-2 shows recent changes in natural gas consumption patterns in
West Germany. Gas use in the industrial sector has risen modestly, sig-
nificantly in the residential/commercial sector, and declined about equally in
the electric generation sector. As in the other three countries, demand for
gas is highly correlated with its price competitiveness via other fuels.
Table 4-16 provides a breakdown of consumers according to prices paid, to
which VAT at 14 percent is added (deductible from income tax for industrial
40 Idem., "Natural Gas on the Road into the Next Century," Essen, Germany, Au-
gust 1983.
41 CEDIGAZ, op.cit.
-a
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Figure 4-2
Natural Gas Consumption in the Federal Republic of Germany
by Consumer Groups
[in Mill.tons coal equtvalent]
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Table 4-16
GERMANY: NATURAL GAS, PERCENTAGE SALES BY TARIFF GROUP
1980 1981 1982 1983
Domestic Users:
1. Heating Tariffs 26.8 26.6
2. Other Tariffs 4.7 4.5
3. Collective Heating 9.9 10.0
4. Comercial & Similar Uses 15.0 14.4
5. Industry 43.4 44.6
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
In 1983 the total number of customer was 8,425,000.
Source: EEC, Eurostat, Gas Prices, 1978-84.
27.1
4.5
10.6
15.0
42.8
100.0
27.3
4.8
11.0
15.3
41.6
100.0
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Table 4-17
WEST GERMANY: EXAMPLE DOMESTIC & INDUSTRIAL CONSUMIER PRICE (DUSSELDORF)
Domestic (Annual Consumption: 8.4 6J) DM/GJ
January 1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Taxes Included
29.42
29.42
29.69
35.97
46.76
45.24
Excl. Taxes
26.27
26.27
26.27
31.83
41.38
39.68
Industrial (Annual Consumption: 419 GJ)
January 1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Taxes Included
14.45
14.45
14.58
19.36
24.45
22.20
Excl. Taxes
12.90
12.90
12.90
17.13
21.64
19.47
Source: EEC, Eurostat, Gas Prices, 1978-84.
DM/ GJ
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and commercial users). There are considerable differences in the final price
paid by end-use sector. These price differences result from the problems of
applying local distribution charges equitably. Supply contracts for all
households are revised annually. In a manner similar to domestic users,
prices for industrial consumers are set by negotiations with suppliers.
Prices paid by industrial users are not required to be published although, as
with domestic users, there is considerable dispersion in prices paid. In gen-
eral, after a sharp rise in the early 1980s, gas prices in West Germany have
been relatively stable.
Summary
Overall, the Western European natural gas market is relatively young com-
pared to those of North American, and it is also highly complex. The current
patterns of gas consumption--both in terms of its share of total energy use
and in its distribution among residential, commercial, industrial, and elec-
tric generation sectors--vary widely among the countries of Western Europe.
Indeed, the gas industries of certain countries (such as the Netherlands and,
as regards residential use, the United Kingdom) are "mature," while those of
other countries (such as West Germany) are still in their adolescence.
Despite this complexity, the same core factors will shape the course of
natural gas demand over the coming 15 years in Western Europe as they will in
North America and the Pacific Basin. These factors are the price of natural
gas relative to those of other fuels, economic growth, and the energy policies
of individual countries. In addition, strategic considerations (to some ex-
tent tied to policy and how gas is priced) will have an impact on the levels
and patterns of future gas demand.
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The Relative Price of Gas
As a determinant of future natural gas demand in Western Europe, the
price of gas has two elements: its price per se and its price relative to the
(expected) prices of crude oil and refined products. If, as seems likely, fu-
ture gas prices are tied less mechanistically to those of oil, natural gas
demand will be less dependent on oil prices. Gas prices doubtlessly still
will rise or fall as oil prices move up or down, but the prices at which the
various regional sub-markets for gas clear also will depend on the structure
of gas demand and on supply conditions.
We postulate three main possibilities for oil-price expectations, based
on the market structure one expects to prevail in the world oil market. These
structural possibilities are: (1) a strong, reconstituted oil cartel (with
"high" oil prices); (2) a competitive market, with no cartel (and with "low"
oil prices); and (3) a weak cartel, of varying cohesiveness (and cor-
respondingly variable oil prices). We suspect that gas demand will vary ac-
cording to which structural expectation prevails, although we have, as yet,
little idea exactly by how much. High oil prices would retard all energy-
using investments, gas included; the weakening of the gas/oil price link (if
it occurs) would partly offset this retarding effect on gas demand. Low oil
prices would have the opposite effect, but gas would have to compete against
cheap oil; this would increase the importance of freeing gas prices from
linkage to oil prices. Finally, variable oil prices would put a premium on
fuel-switching capability, spurring investments in fuel-switching capacity
wherever energy accounted for a significant share of total costs. For gas to
compete in the "penny-switcher" market would require greater freedom to vary
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prices among classes of users than has been permitted in many parts of Western
Europe.
Economic Growth
This chapter did not undertake a separate analysis of economic growth
factors, which is an important determinant of natural gas demand, although
some general observations can be made. Economic growth in Western Europe has
been sluggish in the 1980s, apparently as the result of governments' reluc-
tance to pursue expansionary macroeconomic policies for fear of renewed infla-
tion. Absent structural reforms in labor and other markets, this reluctance
may persist, despite beneficial supply-side impacts of lower oil prices. If
so, an important source of growth in the demand for natural gas--still incom-
pletely developed in most of Western Europe, as discussed--will be lacking.
Note that the likelihood of instituting more expansionary macroeconomic
policies likely varies with expectations about oil prices. High oil prices
would pose more difficulties for macroeconomic policymakers fearing inflation
than would low oil prices. We therefore expect that Western European govern-
ments would resist expansionist policies more resolutely under high- than un-
der low-oil-price expectations. For governments subject to and concerned with
short-term, "political business cycle" effects, variable oil prices would pose
problems of their own. This latter set of oil-price expectations perhaps
would cause instability in macroeconomic policies that would reduce economic
growth in Western Europe and hence weaken overall growth in gas demand.
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National Energy Policies
We asserted at the very outset of this chapter that differences in na-
tional energy policies largely explain disparate patterns of current natural
gas use in the countries of Western Europe. Some of these policies pertain
directly to gas, others indirectly but with no less impact. Thus, Dutch and
U.K. government measures deflect domestically-produced gas supplies from in-
ternational to internal uses. The French government's singleminded pursuit of
nuclear power development in the generation of electricity includes restric-
tions and subsidies that singificantly retard possibilities for development of
gas use. And West German policies favoring the use of domestically-produced
coal in the generation of electricity pose obstacles to penetration by gas in
that sector, even if gas prices were to become more favorable. Clearly, in
Western Europe, national patterns of gas use will not become more similar un-
til these policy barriuers are reduced.
As with economic growth, national energy policies likely will vary with
different expectations about oil prices. High oil prices probably would rein-
force many of the policies that contribute to diversity in gas use, such as
the French commitment to nuclear power. In contrast, low oil prices could un-
dermine such policies, thereby fostering more homogeneous gas development
throughout the region. Our guess is that variable oil prices also would rein-
force the more idiosyncratic policies that were adopted in response to the oil
price shocks, and thus weaken any trends toward common patterns of gas use in
Western Europe.
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Strategic Considerations
In our study of North America, we argued that strategic decisions by both
the U.S. and the Canadian governments would largely shape the future evolution
of gas use.4 2 In the case of Japan, the strategic decision concerned the con-
struction of a national gas grid, if not of steel pipe, then of LNG terminals
and transshipment facilities. In the case of Western Europe, strategic issues
also are important. Certain of them involve the energy policies of individual
countries--e.g., French willingness to consider curtailing nuclear power de-
velopment or West German reconsideration of its policy of prohibiting gas use
in electric utility boilers (perhaps as part of an anti-acid rain campaign),
and these should not be overlooked.
But the overriding strategic issue in Western Europe is whether the Nor-
wegians will be able to implement not only the large deal announced in June
1986, but also other large deals involving the other three-quarters of the
Troll field. To do so, they must in effect increase demand in Western Europe
by persuading enough customers that it can supply gas at competitive prices
over an extended period, in order to induce new investments by its customer-
countries both in infrastructure and in gas-using equipment. If the Nor-
wegians can build the pipeline into Zeebrugge, Belgium, and if it then is ex-
tended through France, the West German monopsony position in the West European
gas market will have been broken. The result then should be more vigorous
competition throughout the entire region, and with it will come larger volumes
of natural gas both demanded and delivered. Only then will it be possible to
exploit Troll gas to the fullest extent envisioned.
42 In Washington, the issue is pipeline policy. In Ottawa, the two issues are
wellhead supply and export pricing.
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It appears that the decision to proceed with the Zeebrugge pipeline ac-
cording to the current schedule hinges critically on expectations about oil
prices. Even though growth in total energy demand might be greatest under our
low-price scenario, the associated price of gas could be too low to support
both development of Troll reserves and new pipelines to transport the gas to
customers. (This point suggests another important determinant of the
viability of the Norwegian strategy, namely, the size of compressible economic
rents and whether the Norwegian government politically can allow enough of
them to be squeezed out, if need be.) High oil prices would make gas prices
much more attractive, but the macroeconomic effects could at least defer Nor-
wegian plans further into the future, if not kill them altogether. From the
narrow perspective of Norwegian gas development and export, perhaps the most
favorable oil-price scenario would be variable oil prices, a development that
would stimulate the demand for flexible fuel systems--primarily oil/gas dual-
fired systems.
* * * *
The net result of this analysis, as applied to the four major energy-
consuming countries of Western Europe, is not the derivation of one single,
overall forecast of future natural gas demand. The imponderables are simply
too numerous and too weighty to make such an endeavor worthwhile. Even
without a strategic breakthrough on Norway's sales of Troll gas, there still
is some room for natural gas demand to grow in all four countries. Italy of-
fers the most favorable prospects, in all sectors, particularly if certain of
its regional policies begin to click in the less-developed south. France and
West Germany both should use more gas in the residential and commercial sec-
tors, and probably in the industrial sector as well, but barring policy
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shifts, neither country is apt to increase gas use in the electric generation
sector. In fact, currently envisioned decline in this sector in West Germany
could cancel out any growth in gas use in the other sectors.
If the Norwegians succeed on a large scale in bringing Troll reserves
onstream before 2000, the picture sketched about would be quite different.
Some of the market for Troll gas would be in entirely new regions (e.g.,
Spain), but the Norwegians' plans only can succeed if France and Italy at a
minimum, and probably West Germany and the United Kingdom as well, use more
gas than is currently planned. That is to say, the success of Norway's
strategy regarding Troll depends more on the development of favorable price
terms than many decision makers in the four countries now expect will happen.
isi
APPENDIX
DERIVATION OF DEMAND SCENARIOS
by
Arthur W. Wright
This study did not attempt to construct a model that would supply
econometric or other estimates of natural gas demand in Western Europe. How-
ever, for the simulation runs using the dynamic natural gas trade programming
model described and applied in Chapter 5, it was necessary to obtain natural
gas demand scenarios for various oil-price assumptions based on relative
prices and economic growth. We therefore constructed a simple "calculator,"
which takes parameters for GNP or GDP growth, generates associated total ener-
gy use levels in each year, and then calculates the share of natural gas in
total energy demand.1 For each of the four countries studied in detail, fu-
ture gas demands were calculated for the period 1984-2017 for the three oil-
price scenarios.
Our approach to estimating future natural gas demand must exhibit certain
characteristics. First, it must be dynamically stable in the sense that
estimated energy or gas use should not go suddenly "off the charts" in some
future year. Second, it also had to reproduce the historical values early in
the time period (1984 and 1985). Obtaining even a simple calculator having
these two characteristics proved to be challenging. We repeatedly made
simplifying, ad hoc assumptions, or abandoned particular derivations that
posed difficulties, as became desirable on theoretical or other grounds. It
1 We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Charles Blitzer and David Wood,
who are only partly to blame for the results of this exercise.
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turned out that, given the supply conditions input to the model, the simulated
results were insensitive to the demand numbers. Therefore, we suspended the
search for a more satisfying set of assumptions until such time that we have
the resources to conduct further research into better ways of capturing par-
ticular relationships.
The key idea of the "calculator" is to divide both total energy use and
natural gas use into two components. One is driven by the stock of existing
capital equipment in use at the beginning of the time span studied (1984).
The energy/gas efficiency characteristics of this historical capital stock are
fixed, and so energy/gas consumption is "captive." We assume that this stock
depreciates at a constant rate, so that the effect of the old equipment decays
at an exponential rate. The second component of energy/gas demand depends
upon the efficiency characteristics of new capital goods. We "model" this
component as depending upon economic growth (to contain the level of new in-
vestment ) and relative energy prices (to capture efficiency effects). Al-
gebraically, for total energy use:
Et = E(1 - )t + I()Yt Y0(1- de) t ] (1)
where: Et = total energy use at time t (O = 1984);
d = the constant annual rate of economic depreciation of energy-
eusing capital stock;
I = a function that determines the energy intensity of new capital
stock; and
Yt = GNP or GDP at time t ( = 1984).
For natural gas:
Gt= G(1 -dg)t + S()[Et - E0(1 - d)t (2)
where: Gt = total gas use at time t (O = 1984);
d = the constant annual rate of economic depreciation of gas-using
gcapital stock; and
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S = a function that determines the share of natural gas in new gas
use.
Substituting equation (1) into equation (2), we express gas use as follows:
Gt = G(1 - dg)t + S(.)I(-)[Yt - Y(1 - de)t .(3)
For oil prices, we assumed that they fell from an OECD weighted average
for 15 products in 1984, $27.68/bbl, to an estimated $16.00/bbl in 1986, and
then (high) rose to $28.00 or (low) fell to $8.00/bbl in 1987 and stayed there
through 2017. The middle, or variable, oil-price scenario is taken to be the
mid-point between the high and low scenarios.
Assumptions about economic growth over the period 1986-2017 were adjusted
to reflect expected differences between the oil-price scenarios as well as
inter-country differences (e.g., the United Kingdom produces oil and the other
three countries do not). The economic growth assumptions used in the model
runs presented in this report were as follows:
For France, Italy, and West Germany:
Strong Cartel Competition
(High Oil Prices) (Low Oil Prices)
1986 3.0%
1987 0.0% 3.0 per year
1988-90 1.5% for the entire
1990-99 2.0% period
2000-17 2.5%
For the United Kingdom:
1986 -1.0% -1.0%
1987 2.5% -2.0%
1988 2.5% -1.0%
1989 2.5% 0.0%
1990-91 2.5% 1.5%
1992-94 2.5% 2.0%
1995-99 2.5% 2.5%
2000-17 2.5% 3.0%
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As noted, the growth rates for the United Kingdom differ because of its size-
able oil production. By the year 2000, however, the special effects of oil
prices (both ways) wear off, and U.K. growth rates become the same as for the
other three countries.
The calculator as it now stands is quite sensitive to assumed economic
growth rates. Scaling the rates up or down moves both energy use and gas use
around quite significantly. (Again, though, changes in gas demand do not push
the model runs around very much.)
In calculating the term for "new" energy use, we assumed an energy/GNP
elasticity of unity. This was based on the view that (except in transition
periods) the long-run energy/GNP elasticity tends to be about unity. During
transition periods (e.g., after the oil-price shock of the mid-1970s), the ob-
served elasticity may be less than unity, but that is because of the delayed
adjustment to the new conditions. Here, though, we only are estimating the
elasticity for new capital equipment.
To derive energy and gas use attributable to the capital stock existing
at the beginning of the time span, we started with estimated rates of economic
depreciation for different classes of capital equipment. 2 By assigning the
equipment to industrial sectors, judiciously choosing an average figure for
each sector, then weighting them by sectoral shares in energy or gas use, we
were able to calculate average rates of depreciation. The figures for total
energy use were reassuringly grouped right at 0.12. Those for gas use varied
21 See Hulten, Charles R. and Frank C. Wykoff [19811], "The Measurement of Eco-
nomic Depreciation," in C.R. Hulten (editor), Depreciation Inflation and the
Taxation of Income from Capital, The Urban Institute Press, Washington, D.C.
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considerably more, reflecting the disparate patterns of gas use across the
four countries:
France 0.10
Italy 0.07
United Kingdom 0.09
West Germany 0.08
The choice of the component of gas use by far proved the most difficult
task. The initial notion was that gas use might be expected to vary with its
price relative to that of oil, from some maximum at a very low relative price
(say, the Dutch share of natural gas in total energy use) to some minimum at a
very high relative price. If one knows the relative prices at which maximum
and minimum values occur, the share function could be approximated elegantly
by a logit function, or inelegantly by a bounded linear function. Postponing
the logit approach until further research is possible, we used the inelegant,
bounded linear approximation.
Unfortunately, we had to estimate the values of the relative prices of
gas at which the maximum and minimum shares would be reached; depending on
what one chooses, of course, the slope of the linear approximation may vary
quite significantly. Moreover, the results of applying the calculator proved
very sensitive to the choice of this slope, and we ended up using ad hoc as-
sumptions both in order to get the various countries' results to track actual
data for 1983 and 1984, and to prevent gas use from going off the charts. As
a rule, where it proved necessary to assume relatively high share factors in
the early years to get the calculator rolling for a particular country, we as-
sumed that they would decline over time, at least in the direction of the more
conservative factors used for France and Germany. This is clearly an area
warranting further study, in order to sharpen the choice of gas as a share of
total energy use with new capital equipment.
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The linear share factors estimated by the procedure described above for
the four countries were as follows:
High Oil Price Scenario
France:
Italy:
United Kingdom:
West Germany:
1983-87 0.137
1987-2017 0.150
1984
1985
1986-87
1988-89
1990-94
1995-99
2000-17
1984
1985-86
1987-88
1989-94
1995-99
2000-10
2011-17
0.300
0.250
0.225
0.220
0.210
0.205
0.200
0.265
0.250
0.240
0.220
0.200
0.190
0.180
1984-87 0.147
1988-2017 0.150
Low Oil Price Scenario
France:
Italy:
United Kingdom:
West Germany:
1984-2017 0.137
1984 0.300
1985 0.250
1986 0.225
1987 0.220
1988-89 0.200
1990-94 0.180
1995-2017 0.170
1984 0.265
1985 0.225
1986-89 0.200
1990-94 0.180
1995-99 0.160
2000-17 0.150
1984
1985-87
1988-90
1991-2017
0.195
0.190
0.180
0.175
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The results of the foregoing assumptions are reported in the following
Tables, two each (for high and low oil price expectations) for the four coun-
tries. The tables show the GNP or GDP figures used, total energy use, total
gas use, and the implied year-to-year percentage changes in gas use.
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1988 $283.74 185.3 0. 003 51.6 0. 013
1989 $29(0. 83 186. 4 0. 006., 5(. 1 -0. -029
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20 )17 ·4: 323 2 t:). C5 67.4 :. :;
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2 )$6;2.5.28 354. 3 0. . 3 4
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.;333. ;82 194. 3 ). 025 37. 3 -0. (37
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20)7 $410. 56 L34.5 . 0 )2.8 4 1 . 9 . ' 1
20(:)8 $422. 88 241.2 0. 029 42 9:. 0
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20i)10 $448.63 255. 4 0.029 44.9 0.0 t)24
20 ) 1. $462. 09 262. 8 0. 029 46.0 : :. 024
2012 $475.95 27. 5'0.) 0);9 47. 1 0.025
()3 $49C.2 L :78. 4 . 0. 29 48. 3 0. 0i;E
20) 14 $54. 94 286. 6 0.29 49.6 
20O 15 $52). 08 295. 1 0. 030 5:). 9 ). ot
2016 $535. 69 303. 8 0. 30 52. 3 .3 02'7
i0. OI 7 c:1 . 7 - 312. 9 0. 030 53. 7 0. 027
20 1i $ 56 8. 3 1 3 22.2 0. 03) 552 0. ), 8
2t() 0.. $585. 36 331. 7 0. 030 56.7 )0. 028
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WESTERN EUROPEAN NATURAL GAS TRADE MODEL
by
Charles R. Blitzer
with the assistance of
George Deltas and Peter Scully
INTRODUCTION
'This chapter provides a brief description and overview of the
natural gas trade model for Western Europe, which was developed as part
of the M.I.T. Center for Energy Policy Research (CEPR) study of
international natural gas trade. The model provides a framework for
integrating the supply and demand components of this study and has four
principle objectives.
Our first objective for use of the model is to check the
feasibility and consistency over time of various demand forecasts and
supply constraints. These constraints include reserve levels, installed
pipeline capacities linking various countries, and minimum or maximum
export/import flows associated with either contracts or exogenous
policies. This integration provides a mechanism for isolating some of
the principal bottlenecks that are likely to emerge in the evolution of
natural gas trade in Western Europe.
A second use of the model is to calculate least-cost production and
trade patterns to meet projected levels of future demand growth in
different countries. The model derives these to be consistent with
various supply-side constraints and cost assumptions, as well as with
existing and anticipated minimum contract deliveries from individual
exporters to individual importers.
A third, closely related objective is to estimate the marginal
costs of expanding production or increasing consumption in different
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countries, or the marginal costs of additional exports from one specific
location to another. On the production side, the model includes both
operating and investment costs. Operating costs are always incurred
when there is production from a particular reserve. Investment costs
are not automatic, but come about whenever additional capacity is built
to expand production above the level of capacity previously installed.
Since the model is dynamic, it can keep track of yearly reserves and
whether low-cost reserves are being fully utilized. Whenever this
occurs, the model calculates the so-called "user cost" associated with
depletion of low-cost reserves, which forces additional use of higher
cost gas. Similarly, the marginal costs of transporting gas from one
location to another include the marginal operating costs, capital
costs,1 and the user costs of having to use alternative routes and
reserves when a particular pipeline is fully utilized.
Finally, the model can be used to perform a-variety of sensitivity
tests. Among the variables used in developing a specific scenario are:
the time pattern of gas demand growth by country, country-specific gas
reserves and production costs, major expansions of the pipeline network,
minimum delivery requirements under existing and foreseen contracts, and
various policy constraints that can be imposed by specific importing or
exporting countries. By having the model calculate the least-cost
solution for each scenario, it is possible to estimate optimal build-up
and depletion profiles, export patterns, and the real costs (in terms of
1 Due to lumpiness in pipeline investment, the choices about pipeline
expansion that the model itself can make are restricted. This point
will be amplified below.
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production and transportation costs) of supply diversification
strategies.
It is important to stress that the model, as presently formulated,
does not determine either the time path of gas demand or the market
clearing prices in Western Europe either as a whole or for individual
countries. Rather, these are taken as projections derived in the Demand
chapter. Of course, the model can be solved repeatedly to investigate
what would happen to costs and trade patterns if demand were to grow
more or less rapidly. In this respect, the model is similar to the
model developed for Pacific Basin LNG trade and is different from the
North American model, which included specific demand curves for Canadian
gas exports. In the future, it may be possible to extend the model to
examine optimal gas consumption levels, but the feasibility of this
extension will depend on the availability of data, from which explicit
price-sensitive demand functions could be estimated.
The specific structure of production and transportation costs,
contracts, reserves, demand growth, etc. associated with each scenario
are based on work described elsewhere in this report. A linear
programming algorithm is used to find the least-cost solution for each
scenario.2 There is no presumption that the least-cost solution is the
most likely to emerge in the future. Rather, the purpose is to
ascertain the cost of deviations that may be due to government
intervention, diversification objectives, pre-existing contractual
relationships, taxation policies, and so forth.
The model is formulated and solved on an IBM PC-XT using the
GAMS/MINOS system developed at the World Bank and Stanford University.
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Natural gas production, exports, and required new investment levels
are calculated at three-year intervals beginning in 1984 and continuing
until 2017. This long time horizon is required to account fully for the
long investment lags and long operating lives of major capacity
expansion projects. Dynamic relations also are important because
production in earlier periods affects marginal production costs in the
future. Because of the well-known and inevitable problems with terminal
conditions, we report results only through 2014.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. The
next section presents and discusses the algebraic formulation of the
model. The following section reviews the model's internal pricing
structure. The last section describes and discusses the results of
various model runs.
MODEL FORMULATION
In technical terms, the model is formulated as a mathematical
programming problem in which a computer algorithm is used to find the
optimal time path of the values of the endogenous variables (e.g.,
production and trade flows in each country, investment in new gas
production capacity, etc.). This section reviews the formulation of the
model. It should be understood that this modeling framework is
considerably more flexible than this summary may indicate, in the sense
that additional constraints, projects, producing regions, policy
interventions, etc. could be added.
The model takes account of gas demand in eight countries. Five of
these countries--France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and the
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United Kingdom--are considered "major," in the sense that their demands
are relatively large, and all but the Netherlands (for reasons explained
in Chapter 2) were the focus of attention in the Demand component of
this study. The "minor" consuming countries include Austria, Belgium,
and Norway. They are included for completeness and because considerable
volumes of traded gas flow through these countries. For all countries
future gas consumption levels are exogenous to the model, having been
forecast as part of a particular scenario. Gas consumption in 1984 and
future growth rates are summarized in Table 5-1. 3 It should be noted
again that these demand projections are conditional on the availability
of supply (which this model is designed to test), as well as on specific
assumptions concerning oil and gas prices and economic growth.
In addition to these consuming countries of Western Europe, the
model also includes exports from Algeria and the Soviet Union.4
Domestic production of natural gas in the "minor" producing countries--
Austria, Belgium, France, West Germany, and Italy--is handled
exogenously. This implies that for these countries, net imports of gas
are part of the ex ante design for each scenario. However, the pattern
of where these imports come from is endogenous to the model, except for
possible limits imposed by existing contracts.
1984 consumption, production, and trade data are based on data from
British Petroleum. Some minor modifications were made to the
consumption data to ensure equality with domestic production plus net
imports.
Significant exports from other countries outside the region were ruled
out on a priori grounds of relative costs.
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Table 5-1
Natural Gas Consumption and Average Annual Growth Rates
1984 Demand Scenarios
consumption
Countries (Bcm) low medium high "super"
France 29.50 2.94% 3.19% 3.43% 5.00%
West Germany 50.20 2.33% 2.52% 2.70% 4.41%
Italy 33.20 2.21% 2.35% 2.49% 4.25%
United Kingdom 47.50 0.87% 0.53% 0.18% 3.28%
Netherlands 38.60 0.50% 0.45% 0.40% 1.00%
Belgium 9.00 2.94% 3.19% 3.43% 5.00%
Austria 4.10 2.33% 2.52% 2.70% 4.41%
Norway 3.70 1.20% 1.00% 0.80% 3.00%
Total/Average 215.80 1.88% 1.96% 2.05% 3.85%
Table 5-2
Reserves, Capacity, Production, and Costs
1984
.------------------------------ marginal marginal
production operating capital
reserves capacity production costs, costs,
Countries (Tcm) (Bcm) (Bcm) $/Mcf /Mcf/year
Algeria 3.1 42.5 17.2 0.10 1.30
Netherlands-1 4.0 85.0 69.1 0.01 0.10
Netherlands-2 2.0 0.45 5.25
Norway-1 1.0 31.2 29.6 0.20 1.50
Norway-2 1.5 0.30 2.50
Norway-3 2.0 0.45 4.80
Norway-4 1.0 0.50 5.00
Norway-5 1.0 1.00 12.50
USSR (Export only) 41.1 65.3 29.4 0.15 1.50
United Kingdom-1 1.5 51.1 35.4 0.30 2.25
United Kingdom-2 1.0 0.45 5.25
Austria na na 1.3 na na
Belgium na na 0.0 na na
France na na 6.0 na na
Italy na na 13.1 na na
West Germany na na 14.7 na na
Total 59.2 275.1 215.8
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Gas production in Algeria, the Netherlands, Norway, the Soviet
Union, and the United Kingdom are all endogenous variables. For the
Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, rising production costs are
simulated by specifying several reserve "pools" in each country, each of
which has different production costs and different levels of ultimate
reserves. The model determines the ordering and timing of development
in each. For each country, the endogenous variables include production,
required capacity expansion, and remaining reserves. Table 5-2
summarizes data on reserves, production, and costs.
Gas trade takes place though a series of pipelines linking
adjoining countries.5 For simplicity, we assume that pipeline capacity
linking two adjoining countries can be used both for trade in either
direction and for transshipments. For example, the pipeline capacity
between the Netherlands and West Germany is used both for the
Netherlands's exports to West Germany and Italy and for Norway's exports
to the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Similarly, Norway's exports to
France flow through four "pipelines:" Norway-West Germany, West
Germany-the Netherlands, the- Netherlands-Belgium, and Belgium-France.
Table 5-3 lists all 12 pipelines in the system and the directions and
amounts for each.
The following sub-sections describe the model in greater detail.
The format is to provide the underlying motivation of specific
5 Algeria exports LNG to France and Belgium rather than shipping
thorough a pipeline. The fact that gasification and regasification
facilities are limited implies that the model's considering this link as
similar to a pipeline (although including the additional costs of LNG)
does not greatly distort reality.
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Table 5-3
Export Flows and Pipelines
Pipeline Segment Export Flows in Pipeline Segment
Norway - United Kingdom
Norway - W. Germany
USSR - W. Germany
USSR - Austria
Algeria - Italy
Algeria - France
(LNG)
Norway to United Kingdom
Norway
Norway
Norway
Norway
to W. Germany
to Netherlands
to Belgium
to France
USSR to W. Germany
USSR to France
USSR to Austria
USSR to Italy
Algeria to Italy
Algeria
Algeria
Netherlands - W. Germany
Netherlands - Belgium
France - Belgium
France - W. Germany
Italy - W. Germany
to Belgium
to France
Netherlands to W. Germany
Netherlands to Italy
Norway to Netherlands
Norway to Belgium
Norway to France
Netherlands to Belgium
Netherlands to France
Norway to Belgium
Norway to France
Netherlands to France
Algeria to Belgium
USSR to France
Netherlands to Italy
Italy - Austria
1984 Flow
(Bcm)
12.1
7.0
2.8
1.7
2.3
T13.8
13.5
4.9
18.4
2.8
8.2
TT11.0
6.7
1.5
9.0
T0.5
15.0
5.2
2.8
1.7
2.3
27.0
5.8
7.3
1.7
2.3
7.3
1.5
8.8
4.9
5.2
USSR to Italy 8.2
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constraints and to describe them specifically in prose and algebraic
equations. In general, endogenous variables are represented by capital
letters and parameters by lower-case letters. Bars over letters
indicate exogenous variables. The subscripts "i" and "j" refer to
producing and/or consuming countries, "k" refers to different reserve
structures with different costs in producing countries, "p" refers to
pipelines, and "t" refers to the time period. Variables with bars are
predetermined. All volumes of gas are denominated in billions of cubic
meters per year (Bcm per year) and costs are in U.S. dollars per
thousand cubic feet ($/Mcf), except as noted.
Supply-Demand Balances
We begin with the identity that total gas production in each
country plus imports of gas to that country from all other countries
equals exports of gas from that country to all others plus domestic
consumption. These supply-demand balances are expressed in the
following relationship:
Total Total Dom estic
production, + imports, = consumption, +
country i to country i country i
tS,
try
Let Xikt represent annual production from reserves of type k in
country i in year t; C t represent consumption in country i in year t;
and E(ij,t) represent exports from country i to country j in period t.
Algebraically, we have:
Xi,k,t + E Eji t
k '' j ''
= Ci,t + Ei,jt
1
i
(1)
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For the minor producing countries, production and consumption are
predetermined for each scenario.
Production-Reserve Relationships
There is a recursive relationship between production in any one
period and the remaining reserves in the next period; that is:
Remaining
k in coun
start of
.R 1 [ ][ Production
Remaining reserves Number from reserve k
:= k in country i, - of Years in country i,
tart of year t-1 per Period year t
i1 m, .
Defining Rik t as reserves (in Bcm) in country i at the start of period
t, and recalling that periods are three years in length, the equation
is:
R = R -3X (2)
i,k,t R,k,t-l - 3X ,kt-1 (2)
The following constraint represents a simple approximation to the
limitations on annual production imposed by the level of remaining
reserves. That is, production from each reserve in each country in each
year can be no greater than an exogenously specified fraction of
reserves remaining at the beginning of that year:
Maximal rate Remaining reserves
k < of reserve k in country i,
- depletion start of year t
country i
These maximal rates, ai,ks can represent either technical/engineering
limits or more restrictive policy interventions. Initially, technically
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imposed bounds are assumed.6 That is:
Xik t < ai,kRik,t
Production-Investment Relationships
Annual gas production in each country also is constrained by
available production capacity, which in turn depends on previously
undertaken investment projects. Base year extraction capacity is
predetermined, but endogenous investment activities allow that to be
augmented at constant capital costs per unit production in each reserve
type in each country.7 That is:
k < capacity, reserve minus +
ill < k, country i, depreciation
year t-1 rate
Let Ki,k,t stand for production capacity from reserve k in country i in
year t, Ii,k,t stand for new capacity introduced in year t, and di stand
for the rate of depreciation in country i. We then may derive the
following relationships:
X. < K. (4)Xikt - i,k,t
6 We recognize that the technical relationship between production and
reserves is more complicated than represented here, but have adopted
this formulation for its simplicity. If data were available, it would
not be difficult to substitute more complex equations.
Initial productive capacity for high-cost reserves in the Netherlands,
Norway, and the United Kingdom are taken to be zero. For these reserves
all production capacity is determined endogenously.
-% I---
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Ki,k,t (1-di)Ki'kt_1 + Ii, t
Pipeline Flows and Restrictions
Total natural gas flows through a specific pipeline segments equal
the sum of all the "from-to" exports that must flow through that
pipeline segment. In some cases, only one export flows through a
pipeline (e.g., Norway-United Kingdom), while in other cases up to five
exports share the same pipeline segment (e.g., the Netherlands-West
Germany). That is:
Flow in pipeline p Sum of exports
(between countries = [country i to
k and 1), country j,
year t year t
Let PFp t represent total flows in year t in pipeline segment p. There
are 12 pipeline segments and 16 export activities. Table 5-4 lists
which exports flow through each pipeline segment. Equation (6) defines
the flow through pipeline p, where the summations are only for those
export flows, Eijt, which are associated with pipeline segment p.
This relationship is summarized as:
PFp t = C Ei,j,t (6)
1 j
Annual flows through each pipeline segment are limited by available
capacity in that year. Unlike with production, the model has relatively
little freedom to choose the optimal pattern of pipeline expansion. The
reason for this is that there are significant economies of scale in
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Table 5-4
Pipeline Capacity and Operating Costs
(units: Bcm/year and $/Mcf)
operating 1993-
Pipeline segments costs 1984 1987 1990 2017
Norway - United Kingdom 0.11 20 20 20 20
Norway - W.Germany 0.20 15 35 35 66
USSR - W.Germany 0.25 55 55 65 81
USSR - Austria 0.30 15 15 15 15
Algeria - Italy 0.20 12 18 18 18
Algeria - France b/ 0.20 15 15 15 15
Netherlands - W.Germany c/ 0.01 81 81 81 81
Netherlands - Belgium 0.025 a/ a/ a/ a/
France - Belgium 0.02 a/ a/ a/ a/
France - W.Germany 0.05 a/ a/ a/
Italy - W.Germany 0.075 a/ a/ a/ a/
Italy - Austria 0.05 a/ a/ a/ a/
NOTES:
a/ Pipeline capacity is not explicitly constrained.
b/ Algerian LNG exporting capacity to France is 31 Bcm per year;
France can expand its LNG importing capacity from 15 to 31 Bcm
per year at a capital cost of $50 per installed Mcm per year.
c/ Initial capacity can be expanded endogenously at a given, constant
capital cost of $22 per Mcm.
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pipeline construction. In general, it pays to build excess capacity
initially and then have demand catch up, rather than continually make
small additions. For this reason, the capacities of pipeline segments
from Norway, the Soviet Union, and Algeria are treated as exogenous or
"scenario" variables. Since other pipeline segments within Western
Europe either have surplus capacity or can be expanded at low capital
cost, they are not explicitly bound. However, all rules have
exceptions; in this model there are two. Because of its large magnitude
and the relative unimportance of economies of scale problems (due to the
fact that this link is not just one, but a multitude of pipelines each
of which can be expanded marginally), the expansions of the Netherlands-
West Germany pipeline links are determined endogenously using constant
marginal cost. The other exception is LNG exports from Algeria to
France. Algerian export capacity is taken as exogenous, but the model
calculates how much additional regasification capacity to install in
France, up to the limit imposed by Algerian capacity.8 That is:
Flow in pipeline Installed capacity
p, year t < of pipeline p,
year t
Let PCAPp t represent installed capacity in year t for pipeline
segment p, and IPp t represent additions to pipeline segment p, which is
first available for use in year t. The variable IP with a bar over it
indicates that it is an exogenous value (pre-set for each scenario), and
IP without a bar indicates the variable is endogenous. We then have:
8 For details, see Table 5-4.
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PFpt
PCAPp't
< PCAPp t (7)
= PCAPp t_- + IPpt + IPp't (8)
Cost Calculations
The model considers four sets of out-of-pocket costs. These are:
(1) operating (or current) costs of gas production; (2) capital costs
associated with investment and capacity expansion in gas extraction;
(3) marginal operating costs of shipping gas through particular pipeline
segments (including the Algeria-France LNG link); and (4) investment
expenditures associated with the endogenous expansion of pipelines. The
costs of pipeline expansion, which is part of the different scenarios,
are given to the model as a constant. While constants do not affect the
solution of any one run of the model, these costs are important when
comparing different scenarios. That is:
Extraction 1
operating
costs,
country i
Extraction
capital
costs,
country i
year t
Pipeline p
operating
costs,
in year t
Pipeline p
capital
costs,
n year t
Unit
extraction
operating
costs,
country i
Unit
extraction
capital
costs,
country i
Total
annual
production,
country i,
year t
I
P
F
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Define OCt as total operating costs in year t, oci k as the unit
marginal operating costs of gas production in country i from reserve k,
and opp as the unit marginal operating costs of pipeline segment p. The
following equation defines the sum of these costs:
OCt EE oc ,kXikt + E oppPFpt (9)
i k p
Define INt as total investment costs in year t, cci,k as unit capital
costs for expansion of gas production from reserve k in country i, and
Cpp as the capital expansion cost associated with an increase in
pipeline segment p's capacity by one Bcm per year. These costs are
annualized and discounted to reflect the fact that new capacity that
become available in year t incurs its investment expenditures in the
previous year.9 The following equation defines total investment costs
in year t:
INt = cci,kIi k t + E cPpIPpt (10)
ik p
Objective Function
The objective function represents what the model is attempting to
achieve, or how it selects among alternative programs that are feasible
in the sense that all constraints are satisfied. Here, the model is
asked to find the feasible program with the lowest discounted present
In addition, to account for terminal conditions and the long life of
investments, the capital costs near the end of the planning horizon are
truncated.
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value cost. Other objective functions could be utilized in models such
as this one. These include maximization of revenue to producers or
taxes to governments, or simulation of competitive or monopolistic
market behavior. However, to use other objective functions would have
required more data than was available for this study.
Define TDC as the total discounted costs of any solution, and t as
the discount factor in year t.10 This total is calculated using the
following equation:
TDC = bt[OC + INt ] (11)t t t
PRICE STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
In addition to solving for the endogenous variables described
above, (technically called primal variables), the model calculates a set
of implicit or "shadow" prices (dual variables). Each constraint or
equation has an associated shadow price, that represents the marginal
cost--in terms of the objective function--of that constraint being
"tightened" by one unit. These are calculated based on the model's
internal cost structure and are used in determining the optimality of
any intermediate solution. In effect, the model knows that an optimal
solution is found whenever: (a) all variables that are not at their
upper or lower limits have the property that the marginal benefits (MB)
from increasing that variable by a small amount exactly equal the
10
In principle, the discount rate need not be constant over time.
Also, different discount factors could be applied to different flows if
these differed substantially in their risk characteristics.
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marginal costs (MC) of doing so; and (b) there are no variables for
which marginal benefits exceed marginal costs.1l These costs and
benefits are calculated using the shadow price structure. The shadow
prices also are useful in that they can be employed in evaluating
specific projects outside the model, so long as those projects are not
too "large."
To illustrate how the shadow price structure works, we examine the
interrelations among a few key prices and variables. Consider first the
costs and benefits of exporting a small additional amount from country i
to country j; that is, increasing variable Ei,j,t by one Bcm. This
variable appears in three or more equations: the supply-demand balance
(equation (1)) for the exporting country, the supply-demand balance
(equation (1)) for the importing country, and as many equation (6)'s as
there are pipelines through which that export of gas must flow. The
shadow prices associated with each of these equations or constraints can
be used to perform a cost-benefit test on whether this variable should
be increased or decreased. The production cost of the gas is the shadow
price of equation (1) for the exporting country. To this must be added
transportation costs, which are the sum of the shadow prices of all
pipeline capacity constraints through which the gas flows on its way to
country j. This must be compared with the implicit value of gas
imported into country j, which is the shadow price of equation (1) for
that country. If the total cost of increasing E is less than theij,t
These are known as the "complementary slackness" conditions and hold
for all constrained optimizing problems.
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cost of Ekj t ' where "k" is exports from another country, then the
model will choose to increase exports from i to j and reduce them from
country k.
The next step is to see what determines the marginal production
cost of gas in country i. Here we examine the equations where Xi,k, t
appears. Marginal operating costs of extractions are oci,k times the
shadow price of equation (9), which is merely the discounted value of
expenditures in year t. Capital rental charges for equipment are added
from equation (4). Together these form total out-of-pocket marginal
production costs. In addition to direct costs, there are "user" costs
related to resource depletion. These appear as the shadow prices of
constraints (2) and (3). The shadow price of (3) is the value of being
able to produce one additional unit from a low-cost reserve in which
production is constrained by an upper limit related to remaining
reserves. The shadow price of (2) represents the cost of limiting
future production from the reserve because depletion now decreases the
upper bounds on possible production in later years. The value of the
gas in producing country i is the shadow price of equation (1) for that
country.12
To determine the costs of using a particular pipeline, the model
calculates the marginal operating costs from equation (9) and the
capital rental charges from equation (6). While the former costs are
12 Note that whenever a country is producing from more than one resource
or reserve base in a given year, the model adjusts the user costs of the
lower-cost resources so the total costs of producing from all resources
is identical. If this were not the case, it would pay to stop producing
from one or more reserve.
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always positive, the latter are positive only when a pipeline is being
fully utilized. The total capital costs for pipeline expansion are
derived from equation (10) when the model itself determines the optimal
expansions. But in other cases where, for reasons of economies of
scale, the pipeline expansion is taken as part of the exogenous
scenario, these costs are added directly to the objective function as
constant increments to total cost.
RESULTS
This section illustrates how the model can be used to analyze the
factors that determine least-cost supply patterns and marginal costs of
delivering gas. The simulations use data that were developed as part of
the Supply and Demand chapters, as summarized in Tables 5-1 to 5-6.
Table 5-1 summarizes the four different demand scenarios that were
developed for this study.13 The "low" and "high" demand growth
scenarios correspond to "high" and "low" average oil prices,
respectively. As explained more fully in the Demand chapter, the reason
why gas demand grows relatively slowly when world oil prices are high is
that the negative income effect of high oil prices on economic growth
outweighs the positive substitution effect of lower relative gas prices.
The reverse holds true when oil prices are low.14 The relatively minor
13 This table contains the average annual growth rates for gas demand in
each scenario. However, the model actually utilizes a time sequence of
demand growth rates for each country in which yearly growth rates often
diverge substantially from the average. The Demand chapter provides
more detail on these derivations.
14 Note that for those countries that are net oil exporters, gas demand
grows more rapidly in the "low" case because both their economic growth
and oil prices are positively correlated.
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differences between the average annual growth rates are explained by the
fact that the opposite signs of the income and price substitution
effects associated with changes in world oil prices nearly cancel each
other. The "super" demand growth scenario is meant to represent an
upper limit on how rapidly demand might grow through a combination of
faster economic growth, reductions in the relative price of gas, and
other demand promoting effects.
The reserve and production cost data used in the model are
presented in Table 5-2. (The Supply chapter discusses their derivation
in greater detail.) Tables 5-3 to 5-5 summarize assumptions about the
pipeline network, including the marginal costs of shipments through each
segment, and the capital costs of expansions. One of the questions the
model can be asked is whether there are additional costs associated with
meeting import demand under existing contracts, which may not represent
the lowest costs of production and transportation. The estimated
minimum deliveries corresponding to existing gas contracts are
summarized in Table 5-6.15
Although these tables summarize our best estimates, we recognize
that there is great uncertainty about supply costs, future expansions in
the pipeline network their costs, and future demand growth. Therefore,
the results discussed here should be interpreted as tentative and
illustrative. The model is available for others to use substituting
their own assumptions.
For details on the derivation of these numbers, see Appendix B of the
Demand chapter.
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Table 5-5
Pipeline Expansion Costs
Size of Investment
Increment Cost
Pipeline (Bcm per year) ($ bils.)
Full
Capacity
Annual
Usage Cost
($/Mcf)
Norway - United Kingdom
Norway - W.Germany
USSR - W.Germany
USSR - Austria
Algeria - Italy
Algeria - France
Netherlands - W.Germany
20
20
40
20
12
10
1
1.0
1.5
7.5
3.8
1.6
0.5
0.022
0.21
0.32
0.80
0.80
0.57
0.21
0.09
Table 5-6
Minimum Contracted Volumes, Adjusted for Take Provisions
(units: Bcm/year)
Exporter/Importer 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017
Algeria/Belgium
Algeria/France
Algeria/Italy
USSR/Austria
USSR/France
USSR/W. Germany
USSR/Italy
Holland/Belgium
Holland/France
Holland/W. Germany
Holland/Italy
Norway/Belgium
Norway/France
Norway/Holland
Norway/UK
Norway/W. Germany
1.6 1.5
8.1 7.1
6.6 9.6
4.1
4.5
12.7
7.6
5.8
7.8
18.2
0.4
2.0
2.2
3.0
13.6
5.5
2.0
7.8
16.0
12.0
2.1
5.0
12.9
3.0
1.5
6.7
9.6
2.0
9.6
16.0
12.0
2.1
3.6
12.9
3.0
3.0 3.0
3.4 3.4
3.0. 3.0
7.6 7.6
9.2 9.2
1.5
6.7
9.6
2.0
9.6
16.0
12.0
2.1
3.3
12.9
3.0
3.4
5.0
3.4
7.6
10.8
1.5
6.7
9.6
1.2
9.6
8.4
6.4
1.5
3.3
12.9
0.0
4.1
7.7
4.1
7.6
13.5
1.5 1.5
4.0 4.0
9.6 9.6
1.2 1.2
9.6 8.0
8.4 8.4
6.4 6.4
1.5 1.5
0.0 0.0
12.9 12.9
0.0 0.0
2.8 2.6
7.9 7.8
2.8 2.6
0.0 0.0
9.7 9.0
0.0
0.0
9.6
0.0
6.4
0.0
6.4
1.5
0.0
12.9
0.0
2.6
7.8
2.6
0.0
9.0
0.0
0.0
9.6
0.0
6.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
12.9
0.0
1.6
6.4
1.6
0.0
6.4
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.6
6.4
1.6
0.0
6.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.6
6.4
1.6
0.0
6.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.6
6.4
1.6
0.0
6.4
--------------------------------------------------------
5-23
To demonstrate how the model can be used, summary results are
presented for five cases. Case 1 assumes a medium level of demand
growth for natural gas. For the period 1984-2017, the average rate of
demand growth is about 2 percent per year, with consumption growing
somewhat faster in France, West Germany, and Italy, and more slowly in
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In addition, we assume that the
model is free to disregard existing contracts in choosing the minimum
cost pattern of meeting demand. Pipeline capacity is shown in Table
5-4.
Table 5-7 summarizes the results for Case 1. The top portion of
the table lists the assumptions about the underlying scenario and the
total discounted costs of meeting this level of demand.1 6 The scenario
assumptions are summarized in terms of which demand-growth pattern is
used, whether exports are constrained by policy and/or existing
contracts, and if new pipelines are added in addition to those specified
in Table 5-4. The next portion of the table summarizes the time pattern
of trade flows. The most striking result is that, through the 1990s,
Continental import demand is met by exports from the Netherlands for
those countries (West Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium) where there
is a choice among sources. This is due to relatively low production and
transportation costs in and from the Netherlands.
These include all costs associated with those internal choices the
model can make. Not included are the costs of domestic production in
the minor producing countries and the fixed costs of the pipelines,
which are exogenous for each scenario. These are shown in Table 5-4.
Solutions that include other pipelines have their investment cost added
to the total.
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Table 5-7
Summary Results: Case 1
Demand Scenario --medium
Export Constraints--none
New Pipelines --none
Discounted Cost ($ bils.) = 13.88
1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014
Imports (Bcm/year)
Austria from USSR 2.8 3.6 4.2 5.1 6.1 7.3
Belgium from Algeria 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Belgium from Netherlands 5.8 12.1 14.5 17.0 11.3 6.7
Belgium from Norway 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.6 16.6
France from Algeria 9.0 0.0 15.0 22.4 31.0 31.0
France from Netherlands 7.3 33.6 26.5 27.3 0.0 0.0
France from Norway 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
France from USSR 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.4 39.6
Netherlands from Norway 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Italy from Algeria 6.7 0.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0
Italy from Netherlands 5.2 27.4 14.4 19.7 17.8 27.7
Italy from USSR 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.9 7.7
United Kingdom from Norway 12.1 0.0 11.9 20.0 0.0 16.7
W. Germany from Netherlands 15.0 45.1 51.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
W. Germany from Norway 7.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 22.9 49.3
W. Germany from USSR 13.5 0.0 1.9 60.1 52.6 41.4
Total Gas Trade Flow 105.8 121.7 157.6 192.4 205.6 262.0
Marginal Import Cost ($/Mcf)
Austria from USSR 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.76 1.11
Belgium from Algeria NA NA NA NA NA
Belgium from Netherlands 0.15 0.42 0.46 0.75 1.10
Belgium from Norway NA NA NA 0.75 1.10
France from Algeria NA 0.44 0.48 0.76 1.12
France from Netherlands 0.17 0.44 0.48 NA NA
France from Norway NA NA NA NA NA
France from USSR NA NA NA 0.76 1.12
Netherlands from Norway NA NA NA NA NA
Italy from Algeria NA 0.48 0.52 0.81 1.16
Italy from Netherlands 0.21 0.48 0.52 0.81 1.16
Italy from USSR NA NA NA 0.81 1.16
United Kingdom from Norway NA 0.33 0.36 NA 0.71
W. Germany from Netherlands 0.14 0.40 NA NA NA
W. Germany from Norway NA NA 0.44 0.71 1.07
W. Germany from USSR NA 0.40 0.44 0.71 1.07
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As low-cost reserves in the Netherlands are depleted and absolute
demand levels increase, other supply sources are needed. By the turn of
the century, France and Italy begin importing from Algeria, while West
Germany imports increasingly from the Soviet Union. When pipeline (and
LNG) capacity from Algeria reaches its upper limit, France and Italy
begin importing from the Soviet Union. Norwegian exports to West
Germany rise rapidly because the pipeline from the Soviet Union to West
Germany reaches its upper capacity limit, and it is less expensive to
satisfy French demand with that gas than for France to import from
Norway.
The United Kingdom is a special case because the model can choose
to meet its demand through either increased domestic production or
imports from Norway. In the early years, it is less expensive to
produce domestically than import, but the reverse is true in later years
as low-cost reserves are depleted.
The last panel in Table 5-7 presents the marginal costs of each
import in the optimal solution.17 These include the marginal costs of
production and transportation from exporting to importing country.
These are "pure" marginal costs in the sense that they do not include
any rents or taxes. Also, the amortization costs associated with
capital investments, such as pipeline or initial production capacity,
are exogenous to the model. For these reasons, the marginal costs may
appear low. However, they are consistent both with the production and
17 Values are shown only for imports that have positive levels. Imports
which potentially might have been included in the solution but are not,
are indicated by "NA."
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transportation costs shown in Tables 5-2 and 5-4 and with the fact that
demand does not grow rapidly in this scenario. Toward the end of the
projection period, costs begin to increase quite rapidly as low-cost
reserves either become depleted (e.g., the Netherlands) or not available
at the margin due to pipeline limitations (e.g., Algeria).
These results may be considered infeasible in the sense that they
are inconsistent with existing gas delivery contracts. Case 2 differs
from Case 1 in that the minimum "takes" associated with existing
contracts are imposed as a minimum condition. These are summarized in
Table 5-6. Demand above these minimums can be satisfied by the
least-cost trade patterns. Table 5-8 contains summary results for this
scenario. Through the end of this century, the model chooses to deliver
the minimum levels from Norway, Algeria, and the Soviet Union.
Additional quantities come from the Netherlands, which is the lowest
cost producer. The bottom portion of Table 5-8 shows the differences
between the unit costs from the Netherlands and from other exporters to
each importing country.
As contracts expire and as low-cost reserves in the Netherlands are
depleted, the model selects a balanced trade pattern based entirely on
cost considerations. The main difference between the trade pattern for
later years in Cases 1 and 2 is that the Netherlands remains an exporter
for a longer period, exporting much less in the 1990s in Case 2 than in
Case 1. In the case of the United Kingdom, the minimum imports from
Norway in Case 2 mean that domestic reserves are greater in later years,
which implies that domestic production in the first decades of the next
century will be cheaper than continuing to import from Norway after
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Table 5-8
Summary Results: Case 2
Demand Scenario --medium
Export Constraints--minimum contracts imposed
New Pipelines --none
Discounted Cost ($ bils.) = 17.71
1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014
**********************************************************
Imports (Bcm/year)
Austria from USSR
Belgium from Algeria
Belgium from Netherlands
Belgium from Norway
France from Algeria
France from Netherlands
France from Norway
France from USSR
Netherlands from Norway
Italy from Algeria
Italy from Netherlands
Italy from USSR
United Kingdom from Norway
W. Germany from Netherlands
W. Germany from Norway
W. Germany from USSR
2.8
1.5
5.8
1.7
9.0
7.3
2.3
4.9
2.8
6.7
5.2
8.2
12.1
15.0
7.0
13.5
3.6
1.5
7.6
3.0
6.7
13.9
3.4
9.6
3.0
7.8
9.7
9.8
7.6
21.6
8.5
14.9
4.2
1.5
8.9
4.1
5.8
20.8
6.7
8.3
4.1
9.6
16.4
6.4
7.6
31.1
13.5
8.4
Total Gas Trade Flow
Marginal Import Cost ($/Mcf)
Austria from USSR
Belgium from Algeria
Belgium from Netherlands
Belgium from Norway
France from Algeria
France from Netherlands
France from Norway
France from USSR
Netherlands from Norway
Italy from Algeria
Italy from Netherlands
Italy from USSR
United Kingdom from Norway
W. Germany from Netherlands
W. Germany from Norway
W. Germany from USSR
105.8 132.3 157.3 175.0 207.2 267.0
0.45 0.45 0.45
0.32 0.32 0.32
0.10 0.15 0.27
0.46 1.10 0.52
0.30 0.30 0.30
0.12 0.17 0.29
0.48 1.12 0.54
0.45 0.45 0.45
0.43 1.08 0.49
0.30 0.30 0.33
0.16 0.21 0.33
0.50 0.50 0.50
0.33 0.98 NA
0.08 0.13 0.26
0.42 1.07 0.48
0.40 0.40 0.40
5.1
1.5
12.9
2.6
4.0
29.9
7.8
8.0
2.6
18.0
13.3
6.4
0.0
45.6
9.0
8.4
6.1
0.0
18.3
1.6
24.5
13.5
6.4
15.0
1.6
18.0
20.3
6.4
0.0
12.9
10.8
51.9
7.3
0.0
8.3
15.1
31.0
0.0
6.4
33.2
1.6
18.0
27.7
7.7
20.0
0.0
42.9
47.8
0.64
NA
0.62
0.62
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.60
0.68
0.68
0.69
NA
0.60
0.59
0.59
1.11
NA
1.10
1.10
1.12
NA
1.12
1.12
1.08
1.16
1.16
1.16
0.74
NA
1.07
1.07
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existing contracts expire. Of course, this conclusion is sensitive to
assumptions about demand growth in the United Kingdom, which in this
scenario grows very slowly.
Note, however, that the total discounted costs are significantly
greater under existing contracts than they would be if trade patterns
depended solely on costs. In Case 2, the increase in discounted costs
is almost $4 billion, an increase of more than 27 percent over Case 1.
Similar results were obtained by exogenously constraining the level of
total exports from the Netherlands, either in absolute amounts or
relative to remaining low-cost reserves.
The model also can be used to estimate the implications of
different patterns of gas demand growth. Simulations were conducted
using each of the scenarios summarized in Table 5-1 with and without
minimum contract "takes" imposed. Results for the "super" demand
scenario are presented in Tables 5-9 (no minimum contract constraints)
and 5-10 (minimum contract takes). Here, gas demand in Western Europe
grows at a rate so rapid it cannot be satisfied (at any cost) without
building more pipelines than those that were initially assumed and
summarized in Table 5-4.
For these cases the model was run with numerous alternative
pipeline additions, with the discounted capital costs of "new" pipelines
being added to production and pipeline operating costs, which are
determined in each solution. The results for the configuration with the
lowest total discounted costs are reported in Tables 5-9 and 5-10.18
18 Since all possible configurations were not tried, this trial-and-
error procedure does not necessarily lead to a true minimum-cost
solution. However, comparison of the many solutions obtained suggests
that our results are not too far from the global optimum.
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Table 5-9
Summary Results: Case 3
Demand Scenario --"super"
Export Constraints--none
New Pipelines --1996: Algeria-Italy +12 Bcm
2002: Norway-UK +20 Bcm, USSR-W. Germany +40 Bcm
2005: Algeria-Italy +18 Bcm, USSR-Austria +20 Bcm
2008: Norway-UK +20 Bcm
2011: USSR-Austria +30 Bcm, USSR-W.AGermany +40 Bcm
2014: Norway-W. Germany +30 Bcm, Algeria-Italy +18 Bcm
2017: USSR-W. Germany +40 Bcm
Discounted Cost ($ bils.) = 26.39
1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014
**********************************************************
Imports (Bcm/year)
Austria from USSR
Belgium from Algeria
Belgium from Netherlands
Belgium from Norway
France from Algeria
France from Netherlands
France from Norway
France from USSR
Netherlands from Norway
Italy from Algeria
Italy from Netherlands
Italy from USSR
United Kingdom from Norway
W. Germany from Netherlands
W. Germany from Norway
W. Germany from USSR
2.8
1.5
5.8
1.7
9.0
7.3
2.3
4.9
2.8
6.7
5.2
8.2
12.1
15.0
7.0
13.5
4.8
0.0
15.0
0.0
12.0
31.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
18.0
18.3
0.0
0.8
59.4
0.0
0.0
6.3
0.0
19.7
0.0
15.0
43.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
30.0
18.7
0.0
20.0
18.6
1.0
58.8
8.2
0.0
24.8
0.0
31.0
8.8
0.0
35.5
0.0
30.0
25.5
6.9
22.6
0.0
15.5
85.5
10.7
0.0
31.6
0.0
31.0
11.4
0.0
55.3
0.0
30.0
26.4
24.3
58.1
0.0
66.0
65.7
13.8
0.0
40.0
0.0
31.0
17.7
0.0
76.5
0.0
66.0
0.0
38.2
35.1
0.0
86.0
84.5
Total Gas Trade Flow
Marginal Import Cost ($/Mcf)
Austria from USSR
Belgium from Algeria
Belgium from Netherlands
Belgium from Norway
France from Algeria
France from Netherlands
France from Norway
France from USSR
Netherlands from Norway
Italy from Algeria
Italy from Netherlands
Italy from USSR
United Kingdom from Norway
W. Germany from Netherlands
W. Germany from Norway
W. Germany from USSR
105.8 159.6 231.6 294.3 410.6 488.9
0.45 0.55
NA NA
0.28 0.51
NA NA
0.30 0.53
0.30 0.53
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
0.34 0.57
0.34 0.57
NA NA
0.36 0.41
0.27 0.50
NA 0.50
NA 0.50
0.95
NA
0.94
NA
0.96
0.96
NA
0.96
NA
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.82
NA
0.91
0.91
2.18
NA
2.17
NA
2.19
2.19
NA
2.19
NA
2.23
2.23
2.23
1.03
NA
2.14
2.14
0.45
NA
3.24
NA
3.26
3.26
NA
3.26
NA
0.50
NA
0.50
1.14
NA
3.21
3.21
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The most important additions to the network for reducing costs are
periodic increases between Algeria and Italy, the Soviet Union and
Germany, and Norway and the United Kingdom.
The pattern of gas trade in Case 3 is not too different from that
in Case 1, although the trade volumes are much larger in each time
period. The Netherlands initially is still the primary exporter, with
Algeria and the Soviet Union becoming major exporters in the 1990s, and
Norwegian exports growing rapidly afterwards. This is similar to the
results obtained when demand grows more slowly, but the transitions in
that instance are much accelerated.
Not surprisingly, it would be quite costly to meet this level of
demand growth. The total discounted costs of Case 3 are about twice
those for Case 1. The differences are more pronounced in the later
years, when the absolute differences in gas consumption are larger. In
Case 1, the marginal costs of one additional Mcf of demand averaged
about $0.75 in 2008. In Case 4, the marginal costs are nearly 3 times
as high, averaging about $2.20 in 2008.
The only difference in the scenarios for Cases 3 and 4 is that
minimum contract takes are imposed in the latter. As expected, the
effect of these additional constraints is to increase total costs by
slowing exports from the lowest cost source (the Netherlands) and using
higher cost gas from Norway, the Soviet Union, and Algeria. But in
comparison with Cases 1 and 2, the absolute and relative effect of these
constraints is much less. The reason is that demand grows so rapidly
that exports from higher cost suppliers are needed by early in the 1990s
in any case.
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Table 5-10
Summary Results: Case 4
....- kDemand Scenario --"super"
Export Constraints--minimum contracts imposed
New Pipelines --1996: Algeria-Italy +12 Bcm
2002: Norway-UK +20 Bcm, USSR-W. Germany +40 Bcm
2005: Algeria-Italy +18 Bcm, USSR-Austria +20 Bcm
2008: Norway-UK +20 Bcm
2011: USSR-Austria +30 Bcm, USSR-W. Germany +40 Bcm
2014: Norway-W. Germany +30 Bcm, Algeria-Italy +18 Bcm
2017: USSR-W. Germany +40 Bcm
Discounted Cost ($ bils.) = 28.52
1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014
Imports (Bcm/year)
Austria from USSR 2.8 4.7 6.3 8.1 10.7 13.8
Belgium from Algeria 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 -0.0
Belgium from Netherlands 5.8 10.5 14.1 20.7 30.0 38.4
Belgium from Norway 1.7 3.0 4.1 2.6 1.6 1.6
France from Algeria 9.0 6.7 11.0 13.5 31.0 31.0
France from Netherlands 7.3 23.6 32.5 18.7 28.3 38.5
France from Norway 2.3 3.4 6.7 7.8 6.4 6.4
France from USSR 4.9 9.6 8.3 35.3 32.0 49.3
Netherlands from Norway 2.8 3.0 4.1 2.6 1.6 1.6
Italy from Algeria 6.7 7.8 30.0 30.0 48.0 66.0
Italy from Netherlands 5.2 18.6 12.3 26.0 8.4 0.0
Italy from USSR 8.2 9.8 6.4 6.4 24.3 38.2
United Kingdom from Norway 12.1 7.6 9.3 22.6 56.2 30.3
W. Germany from Netherlands 15.0 35.9 53.9 12.9 12.9 0.0
W. Germany from Norway 7.0 8.5 13.5 9.0 29.7 58.9
W. Germany from USSR 13.5 14.9 11.1 79.1 89.0 111.7
Total Gas Trade Flow 105.8 169.4 225.0 296.9 410.2 485.7
Marginal Import Cost ($/Mcf)
Austria from USSR 0.45 0.45 0.64 1.16 0.45
Belgium from Algeria 0.32 0.36 0.66 NA NA
Belgium from Netherlands 0.17 0.32 0.62 1.15 1.26
Belgium from Norway 0.51 1.00 0.94 1.16 1.26
France from Algeria 0.30 0.34 0.64 1.17 1.28
France from Netherlands 0.19 0.34 0.64 1.17 1.28
France from Norway 0.53 1.02 0.96 1.18 1.28
France from USSR 0.45 0.45 0.64 1.17 1.28
Netherlands from Norway 0.48 0.97 0.91 1.13 1.24
Italy from Algeria 0.30 0.48 0.68 1.21 0.50
Italy from Netherlands 0.23 0.48 0.68 1.21 NA
Italy from USSR 0.50 0.50 0.69 1.21 0.50
United Kingdom from Norway 0.38 0.78 0.81 1.03 1.14
W. Germany from Netherlands 0.16 0.40 0.61 1.14 NA
W. Germany from Norway 0.47 0.87 0.90 1.12 1.23
W. Germany from USSR 0.40 0.40 0.59 1.12 1.23
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Another possible application of the model is to evaluate, at least
in part, the economics of building additional pipeline capacity. For
instance, note that in Case 1 it is optimal to fully utilize the
exogenous pipeline capacity of 18 Bcm per year between Italy and Algeria
from 1996 onward. This full utilization implies that the model would
choose larger volumes of Algerian exports to Italy if it could, because
that would satisfy Italian demand at lower total cost. However, the
capital costs of building a pipeline must be compared with the potential
savings.
The results of such an experiment are shown in Table 5-11. The
underlying scenario is identical with Case 1 except export capacity
between Algeria and Italy is increased by 12 Bcm per year beginning in
1996. This additional capacity is utilized, with Italian imports from
the Netherlands (and later from the Soviet Union) being reduced
accordingly. This permits greater exports from the Netherlands to
Germany and France, with those countries reducing their higher cost
imports from the Soviet Union and France. In total, the effect of these
reallocations is to reduce production costs and marginal transportation
costs by $210 million (discounted to present value). However, when the
discounted cost of the additional pipeline is included, the total
discounted costs of this scenario are $310 million greater than for
Case 1.
In closing, we again emphasize that these results are meant to be
illustrative of the model's structure and potential applications. The
outcomes of the scenarios reported here are highly sensitive to specific
cost data for each country, projected pipeline construction and costs,
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Table 5-11
Summary Results: Case 5
Demand Scenario --medium
Export Constraints--none
New Pipelines --1996: Algeria-Italy +12 Bcm
Discounted Cost ($ bils.) = 14.19
1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014
Imports (Bcm/year)
Austria from USSR
Belgium from Algeria
Belgium from Netherlands
Belgium from Norway
France from Algeria
France from Netherlands
France from Norway
France from USSR
Netherlands from Norway
Italy from Algeria
Italy from Netherlands
Italy from USSR
United Kingdom from Norway
W. Germany from Netherlands
W. Germany from Norway
W. Germany from USSR
2.8
1.5
5.8
1.7
9.0
7.3
2.3
4.9
2.8
6.7
5.2
8.2
12.1
15.0
7.0
13.5
3.6
0.0
12.1
0.0
0.0
33.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
27.4
0.0
0.0
45.1
0.0
0.0
4.2
0.0
14.5
0.0
4.9
36.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
30.0
2.4
0.0
20.0
53.0
0.0
0.0
Total Gas Trade Flow
Marginal Import Cost ($/Mcf)
Austria from USSR
Belgium from Algeria
Belgium from Netherlands
Belgium from Norway
France from Algeria
France from Netherlands
France from Norway
France from USSR
Netherlands from Norway
Italy from Algeria
Italy from Netherlands
Italy from USSR
United Kingdom from Norway
W. Germany from Netherlands
W. Germany from Norway
W. Germany from USSR
105.8 121.7 165.6 192.4 205.6 259.6
0.45 0.45
NA NA
0.14 0.28
NA NA
NA 0.30
0.16 0.30
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA 0.34
0.20 0.34
NA NA
NA 0.33
0.13 0.27
NA NA
NA NA
5.1
0.0
17.0
0.0
13.3
36.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
30.0
7.7
0.0
20.0
2.9
0.0
60.1
6.1
0.0
16.4
3.6
31.0
0.0
0.0
28.4
0.0
30.0
12.8
2.0
0.0
0.0
22.9
52.6
7.3
0.0
6.7
16.7
31.0
0.0
0.0
39.6
0.0
30.0
15.7
7.7
14.3
0.0
49.3
41.4
0.48
NA
0.45
NA
0.47
0.47
NA
NA
NA
0.51
0.51
NA
0.36
0.43
NA
0.43
0.64
NA
0.63
0.63
0.64
NA
NA
0.64
NA
0.69
0.69
0.69
NA
NA
0.59
0.59
1.11
NA
1.10
1.10
1.12
NA
NA
1.12
NA
1.16
1.16
1.16
0.71
NA
1.07
1.07
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
M.-
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and exogenous demand projections. One obvious implication of these data
is that the marginal costs of importing gas to Western Europe are low in
comparison with existing contract prices, and that they do not rise very
sharply unless demand grows extremely rapidly. This suggests that
different results would doubtlessly obtain if the data contained in
Tables 5-1 through 5-5 were revised substantially.
FLEXIBILITY AND PRICE TERMS IN CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS
IN EUROPEAN NATURAL GAS MARKETS
by
John E. Parsons
INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyzes two key issues involving long-term natural gas
contracts in the Western European market. The first is the extent to which
the various suppliers will need to depend upon contracts with high take
provisions, as opposed to more flexible provisions or spot sales, under
various conditions. A treatment of contracts in an earlier study discussed
the criteria by which such a decision is made;' this chapter applies them
to the various suppliers in the Western European gas market. Second, an
analysis is undertaken of the price indices typically used in this market,
the problem of price renegotiations, and the extent to which changes in the
contract delivery prices can be anticipated. Appendix A provides a summary
of the source material of the parameters used in the country analyses
discussed in this chapter.
The chapter shows that there is an increased possibility for more
flexible contracts in Western European natural gas markets. However, this
possibility is supplier- and field-specific. The Groningen fields will
International Natural Gas Trade Study Group, Final Report: East
Asia/Pacific Natural Gas Trade, MIT Energy Laboratory Report No. MIT-EL
86-005, Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 1986.
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continue to play the role of flexible supplier, as they have in the past.
The large new contribution to flexible supplies will be the Troll fields.
This chapter also shows that the cost figures developed in the Supply
chapter by Adelman and Lynch for the Troll field justify development
without use of strong take-or-pay contracts; however, the numbers indicate
that the field cannot be a flexible supplier in the same fashion as
Groningen, and some security is needed in the form of take commitments.
Supplies from Algeria and the new Troll field represent an intermediate
case, with liquefaction (for Algeria) and transportation costs high enough
to make take-or-pay commitments an important contribution to project
returns. While marginal Soviet gas deliveries may be made using current
excess capacity, new Soviet gas will be developed only with traditional
take-or-pay commitments. This chapter also explains why contract prices
likely will remain tied to oil prices, and why renegotiations will only
partially respond to short-term gas sale prices. The price renegotiated
will continue to be referenced partially to project costs.
CONTRACT FLEXIBILITY
As explained in the earlier study, one primary objective of
take-or-pay contracts in gas markets is to eliminate opportunistic behavior
by buyers, thereby guaranteeing the supplier a price that will cover the
cost of the large capital expenditures necessary to develop and deliver
natural gas, as well as a reasonable profit. This problem is particularly
important in the Western European gas market, which is characterized by a
small number of buyers (primarily France, Italy, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and the United Kingdom), some of which have monopsonistic power.
·Z
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For example, the British Gas Corporation (BGC) exercises this power over
fields in the North Sea, and Ruhrgas exercises significant power in
brokering purchases from both the USSR and Norway. An important fact to
bear in mind, and one often overlooked, is that monopsonistic power can be
used not only to negotiate a relatively low price relative to other markets
(as the BGC did for many years), but--due to the large capital expenditures
targetted specifically for delivery of gas to a given
customer--monopsonistic power also can be used opportunistically to bargain
a price that renders the initial investment unprofitable. This second
factor is a problem not just for the seller, but for the buyer as well.
The buyer's future ability to engage in opportunistic behavior will be
anticipated by suppliers, who will require some form of guarantee--such as
a strong long-term contract--that will reduce the profitability of the
relationship. This problem has been perpetuated by the failure of Western
Europe to develop a common carriage system (see the Demand chapter for a
detailed discussion).
A key task is to determine exactly how important these opportunism
problems are, and exactly how much change in the nature of take-or-pay
contracts can be anticipated. The earlier treatment of contracts in the
East Asia/Pacific natural gas trade study presented a model ("CONTRACT,"
which is included as an appendix to the Contracts chapter in a previous
study [see Footnote 1]) for estimating the portion of a field's net present
value that is secured by means of long-term contracts. This chapter
applies the CONTRACT model to the Western European natural gas market in
order to assess opportunities for introducing more flexible contract
relationships between buyers and sellers. A brief review of the model
follows.
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The opportunistic bargaining problem basically is rooted in the small
number of buyers facing any given supplier and in the high capital costs
needed to develop both a natural gas field and its delivery system. If a
supplier were to install capacity without being assured of a given rate of
return via strong long-term contract commitments, then it would face the
danger that buyers might be in a position to negotiate a lower delivery
price from the supplier. The problem is determining the significance of
this danger, and estimating the lower range of prices that a supplier can
anticipate if capacity is installed without such commitments.
CONTRACT provides this estimation. It takes as input various
parameters both of a potential supplier's cost structure and of the prices
that would be the likely outcome of negotiations for long-term contracts
(including the possibility that negotiations would fail to reach any
agreement). The model then projects a probability distribution of prices
that a supplier could anticipate from sales made to that same market or to
buyers after capacity has been installed on a "spot" or short-term basis.
The model essentially evaluates the importance of the opportunistic
bargaining power that the installation of capacity yields to the potential
buyers. In instances where there is excess demand, competition among
suppliers will neutralize any opportunistic bargaining power that the
installation of capacity may have yielded to buyers. In instances where
there is excess supply, the price may be bid down as a result of the
bargaining power that the installation of capital yields to buyers. How
low the price will be bid depends critically upon the cost structure of the
gas field. For example, if there are high capital costs, then prior to the
installation of capacity the supplier will not accept a low price, and the
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buyers either will accept a price that makes the development of the field
worthwhile or they will refuse such a price and the field will be
cancelled. Once the capacity has been installed, however, the buyers are
aware that the supplier may accept price terms below those which will yield
it an acceptable rate of profit on its initial capital expenditures, and
their bargaining position therefore will be more aggressive. Their ability
to negotiate a lower price then depends upon the probability that there
will be excess supply available at prices below those necessary to yield an
adequate return on the supplier's capital. In the results presented below,
note that suppliers with very low capital costs per Mcf of natural gas have
significantly greater leeway in developing fields in the absence of strong
take-or-pay contract provisions.
The key inputs to the model are: (1) the number of potential buyers,
which determines the competitive pressures that buyers will face during
negotiations for the supplier's capacity; (2) the range of possible
reservation prices (i.e., the prices above which each buyer may be willing
to purchase the gas--this must be a range, since from the supplier's point
of view, there is a significant degree of uncertainty in negotiations about
the actual price it can demand from buyers; and this uncertainty is a
central issue behind the value of long-term contracting); and (3) per unit
operating costs. The probability that the reservation price of enough
buyers will be at the lower end of the range of reservation prices, so
there is excess supply at a price below total unit costs, is the
determining factor in assessing the value of long-term take-or-pay
contracts.
The primary results of applying the CONTRACT model to the Western
European natural gas market are as follows.
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Opportunities exist in that market to increase the flexibility of
contract provisions in the coming years. However, this increased
flexibility will be provided by particular suppliers, and does not
represent a feature to which all suppliers must adapt. For instance, the
Netherlands can continue to operate as a flexible supplier. Norway's Troll
field represents the new and large addition to gas supplies that can be
prudently developed without reliance on strong take-or-pay provisions.
Our analysis of the Troll field, based on publicly available cost
data, demonstrates that long-term, inflexible take-or-pay contracts are
unlikely to increase the security and value of the Troll field by a
magnitude comparable to Soviet fields or traditional gas projects. In many
of the press reports about the announcement of the development of this
field, there has been much discussion of the suprisingly flexible or low
commitment of contracted gas. Our results demonstrate that this is neither
a peculiar marketing strategy nor a dangerous experiment in new markets on
the part of the Norwegians, but simply a consequence of the project's cost
structure.
Alternately, one may view our results, along with the information that
the Troll field contracts are very flexible, as evidence that the field
developments costs probably are in the low range, as has been claimed.
However, the capital costs for Troll given by Adelman and Lynch are
slightly higher than those given for low-cost Algerian gas. Both Troll and
low-cost Algerian gas can be developed with increasingly flexible
contracts. A key variable determining the possibility for flexibility of
both is the number of markets that each supplier feasibly can serve. If
there is a difference in flexibility between Troll and low-cost Algerian
supplies, it is likely to come as a result of the development or failure to
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develop alternative routes and markets to supply. While marginal additions
to USSR and high-cost Algerian supply, using existing excess delivery
capacity, may be possible on the basis of short-term sales, the model
suggests that strong long-term contracts remain an essential ingredient for
future development of significant capacity for these two suppliers.
The following material summarizes results for each of the major
suppliers.
USSR
To assess the importance of strong take-or-pay contracts in the future
development of USSR natural gas fields and pipeline capacity, data for the
CONTRACT model must be developed. Cost data for development, production,
and transportation costs are taken from estimates provided by Lynch's
Appendix B to the Supply chapter. At the high end of what he terms
"sensible estimates," the above-ground costs for field development and new
pipelines are around $2.56/Mcf, of which about two-thirds, or $1.70, are
capital costs. Operating costs (that is, short-run variable costs of
supply) account for the remaining $0.86/Mcf. USSR gas currently flows to
three primary buyers: France, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany.
A range of possible reservation prices is used for each of these three
buyers, running from $1.50 to $4.25/Mcf, with an expected delivery price of
about $3.32/Mcf.
As noted earlier, an important question concerns the probability that
the negotiated price would fall below the total project costs of $2.70/Mcf.
For a project with an annual delivery of approximately 9 Bcm at an expected
base price of $3.32/Mcf, a long-term contract with high take requirements
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would yield the USSR a net present value of $1.69 billion. Increasing
flexibility or anticipating that much of the gas would be sold through spot
market or short-term sales would cut the expected net present value by
almost 34 percent, or by $0.57 billion. In the case of the USSR, if the
range of possible prices is as specified and the cost structure is close to
that estimated by Lynch, then the danger is significant that the price of
gas sold absent strong take-or-pay contracts will yield an inadequate rate
of return. This indicates that, for USSR gas, there should be little
significant shift to spot sales. The USSR reasonably could seek to use its
current excess capacity for spot sales, but this should not be viewed as
anything other than a temporary feature of the market.
The above calculations used future natural gas prices higher than
those currently prevailing. One should not take current spot sales as an
indicator of the long-term clearing price for fixed-commitment contracted
gas. (This issue is discussed in greater detail below; for the moment,
note that the high prices currently reported for Troll gas are a reminder
that such an identification would be in error.) The picture regarding
moves to flexibility in USSR gas contracts is, however, even starker if one
believes that current natural gas prices represent a long-term trend, for
this implies smaller margins and a greater cost due to opportunistic
behavior.
These figures apply only to gas contracts requiring capital
expenditures on new fields and pipelines. For existing extra capacity, the
importance of long-term contracts will be less. However, once new capacity
is needed, then the amount of gas being sold under short-term arrangements
from pre-existing fields must be incorporated into calculations for the new
W.
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field; otherwise, the contracts for the new field supply merely will
replace the supply delivered under short-term arrangements, therefore
failing to provide the supply security for which they were intended.
One important caveat concerns the USSR's Eastern European customers.
If the quantity of gas demanded and supplied to these buyers continues to
increase significantly, then the negotiating relations between the USSR and
its Western European buyers will be altered significantly. The issue is
not related to problems of long-term supply limitations or increasing
supply costs and their effect on which buyers will have access to gas at
what price; rather, given an anticipated level of gas deliveries to Western
Europe, the salient point is that the existence of potential Eastern
European customers able to draw from the same field and delivery system
significantly reduces the ex post bargaining problem for the USSR. Given
an expected level of demand in both Western and Eastern Europe, the
possibility that one set of buyers--in Western Europe, for example--may
seek to negotiate lower delivery prices after the capacity has been
installed is less threatening to the USSR. Although the additional gas
that the USSR would need to divert from Western to Eastern Europe probably
could be sold in Eastern Europe only at a price lower than in Western
Europe, this lower price represents a floor on opportunistic bargaining
that the USSR may face.
The results of running a similar simulation for USSR fields, which
included a total of six potential buyers under the assumption that it is
possible to switch delivery of supplies from one buyer to another, show
that the importance of long-term contracts falls significantly, although
still remaining notably large. The importance of long-term contracts both
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to the net present value (NPV) of a field and to pipeline capacity
development drops from 30 to 9 percent of the NVP under the best
assumptions, or to $152 million of a field NPV of $1.69 billion.
NORWAY: THE TROLL FIELD
Calculations concerning Norwegian gas from the Troll field yield a
significantly different conclusion regarding possibilities for flexible
contracts. According to cost figures presented by Lynch and Adelman in the
Supply chapter, the capital expenditures necessary to develop Troll are
dramatically below the expected price of gas, even under several dismal
future price scenarios. Therefore, the dangers inherent in developing the
Troll field, absent strong take-or-pay terms, are likely to be minimal, and
it is reasonable to expect that this field will be developed using
innovative and flexible purchasing commitments.
For our simulation of the value of long-term contracts for the Troll
field, we used a figure of $1.09/Mcf in capital costs, and $0.40/Mcf in
operating expenses. Notice that long-term contracts are important only
when the short-term sales price can be opportunistically bargained below
this relatively low cost--an event with low probability. To examine the
extreme danger case, the model assumes three potential buyers, with
reservation prices ranging from $0.50 to $4.00/Mcf, yielding an expected
price of $2.75. For this set of possible scenarios, long-term contracts
offer the project a moderate amount of security, guaranteeing 9 or 10
percent of the project's NPV and prices only $0.10/Mcf greater than those
that would result from short-term sales with opportunistic bargaining.
6-11
Of course, if Norway increases the capacity of the Troll field so it
approaches a capacity satisfying the total demand of its potential
customers, then the danger of opportunistic bargaining increases.
Nonetheless, the extremely low cost of development makes even this
situation relatively danger-free, at least compared to other gas projects.
At the extreme assumption of an expected price of $2.35 and a possibility
that the price drops as low as $1.60 in take-or-pay contract negotiations
and to $0.50 in short-term sales negotiations, the take-or-pay contracts
secure 13 percent of the NPV, a relatively low figure for most natural gas
markets.
THE NETHERLANDS
Costs of Dutch gas from Groningen are far below expected prices, and a
relatively large portion of the costs are in operating expenses. Under
these conditions, the value of long-term contracts is nil.
Of course, deliveries from Groningen were the first to be cut back in
times of excess supply (such as in the early 1980s), perhaps creating the
impression that, absent long-term contracts, the Dutch face buyers who
cancel their initial commitments and potentially demand lower prices,
thereby creating the impression that long-term contracts would be useful in
securing more stable markets. In fact, this impression is the result of
confusion regarding the role that the Dutch fields play given the low
importance of long-term contracts in securing the NPV of their development.
The realized flexibility in actual supplies in no way contradicts the
conclusion that long-term and inflexible contracts would not add to the
value of the Dutch fields. The cutbacks in purchases made
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in times of excess supply do not represent opportunistic behavior on the
part of buyers, or an unanticipated event, or an effort on the part of
buyers to force renegotiation of long-term prices lower than originally
anticipated. The Dutch are able to meet the needs of consumers and thereby
are able to extract a premium price--a premium price on average. In times
of excess supply they will cut back their deliveries and in times of
shortage they will deliver with a premium charge. This role for Groningen
gas will continue into the future, with the possible amendment that it will
face competition from the new Norwegian fields, Troll in particular.
The other Dutch fields are significantly more expensive. The costs
for the Zuidwal field ($1.133/Mcf), while significantly above those for
Groningen, nevertheless are notably below the range of long-term expected
natural gas prices. Thus, even for these more expensive Dutch fields,
there is a great amount of room for contract flexibility not possible for
the USSR or Algerian fields.
However, since the other Dutch fields are more expensive than
Groningen, it could make sense for the Dutch to sell gas from these fields
first, preserving Groningen gas for the premium flexible market.
ALGERIA
The final major supplier is Algeria. As mentioned above, there is
significant possibility for increased flexibility in Western European
markets stemming from the gas fields in the Netherlands and, to a dramatic
extent, from the Troll field. However, as emphasized before, this does not
imply that all producers should adapt their practices to this new
development. Like the USSR, Algeria must expend large amounts of initial
.n
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capital to make its gas deliverable to the Western European market. This
suggests that long-term take-or-pay contracts are likely to remain a
significant feature of Algerian contracts. However, note that Algeria,
like Troll, represents a somewhat intermediate supplier: It is not as
dependent upon long-term contracts as is the USSR, but nevertheless it is
unable to choose the flexible supply market as its targetted market.
Again, note that this conclusion refers primarily to new investments
in capacity and does not concern marginal additions to capacity or sales of
current excess capacity.
Using the CONTRACT model and inputting data from Adelman and Lynch's
supply cost estimates, Algeria seems in a better position than its current
insistence on relatively high-priced inflexible contracts would justify.
We begin by using cost estimates for the Hassi R'Mel project in Algeria, in
which the total capital costs c.i.f. to South France are $0.92/Mcf and
operating costs are $0.32/Mcf. We assume only two buyers, and possible
reservation prices range from $1.00 to $5.00/Mcf, with the expected price
being $2.80/Mcf. In this situation, the long-term contracts secure at most
10 percent of the project development NPV. If the expected price is
$3.00/Mcf, then the importance of the long-term contracts drops to between
2 and 7 percent of project NPV. When the number of potential buyers is
three and the expected price $2.50/Mcf, then the importance of long-term
contracts is negligible.
For the set of highest-cost estimates--those for the Rhourde Nousse
field--the results are more tentative. If an expected price of $2.50/Mcf
is calculated for two buyers, then the certainty of a take-or-pay contract
provides Algeria with an NPV 30 percent higher than without. When there
6-14
are three buyers, the importance of long-term contracts falls to 9 percent.
For higher expected prices, the value of long-term contracts falls only
marginally.
The example of Algerian supply allows us to emphasize the importance
of understanding the role of long-term contracts in interpreting the
behavior of actual gas markets, and to contrast this with an understanding
of typically competitive commodity markets. In most clearing markets, the
price of a good is determined by the marginal value of the commodity and by
the marginal cost. A producer's actual cost of production does not
determine the profit that producer will earn. If one producer has a cost
of production higher than other producers, then it will earn a smaller rate
of profit in long-run equilibrium. The rate of profit it can expect to
earn may affect its decision to enter the market at all, but there is no
other connection between its costs and the market price of its product.
In seeming contradiction of this basic principal of economics, Algeria
often has claimed that its high costs of liquefaction require that it
receive a higher price for its gas than other suppliers receive for theirs.
In a clearing market, this is unjustifiable. A buyer will purchase from
the lowest-price supplier, and if the Algerians wish to be the supplier,
then they must offer the clearing price regardless of their own costs.
However, gas markets are much more complicated than is indicated if only
the moment at which is market clears is considered, and this is one point
embedded in the CONTRACT model.
Consider a case where Algeria signs a long-term contract to deliver
LNG at the current market-clearing price, but requires that the buyer
commit to purchasing a given volume over the next 20 years, then embeds
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these terms in stringent take-or-pay clauses. These conditions are
embedded in the contract to ensure that the buyer will not renegotiate
opportunistically. They yield to Algeria a minimum payment, regardless of
the buyer's future decisions. Now assume that the prices of substitute
fuels move downward, so that buyers now wish to renegotiate the price of
their takes. Under this new circumstance, the gas market may clear among
other buyers and suppliers (for instance, the Netherlands), so the new
clearing price is significantly lower than it was at the time the original
contracts were signed. Should we therefore anticipate that Algeria will be
forced to readjust its price closer to this new clearing price? Would it
be in Algeria's best interest to do so?
Although the common answer to this question is yes, it may not be
correct. The Algerians may either refuse to reopen their contract or they
may accept renegotiations--on the principal that the price to be negotiated
should be above the price of Dutch gas "because the costs of liquefaction
are high." This would be a reasonable position in which the price paid is
"determined" ex post by the costs of production, although at the time the
contract was signed the price was set in expected value to clear against
all other suppliers, i.e., according to the marginal value of the gas.
This ex post reference to cost is an effort to enforce the ex ante
efficient contract, which was written in reference to the clearing price.
This confusion between ex post and ex ante efficiency and the stubborn
insistence that current deliveries or even renegotiated contract prices
should be related to the then-current clearing price for new gas is a major
one in discussions of gas contracts and renegotiation problems.
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PRICE INDICES
This chapter began with a discussion of those economic features of the
natural gas industry that compel producers to demand long-term contracts.
The central conflict created by the decision to require long-term contracts
is the need to reconcile the object of specifying the obligations of the
consumer or buyer, that is, the need to constrain the flexibility on the
one hand, and the need to adapt the contracts or the obligations of the
buyer so they respond fairly to the sometimes drastically changing market
circumstances that occur during the term of the contract. If two parties
sign a contract when an alternative fuel--oil, for example--is priced at
$28/barrel, then when oil becomes available at $15/barrel, the obligation
to continue purchasing natural gas at higher prices negotiated earlier may
have disasterous consequences for the buyer.
In standard commodity markets, the price response of a good to the
changing costs of supply and to changing market prices for substitutes is
determined by the concurrent forces of supply and demand: Buyers either
may continue purchasing the commodity at the going price or switch to the
substitute commodity. For reasons discussed above, and in greater detail
in the East Asia/Pacific study, it is not often possible to permit this
form of price determination in the natural gas market, or in any market
requiring long-term contracts. If the buyer were free to demand a lower
price for natural gas by threatening to abrogate the contract, then the
objective of the contract--to protect the producer against opportunistic
behavior on the part of the buyer in ex post price negotiations--is
undermined. The buyer also would be free to seek renegotiations to exploit
the advantage of the supplier's capital commitment under the guise of
F"~R
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changed circumstances, making cheaper alternative supplies available. The
problem of price indices and price renegotiations primarily is an exercise
in attempting to resolve this contradiction. That is, it is an attempt to
incorporate the equilibrium price and quantity adaptations that would occur
in a clearing market when there is a supply shift in a related market
without also permitting opportunistic behavior.
Since the mid-1970s, natural gas delivery prices commonly have been
pegged to the price of oil. Under certain simple assumptions, this is a
convenient way to resolve the central contradiction of long-term
contracting in the natural gas market.
Take the following situation. In a current market, natural gas
is competitive with fuel oil in the industrial market. If supply
conditions in the crude oil market change and if buyers are free to switch
between fuel oil and natural gas, then the equilibrium prices for both oil
and natural gas would change accordingly. We would expect the prices of
oil and natural gas to move together--that is, in the same
direction--although not in lock-step. This does not imply that natural gas
always will trade at some fixed discount from fuel oil, but it does imply
that if the price of fuel oil declines, then the price of natural gas also
will decline by some determinable amount. Note that this is a purely
counterfactual experiment--we conjecture what would happen if the market
were competitive and absent any of the strategic and opportunistic elements
that mandate the use of contracts in the first place.
Bearing this in mind, then a contract in which the price of natural
gas is pegged to the price of oil in accordance with this equilibrium
relationship can provide a resolution to the problem of contract rigidity.
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A buyer faced with declining oil prices will receive a break on the price
of natural gas, and renegotiations will be unnecessary. Therefore, a
supplier may safely interpret a buyer's pursuit of a price renegotiation as
an attempt to exploit opportunistically the bargaining power that the buyer
has gained over the supplier. The legitimate objectives that a price
renegotiation serves when future prices are fixed by contract and not
subject to changes in alternative markets would have been satisfied by the
indexing clause, and hence the supplier has no need to concede to a
renegotiated price.
There are several problems with this resolution. The first is purely
technical. The most appropriate price index is not necessarily the
counterfactual equilibrium price relationship between oil and natural gas
(hence forward referred to as "the counterfactual equilibrium
relationship"). A price index that simply mimics the counterfactual
equilibrium relationship simply shifts the full price risk to the supplier,
and achieves no efficiency gains. One objective of imposing a price index
is not simply to pass the benefits of the cost decrease to the buyer, but
to induce the buyer to make "efficient" future take decisions under the
changed market conditions. If the producer has the right to determine the
volume of subsequent takes, for example, based on the new price, then one
objective of the price index would be to induce the most efficient take
decisions ex post, and thereby to improve the ex ante efficiency of the
contract. The price might conform more or less to the counterfactual
equilbrium relationship, depending upon the divergence necessary to induce
the proper incentives.
This is related to the fact that, although gas prices recently have
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been pegged to oil prices, the gas market has not "cleared." This may be
currently inefficient, ex post, but it also may be interpreted as an
outcome that, as one element of an entire earlier contractual relationship,
formed an efficient market ex ante (as argued above in terms of the
Algerian renegotiation position).
A second problem is that the counterfactual equilibrium relationship
may be very complex and poorly understood. While true, it still may
significantly improve flexibility.
The third and most serious problem is that it probably holds true only
over a narrow range of prices. If, for example, the price of oil falls
significantly over an extended period, then natural gas might more directly
compete with fuel oil in the industrial market, making the relationship
between oil and natural gas in this range more elastic. But as we cannot
predict the future, any index is likely to encounter difficulties. This is
Adelman's point when he decries the persistent efforts of many suppliers to
index the price of natural gas to the price of oil. There is no single,
persistent, pre-determinable relationship between the two. Yet, while this
may be true, it is not sufficient reason to recommend against using the
price of oil as an index. For the reasons just given, this index yields an
ex post delivery price that is, on average, more in accordance with what
one might expect from a clearing market--but it avoids instituting this
clearing market and thereby preserves some advantages of long-term
contracts not present in a clearing market. It is a compromise and an
imperfect resolution to the central contradiction that arises out of the
need to contract, but its strengths are real.
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Finally, we must distinguish between the short- and long-run
equilibrium price relationship between the oil and gas markets. The
short-run relationship may differ significantly from the long-run
relationship. One typically would wish to write the price formulae in
terms of the long-run relationship.
The problem of short- versus long-run raises an additional
complication in the area of appropriate incentives. The responsiveness of
natural gas prices to changes in demand is supposed to stimulate decisions
to shift in and out of natural gas. If price changes are preprogrammed,
then it is not clear that the desired long-run adjustments in the various
consuming segments that would justify the long-term price adjustment will
in fact occur. In fact, it typically is necessary to write the price index
so the contract price does not completely adjust so much as it would in the
reduced form counterfactual equilibrium relationship. If the price of oil
rises, then the contract price of natural gas also rises, but remains below
market-clearing levels. Conversely, if the price of oil falls, the price
of natural gas falls but not enough to permit the gas market to clear.
This feature of the necessary price index reinforces the comments above
regarding Algeria's bargaining strategy.
One example of this type of problem is particularly relevant to
pegging the price of natural gas to oil. The development of new natural
gas supplies was one of many market responses to the OPEC cartel. To the
extent that natural gas supplies are pegged to oil prices in a manner that
guarantees the oil suppliers that, if they raise their prices, then the
price of gas will rise as well, can work to stabilize or strengthen the
power of the cartel. However, if the corresponding rise in gas prices is
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less than what the cartel would establish, and is equal to what would arise
in our counterfactual equilibrium relationship under competition in which
cheaper gas supplies replace oil (albeit at higher prices, due to higher
oil prices), then this effect will not take place.
The decision regarding which alternative fuels should be the basis for
indexing therefore is fundamentally a decision about what one believes is
the comparative static reduced-form relationship of the equilibrium prices
for the counterfactual negotiations. If one believes that natural gas will
compete with distillate fuel oil and that the movements of distillate fuel
oil prices will determine the equilibrium prices for natural gas, then one
would choose distillate fuel oil as the price index. However, this does
not imply that natural gas must remain in lock-step with distillate fuel
oil: One might choose a much looser, non-linear relationship.
In Western Europe, where differences in national energy policies and
in economic and consumption factors produce a variety of price
elasticities, one would expect that contracts written between different
countries would be indexed to different alternative fuels. However, in
constructing the index, other features also are important: the
availability of the index prices series and its objectivity and accuracy.
The past several decades have seen several periods of price
renegotiations and several cases of unilateral alterations in contract
terms. Some contracts provide that, after a specified period of time, the
original price formula may be renegotiated. In all other cases, the force
majeur clause is invoked to achieve the same end.
This raises the question of what efficacy the price index has if the
parties to the contract renegotiate price. Some analysts assert that the
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original price clauses have little meaning when this happens. But this
interpretation of renegotiations may ignore some forces prevailing at the
time of renegotiation and how these were anticipated when the original
contract was written.
A variety of conditions and forces play a role in renegotiation, and
there is a commensurate variety of ways in which they may be interpreted in
terms of the objectives of long-term contracts.
First, the forced renegotiations are not purely and simply a case of
reopening the original contract negotiations based upon new market
conditions. In the original contract negotiations, both parties were free
to accept or reject offers based on their perceptions of the alternatives
available to each. In the original negotiations, there is no compelling
basis for either party to accept a "fair price," except insofar as their
best available alternative is that price. In renegotiations, however,
another factor is present: What are the consequences if an agreement on
"fair price" is not reached? The nature of these possible consequences and
the notion of "fair price" need to be carefully defined.
If the contract were litigated and adjudged to be fully in force, then
the possible consequences might be paying a pre-established penalty for
breach of contract and the fair price might be considered the originally
contracted-for price. However, in many cases the legal system will not
enforce a contract to the letter of the original agreement, or it is
incapable of enforcing the original penalties. Alternatively, this may not
be the enforcement rule to which the supplier and buyer would have agreed
ex ante. Also, the cost of litigation may be prohibitively expensive.
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In some instances, the original contract may have been negotiated on
the understanding that the price formula would apply only so long as market
conditions remained within a prescribed range. If, however, conditions
changed dramatically in ways not originally anticipated, then both parties
might wish to abrogate. In this case, the two parties instead might wish
to renegotiate the contract so it reflects what they would have agreed upon
had they, at the time of the original negotiation, known these new
circumstances. In this context the notion of a "fair" price becomes
meaningful. It may be the reasonable task of the renegotiations, perhaps
supported by agreed-upon arbitration or even litigation, to identify the
price that would have been negotiated--the "fair" price.
When it is possible to specify the rules governing this process, they
may be included in the contract. When it is not possible, then the
arbitrartion or legal system may be called upon to determine the
appropriate price formula, perhaps based on principles embodied in the
original contract.
One simple example of a case where it is possible to specify a basis
for identifying the price that "would have been" negotiated without having
to identify a particular price formula comes from U.S. natural gas
contracts signed in the 1960s and 1970s. In these contracts, a "Most
Favored Nation" clause stipulated that a buyer must pay to one pipeline the
best price that it was currently paying to other pipelines as a result of
contract negotiations. Assuming that new contracts are being continually
signed, then the sequence of prices the buyer agrees to pay is in some
respects comparable to a spot market, and the price clause simply maintains
the price of the contract at the going spot price. This accomplishes the
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objective stated above of having the contract price correspond to the price
of a counterfactual equilibrium price, thereby permitting the seller the
power to allow the buyer the right to make decisions on the size of take
based upon this price. Further, it accomplishes this without resorting to
the imperfect process of using a price index pegged to an alternative fuel.
However, in the Western European natural gas market, there are not
enough new contracts being signed to make the Most Favored Nation clause a
satisfactory surrogate to the counterfactual equilibrium price. The
Western European market is characterized by a few big sellers, by some
monopsonistic buyers, and at times by cooperative agreements among buyers.
Nevertheless, a comparable purpose is served by the notion that there
exists a "fair" price that can be determined after sufficient
investigation. The notion of "fair" may assert the supplier's right to
receive a given level of return on capital assets (as is the case in U.S.
regulatory pricing of utility services), or the notion of fair may be
determined as relating to the price of the fuels with which natural gas
currently is competing. The availability of data may determine which
definition is most appropriate.
The principles used during arbitration or litigation may be based on
principles stated in the original contract. For example, if the parties
originally pegged prices to the price of oil, then the arbitrator may use a
similar benchmark, albeit with modifications, in resolving subsequent
renegotiations. Alternatively, if the parties set the original price based
on a specified parity relationship, then this principal may govern
renegotiations. However, if the purpose of renegotiations is to break out
of a previously agreed-upon relationship that no longer retains its
6-25
validity, then the arbitration authorities must seek alternative solutions.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has discussed the possibilities for increased flexibility
in natural gas take-or-pay contracts in the Western European market. At
price levels existing prior to the recent cut in world oil prices, the
prospects for increasing such flexibility were good. This conclusion still
holds for prices below 1985 levels, although not so low as current clearing
prices for short-term natural gas sales. Since current low oil prices are
not likely to persist in the long run, prospects for flexibility remain.
This conclusion may not apply to particular fields and to purchases
made from particular buyers. USSR current delivery capacity likely will
require take-or-pay levels that were used in the past. This also holds
true for certain fields, such as Algerian gas delivered from the Rhourde
Nousse plant. Norwegian gas from Troll delivered to the Continent
(although not to the United Kingdom) can be sold on terms similar to the
sale of less expensive Algerian gas, especially if planned additional
pipeline capacity to Belgium is built. These last two suppliers can be
expected to sell gas on terms moderately more flexible than historically
has been true in Western European markets. Nevertheless, there does not
exist an alternative source for major quantities of flexible supplies such
as those the Groningen field has provided.
In contrast with views expressed elsewhere in this study, this
chapter's conclusion regarding oil product price indices is that oil prices
will continue to play a central role in natural gas contract price terms.
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Terms of Western European Gas Contracts by Elise L. Erler (May 1986)
(Sources: Data Resources Inc., various issues of Energy Economist. International Gas Report,
Petroleum Economist).
SUPPLY CONTRACTS FOR ALGERIA (Sonatrach)
FRANCE (Gaz de France)
(3 Contracts)
$4.70/MMBtu
$4.41/MMBtu at Tunisian border
ITALY (Snam)
$4.80/MMBtu
Price Index
(May 1986)
100% OPEC crude oil
paying in dollars
100% OPEC crude oil
Price Review
Contract Length
Every 3 Years
#1: 25 Years
#2: 25 Years
#3: 20 Years
Renegotiation
Flexibility Terms
Delivery Level
1985-1986: Price
1984: 90%-100% take-or-pay
9.1 Bcm (5/86)
1985: Index formula, delivery flexibility
1984: 86%-100% take-or-pay
1983: 2.13 Bcm
1984: -6.56 Bcm
1990: 12.0 Bcm
3/86: $3.80/MMBtu f.o.b.
12/84: $4.46/MMBtu at Sicily
Basis of Supply Supply Basis
#1: 1964 contract for 0.57 Bcm/yr
#2: 1972 contract for 3.83 Bcm/yr
#3: 1964 contract for 5.68 Bcm/yr
12/85: France gained flexibility in take;
prices are high and subsidized by
French government
3/86: $3.80/MMBtu f.o.b.
Supply Basis
Second Trans-Mediterranean pipeline is being
built
Contracts re-established in 1982
Prices were high; subsizidized by Italian gov-
ernment for 3 years
Appendix A:
Consumer
Base Price
Price
Notes
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Appendix A: Continued.
SUPPLY CONTRACTS FOR NETHERLANDS (Gasunie)
France (Gaz de France)
$3.70/MMBtu
Italy (Snam)
$4.20/MMBtu
West Germany (Ruhrgas)
$3.50/MMBtu
Price Index
(May 1986)
Price Review
Contract Length
Renegotiation
Flexibility Terms
Delivery Level
65% fuel oil; 35% gasoil;
Inflation indicator
1984: Paying in ECUs
1984 - Every 3 Years
10 years added in 1984
until 2003
Every 3 Years
1985: Price lowered
1984: 30% take-or-pay
1985: 5.3 Bcm (8% increase
for first 6 months)
65% fuel oil; 35% gasoil;
Inflation indicator
1984: Paying in dollars;
want to pay in ECUs
1984 - Every 3 Years
10 years added in 1984
until 2003-2010?
Every 3 Years
1985: Price lowered
1984: 30% take-or-pay
1984: 4.6 Bcm
1985: 3.4 Bcm (6% increase
for first 6 months)
65% fuel oil; 35% gasoil;
Inflation indicator
1984 - Every 3 Years
10 years added in 1984
until 2003-2010?
Every 3 Years
1985: Price lowered
1984: 30% take-or-pay
1985: 11 Bcm (10% increase
for first 6 months)
2/85: $3.57/MMBtu
Basis of Supply Supply basis
Price index changed to
compete with electricity.
12/84: $4.16/MMBtu
at border
Supply basis Supply basis
Contract represented 14% of
Italy's natural gas consumption.
Gasunie has flexible swing capacity with extra natural gas available for purchase (when peak
demand creates contract shortages for other natural gas suppliers or when the Soviet Union
cannot make its contracted deliveries).
Consumer
Base Price
Price
Notes
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SUPPLY CONTRACTS FOR NORWAY (Statoil)
Consumer
Base Price
Price Index
(May 1986)
Price Review
Contract Length
France (Gaz de France)
$4.20/MMBtu
$3.75/MMBtu (Troll)
$5.50/MMBtu (Statfjord)
60% fuel oil; 40% gasoil
Troll index includes inflation
Troll: Regular review for each buyer
Statfjord: 10/85 and 2/86 for 6 to 9 months
Sleipner: Cancelled
Troll: 1985-2020
Statfjord: 1986-2007
West Germany (Ruhrgas)
$4.20/MMBtu
$3.75/MMBtu (Troll)
$5.50/MMBtu (Statfjord)
60% fuel oil; 40% gasoil
Troll index includes inflation
Troll: Regular review for each buyer
Statfjord: 10/85 and 2/86 for 6 to 9 months
Sleipner: Cancelled
Troll: 1985-2020
Statfjord: 1986-2007
Renegotiation
Flexibility Terms
Delivery Level
Troll: 80% to 105%
Troll: Start in late 1990s;
plateau at 15 Bcm after 2000
Troll: 80% to 105%
Troll: Start in late 1990s;
plateau at 15 Bcm after 2000
Statfjord: $3.76/MMBtu (1986 short term)
Sleipner: $4.00/MMBtu (cancelled)
Statfjord: $3.76/MMBtu (1986 short term)
Sleipner. $4.00/MMBtu (cancelled)
Basis of Supply Field dedicated except Troll (supply basis) Field dedicated except Troll (supply basis)
Final Statfjord terms not included. U.K. government rejected purchase of Sleipner gas.
Norway has been selling natural gas on a dedicated field basis Except for Troll).
Price
Notes
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SUPPLY CONTRACTS FOR SOVIET UNION (Soyuzgazeksport)
France (Gaz de France)
(3 contracts)
Italy (Snam)
(2 contracts)
West Germany (Ruhrgas)
(5 contracts)
$3.70/MMBtu $4.20/MMBtu $4.20/MMBtu
Price Index
(May 1986)
#1,2: 50% fuel oil; 50%
gasoil; Inflation indicator
#3: 40% fuel oil; 40% gasoil;
20% inflation indicator
40% fuel oil; 40% gasoil;
20% crue oil; pays in dollars
50% fuel oil; 50% gasoil
Price Review
Contract Length
Renegotiation
#1: 1984-2000
#2: Until 2008
1985: #3 price and take;
next in 1987
#1,2,3: Until 2000
#4: 1984-2008
1985: #4 contract plateau
level reduced from 10.5
Bcm to 8.0 Bcm
Flexibility Terms
Delivery Level
1984: 80% take-or-pay
1985: #3: 80%-105%
take-or-pay
#1,2: 4 Bcm
#3: 8 Bcm
1985: Total take lowered
1984: 80% take-or-pay
#1: 7 Bcm
#2: Flexibly building to
6 Bcm in 1992
1984: #4: 64%-100%
take-or-pay
#1,2,3: 11Bcm
#4: 10.6 Bcm
#5: 0.65 Bcm
2/86: $3.10/MMBtu at border
12/84: $4.25/MMBtu at border
Basis of Supply Supply basis
10/84: #4: $3.80/MMBtu
Supply basis
#1,2: Signed in 1982 to
replace dwindling domestic
and Dutch gas supplies.
By 1991, Italy will buy 13 Bcm
per year from Soviet contracts.
#5: For West Berlin.
Ruhrgas wants less
contract and more spot
gas from Soviet Union.
Soviet Union is increasing its natural gas sales to Western Europe to replace decreasing
revenues from declining oil output.
Consumer
Base Price
Price
Supply basis
Notes
TECHNOLOGIES FOR NATURAL GAS UTILIZATION
by
David C. White
INTRODUCTION
The use of gaseous fuels dates from the late 18th century, when town
gas produced by coal gasification was used for street lighting, in
residences, and in some industrial processes. The first half of the 19th
century saw an excess of clean-burning and low priced gaseous fuel, as
natural gas associated with petroleum production entered the market (see
Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of the history of natural gas use in
Western Europe). In the United States, the petroleum, petrochemical, and
other energy-intensive industries grew in close proximity to the oil fields
and used natural gas as the fuel of choice for process heat, steam and
electricity production, and as a chemical feedstock. The excess of
associated gas plus the discovery of major natural gas fields in the United
States led to the construction of natural gas pipeline networks to other
major industrial centers (the distribution networks established from town
gas gave a ready market for this low-cost fuel). The development of this
natural gas delivery system was well-established in the United States by
the mid-1900s. It has developed rapidly since the 1960s in Europe and is
still expanding; and since the 1970s natural gas (mostly in the form of
LNG) has been part of Japan's growing mix of fuel supplies.
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Alongside a worldwide supply and transmission network for natural gas
and a growing base of proven reserves, there has developed a broad set of
technologies to exploit this fuel for its inherent advantages over
alternative sources of energy.
Natural gas is ideal for residential, commercial, industrial, and
electric generation applications that require a high-quality,
thermally-controllable source of energy. Because it can be delivered
essentially pollution-free (no sulfur, inorganic solids, or heavy
hydrocarbons), it is possible to build simple combustion systems that
produce high-temperature heat and, depending upon application and design,
that emit only C02, H20, and some NOx.
Natural gas-fired systems have the lowest capital costs of any system
using a hydrocarbon fuel as its primary energy source. It can be burned as
an open flame for cooking, baking, and other process applications where
product contamination would render other hydrocarbon fuels prohibitive. It
can be used in combustion chambers to produce steam or to heat other
fluids, such as in petroleum refineries, most industrial process steam
applications, or in electric power production. It can be used in internal
combustion engines or gas turbines over a full range of sizes from a few
horsepower to the hundred thousand horsepower gas turbines.
The large range of applications for which natural gas can and has been
used, plus nearly a century of development of natural gas-burning
equipment, has produced a wide spectrum of commercially available
equipment. New equipment reaching commercialization in the last decade
include the phosphoric acid fuel cell system, which uses reformed natural
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gas, and the large-scale gas turbines operating at higher temperatures and
having increased thermal efficiencies (45%+) than those developed for
aircraft propulsion and modified for utility peak-load applications. The
increased price of natural gas in all markets worldwide following the high
crude oil price rises of the late 1970s stimulated further development of
natural gas-consuming equipment. Efficiency improvements were sought to
help maintain its cost competitiveness with both other hydrocarbon fuels
and electricity. Today much of this development work is yielding improved
efficiences in gas-consuming equipment used in all consuming sectors.
Thus, as natural gas markets return to price competitiveness in today's era
of lower world crude oil prices, a full set of technologies and
commercially available equipment are in place, ready to exploit natural
gas's other important attributes--namely, that of its being a
clean-burning, low-polluting, easily useable fuel.
The major problem with natural gas is that it is difficult both to
transport and to store. Conventional crude oil and its many liquid
derivatives are much easier to transport and store, and have much higher
energy density per unit volume under normal temperatures and pressures.1
Both pressurization and liquefaction are used to transport natural gas, but
the former process entails the costs of constructing and maintaining
pipelines from source to end user, and the latter entails the costs of
1One cubic foot of middle distillate has, under standard conditions, a heat
at combustion of 106 Btu/ft3, while natural gas (or methane) is only 103
Btu/ft3. By going to higher pressure (140 bars), the energy density
increases to 180,000 Btu/ft3 or by liquefying at approximately -1600,
increases to 675,000 Btu/ft3.
7-4
liquefying, transporting in special temperature-controlled vessels, and
regasifying it for final use.
For contiguous land masses and during periods of high demand for
natural gas, a pipeline system has proven to be an efficient and economic
delivery system. The network of natural gas pipelines in North America has
functioned well for over 50 years; at present, it gathers, transports, and
distributes natural gas to meet fully 25 percent of total U.S. energy
demand. The Western European system still is expanding; natural gas
represents a major energy source, meeting about 15 percent of total energy
demand. Figure 7-11 shows the relative costs of delivering hydrocarbon
fuels by pipelines and ocean transport, including liquefaction of natural
gas.
Liquefaction of natural gas is a well-developed, mature technology
whose major disadvantage is the costs involved in liquefaction, transport,
and regasification, except for long distances (over 3,000 miles), where it
competes with gas transported by pipeline. For large facilities, say 1
Bcf/d, Adelman and Lynch in a previous study give typical liquefaction and
regasification costs of $1.50/Mcf, plus transportation charges of
$0.20/1000 miles.2 Thus, processing and transport charges over distances
of 3000 to 4000 miles are typically $2.00 to $2.50/Mcf. To this must be
added the resource cost, plus profits, taxes, etc. Adelman and Lynch give
typical discovery and development costs of $0.30/Mcf, so LNG delivered from
supplier to large consumer at prices of $3.00 to $4.00/Mcf should be
feasible and still allow for reasonable profit margins at all parts of the
system. At these prices, with world crude oil priced around $20/bbl, LNG
is competitive with other major clean liquid fuels, such as middle
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distillates. Because natural gas is difficult and expensive to store and
transport via pipelines or LNG, the potential for large rents by resource
owners and developers, under normal supply/demand conditions, is
substantially less for natural gas than it is for crude oil.
Today, delivery of natural gas to end users can be by pipeline,
conversion to LNG and transport, or conversion to a liquid such as
methanol, gasoline, or middle distillate. If a transportation fuel is
desired, chemical conversion to methanol, gasoline, and middle distillate
is technically feasible but expensive relative to petroleum-derived liquid
fuels, mainly due to processing costs and primary energy lost in
conversion.
Significant R&D programs by major oil and chemical companies are
exploring ways to transform the methane molecule to a more useful liquid
hydrocarbon. The high chemical stability of the CH4 molecule makes this a
difficult and expensive task in terms of process economics and energy lost.
New chemical conversion technology may come in time, but basing projections
on inventions not yet made is even more risky than predicting world crude
oil prices. History has not treated such forecasts kindly.
The following sections discuss specific technologies based on methane
and methane-derived chemical or transportation fuels. The data given are
derived from the extensive published literature on natural gas-consuming
equipment and technologies to convert natural gas to other products,
including liquid hydrocarbon fuels. The major message from this review is
that natural gas for combustion applications--including process heat, steam
raising, thermal engines, and similar applications in the residential,
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commercial, industrial, and electric generation markets--is not constrained
by the availability of cost-effective, high-performance, end-use equipment.
Rather, the central issue for all these applications is natural gas
supplied at competitive prices in an unconstrained marketplace. Data
presented in the Supply chapter of this study indicate that natural gas,
free of present policy constraints, should be available at prices
competitive with world crude oil. Both the resource base and the delivery
system are adequate and capable of expanding to meet current and projected
demand. The technology to use natural gas is also available. These
technologies will help sustain demand and, depending on other
factors--prices, environmental issues, energy policy--could help natural
gas obtain a growing share of future energy demand.
TECHNOLOGY FOR NATURAL GAS UTILIZATION
Technologies that use natural gas in the consuming sectors--
industrial, commercial, residential, and electric utility--are well
developed, mature, and available in a world-competitive marketplace.
Technology for natural gas use by the transportation sector exists for
speciality markets, but not as a general competitor with vehicles designed
to use petroleum-based liquid transportation fuels.
Below are listed a few technologies for each consuming sector; these
represent areas with new market potential and highlight developments
currently underway for equipment using natural gas.
Industrial
Cogeneration:
--gas turbine: process steam
--energy drives (methane gas): process steam
--fuel cell: process steam
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Process Heat:
--regenerative burners (increased efficiency)
--engine-driven dryers/process heaters
Heavy Oil- or Coal-Fired Boilers:
--gas injection to reduce NOx after combustion; can also include
sulfur sorbent injection to reduce SOx
Commercial
Packaged Cogeneration:
--engine-driven systems, consisting of electric generation,
refrigerant compressors, and absorption chillers
Space Conditioning:
--gas-fired heat pumps plus, for cooling, desiccant
dehumi di fi cati on
--gas-fired desiccant dehumidification plus electric cooling.systems
Residential
Furnaces:
--pulse combustion and condensing system (increased efficiency)
--modular heaters with advanced controls and simplified piping
Electric Generation
Base Load:
--gas turbine-combined cycle systems using advanced higher
efficiency gas turbines in the 100 MW-size range
Environmental Control:
--natural gas injection for NOx reduction after comustion;
also can include sulfur sorbent injection to reduce SOx
--natural gas in conventional boilers to reduce emissions
Transportation
CNG-Fueled Vehicles:
--currently fleets of vehicles are the most feasible application
INDUSTRIAL NATURAL GAS UTILIZATION
Natural gas has a broad market in most industrialized countries.
Typically, 30 to 40 percent of the natural gas is consumed by industry in
the developed Western countries (see Table 7-1).
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Table 7-13
Country Industrial Gas Consumption/Total Sector Energy
United States 41
United Kingdom 32
France 22
West Germany 24
Italy 26
Japan 6
The principal uses of natural gas are in boilers to produce process
steam, as process heat in the primary metals, chemicals, and paper
industries, and as process drying in the food and textiles industries. The
specific advantages of natural gas in these applications are:
--natural gas boilers and burners can be controlled over a wide
temperature range;
--specific temperature requirements can be maintained for product
quality control;
--high exhaust air temperatures can be used for preheating combustion
air, which increases efficiency;
--natural gas is a "clean" fuel, and thus can be used for direct
heating of liquids, foods, etc.; and
--natural gas combustion can be designed for' very low pollutant
emissions, and also can be useful in special applications to reduce
emissions from other hydrocarbon fuels.
Natural gas faces price competition from residual oil and coal for
boiler applications, a factor complicated by the fact that most industrial
boilers are dual-fired, and thus allow rapid shifts from one to another
fluid hydrocarbon fuel as prices change.
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For process heat, natural gas and electricity compete in some
applications. The more precise temperature control and improved delivery
of heat energy to the work surface that is possible with some electrical
heaters favor electricity over natural gas. Such applications are very
price/cost sensitive, and manufacturers of gas-fired end-use equipment
continue to improve their products to maintain a share of these specialty
markets. To a major degree, it is the relative price of electricity versus
natural gas, rather than technology advances, that determines which energy
form is used.
There are social, economic, and technological reasons for industry to
continue to use natural gas, but there are no specific technology
innovations on the horizon that offer major opportunities for natural gas
use in industrial applications. The current R&D programs sponsored by the
U.S. utility industry are typical of the programs of end-use technology
improvement currently underway in North America, Western Europe, and Japan.
The U.S. gas utility industry, through the Gas Research Institute
(GRI), is working on selected projects to increase efficiency of natural
gas industrial equipment and to develop new applications.4 The major R&D
activities include:
--Improved gas-fired engine drives for cogeneration, heat pumps, and
compressors;
--Development of higher temperature and higher efficiency recuperators
and heat recovery systems;
--Advanced burner and combustion controls;
--Improved and new processes for the metals, glass, and ceramics
industries;
--Development of fuel cells for both cogeneration and direct
production of electricity; and
--Development of improved absorption chillers and dessicant
dehumidification systems for cooling.
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In the United States, the general approach to R&D is to have
cost-sharing on end-use equipment by the gas supply industry and the
manufacturers of end-use equipment. This is helping to overcome the
economic constraints of a large, disaggregated market of both buyers and
suppliers. To a major extent, the technology is mature and well known, so
market penetration for product innovation is difficult, although the above
approach to risk sharing is proving effective in bringing forth products
with improved efficiency or with new industrial applications.
Industrial Cogeneration in the United States
The installation of cogeneration facilities is economic when the
electric power generated produces revenue (or savings) that justifies the
capital required to build a cogeneration facility over a simple
steam-raising facility. For plants in the range of 125 x 106 to
1000 x 106 Btu/hr, the additional capital for the cogeneration part of the
system is approximately 130 percent for the smaller and 85 percent for the
larger system. Thus, a cogeneration plant will involve a capital
investment approximately two times that of a boiler producing process
steam. The ability to generate sufficient revenue from electricity
production to justify the larger capital investment makes cogeneration
systems very sensitive to the plant steam-load factor. In general, load
factors of at least 50 percent or larger are required for cogeneration to
be economically feasible.
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A U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) study using a real rate of return
greater than 7 percent indicated that, in the United States, there could be
a potential 39,000 MW of cogeneration installed in industrial sites by the
year 2000.5 Eighty percent of the plants and 90 percent of the power are
in six major industrial sectors (SIC 20 - Food; SIC 22 - Textile Mill
Products; SIC 26 - Pulp and Paper; SIC 28 - Chemicals; SIC 29 - Petroleum
and Coal Products; SIC 33 - Primary Metals) (see Table 7-2). Over 40
percent of the power produced is in plants from 10 to 50 MW in size and
nearly two-thirds in plants from 2 to 50 MW. The total potential natural
gas demand represented by these industrial cogeneration facilities is
between 2 and 3 Tcf. Natural gas will have to compete in price with middle
distillate and residual fuel oil to obtain this market. Dual-fuel
capability is usually standard practice in package boilers and cogeneration
facilities.
Table 7-2 summarizes the results of the DOE study. Regionally, 40
percent of the cogeneration potential is along the eastern seaboard, and 24
percent in the southwest. The cogeneration potential is greatest,
therefore, in those areas where for electric utilities the gas turbine
combined cycle systems are most promising (see p. 7-26 section on "Electric
Utility Use on Natural Gas" for a fuller discussion). The Tabors study
projected 28 MW additional capacity to utilities along the eastern
seaboard.1l The industrial cogeneration potential in this same region is
approximately 16 MW. Since both are supplying the same electricity demand,
the industrial cogeneration installed will reduce the need for utility
generation capacity. Should the full industrial cogeneration potential be
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Table 7-2
Potential Number of Cogeneration Plant Sites,
Megawatts and Sizes for ROI 7% (uninflated)5
Potential MW
Potential No.
of Plants
20
22
26
28
29
33
Remaining Sectors
TOTAL
7,005
1,882
7,962
10,316
5,836
2,397
3,950
39,348
Size (MW)
2
2 - 10
10 - 50
50 - 100
100
Total MrW Production
1,162
7,844
16,881
7,621
5,842
39,348
SIC
18
5
20
26
15
6
10
100
734
499
437
547
236
434
730
20
14
12
16
6
12
20
3,644 100
3
20
43
19
15
TOTAL 100
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installed, the need for electric utility capacity would be reduced
correspondingly. The opportunity for cooperation and net savings in
capital investments between industry and utilities is substantial across
the country and even greater in the eastern Atlantic coastal states. The
advantage of cooperation between industry and the electricity utility
sector is being recognized and used as an effective alternative way for
U.S. utilities to add generation capacity to meet future electricity
demand.
RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL NATURAL GAS UTILIZATION
The residential and commercial markets are major consumers of natural
gas. For most countries the residential market is the largest, ranging
from 35 to 60 percent, except for Italy and West Germany, which have very
small residential demand. The commercial market is very country-specific,
as shown in Table 7-3.3 The sum of these markets in most countries is
slightly larger than the industrial demand.
Table 7-3
(%) Residential/Commercial Sector Consumption of Natural Gas/
Total Sector Energy
Country Residential Commercial
United States 52 53
United Kingdom 58 --
France 36 71
W. Germany 4 17
Italy 18 42
Japan 36 39
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Seasonal variations in residential demand place constraints on the supply
system, because they require some storage capacity; it also stimulates
selective sales of interruptable gas or other marketing procedures to
reduce demand variations.
The general focus of R&D for residential end-use equipment is to
increase furnace efficiency by pulsed combustion or by condensing exhaust
gases. Efficiency gains from approximately 60 to over 90 percent for
poorly designed and adjusted furnaces have been obtained in new,
commercially available equipment. In the United States, gas-fired heat
pumps are under development for colder climates.4 Coefficients of
performance (COPs) from 1.2 to 1.7 are possible in these systems. Some R&D
is underway on residential-size air conditioning equipment, but this market
is dominated by electric air conditioning systems and is not promising.
Another area of important R&D for the residential market is for new
systems of interior piping. Flexible copper and steel tubing is being
investigated, along with rapid-disconnect outlets, to accommodate gas-fired
room heating equipment. The Japanese market is the most advanced in this
new technology. Western Europe, and particularly the United Kingdom, also
are developing this approach for new and retrofit construction. The U.S.
market has not yet developed, delayed by building codes and other
institutional constraints. Both end-use and gas service technologies may
contribute to continued growth in residential gas demand. Western Europe
residential demand has been and is projected to be an important part of
future demand, so such R&D will likely help this market.
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The commercial market is very country-specific, and is largely
determined by building heating and coaling loads. Historically this market
has consisted of packaged boilers and chillers to supply heating and
cooling and other hot water requirements. Research and development to
improve these conventional equipments is underway. One major thrust for
U.S. markets is for package cogeneration systems, sized to thermal load, as
characterized in Figure 7-2. This technology offers the promise of
economic savings for commercial building owners, reducing electricity
demand growth for electric utilities, and helping gas utilities to add
year-round gas load. The technology under development4 includes a range of
engine-driven systems from 15 to 650 kW electric capacity. The phosphoric
acid fuel cell is also part of the cogeneration strategy. Over 40 units of
40 kW size are being tested, and a 200 kW unit is under development.
Heat Pump/Air Conditioning Systems
A heat pump is a machine in which the application of external energy
causes heat to flow from cold to hot regions. All heat pumps require an
external source of energy. Electric, gas, solar, geothermal, and waste
heat sources all have been used to drive heat pumps. Most types of heat
pumps operate on a vapor compression refrigeration cycle. For a gas-fired
heat pump (GFHP), the conversion from chemical energy to mechanical work is
performed at the site where heating/cooling is needed; thus, thermal energy
normally wasted in producing mechanical work can be captured to provide
additional space heating in winter months or domestic water heating in
summer months. This ability to capture and use energy normally wasted
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makes the gas-fired machine potentially more efficient in utilizing primary
energy. Since it can combine waste heat recovery with heat extracted from
the cold, outside air or from conditioned space, the GFHP also is superior
to gas furnace/air conditioner systems in utilizing primary energy. If
wasted heat is not captured and used during the cooling season, the
efficiency advantage of a gas-fired machine is lost.
To produce mechanical work, one alternative to the thermal engine is
to use an electric motor for the compression of refrigerant. The electric
heat pump (EHP) is a relatively mature technology, and it is possible to
obtain good performance and long life from it at a reasonably low system
cost. In contrast, to perform the compression function the GFPH requires
several complex components. The development of cost-competitive, yet
efficient equipment represents a difficult technology challenge facing gas
heat pumps.
An alternative way to produce cooling is with an absorption system,
where the equivalent of refrigerant compression is accomplished by
absorbing the refrigerant in a liquid solution at low temperatures, pumping
the solution to a boiler with a liquid feed pump, then boiling the
refrigerant out of the liquid solution by applying gas heat. Current
absorption technology yields a heating COP of about 1.25 and a cooling COP
of 0.5 for residential-size equipment.4
Modifications that can be made to improve performance of the basic
absorption cycle include: multiple components, e.g., two boilers (double
effect); additional heat exchangers; higher operating temperatures and/or
pressures; different fluid pairs; multiple cycles; and combined cycles,
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e.g., regeneration. In the double-effect cycle, the latent heat of the
refrigerant produced in a high-pressure generator is used to produce
additional refrigerant in a low-pressure generator. A double-effect cycle
is expected to improve the heat pump efficiency by 50 percent over the
basic single-effect in residential-size equipment. The performance
improvement requires a significant increase in hardware complexity and
investment over the single-effect cycle.
Most cooling systems, whether gas or electric, actually provide two
types of cooling: sensible cooling (temperature reduction) and latent
cooling (dehumidification). In a desiccant-based cooling system, the
latent cooling load is met by means of a desiccant, or drying agent, which
removes moisture from the air. The desiccant is regenerated by the
application of a heat source that releases the moisture, which is ejected
to the outdoors as exhaust. Sensible cooling can be incorporated by
including standard electric cooling components with reduced capacity.
In the U.S. market, Cargocaire Engineering Company provides the
equivalent capacity of an 80-ton electric air conditioner by substituting
15 tons of desiccant for 60 tons of electric cooling. 6 In a typical 30,000
square-foot supermarket located in the humid southeast United States, the
desiccant-based system reduces the electrical load to the customer by 27
percent, while increasing annual gas consumption by 750 to 1,500 Mcf.
Desiccant systems for cooling applications are another way to utilize
waste heat from cogeneration systems or other thermal engines. In the
United States, research on total desiccant cooling systems in the size
range of 5 to 20 tons is under development under GRI sponsorship. 4
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Attaining COPs of 1.2 is a design objective for early systems, with 1.7 an
objective for advanced systems.
Gas-fired engine-driven heat pump systems have heating COPs from 1.2
to 1.7 and cooling COPs from 0.6 to 1.0. The competitive system is the
electric heat pump. In very cold climates, the GFHP is best for heating.
In small sizes (particularly in residential applications) the gas-fired
systems are not economically competitive with electric systems.7 In large
systems (commercial applications) either gas or electric systems may prove
the best choice (see Figure 7-3). In any system comparison, size,
operating conditions, regional temperatures, and gas and electricity prices
all must be considered. Companies and electric utilities in North America,
Western Europe, and Japan are supporting research on improving the
performance and cost of their respective systems, and in time, systems with
improved efficiencies are expected to reach the commercial market.
An assessment of current and projected GFHP technology was performed
by GRI, and some of the results are shown in Figures 7-3, 7-4, and 7-5.
While the development of new and improved technology may help retain
current demand, there is no basis for projecting a significant natural gas
demand growth in either the residential or commercial space conditioning
markets based on outstanding gains in GFHP equipment. Lower natural gas
prices may have a more dominant effect on future demand than end-use
technology gains.
NATURAL GAS FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Gas Turbine and Steam Turbine Cycles
Gas-fired boiler-steam turbine drives for electricity generation have
a long history of use in the United States. Before 1970, natural gas was
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the dominant industrial and utility boiler fuel in the southwestern United
States. In 1985, because of excess natural gas capacity and hence
favorable prices, 3 Tcf of natural gas were burned by electric utility
companies. The 1986 drop in world crude oil prices may affect the
consumption of natural gas. Nevertheless, the lower capital costs of
natural gas boilers, considering combustor design and emission controls,
make such systems competitive with residual fuel oil and even coal, if
long-term, competitively priced natural gas is available.
While uncertainties in both government regulations and the future
price of natural gas make conventional boiler steam turbine systems
unlikely in the United States, there is growing interest in gas turbine
combined cycle systems (GTCC) for electric utility applications. Several
U.S. utility companies currently are planning GTCC installations based on
using middle distillate or natural gas by obtaining a Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) waiver of the Fuel Use Act for a specified
period (usually 10 years).8
The largest commitment to GTCC systems comes from the Japanese utility
industry. 9 The plan is for 7,200 MW to be built by 1994. In 1985, Tohoku
Electric brought on-stream two 548 MW GTCC systems in 1985 that were
supplied by Mitsubishi. The measured efficiency was 49.1 percent (low
heating value [LHV] for methane). Using the high heating value (HHV)
typically used in U.S. efficiency calculations yields a 44 percent
efficiency. The NOx level was 10 ppm, obtained using a low NOx combustor,
followed by selective catalytic reduction using ammonia hydroxide in the
exhaust streams. The combination of high efficiency and very low emitted
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pollution is a major accomplishment. The approximate 10 point gain in
efficiency over conventional scrubbed coal or heavy fuel oil-fired steam
plants is a significant fuel savings for these gas-fired GTCC systems.
While less than one year of operation has been logged on these plants,
their current and projected availability is high, making them attractive
competitors for base- as well as intermediate-load applications.
The first of the GTCC systems at Tohoku Electric was built in
approximately 30 months and placed into commercial operation just 34 months
from the start of construction. Modular design and factory construction of
the heat recovery boiler (four units: economizer, evaporator, SCR module,
and super heater) plus three gas turbines (118 MW) and one steam turbine
(191 MW) helped to reduce the plant construction time.
In the East Asia/Pacific region, where there is significant present
and future natural gas available, the GTCC system is a promising and very
competitive technology.
In the electric utility sector of the Federal Republic of Germany,
existing regulation hinders the use of gas. Gas-fired power plants for
base-load generation currently are not licenced by the authorities. Only
if the regulation changes could base-load gas-fired power plants be built.
In France, for example, the electric utility sector uses primarily
nuclear fuel and therefore natural gas plays only a minor role. Since the
electric utility industry in France has a very high nuclear capacity, it
provides electricity at relatively low cost to the industrial and
residential sectors. Natural gas is not likely to be a factor, unless this
situation were to change drastically.
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In Western European countries with indigenous gas resources, such as
the Netherlands and Norway, planning and construction of combined cycle
power stations for electricity generation are under way. In Norway a 1000
to 2000 MW station will be built, and in the Netherlands existing power
stations will be replaced with combined cycle stations. The driving force
for these decisions is not technology but the availability of cheap natural
gas. In the current, government-managed gas markets of most Western
European countries, technology will not be a major influence on natural gas
demand.
Table 7-4 shows typical use of natural gas for electricity production
in four Western European countries, and in the United States and Japan.
Table 7-43
Country % Natural Gas for Electricity/Total Sector Energy
United Kingdom -0-
France 2
West Germany 15
Italy 12
Japan 22
United States 14
Electric Utility Use of Natural Gas in the United States
The U.S. electric utility industry currently uses approximately 3 Tcf
of natural gas annually, of which two-thirds are under firm contracts and
one-third are interruptable. 10 Of this gas, over 98 percent is used in
steam boilers and approximately 1.2 percent is used for combustion turbine
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peaking power. North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)
projections for natural gas consumption in 1992 are for 20 percent lower
demand than present levels.10
The potential for increased use of natural gas by electric utilities
is difficult to assess with any reliable accuracy. For gas turbine
applications, natural gas and middle distillate fuels are perfectly
substitutable--price alone determines the choice. An indication of this
potential market can be obtained from a recent study by Tabors and Flagg,ll
who used the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Electric Generation
Expansion Analysis System (EGEAS) to project the generation choice for the
period 1990 to 2004 for the six "model" EPRI regional utilities. The
growth rates used in these studies were: NE, 2.1 percent; SE, 3.7 percent;
EC, 3.5 percent; SC, 4.2 percent; WC, 3.2 percent, and W, 3.5 percent.
(These are approximately 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points higher than the
1983-1992 growth rates projected by NERC.10) The capital costs and heat
rates used by Tabors et al. for the plant types considered, updated to
$1984, were:
Table 7-5a
Plant Costs and Heat Rates1l
Heat Rate
$1984 (Btu/kWhr)
Light water reactor 2100 10,700
Atmospheric fluidized bed coal (AFB) 950 9,640
Gas turbine combined cycle 330 7,260
Advanced gas turbine combined cycle 480 6,210
Advanced combustion turbine 250 10,300
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Comparing these numbers to data from the EPRI/Fluor study12 for advanced
gas turbine and combined cycle systems, we typically have:
Table 7-5b
Plant Costs and Heat Rates2
EPRI/Fluor Capital Cost ($1984) Heat Rate (Btu/kWhr)
Advanced gas turbine 500 8,000
combined cycle
Advanced combustion turbine 250 11,900
Thus, the capital costs of the Tabors study are equivalent to those of the
EPRI/Fluor study, but the heat rate is 15 to 20 percent lower and will
understate fuel usage, and hence fuel cost, in their expansion planning
study. However, the data used are sufficiently representative that their
conclusions can be used to indicate potential gas demand following upon
electric utility installation of GTCC systems. These systems, designed for
natural gas, ultimately could be converted to integrated gasifier GTCC
systems if the cost of gas were to increase sufficiently to make the
capital cost of the coal gasifier economically desirable.
The low capital costs--$250/kW for combustion turbines and $500/kW for
the GTCC system fired with natural gas at $4.00/MMBtu--make the GTCC
system a dominant choice in 4 of the 6 model EPRI regional utilities for
the 1990-2004 planning period. The essential results of the Tabors study
can be gleaned from the relative amount of GTCC installed in 2004.11
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Table 7-6
GTCC Installed by the Year 200411
GTCC TOTAL
REGION (MW) (MW)
NE (Northeast) 12,000 12,000
SE (Southeast) 16,000 16,000
EC (East Central) 9,000 16,000
SC (South Central) 13,000 25,000
WC (West Central) 9,000 17,000
W (West) 500 12,000
The choice of unit additions from the available technologies considered in
Table 7-5a were either GTCC or AFBC, and the MW additions for each were
approximately linear over the 15-year planning study. The essential
feature of the study is that on the eastern seaboard, where coal costs are
high, the choice is 100 percent GTCC. In the three central regions, gas
and coal are competitive and split the market 50/50. In the west, low coal
costs capture the total market. Based on this study, the projected
incremental gas consumption by regions in the United States is:
Table 7-7
U.S. Electric Generation Incremental Gas Consumption (106 Mcf)1 1
Region 1990 1994 1999 2004
NE 420 1040 1690 2410
SE 80 710 1900 3350
EC 0 230 360 640
SC 0 280 340 640
WC 30 130 400 710
W 0 60 10 20
TOTAL 530 2450 4700 7770
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Of the projected increase in natural gas demand of 0.5 Tcf in 1990 to
almost 8 Tcf in 2004, 80 percent is consumed on the eastern seaboard (NE
and SE). Thus, in this scenario, the availability and price of natural gas
in the eastern states is a critical factor. For the early 1990s, the low
capital costs and rapid construction potential of the GTCC system are a
powerful driving force. By the mid- to late-1990s, the coal gasifier
technology should be fully commercial, so for an additional $800/kW
($1984),12 an environmentally clean, coal-fired base-load plant can be
available, which is already producing revenue and whose capital costs are
partially subsumed in the rate base. The phased construction being studied
by EPRI12 gives an additional dimension to the Tabors-Flagg study, making
their results usable on a basis to project potential electric utility
natural gas demand to the year 2000. Even if their results are 50 percent
too high, they still project a 200+ percent growth in natural gas consumed
by the electric utility industry.
The Tabors-Flagg study performed some fuel- and capital-sensitive
studies. Under conditions of a 25 percent increase in fuel cost, from
$4.00 to $5.00/MMBtu, gas turbine combined cycle units are not chosen until
approximately 1995. This sensitivity to fuel prices and consequently also
to heat rates needs more attention. The study used heat rates that were 15
to 20 percent low, and thus there is a bias toward GTCC systems that, under
realistic conditions, may significantly overstate their choice. The
potential for reducing risk in uncertain load growth projections and for
spreading capital commitments over a longer time period are not included in
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the Tabors-Flagg study; these approaches conceivably could help
counterbalance the negative effects of higher heat rates or higher natural
gas costs.
A current example of a GTCC system in the advanced stage of planning
is the generating facility being planned by Ocean State Power of
Burrillville, Rhode Island. The first of two 235 MW, $165 million
generating facilities is in the final stages of authorization of
construction to be completed in 1989.19 Ocean State Power is a partnership
between TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. (Toronto, Canada), Eastern Utilities
Associates (Massachusetts), Newport Electric Corporation (Rhode Island),
and J. Makowski Associates, Inc. (Boston, Massachusetts). The plant will
be fueled by natural gas under a 20-year supply agreement signed with
ProGas of Calgary, Alberta, a company that represents a consortium of 269
Canadian natural gas producers. Transportation of natural gas from Calgary
will be provided by TransCanada Pipeline within Canada, and by Tennessee
Gas Transmission within the United States. The electrical output of the
first 235 MW plant has been contracted to four New England utilities.
This plant has several important features, which may represent
important new arrangements in how electric generating facilities are funded
and how natural gas for electricity generation is sold. The financial
partners include a gas transmission company, two electric utilities, and a
financial firm. The gas, purchased by long-term contract between a distant
gas producer and the customer, will be transported under common carriage
arrangement by two transmission companies, one in Canada and one in the
United States. The bulk of the electricity output is being sold to
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electric utilities that have no financial ownership in the plant. The
projected cost of the electricity to the electric utilities purchasing the
power for their systems is below avoided costs and lower than projected
costs from other generating sources based on other fuels (coal, oil,
nuclear). This particular case study is consistent with the U.S. electric
planning study done by Tabors et al.1 1 It helps to establish a new
marketing procedure for Canadian gas, and gives further evidence that
electric generation may be a source of significant growth in demand for
natural gas in the United States.
Other Factors Affecting GTCC Power Plant Costs
The initial low capital overnight cost of GTCC systems--$500/kW in the
United States and $400 to $500/kW in Japan--is aided further by the short
construction period in holding down final plant costs. Assuming a 3
percent escalation rate and 12 percent interest, the following shows the
percentage increase in overnight costs during time of construction,
assuming a linear construction expenditure rate.
Increase in Overnight Cost by Escalation and
Construction Allowance for Funds Used During Construction
3 years +25%
5 years +46%
10 years +116%
The lower capital cost of GTCC plants allows them to use more
expensive fuels and still be cost competitive. Typically, coal-fired power
plants will cost at least two times more than GTCC plants. At $500/kW for
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GTCC systems and with a 14 percent rate of return on capital, this results
in at least a $1.50/MMBtu fuel price premium that can be paid for a
gas-fueled system. The lower operating and maintenance costs of GTCC- over
coal-fueled plants yield at least another $1.00/MMBtu cost advantage.
Thus, the lower capital and operating costs of gas-fired plants allow fuel
premiums of $2.50/MMBtu or larger on a comparative cost of producing one
kWhr of electricity. The higher thermal efficiency of the GTCC systems
(approximately 20 percent) further help to offset the premium paid for a
clean-burning fuel.
The advanced GTCC systems, which have heat rates of 8,000 Btu/kWhr
(and efficiencies of 42+ percent), are believed to offer even further
potential for improvement. Efforts to achieve higher gas turbine
temperatures through material improvements and interblade cooling are under
development and are expected soon to be available in commercial equipment
having projected heat rates around 7,500 Btu/kWhr. Further potential
efficiency gains may be possible using the isothermal turbine concepts
employing interstage reheat. Gas turbines for stationary base-load
electric power generation have the potential, through continual design
optimization, to add another 5 to 10 percentage points to overall thermal
efficiencies over the next 20 years.
EPRI has conducted detailed analyses of the phased installation of
integrated gasifier GTCC systems--starting with gas turbines, later adding
a heat recovery system steam cycle to produce a combined cycle system, and
finally, if desired, adding a front-end coal gasifier to produce an
integrated gasifier-gas turbine combined cycle gasifier (IGTCC) system.
The final integrated system is modeled after the demonstration IGTCC system
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now operating in the Southern California Edison system at Cool Water,
California. This demonstration was developed under EPRI sponsorship with
multi-industry funding: EPRI, Southern California Edison, Texaco, General
Electric, Bechtel, and Japanese utilities. A detailed study of the
economics of phased IGTCC systems has been conducted by Fluor for EPRI and
a report is available. 1 2 Table 7-8 and Figures 7-6 and 7-7 show typical
data from this study.
Methane Gas for Electricity Generation: Via Fuel Cells
Fuel cell systems using phosphoric acid electrolytes and hydrogen as
fuel are under commercial development by United Technologies. Funding from
GRI and DOE have resulted in the development of a 40 kW system, and units
are being field-tested in the United States and Japan. Concurrently, EPRI
and DOE are funding, at United Technologies, a parallel development of an
11 MW phosphoric acid fuel cell. Recently, United Technologies and Toshiba
of Japan entered into a joint agreement to develop the phosphoric acid fuel
cell. These two companies currently are seeking purchase commitments for
twenty-three 11 MW systems from utilities worldwide to begin initial
production.
The phosphoric acid fuel cell system based on methane uses a steam
reformer step to change CH4 to H2, a fuel cell to convert H2 to direct
current (dc) electricity, and a power conditioner to convert dc to ac with
acceptable wave form and load handling characteristics. The maximum system
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Table 7-8
Typical Data on Phased Construction of Systems Composed of
Gas Turbine, Steam Cycle, and Coal Gasificationl2
Unit Costs ($/kW)**
1 Unit 2 or 3 Units
88°F Ambient*
Heat Rate
(Btu/kW)
Current Gas
Turbine
Advanced Gas
Turbine
260
240
Gas Turbine and
Steam Cycle
245
230
500
12,300
11,900
8,000
NG or Middle Dist.
NG or Middle Dist.
NG or Middle Dist.
Phased IGCC
Current GCC + Texaco
Gasifier
Advanced GCC + Texaco
Gasifier
Advanced GCC + Texaco
Gasifier (gas quench)
Advanced GCC + Texaco
Gasifier (radiant and
convective coolers)
1,420
1,320
10,100 Coal
9,600
10,1001,270
1,380
Coal
Coal
Coa 19,000
Unphased IGCC
Advanced Gas Turbine and
Texaco Gasifier
* Heat Rate: - 100% - 88 F
97% - 200 F
95% - 20°F
1,308
- 100%
- 100%
- 130%
9,600 Coal
Load
Load
Load
**($ January 1984)
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efficiency is approximately 41 percent, and the cost exceeds $2000/kW (the
current price is $2000/kW + site costs). While theoretically the fuel cell
can have very, low losses (no Carnot thermal efficiency limits), its
potential has not been obtained in practical systems. Fuel cell efficiency
typically is 60 to 65 percent, reformer efficiency is 65 to 70 percent, and
power conversion is approximately 95 percent, leading to an overall 40+
percent system efficiency. The high capital cost and low efficiencies,
coupled with no appreciable gains in cost as unit size increases, make fuel
cells a poor bet for large-scale electric power generation. The GTCC
system is much more promising for intermediate- and base-load power
applications.
Specialty applications in commercial or large residential complexes
may be a feasible approach, however. Modest power generation in a city's
central core, where load exceeds what existing transmission facilities can
accommodate, is one potential area of application. However, fuel cell
systems are unlikely to be major sources of natural gas demand in the next
decade, if at all, unless new technology not now foreseen becomes
available.
COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS-FUELED VEHICLES13
Natural gas is an excellent fuel for use in internal combustion
engines. Presently-used fuels--gasoline and diesel--have specific
combustion characteristics that require engines to be designed to match the
fuel for optimum performance--spark ignition (gasoline) and high
compression auto ignition (diesel). Natural gas, which has an octane of
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approximately 130 (compared to 87 to 92 for no-lead gasoline), needs higher
compression ratios (15/1) plus spark ignition because it does not auto
ignite, as does diesel fuel. While dual-fueled engines, both gasoline and
diesel, can and have been built, the efficient use of natural gas likewise
requires dedicated engines.
All general-purpose vehicles need, in addition to their design and
manufacturing infrastructure, an operational fuel supply system. Developed
nations have an existing transportation system based on gasoline and diesel
fuel. So long as reasonably priced petroleum-derived fuels exist, it is
hard to imagine a set of conditions that would bring forth both the
manufacturing infrastructure and a compressed natural gas fuel supply
system that would allow natural gas to compete with the existing complex
and highly competitive auto/truck manufacturing and fuel supply systems.
However, in nations where the indigenous resource base is predominantly
natural gas--Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Indonesia (i.e., many
nations in the East Asia/Pacific region)--an alternate mobile vehicle
infrastructure could and may be a logical development.
For most countries, the most probable gas-fueled vehicles market is
for fleet vehicles--short-range intercity vehicles, such as taxis, delivery
trucks, postal service and police vehicles, school busses, and government
fleet vehicles. Special engines and fuel delivery systems could be
developed to serve such a market. In the United States, there are 4 X 106
fleet automobiles in fleets of 10 or more, and 3 X 106 fleet trucks in
fleets of 6 or more. Manufacturing to supply the special engines for this
fleet is technically feasible, and the national network of natural gas
pipelines to distribute the fuel is already in place.
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To use natural gas in mobile vehicles, the present technology is to
use storage systems at 2400 to 3000 psig for compressed natural gas (CNG)
or to use liquefied natural gas (LNG) stored as a cryogenic liquid at
temperatures near the atmospheric boiling point of methane. Typical CNG
steel storage cylinders are 10.5" in diameter and 38" in length, weigh 100
pounds, and store 320 cubic feet at 70oC (3.2 equivalent gallons gasoline).
Weight reductions by a factor of two are possible, by using cylinders made
of aluminum liners overlapped with glass fibers or Kevlar. Typical small
vehicles use two or three cylinders, an equivalent of 6 to 10 gallons of
gasoline. Trucks usually have more potential storage space for cylinders
and can carry more fuel. However, both full development and U.S.
Department of Transportation certification of such alternate cylinders has
not yet occurred.
For CNG to be used in the engine, pressure reduction to about 1 psig
is required. Two stages of pressure reductions normally are used, and the
heat of expansion needs to be supplied to avoid regulator freeze-ups during
operation. Safety requires overpressure protection of the cylinders and
isolation of the passenger compartment from methane intrusion.
The engine has a high compression ratio (usually about 15/1), spark
ignition, and requires a spark adjustment with speed to obtain optimum
performance. Full optimization of gas-fueled engines has not been
achieved. Emission levels are lower from gas-fueled engines, and it may be
a preferred fuel in congested city areas. Ford Motor Company, Caterpillar,
and Cummins Engine all have developed prototype engines for natural gas
operation. The engine design problems are manageable and only need a
market to justify the development costs.
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A typical conversion factor (clearly engine specific) for natural gas
to gasoline is 125 cubic feet of natural gas = 1 gallon of gasoline. Thus,
if the average gasoline consumption per vehicle is 1000 gallons per year,
it would require 8 X 106 vehicles to create 1 Tcf of natural gas demand.
Methane to Chemicals
The typical petrochemicals derived from methane are shown in Figure 8.
In addition to carbon black, the major primary products, often used as
feedstocks for other products, are ammonia, methanol, and acetylene. The
methanol and ammonia streams follow after producing synthesis gas (CO, H2)
from methane by steam reforming or partial oxidation. These products can
be derived from synthesis gas produced from any feedstock (coal, heavy
petroleum, etc.), but for products with a hydrogen/carbon ratio of 2 or
greater, methane is the preferred feedstock to produce the hydrogen at
minimum energy and processing costs.
The methane found as associated gas from petroleum production by
petroleum exporting nations, plus the general surplus of methane in remote
locations or in nations with modest populations or modest
industrialization, have resulted in a worldwide excess of petrochemical
production from methane. Since chemicals derived from methane are a
logical way to obtain markets, there is good reason to believe this excess
of methane-produced chemicals will continue and will be exported to the
developed Western world. In North America and Western Europe, where
pipeline networks allow methane to be delivered for fuel use to a wide
range of consumers--residential, commercial, industrial, and electric power
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methanol and concludes that properly designed engines can give about 20
percent higher output for the same size, consume about 15 percent less
energy at part load, and operate at high load more economically than can
comparable diesel engines.
Reference 16 has results comparable to those given above, using a
research engine, and further shows that 10 to 20 percent H20 added to
methanol can yield greater energy efficiency and lower emissions. In this
study, a single-cylinder test engine using methanol and also isooctane was
operated under conditions that met standard U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency emission requirements. It was shown that a properly designed
methanol engine could have greater efficiency than a gasoline engine. As
much as 40 percent greater output per unit of energy consumed was obtained
by increasing the compression ratio from 8 to 12 and also by adding 10 to
20 percent H20 to reduce NOx emissions. The higher octane rating of
methanol, plus its cleaner burning characteristics, if exploited in a
dedicated engine designed for methanol, does partially offset the lower
energy per unit volume or weight of methanol over gasoline. Both the
laboratory work of Reference 16 and the field test data on multi-cylinder
engines in Reference 15 support this potential. However, it is not
feasible to use methanol in today's commercial gasoline engines without
major retrofit.
In today's world, with transportation vehicles optimized for gasoline
or diesel fuel use, it is very difficult to postulate a methanol fuel
strategy. The problems of developing markets for methanol-fueled vehicles
(in addition to the comparative cost of methanol and gasoline) are
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substantial and perhaps insurmountable. If methane is to become a
significant resource for transportation vehicles, the methane-to-
methanol-to-gasoline process developed by Mobil or the middle distillate
Shell process may be the only feasible way to use methane as a primary
source for transportation vehicles.
Gasoline from Methanol
The Mobil process, which uses the shape-selective zeolite ZSM-5,
yields the following methanol-to-gasoline conversion:7
X C30 H (CH2)x + X H20
100 lbs -, 44 lbs 56 lbs
Approximately 95 percent of the energy in the methanol is contained in the
hydrocarbon yield. With additional processing, 88 weight percent of the
hydrocarbon can be in the gasoline range. Thus, the gasoline yield and
energy yield are reasonable for the overall process. However, even at
these yields, it takes approximately 2.5 gallons of methanol to yield 1.0
gallon of gasoline. The Mobil-M route takes methanol to a product
compatible with existing transportation equipment and is the only
commercially operating process for going from methane to gasoline. Methane
to synthesis gas to methanol to gasoline involves significant processing
costs, plus energy loss from the primary feedstock. Methane is not a
promising economic route, particularly if crude oil prices are in the range
of $20 per barrel or lower.
7-45
Middle Distillate from Methane
The production of middle distillate fuel from synthesis gas has been
developed by Shell and also by Gulf-Badger. These processes essentially
are Fischer-Tropsch reactions optimized to produce aliphatic straight-chain
hydrocarbons in the middle to upper part of the C1 to C50 range. The
yields by percent weight of the new Shell catalysts are shown in
Figures 7-9, 7-10, and 7-11.
The Shell process first produces a product that is 40 to 70 percent
wax, depending upon process conditions, then hydrocracks the wax to the
desired end products (see Figures 7-9 and 7-10). Typical final product
yields are 60 percent gas oil, 25 percent kerosene, and 15 percent
tops/naptha for a process maximizing gas oil. For a maximum of kerosene,
the yields typically are 50 percent kerosene, 25 percent gas oil, and 25
percent tops/naptha (see Figure 7-11).
Overall thermal efficiency of methane to hydrocarbons is about 60
percent. The Shell process for middle distillate or gasoline is an
alternative to the production of methanol as a way to obtain liquid fuels.
Well-optimized methanol processes usually will yield better thermal
efficiency--say, 65 to 70 percent, compared to about 50 percent for the
higher hydrocarbon fuels preferred for transportation.
CONCLUSIONS
New technology does not appear to be a major determinant in natural
gas end-use market demand. Gas-consuming technology is mature and
available from many competitive manufacturers worldwide. The recent
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Figure 7-11
SMDS Product Breakdownl8
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changes in world oil markets appear to be increasing natural gas supply at
competitive prices. The general availability of natural gas delivery
systems to most consuming sectors in the United States, Western Europe, and
Japan, plus well-proven end-use technologies, could be a stimulus to gas
demand, which in turn also could stimulate R&D on end-use equipment to gain
a larger market share. New technology opportunities do exist, even for
mature end-use equipment.
The prospect that new technology will be a major driving force for
methane to develop new markets is excellent for GTCC systems used in the
generation of electric power. In the United States and probably in most
other consuming countries, this requires the delivery of methane to the
burner tip at prices below $4.00/Mcf. For base-load plants with a 70
percent load factor using an advanced GTCC system with 8,000 Btu/kWh, every
$1.00/Mcf represents a $0.01/kWhr fuel cost. For capital charges of 14
percent, every $500/kW plus a 70 percent load factor also represents a
$0.01/kWhr capital cost. Considering all factors (clean emissions,
modestly sized units of capacity, low capital costs, well-established
technology, etc.), the gas turbine or gas turbine combined cycle system
gives methane a reasonably competitive position against any other electric
power generation system: heavy fuel oil, coal, or nuclear. A 1,000 MW
GTCC system at 8,000 Btu/kWhr and 70 percent load factor represents a
potential annual natural gas demand of 50 Bcf. Electric power generation
thus represents one major potential source of new natural gas demand.
Natural gas is a highly desirable fuel in the industrial market and,
if prices are competitive at the burner tip, it will maintain its market
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share. Speciality markets in primary metals production may offer an
additional potential market. Similarly, industrial cogeneration systems
could be a source of new demand, particularly in the United States, under
current economic and regulatory conditions facing electric utilities.
Advanced technologies to meet this market's needs are under development,
and some advanced systems are commercially available.
Natural gas demand in the residential and commercial sectors is more
dependent upon the delivery system than on development of new end-use
technology. While considerable improvements have been made in furnaces for
all applications and in gas-driven thermal machines for air conditioning,
process drying, compression, etc., there is no outstanding technology
development that appears to offer unique opportunities for new natural gas
applications in conventional markets. Natural gas always has been and
still is a very desirable primary energy source for these markets, when it
can be delivered at competitive prices. The availability of package
cogeneration systems for commercial applications may represent a growing
market in the United States. To a large degree, this demand growth will be
influenced by the policies of electric utility companies in their planning
to meet future electric load growth. There is growing evidence that
utilities may help stimulate this potential market.
The potential exists for natural gas use in the transportation market,
but has the disadvantage of requiring special engines and a dedicated
delivery system. The transformation of methane to gasoline and middle
distillate has significant process and energy costs. While the technology
has improved, no outstanding breakthroughs have been made, nor can any be
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forecast with any degree of assurance. The stable CH4 molecule is
difficult to transform into the higher energy density and more
transportable higher-order liquid hydrocarbons.
In summary, the ability of advanced technology to stimulate natural
gas demand is relatively limited. Commercial technology is available to
all end-use markets. The growing willingness of natural gas suppliers to
face marketplace competition from other hydrocarbon fuels is a strong
indication of a potential expansion in natural gas demand. Both existing
and improved technology will be available to support this potential demand
growth. The end-use market sector that will have the largest growth in
natural gas demand appears to be country-specific and heavily influenced by
each country's fuel policies. For any country facing severe constraints on
electric generation using nuclear power, the combination of cost-effective
technology and the low environmental impact of natural gas represents a
significant potential for new demand by the electric utility sector.
Current economics indicate that natural gas delivered to the burner tip
at prices below $4.00/Mcf is and will be very competitive with other fuels.
However, beyond the economic considerations alone, natural gas offers
the additional advantages of reducing other externalities--such as
pollution costs--that may, in the future, render it appreciably more
attractive.
7-52
REFERENCES
1. The Petroleum Handbook, Sixth Edition, Elsevier Publishing
Company, New York, New York, 1986.
2. International Natural Gas Trade Study Group, Final Report:
U.S./Canadian Natural Gas Trade, MIT Energy Laboratory Report No.
MIT-EL 85-013, Cambridge, Massachusetts, October 1985 and
International Natural Gas Trade Study Group, Final Report: East
Asia/Pacific Natural Gas Trade, MIT Energy Laboratory Report No.
MI1-EL 8b-Ub5, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986.
3. International Energy Agency, "Energy Balances of OECD Countries
1982/83," OECD, Paris, France, 1985.
4. Gas Research Institute, "1987-1991 Research and Development Plan
and 1987 Research and Development Program," Washington, D.C.,
April 10, 1986.
5. Dun and Bradstreet Technical Economic Services and TWR Energy
Development Group, "Industrial Cogeneration Potential (1980-2000)
for Application of Four Commercially Available Prime Movers at
the Plant Site," Report Prepared for U.S. Department of Energy,
Report No. DOE/CS40403-1, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., August 1984.
6. Henry R. Linden, "The Window of Opportunity for New Gas Cooling
Technologies," Paper Presented at the Texas Gas Association
Annual Meeting, Houston, Texas, June 1-3, 1986.
7. Gas Research Institute, "Residential Gas-Fired Heat Pumps: An
Economic Assessment," Washington, D.C., January 1983.
8. Steven M. Scherer, "PEPCo's Early Planning for a Phased Coal
Gasification Combined Cycle Power Plant," Electric Power Research
Institute, Coal Gasification and Synthetic Fuels for Power
Generation Program, Palo Alto, California, April 1985.
9. "Japan to Have over 7200 MW of Combined Cycle by 1996," Gas
Turbine World, November-December 1985, pp. 16-19.
10. North American Electric Reliability Council, "Electric Power
Supply and Demand 1983-1992," Princeton, New Jersey, July 1983.
11. R.D. Tabors and D.P. Flagg, "Natural Gas Fired Combined Cycle
Generators: Dominant Solution in Capacity Planning," MIT
Laboratory for Electromagnetic and Electronic Systems, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, May 1985.
7-53
12. Electric Power Research Institute, "Planning Data Book for
Gasification Combined Cycle Plants: Phased Capacity Additions,"
EPRI Report No. EPRI AP-4345, Palo Alto, California, January
1986.
13. T. Joyce Associates, "Assessment of Research and Development
Needs for Methane Fuels Engine Systems," Report Prepared for the
Gas Research Institute, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, March 1982.
14. George T. Austin, Shreve's Chemical Process Industries, Fifth
Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, New York, 1984.
15. H.K. Menrad, "Alcohol Based Fuels for Automotive Engines,"
Volkswagon Research Center, Paper Presented at the American
Chemical Society Annual Meeting, Houston, Texas, March 23-28,
1980.
16. W.J. Most and J.P. Longwell, "Single-Cylinder Engine Evaluation
of Methanol--Improved Energy Economy and Reduced NOx," Exxon
Research and Engineering Company, Paper Prepared at the Society
of Automotive Engineers Annual Meeting, Detroit, Michigan,
February 24-28, 1975.
17. C.E. Morgan, J.P. Warner, and S. Yurchak, "Gasoline from
Alcohols," Mobil Research and Development Corporation, Paper
Presented at the American Chemical Society Annual Meeting,
Houston, Texas, March 23-28, 1980.
18. M.J. Van der Brugt, J. van Klinken, and S.T. Sie, "The Shell
Middle Distillate Synthesis Process," Paper Presented at the
Fifth Annual Synfuels Worldwide Symposium, Houston, Texas,
November 11-13, 1985.
19. Providence Business News, P&L Publications, Inc., Providence,
Rhode Island, May 5, 1986, p. 1.
·4;'
C"
BC
si-
ac··
Ri"
b"
%k"
kui·
ills
$a·
71-·
JV
K·
"a;,
